What Happens When Your Financial Guaranty Insurer Goes Bust?

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What Happens When Your Financial Guaranty Insurer Goes Bust?

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What Happens When Your Financial Guaranty Insurer Goes Bust ? A Presentation on the Insurance Insolvency of a Financial Guaranty Insurer – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: What Happens When Your Financial Guaranty Insurer Goes Bust?


1
What Happens When Your Financial Guaranty Insurer
Goes Bust?
  • A Presentation on the Insurance Insolvency of a
    Financial Guaranty Insurer
  • Richard G. Liskov Donald J. Mros

2
How Regulators Identify Troubled Insurers
  • Regulators use a variety of tools to measure the
    solvency of insurers, not just outside ratings
  • risk-based capital reports
  • independent actuarial and accounting audits
  • IRIS ratios
  • the insurers own plan for improving its
    finances.

3
How Regulators Deal with Troubled Insurers
  • Regulators have used a variety of methods to
    improve the situation informally
  • encouraging the insurer to sell books of business
  • urging sales of subsidiaries
  • encouraging policy buy-outs
  • doing reinsurance deals that increase surplus

4
The Three Types of Proceedings for Troubled
Insurers
  • Supervision
  • Rehabilitation (sometimes called Conservation)
  • Liquidation

5
Supervision
  • Supervision regulator in insurers state of
    domicile requires insurer to obtain numerous
    specific approvals to operate, but
  • management remains in place
  • no court proceeding initiated
  • and supervision is confidential.

6
Supervision (contd)
  • Typically, an insurer under supervision is placed
    into runoff with no new policies written.
  • Insurer must obtain prior approval for
  • all inter-company transactions
  • all reinsurance transactions
  • major investments
  • levels of staffing and
  • changes in commission scales.

7
Rehabilitation
  • If supervision is not feasible or not effective,
    the regulator will consider the next step
  • seeking a state court order placing insurer into
    rehabilitation or conservation.
  • Insurer must have notice and opportunity to
    oppose the regulators petition, but very rarely
    do insurers oppose.

8
Rehabilitation (contd)
  • Rehabilitation (sometimes called conservation)
  • state court in the home state appoints regulator
    to manage insurer until the conditions causing
    the rehabilitation are eliminated.
  • Insurers are not eligible to be debtors under
    federal bankruptcy law, so only state courts deal
    with insurer rehabilitations and liquidations.

9
Rehabilitation (contd)
  • Completely open-ended proceeding no time limits
  • No such thing as 60-day rehabilitation
  • Insurer remains in existence but management
    ousted with occasional exceptions, and regulator,
    acting as rehabilitator, appoints managers
  • Insurer almost always stops writing new
    business, but continues to pay claims,
    except much, much more slowly

10
Rehabilitation (contd)
  • Similar to an automatic stay in bankruptcy, a
    rehabilitation order from state court will enjoin
    policyholders and creditors from suing the
    insurer or attaching insurers assets.
  • Policyholders living in other states are required
    to file their claims with the Rehabilitator in
    the insurers home state.
  • For most monolines that means New York.

11
Rehabilitation (contd)
  • State insurance codes give broad powers for
    courts to order rehabilitation.
  • Not necessary for regulator to prove that insurer
    is actually insolvent when applying for a
    rehabilitation order.

12
Rehabilitation (contd)
  • It is sufficient in New York and other states
    for regulators to allege that insurer is in
  • hazardous financial condition
  • This is a very nebulous concept which does not
    require detailed showing of insurers finances.

13
Rehabilitation (contd)
  • Like Chapter 11, with the objective of proposing
    and implementing a plan of rehabilitation so that
    insurer can operate normally again, but
  • only regulator can initiate the proceeding
  • only regulator can propose plan of
    rehabilitation
  • policyholders and creditors can object to plan,
    but courts typically defer to regulators plan.

14
Rehabilitation (contd)
  • Unlike federal bankruptcy, no cram down
    procedure allowing creditors to control
    insurers fate.
  • Rehabilitator either proposes plan for
    rehabilitating the insurer, or regulator decides
    to seek liquidation order.
  • State courts usually approve the plan, unless
    they find it egregiously unfair or plainly
    inconsistent with state insurance code.

15
Rehabilitation (contd)
  • In the plan of rehabilitation Rehabilitator
    may propose
  • having policies assumed by stronger insurer or
  • modifying policy terms so that insurer pays less
    or
  • so that insurer pays over much longer time or
  • not paying reinsurers and general
    creditors anything.

16
The Basic Rule of Rehabilitations
  • Policyholders and creditors cannot object to a
    rehabilitation plan that gives them much less
    than their policy or contract promised as long
    as
  • the plan gives them at least what they would
    receive if the insurer were liquidated.
  • Neblett v. Carpenter, 305 U. S. 297, 305 (1938)

17
Liquidation
  • Liquidation occurs when a regulator determines
    there is no realistic possibility of
    rehabilitating an insurer.
  • As with rehabilitations, the home state regulator
    petitions that states court for a liquidation
    order.

18
Liquidation (contd)
  • Liquidation involves marshalling all of the
    assets of the insurer, mainly reinsurance
    recoveries, and distributing them according to
    priorities enacted in the state insurance code.
  • In New York, the priorities for non-life
    insurers, including New York-based financial
    guaranty insurers, are set forth in section 7434
    of the Insurance Law.

19
Liquidation (contd)
  • After administrative expenses (including lawyers)
  • then, in order of priorities
  • policyholders (but no interest for delayed
    payment with certain exceptions)
  • ?
  • government claims
  • ?
  • general creditors, including ceding insurers
    and reinsurers
  • ?
  • shareholders

20
Liquidation (contd)
  • All policyholders
  • must be paid in full
  • before any creditor gets anything.

21
Liquidation (contd)
  • Big unknown
  • whether a credit default swap (CDS) that is
    not specifically in the form of a financial
    guaranty insurance policy will be treated as a
    policy for purposes of priority.
  • New York Insurance Law appears to say a credit
    default swap is not a policy, but the New York
    Insurance Department has said some CDS are
    where CDS holder has an interest in the
    referenced obligation.

22
Insurance Company Receiverships Are Governed by
State Law
  • Insurance company receiverships are conducted
    under the state law of the domicile of the
    insurance company.
  • Most states have enacted either a version of
    the former NAIC Insurers Rehabilitation and
    Liquidation Model Act (Model Act) or the
    Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act (Uniform Act).

23
Insurance Company Receiverships (contd)
  • In 2005, the NAIC revised its Model Act, which it
    adopted as the Insurer Receivership Model Act
    (Revised Model Act), but only Oklahoma, Texas
    and Utah have enacted all or part of the revision
    to date.
  • New York has enacted a version of the Uniform Act
    (N.Y. Ins. Law 7401-36). The receivership of a
    New York domiciled financial guaranty insurer
    would be governed by these sections.

24
Map of Jurisdictions
Key Red - NAIC Model Act/similar law Blue -
Uniform Act/similar law White - NAIC Revised
Model Act (IRMA)
25
Monolines Originally Insured Low Risk Public
Finance Business
  • Financial guaranty insurers originally provided
    coverage for public finance business. This
    involved providing coverage for defaults on bonds
    issued by governmental bodies, such as municipal
    bonds.
  • This business historically did not pose a lot of
    risk. Recently, however, due to the budget crisis
    in California, monolines may be faced with larger
    than expected exposures on their public
    finance business.

26
The Economic Crisis Leads To Financial Stress For
The Monolines
  • Starting in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
    monolines expanded their business to cover
    various structured finance risks, including
    credit default swaps.
  • With the economic crisis, the insurers faced
    large possible losses on these risks, leading to
    financial stress and ratings downgrades for the
    monolines.

27
To Date, Monolines Have Avoided Receivership
  • The monolines have avoided receivership through
    restructurings or negotiated settlements
    with creditors.
  • Recently, Syncora Guarantee reported a negative
    policyholder surplus of 3.8 billion and was
    ordered to stop paying claims by the NYID.
  • It has entered into a restructuring agreement
    with credit default swap counterparties that is
    subject to certain closing conditions.

28
ACA Financial Guaranty Corporation and Kemper
Insurance Companies
  • ACA Financial Guaranty was the first monoline to
    restructure. Counterparty creditors received cash
    payments on their claims and were issued
    surplus notes.
  • The Kemper Insurance Companies have been
    operating under a voluntary run-off plan since
    2004 subject to the supervision of the Illinois
    Insurance Department under confidential plan.
  • Key component reaching agreement with large
    commercial insureds for buy backs of their
    policies.

29
Avoid A State Insurance Company Receivership If
Possible
  • Counterparties usually have an interest in
    avoiding a monoline receivership due to the costs
    and delays that such proceedings generally
    entail.
  • In states where contingent claims are not
    allowed, there is likely to be considerable delay
    before distributions are made to creditors since
    the maturity on public finance obligations is
    often far in the future.
  • Even where contingent claims are allowed, it is
    likely that there will be considerable delay as
    the receiver will need to marshal assets and
    determine claims before making distributions.

30
Bar Date
  • The bar date is the date by which a claim has to
    be filed.
  • In general, if a claim is not filed by that date
    then it is barred from receiving estate
    distributions or it is placed in the lowest
    priority.

31
Bar Date In New York
  • In New York, creditors are to present their
    claims within four months of the receivership
    order or such longer period as allowed by the
    receivership court.
  • N.Y. Ins. Law 7432(b)
  • Proofs of claims may be filed after the bar date
    but they will not share in estate distributions
    unless all timely filed claims are paid in full
    with interest.
  • N.Y. Ins. Law 7432(c)

32
Bar Date In New York (contd)
  • In practice, the bar date in New York is not set
    within four months of the receivership order.
  • American Fidelity Fire Insurance
    Company/American Insurance Company was ordered
    into liquidation on March 26, 1986 with a bar
    date of December 31, 2001 (more than 15 years
    later).
  • Ideal Mutual was ordered into liquidation on
    February 7, 1985, with a bar date of December
    31, 2003 (more than 18 years later).

33
Many State Insurance Laws Do Not Allow For The
Payment Of Contingent Claims
  • A contingent claim generally refers to a claim
    that
  • is uncertain as to whether there ever will be a
    claim
  • uncertain as to the value of the claim or
  • it is uncertain when the claim will become
    payable.
  • Many state insurance laws, including New
    Yorks, do not allow for the payment of
    contingent claims.

34
New York Law Does Not Allow For Payment Of
Contingent Claims
  • Under New York law, a contingent claim shall not
    share in estate distribution unless
  • it becomes absolute against the insurer on or
    before the last day fixed for filing of proofs of
    claim, or
  • there is a surplus and the liquidation is
    thereafter conducted upon the basis that such
    insurer is solvent.
  • N.Y. Ins. Law 7433(c)

35
Definition of Absolute
  • A commercial general liability IBNR claim would
    not be absolute based on case law in New Jersey,
    which has the same contingent claim provision as
    New York.
  • In re Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co., 193 N.J.
    86, 935 A.2d 1184 (2007)
  • The New Jersey Supreme Court interpreted
    absolute to be synonymous with unconditional,
    non-contingent, free from conditional
    limitation, free from doubt, and final and
    not liable to modification or termination. Under
    its interpretation, an actuarial estimate, even
    by generally accepted estimating techniques, is
    not absolute.

36
Financial Guaranty Contingent Claim
  • There are no cases in New York on how the
    provision on contingent claims might apply to a
    claim on a financial guaranty policy for a credit
    default swap
  • but
  • if there is a loss that is certain as to
    liability and amount then it should not be
    considered a contingent claim.

37
The NAIC Model Act Provision On Contingent Claims
  • The 1977 Model Act provides that
  • A contingent claim may receive estate
    distributions if it is filed in accordance with
    Acts claim filing requirements and does not
    prejudice the orderly administration of the
    liquidation.
  • Claims that are due except for the passage of
    time shall be treated as absolute claims are
    treated, except that such claims may be
    discounted at the legal rate of interest.
  • NAIC Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation
    Model Act 37(B),(C) (1977)

38
Model Act (contd)
  • The Model Acts contingent claim provision has
    not been universally adopted in the Model Act
    states. Several states have adopted a more
    restrictive contingent claim provision, and do
    not permit contingent claims.
  • Me. Rev. Stan. Ann. tit. 24 4378 Nev. Rev.
    Stat. Ann. 696B.450
  • N.J. Stat. Ann. 1730C28 N.C. Gen Stat. Ann.
    58-30-195
  • Alaska Stat. 21.78.280
  • Many of Uniform Act states also do not allow
    contingent claims.
  • Ala. Code 27-32-30 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
    20-63
  • Ark. Code. Ann. 23-68-128 Del. Code. Ann.
    tit. 18 5928
  • N.Y Ins. Law 7433 Wyo. Stat. Ann. 26-28-127

39
NAIC Insurers Model Receivership Act Provision
  • The 2005 Revised Model Act provides that
  • An unliquidated contingent claim may be allowed
    if the contingency is removed by the bar date.
  • A claim that is unliquidated by the bar date can
    be valued using an accepted method of valuation
    and allowed if it will not delay administration
    or the cost of valuing the claim is not excessive
    relative to the amount available for distribution
    for the claim.
  • NAIC Insurer Receivership Model Act, Art. VII,
    705(c)(2) (2005)

40
Illinois Allows Contingent Claims
  • In Illinois, contingent or unliquidated claims
    that have not been made absolute and liquidated
    by the bar date may be determined and allowed by
    estimation.
  • Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/209(7)
  • Utah, Missouri and Connecticut also allow
    contingent claims that can be valued with
    reasonable actuarial certainty or another method
    of valuing claims with reasonable certainty.
  • Utah Code Ann. 31A-27a-605(2) Mo. Rev. Stat.
    375.1220(2) Conn. Gen. Stat. 38a-945

41
Transfers Within 12 Months May Be Avoided As A
Preference In New York
  • Whenever a creditor receives a payment from a
    troubled insurer, the creditor has to be
    concerned with a voidable preference claim.
    Preferences are where a creditor receives better
    treatment than similarly situated creditors.
  • Voidable preferences may be recovered by the
    receiver of an insurance company, whether
    the company is in a rehabilitation or
    liquidation proceeding.

42
New York Preference Provision
  • A receiver may avoid any transfer of, or lien
    created upon, the property of an insurer within
    twelve months prior to the granting of an order
    to show cause under this article with the intent
    of giving to any creditor or enabling it to
    obtain a greater percentage of its debt than
    any other creditor of the same class and which is
    accepted by such creditor having reasonable
    cause to believe that such a preference will
    occur, shall be voidable.
  • N.Y. Ins. Law 7425(a)

43
Preference In New York
  • It is within a New York receivers discretion to
    decide whether to seek to recover a payment on
    grounds of voidable preference.
  • A payment in the preference period that is
    explicitly approved in advance by regulators is
    not an absolute defense, but reduces the risk
    that the receiver would consider it a preference.

44
The New York Case Law
  • The little case law we found in New York focused
    on the intent element. In Serio v. Rhulen, 806
    N.Y.S.2d 283, 285 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dept. 2005)
    the court found that the defendant insiders in
    disregard of Frontiers deteriorated financial
    condition, with knowledge and intent . . . caused
    preferential payments to be made by Frontier to
    Frontier Group and other Group-controlled
    entities during the twelve-month period preceding
    the entry of the Order of Rehabilitation for
    Frontier and a finding of insolvency.

45
Preference Under the Model Acts
  • Under the Model Act, a preference is any transfer
    (i) within one year before a successful
    delinquency filing (ii) that enables the creditor
    to obtain a greater percentage of its debt than
    another creditor in the same class would receive.
    NAIC Model Act 28
  • Under the Revised Model Act, a preference is as
    any transfer (i) within two (2) years before a
    successful delinquency filing (ii) that enables
    the creditor to receive more than the creditor
    would have received in a liquidation of the
    insurer. NAIC Revised Model Act Art. VI 604

46
Ordinary Course Of Business Defense
  • In a recent case involving Reliance Insurance
    Company (in Liquidation), the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court ruled that an ordinary course of
    business defense protected a payment on an
    insurance policy from a preference claim,
    although there was no specific language in the
    Pennsylvania statute. Ario v. Ingram Micro, 965
    A.2d 1194 (Pa. 2009)
  • The Pennsylvania court ruled that a payment on a
    policy was not on account of an antecedent debt
    based on (i) public policy grounds, (ii)
    legislative intent and (iii) on the bankruptcy
    code where payments in the ordinary course of
    business are not considered preferential. Id.
  • There is no such case law in New York, and the
    Ario decision may not have great persuasive
    value in New York since the New York voidable
    transfer statute does not have an antecedent
    debt requirement, although the public policy
    arguments may be persuasive to a New York court.

47
Ordinary Course Of Business (contd)
  • The purpose of the ordinary course of business
    defense is to leave undisturbed normal financing
    relations. Generally, to prove a transfer is
    non-preferential under the ordinary course of
    business defense, the creditor must prove
  • (1) that the transfer was in payment of a debt
    incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of
    business or financial affairs of the debtor and
    the transferee, (2) that the transfer was made in
    the ordinary course of business or financial
    affairs of the debtor and the transferee, and (3)
    that the transfer was made according to ordinary
    business terms.
  • Ohio Rev. Code 3903.28 Covington v. HKM Direct
    Market Commcn, Inc., 03AP-52, 2003 WL 22784378
    (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003)

48
Protection In Illinois
  • In Illinois, where the Director of the Illinois
    Insurance Department approves a pre-receivership
    transfer in writing it cannot be later set aside
    as a preference.
  • 215 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/204(m)(C)
  • This does not protect against a fraudulent
    transfer.

49
Fraudulent Conveyance
  • A fraudulent conveyance may also be avoided by a
    receiver under New Yorks debtor creditor law but
    this is more difficult to establish than a
    voidable preference under New York Insurance Law.

50
Are There Any Safe Harbors For Swap Claims?
  • The short answer in New York is no. Other states,
    such as Maryland, have a provision protecting
    against a payment on a swap being a
    voidable preference.

51
Maryland Provision
  • Section 229.1(f) of the Maryland Insurance Code
    provides that
  • Notwithstanding any provision of this subtitle
    a receiver may not avoid a transfer of money or
    other property arising under or in connection
    with a netting agreement or qualified financial
    contract, or any pledge, security, collateral, or
    guarantee agreement or any other similar security
    arrangement or credit support document relating
    to a netting agreement or qualified financial
    contract, that is made before the commencement of
    a delinquency proceeding under this title.
  • Md. Code Ann., Ins. 9-229.1(f)
  • This protection does not apply to a transfer
    made with the actual intent to hinder, delay or
    defraud a receiver or other creditors.
  • Md. Code Ann., Ins. 9-229.1(f)(2)

52
Arguably A Safe Harbor For Swap Claims
  • This provision is arguably a safe harbor against
    a voidable preference claim for a payment on a
    financial guaranty policy covering a swap claim
    if the policy relates to a qualified financial
    contract. A qualified financial contract in
    Maryland is defined to include a swap agreement.

53
Definition of A Swap Agreement
  • Swap agreement is defined as
  • an agreement, including the terms and conditions
    incorporated by reference in the agreement, that
    is a rate swap agreement, basis swap, commodity
    swap, forward rate agreement, interest rate
    future, interest rate option, forward foreign
    exchange agreement, spot foreign exchange
    agreement, rate cap agreement, rate floor
    agreement, rate collar agreement, currency swap
    agreement, cross-currency rate swap agreement,
    currency future, currency option, or any other
    similar agreement, and includes any combination
    of agreements and an option to enter into an
    agreement.
  • Md. Code Ann., Ins. 9-229.1(a)(9).

54
The Definition of Swap Agreement (contd)
  • The definition of swap agreement does not
    specifically include credit default swaps. Credit
    default swaps should be considered a similar
    agreement, but we found no case law on point.

55
Further Possible Statutory Protection Under
Maryland Law
  • Section 229.1(b)(2) of Maryland Insurance Code
    provides that a person may not be stayed or
    otherwise prohibited from exercising any right
    under a pledge, security, collateral, or
    guarantee agreement, or any other similar
    security arrangement or credit support document
    relating to a netting agreement or qualified
    financial contract.
  • Md. Code Ann., Ins. 9-229.1(b)(2).
  • Again, the definition of qualified financial
    contract is key since the protection is afforded
    if the guarantee agreement is related to a
    qualified financial contract.

56
Protection Against The Stay
  • This provision should protect a counterparty from
    a claim that it violated a stay by exercising its
    CDS rights. This provision, though, is not
    included in the New York insurance laws.

57
Other States With Similar Provisions
  • Several other states, including Iowa, Michigan,
    Texas, and Utah have similar provisions
    permitting the exercise of rights under a
    qualified financial contract.
  • Iowa Code Ann. 507C.28A
  • Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 500.8115a
  • Tex. Ins. Code Ann. 443.261
  • Utah Code Ann. 31A-27a-611

58
Concluding Remarks
  • In a receivership of a financial guaranty insurer
    in New York, counterparty creditors should
    anticipate
  • long delays before any distributions
  • possible advantages in a plan of rehabilitation
    to public finance policyholders issue sure to
    be litigated
  • potential preference challenges to any payments
    made within the 12 month look back period, (but
    payments made with explicit prior regulatory
    approval may be OK) and
  • potential litigation over whether a stay would
    apply to CDS remedies.

59
Conclusion
  • Thanks for attending what we hope was a
    useful and informative program.
  • The views we expressed are ours but not
    necessarily those of Chadbourne clients.
  • Wed be pleased to assist you on particular
    issues involving your company.
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