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Introduction to Finance M

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The target firm shareholders earn positive (abnormal) returns due to a merger agreement. ... Citi. Japanese Banks. LOAN. N. Takezawa (ICU) 2002. 23 ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Introduction to Finance M


1
Introduction to FinanceMAAn Introduction
2
TAKE OVERS
Take Overs
Going Private
Acquistions
Mergers, Consolidations
3
Case of Value Destruction?
  • ATT and NCR
  • ATT acquired NCR for 7.5 billion in 1991
  • Estimated loss for ATT shareholders is
    -13.3 x 34/share x 1.092 billion shares
    -4.9 billion
  • Then why did ATT acquire NCR?
  • ATT declared it would enter computer industry
    (1984 consent decree)
  • Market perceived NCR as a poor partner

4
Event Studies
  • The empirical evidence in the US tends to depict
    the following picture
  • The target firm shareholders earn positive
    (abnormal) returns due to a merger agreement.
    This seems to be the case especially for tender
    offers.
  • On the other hands, the acquiring firm
    shareholders do not earn such positive returns.
    In some instances, they earn negative returns.

5
Cont.
  • It could be that positive performance (positive
    returns) is not realized in the short-term but in
    the long-term.
  • We need to look at the long-term performance of
    the firm.

6
We examine post-acquisition peformance for 50
of The largest US mergers between 1979 and mid
1984. Merged firms show significant improvements
in asset productivity relative to their
industries, leading to higher operating cash flow
returns. This performance improvement is
particularly strong for firms with highly
overlapping businesses. Mergers do not lead to
cuts in long-term capital and RD investments.
There is a strong positive relation between
postmerger increases in operating cash flows and
abnormal stock returns at merger
announcements, indicating that expectations of
economic improvements underlie the equity
revaluations of the merging firms. Healy,
Palepu, Ruback (1992) JFE.
7
Post-merger management
  • Although the market could react positively at the
    announcement of the merger, it remains to be seen
    whether the new management team can implement the
    merger plan effectively.
  • Recently, emphasis is placed on post-merger
    management/integration.

8
Empirical Evidence in Japan
  • Acquiring firm shareholders gain at announcement
    of the merger. On average there is 1.2 positive
    abnormal return and 5.4 return over the duration
    of the takeover.
  • Relationships with the Main bank seem to lead to
    such positive returns.
  • Main banks provide efficient monitoring?
  • Kang, Shivdasani, Yamada, J. Finance, 2001.

9
Classification
  • Horizontal Mergers same industry (firms
    competing in the same line of business)
  • Vertical Mergers merging of firms in related
    business - different steps of production (airline
    and travel agency)
  • Conglomerate Mergers Firms not related to each
    other

10
Merger Activity in the US
  • 1890-1904 Merger for Monopoly. JP Morgan
    engineered US Steel. DuPont, American Tobacco,
    Eastman Kodak, etc.
  • Sherman Act 1890, Clayton Act 1914
  • 1916-1929 Merger to Oligopoly
  • Post WWII to early 1970s Conglomerates
  • 1980s Market for corporate control.

11
(No Transcript)
12
1980s
  • Leveraged Buy Outs LBO
  • Borrow to acquire a company.
  • Management Buy Outs MBO
  • Management bids to buy the company (or part of
    company).
  • Nabisco Case the largest acquistion at the time
    (25 billion US dollars)

13
The LBO
  • LBO approach allows for small groups of people
    such as management or a small company such as
    KKR to buy large corporations.
  • Places pressure on management.
  • Could this serve as a monitoring device, to make
    sure management is maximizing the value of the
    firm?

14
Restructuring and Governance in Japan
  • Kang and Shivdasani (JFE, 1997) Empirically
    examine 92 Japanese firms experiencing
    substantial decline in operating performance over
    the period 1986-1990.
  • Does the potential of becoming a takeover target
    force corporates to restructure in Japan?
  • What mechanism governs restructuring efforts in
    Japan according to Kang and Shivdasani?

15
Cont.
  • Reasons for performance decline approx. 60 due
    to unfavorable FX rates.
  • Operational response asset contraction actions
    23 and layoffs 17.4. Asset contraction
    activities include closing plants, asset sales,
    withdrawing from a line of business, etc.
  • Layoffs at 17.4 is still smaller than that for
    the US at 31.6.

16
Cont.
  • Firms with greater equity ownership by the main
    bank are more likely to engage in contraction
    policies by the use of asset sales, plant
    closures, and discontinuation of operations. In
    addition, greater ownership by the main bank also
    increases the probability of employee layoffs and
    the removal of outside directors from the board.
    p.31

17
RJR Nabisco
  • Oct. 28, 1988 CEO, Ross Johnson, formed a group
    to buy RJR Nabisco (MBO). Price at 75 per share
    (market price at about 56).
  • Four days later Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts (KKR)
    made bid. 90 per share.
  • KKR bid at 109 and Johnson group at 112.

18
What makes for an attractive LBO Target?
  • Steady Growth. Relatively mature industry.
  • Relatively unaffected by business cycles.
  • Low CAPEX. Less RD required.
  • Low debt level.
  • Fixable problems. Create value and then sell
    (break-up value).

19
Board Requests
  • Price (per share).
  • Possible future stake (equity) in company gains.
  • Stakeholders. Welfare of stakeholders (community)
    as its fiduciary duty.

20
Comparing Bids
  • KKR
  • 109 (81 in cash)
  • Convertibles in about 25 of new equity
  • Keep both the Tobacoo and Food divisions
  • Guarantee severance payments and benefits for
    layoffs
  • MBO
  • 112 (84 in cash)
  • Convertibles into about 15 into new equity
  • Keep only the Tobacoo division
  • Give equity to 15,000 employees

21
Banking Community
  • KKR
  • Drexel Burnham Lambert
  • Merrill Lynch
  • Morgan Stanley
  • Wassertein Perella
  • MBO
  • Shearson Lehman Brothers
  • Salomon

22
Bankers Trust Chase Mahn Citi Japanese Banks
LOAN
RJR
KKR
Shareholders
Drexel Merrill MS Wasserstein
23
Boone Pickens, Mesa, and Cities Take Over Defense
  • Mesa Petroleum (Boone Pickens) began buying
    shares of Cities Services. May 1982.
  • Cities Services responded by 1) increasing
    outstanding shares (issuing) and 2) bidding for
    Mesa (Pac Man defense). Firms bid for each other
    twice.
  • Gulf Oil bid for Cities Services thus rescuing
    Cities from Mesa (White Knight)
  • Eventually, Occidental took over Cities Services
  • Gulf was bought out by Chevron (Mesa again the in
    the bidding game)

24
Koito Case
  • Koito large manufacturing firm in the Toyota
    keiretsu.
  • Boone Pickens purchase/acquires large percentage
    of Koito shares.
  • Pickens wants to be on Board since largest
    shareholder.
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