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Distributed Reflection Denial of Service

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Infect innocent bystanders (zombies) Zombies listen (e.g. on IRC channel) for ... Coordinate zombies to attack with big packets. Use up 'last-hop' bandwidth ' ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Distributed Reflection Denial of Service


1
Distributed Reflection Denial of Service
  • Networking Talks for the Insufficiently Paranoid
  • Based on http//grc.com/dos/drdos.htm
  • Jim Gast, CS-642 Security, Spring, 2003
  • jgast_at_cs.wisc.edu, UW-Madison

2
Normal Connection Establishment
The Server sets up retransmission timers,
allocates receive buffers, etc. Imagine a web
server that can handle 12,000 connections. If
the process fails, a timeout occurs after 120
seconds, freeing up the resources.
Note SYN packets are very small and take up very
little bandwidth.
Graphics stolen from http//grc.com/dos/drdos.htm
3
State Transition Diagram
4
SYN Flood
  • Each SYN creates one half-open connection
  • Half-open connections take minutes to time-out
  • Servers have finite connection tables
  • Perpetrator would be easily caught (Source IP)
  • Unless SourceIP is spoofed
  • See CERT Advisory CA-1996-21
  • http//www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1996-21.html

100 SYN packets per second fits in 56 Kbps
Graphics stolen from http//grc.com/dos/drdos.htm
5
Spoofed IP Address
The SYN/ACK is delivered to the fake (spoofed) IP
Address. The attacker doesnt see it, and doesnt
care. (Backscatter)
Graphics stolen from http//grc.com/dos/drdos.htm
6
Example SYN Flood Attack
  • February 5th-11th, 2000
  • Victims included CNN, eBay, Yahoo, Amazon
  • Attackers (allegedly) used simple, readily
    available tools (script-kiddies)
  • Law enforcement unable (unwilling?) to help
  • Under-age perpetrators have blanket immunity

7
Defense against SYN Flood
  • Increase size of connection table
  • Add more servers
  • Trace attack back to source
  • Ask your ISP to filter malicious packets
  • Add firewall
  • Typically SYN proxy
  • Dave Parter will talk on firewalls later in the
    semester
  • Ultimate solution was SYN-cookies
  • Reply to SYN with SYN-cookie
  • Allocate no resources until SYN-cookie is
    returned

8
Potential places to stop DoS flood
Graphics stolen from http//grc.com/dos/drdos.htm
9
Distributed DoS
  • Rather than filling connection table, fill all
    available bandwidth
  • Infect innocent bystanders (zombies)
  • Zombies listen (e.g. on IRC channel) for attack
    command (or simply attack at will)
  • Attacker need not have high bandwidth connection

Typical Program EvilGoat EvilBot
Graphics stolen from http//grc.com/dos/drdos.htm
10
Example Distributed DOS Attack
  • 6 attacks on 5 different days
  • One attack lasted for 17 hours
  • 474 infected windows PC as zombies
  • 2.4 billion malicious packets

Goodput?
Time (minutes?)
Graphics stolen from http//grc.com/dos/grcdos.htm
11
Flood-based Distributed DoS Attacks
  • Coordinate zombies to attack with big packets
  • Use up last-hop bandwidth
  • Last-hop router discards packets
    indiscriminately
  • Zombies need not spoof addresses

See http//grc.com/dos/intro.htm for example
horror story
Graphics stolen from http//grc.com/dos/drdos.htm
12
Newest Twist - Reflection
  • Many routers accept connections on port 179
    (Border Gateway Protocol)
  • Although any big server and any port it listens
    on will work
  • Send a SYN to a router, claiming it came from the
    victim
  • The router will send a SYN/ACK to the victim
  • And then re-transmit several times before giving
    up (typically about 4X)

Note Tar-pits will not see any Backscatter but
honey-pots might see the attackers commands.
13
Reflection Mechanism
Graphics stolen from http//grc.com/dos/drdos.htm
14
Distributed Reflection DoS
Graphics stolen from http//grc.com/dos/drdos.htm
15
Other ports susceptible to DRDoS
  • 22 Secure Shell
  • 23 Telnet
  • 53 DNS
  • 80 HTTP / Web
  • 4001 Proxy Servers
  • 6668 Internet Relay Chat

Easily detected ports 1-1023
Well-Known (so far)
But reflection from port 179 is so powerful it
easily overwhelms others
16
Call to action
  • Ingress filtering at all ISPs would stop the
    spoofed SYN packets before they left home
  • Egress filtering at all ISPs would prevent
    spoofed IP addresses from traversing the Internet
  • Flagging multiply-tried, failed SYN/ACKs could be
    used to discover victims and filter further
    attack
  • Disable raw socket interface in client PCs

17
Questions?
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