Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11

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Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After
9-11
Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science
Engineering University of Notre Dame
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Disclaimers

• I receive research funding from the Defense
  Advanced Research Projects Agency under the
  Human ID At A Distance program.
• I have no financial interest in any biometrics
  related company.

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Overview

• The right to privacy.
• Response-to-terrorism motivation.
• State of biometric surveillance.
• The privacy versus security tradeoff.

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Video Surveillance or Privacy?

• In what public places do you already assume you
  are under video surveillance?

When you walk into a building from a parking lot?
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Video Surveillance or Privacy?

• In what public places do you already assume you
  are under video surveillance?

When you shop at your favorite store? Or go to
your bank?
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Video Surveillance or Privacy?

• In what public places do you already assume you
  are under video surveillance?

When you buy gas for your car?
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Video Surveillance or Privacy?

• What if these daily instances of video
  surveillance were not just isolated commercial
  interests,
• but instead all part of a networked national
  government security plan?

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The Right to Privacy

• The Supreme Court has explained that government
  action constitutes a search when it invades a
  persons reasonable expectation of privacy.

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The Right to Privacy

• Do citizens have a right to privacy from the
  government?
• If so, what is the basis for it?
• Where does it apply and not apply?

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The Right to Privacy

• But the court has also found that a person does
  not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with
  regard to physical characteristics that are
  constantly exposed to the public,

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The Right to Privacy

• So although the Fourth Amendment requires that a
  search conducted by government actors be
  reasonable, which generally means that there
  must be some degree of suspicion

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The Right to Privacy

• the scan of spectators facial characteristics
  at the Super Bowl did not constitute a search.
• John Woodard, RAND Tech Rep.

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The Right to Privacy

• In summary
• There is no clear constitutional barrier to
  government deploying a national video
  surveillance, identification, and tracking system.

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Why Video Surveillance ID?

• On 9-11 of 2001, nineteen terrorists hijacked
  four commercial airliners and murdered over 3,000
  people.
• Their stated motivation is hatred for America and
  its support of Israel, plus Islamic religious
  justification.

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Why Video Surveillance ID?

• Some of the terrorists were known to the
  government and on watch lists.

Khalid Al-Midhar, terrorist on the plane that
crashed into the Pentagon.
Mohamed Atta, terrorist on the plane that
crashed into the WTC NT.
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Why Video Surveillance ID?

• Consider the following scenario outlined in a
  Business Week article on 5 November 2001

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Why Video Surveillance ID?

• As the Saudi Arabian Al-Midhar strolled into a
  meeting with some of Osama bin Ladens
  lieutenants in Kaula Lumpur in December 1999, he
  was videotaped by a Malaysian surveillance team.

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Why Video Surveillance ID?

• The tape was turned over to U.S. intelligence
  officials and, after several months, Al-Midhars
  name was put on the INSs watch list of
  potential terrorists.

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Why Video Surveillance ID?

• Using biometric profiling, it would have been
  possible to make a precise digital map of his
  face. This data could have been hooked to
  airport surveillance cameras.

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Why Video Surveillance ID?

• When cameras captured Al-Midhar, an alarm would
  have sounded, allowing cops to take him into
  custody.

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Why Video Surveillance ID?

• So if it worked as well as the Business Week
  article suggests, would you

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Why Video Surveillance ID?

• So if it worked as well as the Business Week
  article suggests, would you
• Want it in every airport?

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Why Video Surveillance ID?

• So if it worked as well as the Business Week
  article suggests, would you
• Want it in every airport?
• and at every border crossing?

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Why Video Surveillance ID?

• So if it worked as well as the Business Week
  article suggests, would you
• Want it in every airport?
• and at every border crossing?
• and every federal building?

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Why Video Surveillance ID?

• So if it worked as well as the Business Week
  article suggests, would you
• Want it in every airport?
• and at every border crossing?
• and every federal building?
• and stadiums, malls, etc?
• If so, you would not be alone!

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Why Video Surveillance ID?

• In a poll just after 9-11, 86 favored use of
  face recognition technology to scan for suspected
  terrorists at various locations and public
  events.
• Six months later, support still at 81.

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Biometric Technologies

• A biometric is something about a person that can
  be measured and used to identify the person.

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Biometric Technologies

• Numerous biometrics exist
• Fingerprint Face
• Iris Retinal scan
• Hand shape Ear
• Gait

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Biometric Technologies

• Different biometrics may be
• invasive / non-invasive
• contact / non-contact
• near / at a distance
• cooperative / non-cooperative

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Biometric Technologies

• The ideal surveillance technology would be
• non-contact
• at a distance
• non-cooperative
• also fast, cheap, and accurate.

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Biometric Technologies

• Commercial face recognition systems have been
  evaluated for airport security applications.
• Recognition from gait is another hot area of
  biometrics research.

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A Face Recognition System
Video Feed

• Watch List
• or Gallery

Detect Face
matching algorithm
Extract Features
Probe
(probe, possible matches)
Police
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Some Terminology
What the system reports
innocent citizen
wanted terrorist
What is really in the scene
innocent citizen
True Negative
False Positive

• True
• Positive

False Negative
wanted terrorist
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Practical Performance Tests

• The Visionics face recognition system was tested
  at the Palm Beach Intl airport in March-April
  2002. The ACLU used FOIA to obtain a report and
  post it on the web.
• (Visionics has now merged to become Identix.)

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Practical Performance Tests

• Palm Beach airport test results
• about 50 true positives
• 3 false alarms per hour
• processing 10,000 images / day.
• Is this good or bad?

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Practical Performance Tests

• An ACLU representative was quoted as saying that
  the Palm Beach airport evaluation results show
  that
• face recognition is a disaster.

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Practical Performance Tests

• But would 50 chance of detection deter
  terrorists?
• Would systems at two checkpoints give 3/4 chance
  of detection?
• three systems give 7/8 chance?

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Practical Performance Tests

• Palm Beach airport tests also cited the
  importance of
• Subjects head motion
• Lighting conditions
• Pose off-angle by 15 to 30
• Eyeglasses and glare

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Practical Performance Tests

• A test of systems at Bostons Logan Airport in
  May-July 2002 showed greater true positives but
  also too many false positives to be practical.
• The director conducting the test
• Its not ready for prime time yet.

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Recognition from Gait

• Gait refers to walking pattern.
• Johanssons 1973 work with point light display
  is a landmark result.
• This was followed by other work showing gender
  discrimination, and recognition of known persons.

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Recognition from Gait

• Currently a hot topic in computer vision, DARPA
  has released a gait challenge problem composed
  of a set of video clips and a sample algorithm.
• The first release has clips of 75 people walking
  under various conditions.

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Recognition From Gait
Grass Concrete

• Two surfaces, shoe types, and camera views.
• 452 sequences (300GB)

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Recognition from Gait
Gallery (G, A, R) 71
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Recognition from Gait
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Recognition from Gait

• Just as face recognition has now run into dealing
  with the hard or real versions of the
  problem,
• Recognition from gait also has hard problems to
  deal with in order to become a practical
  surveillance tool.

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Recognition from Gait

• For more details on the gait analysis challenge
  problem, see the paper by Phillips et al in ICPR
  02.

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Biometric Technologies

• It appears that there is modest real increase
  in security from video-based biometrics in short
  run (2-3 years).
• But there may be a deterrent effect.
• And technology is rapidly improving.

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Biometric Technologies

• Massachusetts governor Swift said she embraced
  the technology as part of security improvements
  she ordered at Bostons Logan airport to restore
  confidence in flying.
• L. Gay, Technology face recognition has limits,
  some say, www.nando.net/technology/story/
  214481p-207c.html

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Biometric Technologies

• Important principles to remember
• A person cant be recognized unless they have
  been enrolled.
• False positives are unavoidable.
• FPs trade against false negatives.
• A human operator is still needed.

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Security versus Privacy

• The civil libertarian fear is that the desire to
  be safe from terrorism will push aside reason in
  balancing security versus privacy.

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Security versus Privacy

• Often quoted by civil libertarians
• They that can give up essential liberty to obtain
  a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty
  or safety.
• - Benjamin Franklin

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Security versus Privacy

• But a common opposing view is
• Benjamin Franklin said that anyone who gives up
  essential liberties to preserve freedom is a
  fool, but maybe he didnt conceive of nuclear
  war and dirty bombs.
• - Neil Young (musician, Lets Roll)

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Security versus Privacy

• The proposed tradeoff is clear
• Loss of some amount of privacy
• for
• Increase by some amount in security.
• Computing technology largely defines the
  boundaries of possible tradeoffs.

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Media Reports / Opinions

• A computer glitch could match the face of an
  innocent person with the digital image of a
  criminal.
• Super bowl snooping, NY Times, Feb 4, 2001.
• Is it really a glitch?
• Or an unavoidable feature?

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Media Reports / Opinions

• On the system used at Super Bowl
• The beauty of the system is that it is
  disguise-proof. You can grow a beard and put on
  sunglasses, and FaceTrac will still pick you out
  of a crowd.
• Lev Grossman, Welcome to the snooper bowl,
  Time, Feb 12, 2001.

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Media Reports / Opinions

• Is use of the term disguise-proof in connection
  with these systems
• Unrestrained technology optimism? Unprofessional
  journalism? Misleading the public?

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Media Reports / Opinions

• A woman in Texas who saw the image claimed the
  man in the picture was wanted for crimes. She
  called the Tampa police, who questioned the man,
  a construction worker. It was the wrong person
  ...
• The system is not 100 percent accurate.
• Electronic surveillance From Big Brother
  Fears to Safety Tool, NY Times, Dec 6, 2001.

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Media Reports / Opinions

• What does this incident illustrate?
• That the computer isnt 100 accurate?
• Or that humans arent 100 accurate?

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Media Reports / Opinions

• Quoting Ed Markey (D., Mass.)
• Its chilling, the notion that 100,000 people
  were subject to video surveillance and had their
  identities checked by the government.
• Lev Grossman, Welcome to the snooper bowl,
  Time, Feb 12, 2001.

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Media Reports / Opinions

• What do you think of when you hear had their
  identities checked?
• Is this an accurate analogy?

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Media Reports / Opinions

• What do you think of when you hear had their
  identities checked?
• Is this an accurate analogy?
• What about a police lineup?

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Media Reports / Opinions

• What do you think of when you hear had their
  identities checked?
• Is this an accurate analogy?
• What about a police lineup?
• Or a policeman on a street corner holding a photo
  of a suspect?

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Media Reports / Opinions

• ACLU representatives have claimed that the
  technology (1) does not work, and (2) it greatly
  threatens privacy.
• Can both claims be true at once?

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Ethical Issues

• Ethical issues arise in (at least)
• Protection of privacy.
• Performance claims.
• Public understanding.

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AITP Standards of Conduct

• Protect the privacy and confidentiality of all
  information entrusted to me.
• Inform the public in all areas of my expertise.
• Insure that products of my work are used in a
  socially responsible way.

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ACM Code of Ethics

• Respect the privacy of others.
• Ensure that those affected have their needs
  clearly articulated.
• System must be validated to meet requirements.

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Software Engg Code of Ethics

• Cooperate in efforts to address matters of grave
  public concern caused by software, ...
• Be fair and avoid deception in all statements,
  particularly public ones, concerning software

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Software Engg Code of Ethics

• Ensure that specifications have been well
  documented, satisfy the users requirements and
  have the appropriate approvals.

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Intl Biometric Ind. Assoc.

• Accountability in Marketing Because truth is
  the key to industry credibility, members attest
  that their stated claims are accurate and can be
  independently verified by a competent authority.
• www.ibia.org/principl.htm

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Ethically Responsible?

• knowing how many checkpoints these people had
  to go through, we had a high probability to
  alert, intercept, these individuals maybe August
  21-st or 23-rd when they crossed the Canadian
  border and we would have perhaps foiled the whole
  plot.
• J. Atick, Visionics CEO, NPR Morning Edition

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Ethically Responsible?

• Its simply the fear of change and technology.
  Once youve adapted, you look back and say I was
  afraid of what?
• T. Colasti, CEO of Visionics, in
• Lev Grossman, Welcome to the snooper bowl,
  Time, Feb 12, 2001.

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The End.