FIRES IN THE OIL

1
FIRES IN THE OIL GAS INDUSTRY

• CASE STUDY
• THE PETROTRIN OIL REFINERY

by Dr. Victor Coombs Chief Medical Officer,
Petrotrin Consultant Occupational Environmental
Health
2
Greatest Fire in History1991

• During the Gulf War 640-odd wells ignited in
  Kuwait. Fires raged for more than eight months,
  consumed 2 billion barrels of oil and cost Kuwait
  100 billion.. Oil wells, refineries, pipelines
  and harbours were destroyed.
• Economist 11/9/91 Vol 321
• Issue 7732 p84.

3
1970 - 1999
Type of Facility Number of Losses Total Amount (MM)
Refineries 6 597
Chemical Plants 1 75
Gas Processing 1 200
Terminals 1 30
Offshore 6 440
PD gt 10,000,000 U.S. MRC 2001
4
Oil Refinery Bombing/Fire

• Oil products releases
• Pollutants released
• Groundwater pollution
• Soil pollution
• Chemical Emission
• Injuries
• Death

5
Industrial Disasters

• Fire
• Explosion
• Toxic Release

6
Piper Alpha Disaster

• North Sea 88.07.06. 165 fatalities from 226 on
  board
• Death toll highest in oil an gas offshore
  operations
• 109 died from smoke inhalation and fire, 14 died
  while escaping. Few died from actual burns.

7
FCCU FIRE/EXPLOSION 91.06.05Equipment
Damaged/Destroyed

• The slurry settler (completely destroyed)
• Slurry Pumps
• Steam blowdown drum
• Steam Superheater exchanger
• Piping

8
FCCU FIRE/EXPLOSION 91.06.05Equipment
Damaged/Destroyed (contd)

• Structures
• Instrumentation
• Buildings
• Electrical equipment

9
Documents Requested by Insurers

• Preliminary report by Accident Investigation Team
• Medical Report and Injury List
• Interviews
• Photographs
• Measurements and Weights of fragments
• Engineering Report
• Engineering data on by-pass valve around slurry
  settler

10
Preliminary Report I

• An explosion and fire occurred at the FCCU at
  2.53 am on Wednesday June 05, 1991. The fire was
  brought under control by Company Fire Services,
  TT Fire Services and TT Methanol Company Fire
  Services

11
Preliminary Report II

• There was one fatality, 12 injuries of which 2
  were very serious and 10 were relatively minor.
  Several workers suffered Post Traumatic Stress
  Disorder (PTSD).

12
Explosion Damage I

• The Fire of the explosion at the slurry settler
  caused extensive damage to N-S piperacks and
  nearby equipment east of the FCCU.

13
Explosion Damage II

• Much of this ancillary damage was apparently due
  to the shrapnel effect of the slurry settler
  and was concentrated in the NE the path of
  trajectory.

14
Explosion Damage III

• At FCCU and Gas Con Control Rooms the blast
  damaged roofs, ceiling, and windows. Adjacent
  structures were relatively intact. But breakage
  of windows occurred 200 metres away.

15
Fire Damage I

• Near the base of the main fractionator the slurry
  pumps were destroyed by fire. Intense heat and
  flames damaged adjacent equipment such as lines,
  heat exchangers and the blower house roof.

16
Fire Damage II

• On the FCCU main structure there was fire damage
  mainly on the north side of the reactor where the
  steam drum is located.

17
Fire Damage III

• The FCCU charge pre-heater and related piping
  suffered damage due to fire caused by a ruptured
  feed line. The East Area Guard Basin became
  ignited from flying debris.

18
Some Findings

• The slurry settler vessel showed tensile failure
  typical of internal explosion.
• Failure of the head in the area adjacent to the
  reinforcing pad around the 18 manway nozzle.

19
Some Findings (contd)

• The manway nozzle complete with bolted over was
  found about 200m north east of the vessels
  original location.

20
Engineering Findings I

• 480 565 psi pressure in slurry settler was
  required for rupture.
• Vessel operating temperature was 610oF.
• Calculations on blast effect was equivalent to
  120-200 pounds of TNT.

21
Engineering Findings II

• A vapour space was most likely present in the
  vessel. (compressible gas bubble) 420 to 1000
  cu ft.
• Energy required to fracture or deform the slurry
  settler vessel was about 70 million ft-lbs of
  energy ? 40 to 47 pounds of TNT.

22
Engineering Findings III

• After the slurry settler pressure vessel
  exploded, there was instantaneous fire (I.e.
  auto-ignition) from the hot slurry oil released
  into the atmosphere.

23
Engineering Findings IV

• Air was most likely trapped inside the vessel
  during start up.
• No evidence of an external explosive device was
  found.

24
Personal Injuries

• SR, age 22. Fatality
• WM, age 35. Severe burns and shock.
• RS, age 39. Severe burns, fracture right arm,
  right foot and right hip, shock.
• KL, age 44. Minor burns and shock.

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Personal Injuries contd)

• HK, age 35. Injuries to right ear and right
  shoulder.
• KJ, age 36. Foreign body in eyes.
• FH, age 28. Minor burns to both forearms.
• RR, age 37. Minor burns and abrasions from fall.

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Personal Injuries (contd)

• RR, age 22. Minor burns and strained neck
  muscles.
• OJ, age 37. Muscular injury right thigh.
• SB, age 39. Splinter in arms.
• TT, age 46. Shock and elevated BP malignant.
• FA, age 32. Sprained ankle.

27
Fortunate Events I

• Damage was mitigated because the predominantly
  ballistic or impact type of damage was confined
  to the NE direction which was unoccupied hillside.

28
Fortunate Events II

• Damage was mitigated by the fact that several
  workers had gone to the canteen to eat.

29
Fortunate Events III

• Some rainfall occurred 20 minutes before the
  explosion which resulted in several workers
  delaying in returning to the FCCU.

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85.10.17 Berth 5

• Fire started - 12.35 pm
• Fire service - 12.45 pm
• Fire under control - 12.50 pm
• All clear given - 3.00 pm

31
Background to Fire I

• In June 1985 a decision was taken to recommission
  the entire length of the 30-inch diameter sealine
  (S/L No. 33) running from the Pile Bent 80
  manifold to No. 5 berth and terminating at No. 6
  Berth.

32
Background II

• The section of the line between No. 5 and No. 6
  Berths (length 1200 ft) was the only inoperative
  part and was positively isolated from the rest of
  the line in 1975. This section had to be tested
  and repaired before being brought back into
  service.

33
Background III

• Between July and October 1985, the other portion
  of the line was in crude oil service, the last
  being the receipt of 319,000 bbls of Algerian
  Condensate on September 1.

34
Background IV

• By October 11, all activities related to the
  repairs of the disused section were completed.

35
Background V

• On October 17, equipment was mobilized and
  manpower allocated to the task of completing the
  final job to allow the re-commissioning of the
  entire length of S/L 33.

36
Background VI

• The last task was to remove the 30 inch diameter
  slip blind installed in 1975, from between the
  bolted flanges on the riser section of the line
  at No. 5 berth, located approximately 22 inches
  above sea water level at noon on the day of the
  fire.

37
Background VII

• A Maintenance Work Permit was prepared and signed
  off by (1) Assistant Area Maintenance
  Superintendent West (2) Port Captain (3) Oil
  Stocks Superintendent and delivered on site just
  prior to start of the job.

38
The Fire I

• Around 12 noon after the flange was loosened on
  S/L 33, heavy crude trapped in the dead leg
  followed by light hydrocarbons (Algerian
  Condensate API 64.9 and vapour Pressure 9.1 psig)
  flowed at an estimated rate of 40 barrels per
  minute for 8-9 minutes.

39
The Fire II

• This line was under a positive pressure from an
  operating crude transfer system in the foreshore
  area. During the 8 to 9 minutes period, the
  30-inch slip blind, weighing 250 lbs was removed
  by the crew.

40
The Fire III

• At 12.33 pm vapours from the light hydrocarbons,
  which had surrounded all floating craft were
  ignited by an open flame or spark, resulting in a
  muffled explosion. Flames were driven by strong
  winds over 20 knots and engulfed all men and
  equipment on the job.

41
The Fire IV

• The fire raged for 15 minutes after which it was
  brought under control, but in all lasted about
  one hour and forty-five minutes.

42
The Fire V

• When the crude transfer operations at the
  foreshore area were isolated from the sea line
  the fire was finally extinguished.

43
Search and Rescue I

• Soon after the outbreak of the fire two men in a
  contractors pirogue arrived on the east of No. 5
  berth and rescued three contractors painters who
  were clinging to the east breasting dolphin clear
  of the water.

44
Search and Rescue II

• Launches Star Fish and Flying Fish were
  involved in the retrieval of victims. Seven were
  recovered from the sea three charred bodies were
  collected from the deck of the Pile Driver.

45
Fire Fighting Operations

• Tug Plaisance arrived at 12.45 pm and Tug
  Plein Palais arrived at 1.28 pm both were
  engaged in fire fighting activity. Foam was used
  to contain the fire.

46
Fatalities

• Men assigned to the Pile Driver Atlas 6
• Men assigned to Maintenance Crew 6
• Launch Crew 2
• Total Dead 14
• All bodies were recovered within 24 hours.

47
Post Mortem Reports
Cause No.
Inhalations of Gas/Burns Burns, Asphyxia, Drowning Inhalation of Gas Burns/charring Inhalation of Gas/Burns/Brain Haemorrhage 4 6 3 1
48
Probable Cause of Ignition

• A spark from the slip blind striking against the
  deck of the tray barge.
• The back firing of the boiler during the process
  of shutting down in an emergency

49
Largest Property Damage Losses 1970 to
1999(Excess of 150,000,000 property damage) -
Onshore
Date Location Plant Type Event Type PD Loss (MM)
10-23-89 Texas Petrochemical VCE 839
5-4-88 Nevada Chemical Explosion 383
5-5-88 Louisiana Refinery VCE 368
11-14-87 Texas Petrochemical VCE 285
12-25-97 Malaysia Gas Plant Explosion 282
7-23-84 Illinois Refinery VCE 268
11-9-92 France Refinery VCE 262
12-13-94 Iowa Chemical Explosion 224
9-18-89 Virgin Islands Refinery Hurricane 207
8-17-99 Turkey Refinery Earthquake 200
9-27-98 Mississippi Refinery Hurricane 200
5-27-94 Ohio Chemical Explosion 200
9-25-98 Australia Gas Plant Explosion 187
10-16-92 Japan Refinery Explosion 187
3-4-77 Qatar Gas Plant VCE 174
6-1-74 England Petrochemical VCE 164
The Loss amounts were adjusted for
inflation. VCE Vapor Cloud Explosion MRC
2001 This listing does not include the onshore
losses to the Kuwait oil fields during the Gulf
War. Total losses are estimated at over
2,500,000,000 (US).
50
Largest Property Damage Losses 1970 to
1999(Excess of 150,000,000 property damage)-
Offshore
Date Location Facility Type Event Type PD Loss (MM)
7-7-88 North Sea Platform Explosion 1,085
8-26-92 Gulf of Mexico Platform Hurricane 931
8-23-91 North Sea Concrete Jacket MD 474
4-24-88 Brazil Platform Blowout 421
11-1-92 Australia Jacket MD 314
1-20-89 North Sea Drilling Blowout 273
11-2-99 Angola Process Deck MD 210
7-1-74 Dubai Platform Blowout 204
10-1-74 North Sea Platform MD 196
The loss amounts were adjusted for inflation. MD
Mechanical Damage MRC 2001
51
Refineries Losses by Equipment Type
Equipment Number of Losses Average Loss (US) Percentage
Piping 25 61,600,000 20
Heaters 5 46,800,000 4
Pumps 8 20,800,000 6
Tankers 15 35,000,000 12
Compressors 3 37,500,000 2
Heat Exchangers 5 28,400,000 4
Vessels 25 17,600,000 20
Other 42 30,000,000 32
MRC 2001
52
Refineries Losses by Operating Unit
Unit Number of Losses Percentage
Alkylation 6 4
Catalytic Cracking 15 12
Coking 8 6
Crude Distillation 14 11
Hydrocracking 14 11
Hydrotreating 15 12
Reforming 4 3
Jetties 2 2
Storage 15 12
Other 35 27
The Loss amounts were adjusted for inflation
MRC 2001
53
Refineries Losses by Event Type
Event Number of Losses Average Loss (US) Percentage
Explosion 38 46,700,000 30
Fire 60 32,870,000 47
Vapor Cloud 19 83,000,000 15
Mechanical Breakdown 4 80,500,000 3
Other 7 54,400,000 5
The Loss amounts were adjusted for
inflation MRC 2001
54
Terminals Losses by Equipment Type
Equipment Number of Losses Average Loss (US) Percentage
Piping 7 53,400.00 18
Tankage 8 33,000.00 20.5
Ship/Barge 8 58,900.00 20.5
Other 16 32,000.00 41
MRC 2001
55
Terminals Losses by Event Type
Event Number of Losses Average Loss (US) Percentage
Explosion 13 13,300.00 33
Fire 16 50,400.00 41
Vapor Cloud 3 38,400.00 8
Mechanical 5 72,900.00 13
Other 2 14,200.00 5
MRC 2001
56
Terminals Losses by Operating Unit
Unit Number of Losses Percentage
Storage 18 46
Pipeline 8 21
Jetty 6 15
Tanker 2 5
Other 5 13
MRC 2001
The loss amounts were adjusted for inflation.
57
Lessons Learned

• Conduct process hazard analyses of all process
  units, both old and new
• Provide regular training for all employees,
  including standardized re-certification training
  for all operators
• Institute a strong mechanical integrity program
  that includes equipment inspection, piping
  inspection, material verification, corrosion
  under insulation inspection, vibration analysis
  and metal thickness verification.
• Provide a well-trained emergency response
  organization that can include employees and/or
  mutual aid agreements.

58
Oil products released as a result of the
bombingof the NIS Oil Refinery
Substance Estimated Release (metric tons)3
Total Crude Oil and Oil products burned/leaked 80,000
Crude Il 56,300
LPG (Liquified Petroleum Gas) 200
Aromatics (e.g. benzene, toluene and xylene)1 400
Gasoline 1,500
Motor Gasoline 4,500
Jet Fuel 1,200
Diesel 350
Fuel Oil 7,500
SCC Gas2 6,700
Other2 1,900
59
Summary of pollutants released as a result of the
1999 bombings in Pancevo
Substance Location Amount Released (metric tons) Emission Route
Ammonia HIP Azotara 250 Waste channel
Calcium ammonium nitrate, phosphates, potassium chloride HIP Azotara 250 Most burned, some into channel
Crude oil HIP Azotara 150 Most burned, some into channel
Vinyl chloride HIP Petrohemija 460 Burned
1,2-dichloroethane HIP Petrohemija 2,100 50 to channel, 50 to soil
Mercury HIP Petrohemija 8 7.8 metric tons to soil, remainder to channel
Sodium Hydroxide HIP Petrohemija 100 Soil and waste channel
Ethyl-, propylene HIP Petrohemija 1,900 Intentionally burned
Hydrochloric acid HIP Petrohemija 130 Soil and waste channel
Crude oil and derivatives NIS Oil Refinery 85,000 80,000 metric tons burned, remainder spilled onto soil
60
Groundwater pollution at HIP Petrohemija
Contaminant Maximum Concentration (µg per liter) Sampling Point Depth (meters) Maximum Contaminant Levels (U.S. EPA) (µg per liter) Factor by which Max. Contaminant Level is Exceeded
1,2-dichloroethane 7,500,000 B-5 18 5 1,500,000
Vinyl chloride 70,000 B-5 18 2 35,000
Dichloromethane 26,500 B-21 10.5 5 5,300
Chloroform 100,000 P-1 1 80 1,250
Tetrachloroethane 40,000 P-1 1 N/A N/A
1,1-dichloroethylene 5,500 B-20 21 7 790
1,2-cis dichloroethylene 29,200 P-1 1 70 420
1,2-trans dichloroethylene 85,600 P-1 1 100 860
1,1 dichloroethane 95,600 P-1 1 N/A N/A
Trichloroethylene 16,500 B-21 10.5 5 3,300
Tetra-chloroethylene 374 B-13 7.5 5 75
1,1,2-trichloroethane 48,000 B-20 21 5 9,600
1,1,2,2-tetrachloroethane 2,220 B-13 7.5 N/A N/A
Chlorobenzene 343 B-20 21 100 3.4
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Groundwater pollution at the NIS Oil Refinery
Contaminant Maximum Groundwater Concentration (µg per liter) Groundwater Sample Depth (meters) Maximum Contaminant Levels (water) (U.S. EPA) (µg per liter) Factor by which Max. Contaminant Level is exceeded
Benzene 9,100 6.3 5 1820
Toluene 4,820 6.3 1,000 4.82
Ethyl benzene 5,330 6.3 700 7.61
Xylenes 11,500 6.3 10,000 1.15
PHCs 109,000 6.3 N/A N/A
1,2-dichloroethane 66,900 6.3 5 13,380
62
Soil pollution at the NIS Oil Refinery
Contaminant Maximum Soil Concentration (mls per kgs of soil) Soil Sample Depth (centimeters)
Benzene 2,230 58-68
Toluene 2,090 58-68
Ethyl Benzene 872 58-68
Xylenes 4,560 58-68
PHCs 3,490 58-68
Lead 95.2 0-10
63
Emission factors and estimated chemical release
from the Pancevo oil fires
Substance Emission Factor (gram per kilogram of oil burned) Estimated Release (metric tons)
Particulates (lt3.5 µm) 16-20 1,200-1,500
Elemental carbon (soot) 2.8-5.5 210-410
Total organic carbon (aerosol) 4.0-8.0 300-600
Total organic carbon (vapor) 7.1-20.7 500-1,600
Carbon monoxide (CO) 51.-11.6 380-870
Carbon dioxide (CO2) 807-829 61,000-62,000
Methane (CH4) 1.6-2.8 120-210
Sulfur dioxide (SO2) 16-33 1,200-2,500
Nitrogen oxides (NOx) 0.49-0.64 37-48
Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons 10 of Total Organic Carbon (aerosol) 30-60
64
Estimated ground-level concentrations of selected
pollutants from the NIS Oil Refinery fires
Compound Estimated Emission Intensity (grams per second) Estimated Wind Velocity (meters per second) Estimated Cross-sectional area of plume (km2) Estimated Maximum Concentration (µg per m3) U.S. EPA Air Quality Standards (µg per m3)
Sulfur dioxide 9600 3-5 4-8 200-800 365
Nitrogen oxides 2200 3-5 4-8 50-200 100
PAH 220 3-5 4-8 5-20 N/A
Particulates 4800 3-5 4-8 100-400 65
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Medical Management ofMass Casualty

• Search, rescue and first aid.
• Transport to health facility and treatment
• Redistribution of patients between hospitals

66
Definitions

• Disaster
• A Disaster situation may be defined as any
  emergency that overwhelms the available medical
  resources.
• Triage
• Triage is a French work meaning to sort.

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Definitions (contd)

• MCI
• A Mass Casualty Incident (MCI) is defined as any
  situation in which the medical care required
  exceeds the ability to provide that care.

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Scene Evaluation

• Safety evaluation of all possible dangers and
  assuring that none still exist.
• Scene evaluation of physical site e.g. no of
  vehicles in crash, fire, explosion or toxic
  release.
• Situation what really happened here? Why?

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Three Major Rules of Triage

• Only immediate life-threatening conditions are
  identified and treated in the initial triage
  round i.e. airway obstruction, open chest
  injuries or major external haemorrhage.

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Three Major Rules of Triage

• Salvage of life takes precedence over salvage of
  limbs
• The Triage Officer must survey all the patients
  as quickly as possible in order to determine the
  number of victims and to obtain an overall
  evaluation of the disaster scene.

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Tagging (Colour Coded)

• Priority I (Immediate) Red Critical/Life Saving
• Priority II (Delayed) Yellow Serious/but can wait
• Priority III (Expectant) Yellow Severe/little
  chance
• Priority IV (Minimal) Green Minor/ambulant
• Priority V (Dead) Black Unresponsive