The Changing Climate of High Seas Fisheries Governance

1
The Changing Climate of High Seas Fisheries
Governance

• Alison Rieser
• University of Hawaii at Manoa
• The Challenge of Change Managing for
  Sustainability of Top Oceanic Predators Workshop
• April 12, 2007

2
1992

• Failure of Coastal State EEZ management came to
  light with the collapse of the No. cod stock and
  Canadas NAFO moratoria
• Coincided with the assertion of larger community
  interests in global commons and proliferation of
  hard soft intl law
• Framework Convention on Climate Change
• Convention on Biological Diversity
• Rio Declaration, Agenda 21

3
UN Fish Stocks Agreement restoring the role of
RFMOs

• Strengthening the RFMOs is key
• Fishing States have a duty to join or create an
  RFMO if none exists
• States with a real interest have a right to
  membership
• Non-member States must adopt measures consistent
  with those of the RFMO
• Compatibility with coastal State management of
  straddling migratory stocks

4
Questions about the reliance upon RFMOs in the
new law of the sea

• Would high seas fishing states cooperate more
  than they did prior to the advent of EEZs?
• Have conditions changed sufficiently to motivate
  them to cooperate, to make them more likely to
  observe the new obligations reflected in the UN
  Fish Stocks Agreement?

5
Changes in climategreater attention to
fisheries from new quarters

• Scientists from a wider array of disciplines are
  now looking at a broad range of issues connected
  with fisheries, including meta- and retrospective
  analyses
• NGOs have moved beyond whaling to all marine
  fisheries, especially high seas

6
Changes in climatescientific consensus on the
need for an ecosystem approach

• Attention to foodweb dynamics, habitat
• agree on ways to operationalize it, e.g.
• FAO Technical Guidelines on EAF
• Pikitch et al. 2004. Ecosystem-Based Fishery
  Management Science, 305346-347.

7
Changes in climate strategies to apply external
pressure on RFMOs through other multilateral
agreements

• Conservation NGOs bringing attention to fisheries
  impacts at meetings of Parties to
• CITES (intl trade in endangered species)
• Convention on Migratory Species
• Convention on Biological Diversity
• World Summit on Sustainable Devt

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CITES

• Proposals to list by-catch species as threatened
  by international trade
• Effort to list Atl bluefin tuna on App. I
• proposals for Southern bluefin
• Appendix II listing of great white shark, basking
  shark, whale shark
• Proposals at June 07 meeting to list porbeagle
  and spiny dogfish on App. II

9
Convention on Migratory Species of Animals (Bonn)

• commitments among states to protect habitat and
  prevent activities that threaten listed species
• Species-specific Memoranda of Understanding
• e.g., Agreement on Conservation of Albatrosses
  and Petrels (ACAP)
• ACAP representatives attend mtgs of all RFMOs
  that overlap albatross range as intergovtl
  organizations

10
Results of this attention?

• WCPFC in 2006 is the first RFMO to adopt measure
  requiring at least 2 methods to mitigate seabird
  bycatch
• CMS Parties prepare for meeting on options for
  cooperation on migratory sharks (toward possible
  agreement)
• Australia mentions CMS activities as good
  motivation for WCPFC to adopt shark measures
  Commission adopts fin-to-body weight ratio/full
  utilization/IPOA

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Changes in climate International Scrutiny of
RFMOs

• Consensus that RFMO performance has been poor
• Overfishing of target fish stocks, delays in
  adopting rebuilding plans
• Few measures to mitigate adverse effects of
  fishing on non-target species and habitat
• No effective scheme of allocation
• Slow to deal with illegal, unreported,
  unregulated fishing
• International attention is now on the reasons for
  poor performance
• Review Conference for the UN Fish Stocks
  Agreement
• FAO Committee on Fisheries March 2007
• Independent bodies, e.g., High Level Ministerial
  Task Force/Chatham House

12
Different strategies for providing international
oversight

• Publicizing failures (shame-on-you strategy)
• RFMO Regularly Failing to Manage Our Oceans
• Identifying best practices among RFMOs
  (good-on-you strategy)
• Defining a model RFMO (inspiration strategy)
• Making specific proposals for items on RFMO
  agenda (heres-how-you-do-it strategy)
• e.g., Greenpeace detailed proposal to WCPFC for
  bigeye TACs and allocations by gear type, marine
  reserves in donut holes between FFA States
  EEZs
• TRAFFICs analysis of conservation impacts of
  allocation for WCPFC trade measures

13
Impact of outside scrutiny identifies costs of
the unresolved allocation issue

• pressure to set TACs high enough to maintain
  fishing levels by historical fishing nations
  undermining scientific advice
• new members insist on shares of TAC or TAE
• reluctance to approve the admission of new
  members
• non-compliance with quotas

14
Contributions of outside scrutiny how to make
progress on allocations

• RFMOs should view this as priority issue
• specify criteria
• for allocating TAC/TAE linking it to compliance
• for new members in terms of rebuilding target
  stocks
• for distributing any decreases across parties
• penalties for exceeding quotas other CMMs
• Monitor the impact of allocation on the
  distribution of fishing effort to unallocated
  species, areas where bycatch of juveniles or
  protected species is likely or where localized
  depletion
• Get outside help early in the process provide an
  arbitrated negotiation process advisory panel
  of external experts

Source Willock and Lack, 2006. Conservation
implications of allocation under the WCPFC.
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Internal reforms by RFMOs

• Cooperate and coordinate among RFMOs (circle the
  wagons strategy?)
• FAO COFI review of RFMOs Mar 2007
• Jan 2007 Kobe, Japan meeting of all tuna RFMOs

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Joint Tuna RFMOs Course of ActionKobe, Japan
Jan. 26, 2007
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Kobe RFMO Performance Review

• Goal - to improve effectiveness and efficiency in
  fulfilling mandates
• Using a common methodology and criteria
• review framework
• common elements of the RFMOs charters
• best practices
• applicable intl instruments
• Teams selected to ensure objectivity and
  credibility publicize on RFMOs website
• First review asap then every 3-5 years

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What role for inter-RFMO cooperation?

• If RFMOs meet, will there be policy transfer?
• e.g., if new RFMOs (SEAFO WCPFC) deal with
  allocation, will older RFMOs follow suit (NAFO,
  CCSBT)
• Does united action on IUU fishing translate into
  internal reforms? (overcapacity, overfishing)
• Does coordination increase accountability?

19
Research question role of institutional
innovations in RFMOs

• Structured and binding decisionmaking
• Voting on matters of substance instead of
  consensus, with no opt-out allowance
• Independent experts panels arbitrated
  negotiation of allocation criteria
• New science arrangements (e.g., hybrid model in
  WCPFC and CCSBT independent science advisory
  panel)

20
Conflicts or synergies among policy instruments?

• How might allocation of participatory rights
  affect the adoption of EBM tools?
• Depends on the nature of the right
  transferability spatial dimension
• Should place-based management measures be adopted
  first to avoid creating resistance by
  quota-owners who claim spatial rights?
• Are there incentive-based tools for ecosystem
  protection?

21
New RFMOs preemptive actions by quota owning
companies

• How does the ownership of fishing rights change
  the behavior of industry?
• e.g., Deepwater Stakeholder Ltd (NZ trawler
  companies) proposed Benthic Protection Areas for
  NZs EEZ the new So Indian Ocean RFMO

22
SIO Closures are those proposed by Southern
Indian Ocean Deepwater Fishers Assoc. (NZ
quota-owning companies) proposed Benthic
Protection Areas for adoption by the new SIO RFMO