Deterrence – or Destruction?

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Deterrence or Destruction?

• Comparative Nuclear Doctrine

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I. Modern Deterrence Theory

• The cult of the bomber, 1919-1939
• Giulio Douhet Opening hours of any major war ?
  destruction of cities with explosives, gas,
  incendiaries ? panic and social collapse
• 1922, 1932-4 Attempts to ban bombers
• Deterrence failed Britain actually initiated
  city warfare in World War II (disproportionate
  response to German error)
• Mass killing / city destruction generally didnt
  have the expected effect on civilian morale
• Britain actually preferred German countervalue
  targeting (cities) to counterforce targeting
  (military forces)

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B. Types of Deterrence

• General vs. Specific/Immediate Deterrence
  Distinction between overall strength (10,000
  warheads) and threat in particular situation
  (willing to go to war over Cuban missiles)

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B. Types of Deterrence

• General vs. Specific/Immediate Deterrence
  Distinction between overall strength (10,000
  warheads) and threat in particular situation
  (willing to go to war over Cuban missiles)
• Direct vs. Extended Deterrence Attempting to
  deter attacks on self vs. others (i.e. South
  Korea, West Germany)
• Existential Deterrence Capability exists to
  become a threat (i.e. Japans nuclear program)

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C. Rational Deterrence Theory (RDT)

• Foundations bargaining theory, especially game
  theory at RAND and other think tanks
• Focuses on manipulating information, costs, and
  probability of victory to prevent rational
  opponents from engaging in some behavior

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3. Requirements of Success under RDT

• Clarity Threat must be understood
• Failures The Doomsday Device, tactical nukes
  in Cuba
• Credibility Opponent must believe threat will be
  carried out if line is crossed
• Failures Nuclear threats over Berlin Wall,
  Vietnam
• Cost Threat must be great enough to outweigh
  benefits of crossing the line
• Failure Sanctions on USSR over Afghanistan
  invasion
• Restraint Opponent must believe threat will NOT
  be carried out if line is NOT crossed
• Failures WMD Inspections before current Iraq
  conflict, Hitler declares war on America
• Rationality Opponent must weigh costs and
  benefits
• Possible failures Paraguayan War, Nuclear war
  termination?

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D. Dilemmas of Deterrence

• Security Dilemma Increased costs and credibility
  also mean decreased restraint (increased
  incentives to initiate conflict)
• Vulnerability Dilemma If you dont attempt to
  counter deterrent threat, maybe you intend to
  strike first (US urges Soviets to harden silos)
• Rationality Dilemma Known rationality can be
  exploited by opponent (as in our bargaining game,
  or counterforce first strike). Solution
  threat that leaves something to chance but
  this decreases restraint, increasing incentives
  for enemy to pre-empt

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Exercise By Dawns Early Light

• Threats to deterrence?
• Causes of escalation?
• How to terminate a nuclear war?

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E. Does deterrence work?

• Inherent uncertainty If opponent does nothing,
  is deterrence working?
• General deterrence creates bias Perhaps having
  to state a threat means it is unlikely to
  succeed
• Quantitative studies US-USSR crises accurately
  described by RDT (responses consistently
  calibrated to threats, not randomly over time as
  predicted by political psychology)

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4. Results from Case Studies (Morgan 2003)

• Success more likely when challenger motivated by
  prospective gains than fear of domestic or
  international loss
• Deterrence successes occur early, before crises
  develop
• Military superiority unnecessary for deterrence
  (consistent with RDT and French nuclear
  doctrine)

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5. Nuclear weapons possession suppresses
conventional conflict spiral
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6. Deterring Terrorists Unexpectedly Violent
Retaliation is Key
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II. Game Theory Formalizing Deterrence

• Assumptions
• Rational choice (Transitive and Connected
  Preferences) Note that preferences do not need
  to be reasonable or sensible, just consistent
• Strategic interaction My choices affect which
  choices are best for you

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B. Elements

• Players Two or more (Nuclear Usually two)
• Strategies The choices players have
• Outcomes The results of the players choices
  (what the world looks like afterwards)
• Payoffs (Preferences) How much each player
  values each Outcome (since the same outcome can
  be valued differently by different people)

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C. Games in Normal (aka Strategic) Form The
Matrix

• This form is used to represent simultaneous choice

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1. Solving a Normal/Strategic-Form Game Without
Math

• Where do the numbers come from? PREFERENCES.
  First step is always rank-ordering outcomes for
  each player.
• Nash Equilibrium ? Neither player could do any
  better by unilaterally changing its strategy
  choice
• To Solve Examine each cell to see if either
  player could do better by unilaterally choosing a
  different Strategy, given that its opponent does
  nothing different.
• Example

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Solving a Game Without Math

• c. Not every game has a Nash Equilibrium
  (prediction instability / switching between
  strategies)
• Example

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Solving a Game Without Math

• d. Some games have multiple Nash Equilibria
  (prediction one of the following outcomes)
• Example

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C. Common Strategic-Form Games

• Prisoners Dilemma
• Both players end up worse, even though each plays
  rationally!

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b. Using PD to model Arms Races (The Security
Dilemma)

• Note that payoff structure is just like a PD

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2. Chicken Who will swerve?
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2. Chicken Who will swerve?

• What If You could throw your steering wheel out
  the window?

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Nuclear Crises and Chicken The Cuban Missile
Crisis

• Key distinction In Chicken, each player would
  rather be the (nice) sucker than have both
  players be nasty ? Not so in PD

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Problem 1 An India-Pakistan Nuclear Crisis

• Determine preferences for each side (discussion)
• If Pakistan assembles, what does India want to
  do?
• If Pakistan doesnt assemble, what does India
  want to do?
• If India assembles, what does Pakistan want to
  do?
• If India doesnt assemble, what does Pakistan
  want to do?
• Identify any Nash equilibria
• Translate this into the real world what does
  game theory predict?

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Problem 2 An India-Pakistan Nuclear Crisis,
Phase Two

• Determine preferences for each side (discussion)
• If Pakistan doesnt strike, what does India want
  to do?
• If Pakistan strikes, what does India want to do?
• If India doesnt strike, what does Pakistan want
  to do?
• If India strikes, what does Pakistan want to do?
• Identify any Nash equilibria
• Translate this into the real world what does
  game theory predict?

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D. Games in Extensive Form The Tree

• Extensive form adds information
• What is the order of moves? Example If you do
  this, then I will do that.
• What prior information does each player have when
  it makes its decision?
• Elements
• Nodes Points at which a player faces a choice
• Branches Decision paths connecting a players
  choices to the outcomes
• Information Sets When a player doesnt know
  which node it is at
• Outcomes Terminal nodes

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3. Solving an Extensive Form Game

• Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Eliminates
  non-credible threats from consideration
• Process Backwards induction If they think
  that we think

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E. Games of Deterrence Credible Threat and
Restraint
War
Preferences A CapB SQ War FSB B
SQ FSB War CapB
Nuke
Attack
Dont Nuke
CapB
FSB
Dont Attack
Nuke
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Dont Nuke
SQ
Deterrence Success!!!
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E. Games of Deterrence Credible Threat But No
Restraint
War
Nuke
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Attack
Dont Nuke
CapB
FSB
Dont Attack
Nuke
Dont Nuke
SQ
Deterrence Fails!!!
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E. Games of Deterrence Restraint, But No
Credible Threat
War
Nuke
Attack
Dont Nuke
CapB
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
FSB
Dont Attack
Nuke
Dont Nuke
SQ
Deterrence Fails!!!
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Problem Three Deterring the USSR Given USSR NFU
Doctrine
NWarEUR
Nuke
Nuke
Dont Nuke
CWinUS
Invade Europe
Dont Nuke
WinUSSR
NWarCON
Dont Invade
Nuke
Nuke
Dont Nuke
Dont Nuke
NWinUS
SQ
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Problem Three If the US is willing to trade New
York for Bonn
NWarEUR
Nuke
Nuke
Dont Nuke
CWinUS
Invade Europe
Dont Nuke
WinUSSR
NWarCON
Dont Invade
Nuke
Nuke
Dont Nuke
Dont Nuke
NWinUS
SQ
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Problem Three If the US is NOT willing to trade
New York for Bonn
NWarEUR
Nuke
Nuke
Dont Nuke
CWinUS
Invade Europe
Dont Nuke
WinUSSR
NWarCON
Dont Invade
Nuke
Nuke
Dont Nuke
Dont Nuke
NWinUS
SQ
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F. Problems of Game Theory

• Simple two-player games assume
• Common knowledge of preferences I know exactly
  what you want, so I can predict your behavior
• Terminal nodes the game actually ends for
  good
• Both players ignore third-party decisions (i.e.
  other nuclear powers, or potential proliferators)
• Real world violates these conditions (in many if
  not most cases)
• Adding concealed preferences, N players, and
  infinite play is mathematically possible but
  the result is infinitely many equilibria (the
  folk theorem)
• Lesson Games constrain the strategies of
  rational players (some are better than others),
  but can not prove a single strategy is best
  under real-world conditions

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III. Elements of Nuclear Doctrine

• Goals
• Deterrence Make it irrational for enemies to
  attack
• Compellence Allow leaders to force changes in
  others behavior
• Warfighting Increase odds of victory in war

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B. Key dimensions

• Size of force Minimal to dominant
• Command and control Hierarchy to delegation
• Employment First strike to last resort
• Force composition Land, Sea, Air
• Missions Demonstrations to all-out war
• Targeting Counterforce vs. Countervalue

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IV. How do doctrines emerge?

• Realism External threats
• All states pursue national interest. Keys
  preventing national destruction or defeat,
  bargaining from a position of strength
• Implications
• Deterrence theory If you want peace, prepare for
  war
• Public declarations are cheap talk states at
  war abandon scruples and treaties
• States try to prevent rivals from gaining
  superiority

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3. Realist Nuclear Policies

• Escalation dominance Be able to beat any rival
  at any level of escalation (conventional,
  tactical nuclear, strategic nuclear)
• Preserve autonomy Do not bargain away
  decision-making power over weapons
• Preserve security Defend the state with
  alliances, civil defense, military defense

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B. Strategic Culture Theory

• Domestic politics determines policy
• Implications
• Dominant ideology (historical analogies, Marxism,
  Maoism, etc) shapes war plans
• Doctrines have symbolic importance ? prestige,
  shame, pride matter for policy
• Civilians target military doctrines which
  threaten domestic popularity

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C. Organizational Politics

• Military organizations develop doctrines in
  unique ways
• Militaries focus on military missions, neglecting
  politics
• Militaries pursue parochial interests

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2. Implications

• Military control ? offensive doctrines (e.g.
  preventive war, inevitable escalation,
  counterforce targeting)
• Follow-on imperative ? new weapons establish
  vested interests, perpetuate the organization
  after its initial purpose

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D. Technological change

• All theories agree that technological change (new
  weapons available) can change doctrines
• Key inventions Nuclear weapons (1945),
  thermonuclear weapons (1952), satellites (1957),
  ICBMs and SLBMs (late 1950s),

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ICBMs and SLBMs Speed, Reach, and Penetration
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D. Technological change

• All theories agree that technological change (new
  weapons available) can change doctrines
• Key inventions Nuclear weapons (1945),
  thermonuclear weapons (1952), satellites (1957),
  ICBMs and SLBMs (late 1950s), MIRVs,

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A MIRVed ICBM The Minuteman III
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MIRV Test Time-Lapse Photo
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D. Technological change

• All theories agree that technological change (new
  weapons available) can change doctrines
• Key inventions Nuclear weapons (1945),
  thermonuclear weapons (1952), satellites (1957),
  ICBMs and SLBMs (late 1950s), MIRVs, PGMs and
  guided cruise missiles (1980s),

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PGMs and Guided Cruise Missiles
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D. Technological change

• All theories agree that technological change (new
  weapons available) can change doctrines
• Key inventions Nuclear weapons (1945),
  thermonuclear weapons (1952), satellites (1957),
  ICBMs and SLBMs (late 1950s), MIRVs, PGMs and
  guided cruise missiles (1980s), ABM/BMD,

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Defense ABM, BMD, SDI, etc.
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D. Technological change

• All theories agree that technological change (new
  weapons available) can change doctrines
• Key inventions Nuclear weapons (1945),
  thermonuclear weapons (1952), satellites (1957),
  ICBMs and SLBMs (late 1950s), MIRVs, PGMs and
  guided cruise missiles (1980s), ABM/BMD, ASAT

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ASAT A threat to early-warning satellites
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D. Technological change

• All theories agree that technological change (new
  weapons available) can change doctrines
• Key inventions Nuclear weapons (1945),
  thermonuclear weapons (1952), satellites (1957),
  ICBMs and SLBMs (late 1950s), MIRVs, PGMs and
  guided cruise missiles (1980s), ABM/BMD, ASAT,
  stealth

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Stealth technology
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V. History The Major Powers

• The United States
• The Monopoly
• US immediately uses weapons against cities
  (countervalue targeting)
• US reserves future weapons for invasion of Japan
  (counterforce targeting of beaches)
• End of World War II ? Iran crisis. US threatens
  USSR. Truman We're going to drop it on you.
• US believes A-Bomb gives it power of compellence,
  not merely deterrence
• The bombing of Hiroshima was the greatest event
  in world history since the birth of Jesus
  Christ. - Senator Brien "Mr. Atom" McMahon, 1952

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2. Massive Retaliation

• US adopts policy of containment (NSC-68)
  prevent Soviet expansion
• Massive retaliation promised disproportionate
  response to USSR transgressions
• Massive retaliation failed
• Not credible US failed to respond to Chinese
  intervention in Korea, East German riots of 1953,
  Hungary 1956, etc.
• Increased Soviet vulnerability USSR believed US
  might strike first in crisis, so USSR needed to
  pre-empt
• End of US dominance threatened to de-couple US
  from European war (US unwilling to trade New York
  for Bonn)

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3. Flexible Response

• Problem US threat to escalate immediately to
  global thermonuclear war is not credible
• Solution Prepare for each step on ladder of
  escalation. Goal escalation dominance

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• Ladder of escalation. From Herman Kahn, On
  Escalation, 1965

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c. Implementing flexible response

• The Triad Bombers, ICBMs, SLBMs for different
  purposes (bombers can be recalled, ICBMs are fast
  and accurate, SLBMs are survivable but
  inaccurate)
• Preparation for both countervalue and
  counterforce strategies (deter and limit damage
  if deterrence fails)
• Conventional build-up in Europe, deployment of
  tactical nuclear weapons
• US acts to restrain unauthorized weapon use
  (locks and codes)
• Acceptance of MAD Limits on ABMs negotiated

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4. Military influence over US policy

• Strong military has become interest group vying
  for government funds
• Predelegation
• Begins in 1957, continues through end of Cold War
  (and beyond?)
• US Commanders given authority to order
  retaliatory nuclear attacks if President
  unreachable (also given the unlock codes)

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c. Military resistance to nuclear warfighting
LNOs

• Problem for civilian strategists US nuclear war
  plan (SIOP) had no contingency calling for less
  than a few hundred nuclear weapons
• Eisenhower demands revisions to allow use of
  single weapons for political purposes (limited
  retaliation, response to conventional war)
• So does Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Carter,
  Reagan.yet SIOP never updated to include LNOs!

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d. Circumvention of civilian control

• Air Force forced to install locks (PALs) on
  nuclear weapons during 1960s.
• PALs require secret code to physically enable
  weapon. Even if missile launched, warhead wont
  detonate without code. Prevents unauthorized use
  of nuclear weapons.
• Air Force quietly sets code to 00000000 and
  tells just about everyone involved in the launch
  process!
• 1977 Congressional hearings lead Air Force to
  finally pick new codes

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e. Team B and worst case scenarios

• CIA issues report on Soviet intentions White
  House Chief of Staff Rumsfeld and others accuse
  it of being too optimistic
• CIA director Colby stands by the results.
  President Ford fires him, appoints Rumsfeld as
  Sec. Defense, and replaces Colby with future
  President George H.W. Bush, who (reluctantly)
  agrees to allow the competitive analysis by an
  outside panel chosen by Rumsfeld
• Richard Pipes (hard-line Sovietologist) selected
  to head Team B to re-examine the findings --
  hires other hardliners (e.g. neo-conservative
  Wolfowitz) as members and advisers

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f. Effects of Team B Report

• Wrong in nearly every factual respect argues
  that Soviet economic chaos is an illusion, that
  defense budget is twice actual size, that Soviets
  have advanced weapons US experts consider
  impossible (research funds are the evidence),
  etc.
• Core notion is that USSR becomes more aggressive
  as power increases suggests that MAD is
  insufficient for deterrence and US buildup is
  needed

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iii. Worst-case projections

• Example Actual US survivability vs. Team B
  estimates

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iv. Increased support for buildup

• Public support was never high, but did increase
  in the late 1970s, pressuring Carter
• 1980s DoD puts out Soviet Military Power each
  year, similar to Team B analysis
• From 1983 ?

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6. Hints of a new warfighting doctrine

• AirLand Battle 1980s doctrine envisions
  tactical nuclear strikes as part of conventional
  operations, not last resort when conventional war
  fails
• SDI US plans to move away from MAD by
  eliminating USSR ability to destroy US (proves
  impossible with 1980s technology)

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c. Renewed Civil Defense Efforts

• Everybody's going to make it if there are enough
  shovels to go around. Dig a hole, cover it with a
  couple of doors, and then throw three feet of
  dirt on top. It's the dirt that does it!
• T.K. Jones, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for
  Strategic and Nuclear Forces, 1982.

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7. Reagans Dream

• Soviet leader Gorbachev
  seeks rapprochement with West
• Gorbachev proposes universal, total nuclear
  disarmament (1986) Reagan accepts proposal
  immediately
• US and USSR begin rapid series of arms control
  treaties
• INF Bans IRBMs from Europe
• Start I Huge cuts in warheads and launchers
• Start II Abolished MIRVs (Never implemented)

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8. After the Cold War Warfighting Resurgent?

• Interest groups fight cancellation of Cold War
  weapons systems (B-2 bomber, Seawolf submarine,
  etc.)
• New threats, new weapons?
• US reaffirms policy of nuclear deterrence against
  non-nuclear countries under Bush
• Nuclear labs push for development of third
  generation nuclear weapons Congress cuts funds
  in mid-1990s
• US withdraws from ABM treaty to pursue BMD
  (2002) Russia responds by withdrawing from START
  II
• Hawks Goal prevent US from being
• deterred by others or self-deterred by
• overly-large weapons

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B. The Soviet Union and Russia

• Stalinism
• Stalin demands the bomb to deter US nuclear
  attack
• Stalin also forbids development of military
  doctrine for use of weapon (weapon is entirely
  political)
• USSR doesnt deploy usable weapons for years
  after first test

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Public Bluster, Private Fears?

• "I do not consider the atomic bomb as such a
  serious force. Atomic bombs are intended to
  frighten people with weak nerves."
• - Joseph Stalin
• "Only the imperialists will perish in an Atomic
  war."
• - V. Molotov, 1949

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2. The development of a doctrine

• Khrushchev adopts warfighting strategy use
  nuclear weapons to open gaps for exploitation by
  armor
• Goal eventual Soviet superiority (already
  enjoyed over China)
• Strict civilian control maintained
• Communist Party fear of Bonapartism
• Justified by argument that long crisis will
  precede nuclear war (so no need for quick
  response)
• Kruschev publicly claims If you start a war, we
  may die but the rockets will fly automatically
  but never builds an automatic system

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3. 1960s Implementing Warfighting Doctrine

• USSR assumes European war will rapidly escalate
  to global thermonuclear war
• Pre-emptive counterforce strategy prepared (but
  even internal documents always describe attacks
  as responses to invasion or attack) never fully
  adopted

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c. Civil Defense
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3. 1960s Implementing Warfighting Doctrine

• USSR assumes European war will rapidly escalate
  to global thermonuclear war
• Pre-emptive counterforce strategy prepared (but
  even internal documents always describe attacks
  as responses to invasion or attack) never fully
  adopted
• Civil defense limit damage in event of war,
  create hardened shelters for leaders (retain
  civilian control during wartime)

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4. Détente Did it make a difference?

• Late 1960s Soviets privately shift to
  second-strike plans, harden missile silos
• Strategic parity US acknowledges USSR as equal
  and gives up compellence BUT Soviets keep
  building ICBMs because of
• i. Cost (cheap) and geography (limited ports)
• ii. Pressure from Soviet defense industry, just
  like the US
• Soviet planners de-emphasize tactical nuclear use
  (conventional offensive believed to be quicker
  and tactical nukes would render military
  operations impossible due to contamination)
• By mid-1970s, warfighting evolved into a no
  first use flexible response doctrine, quite
  similar to US

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5. Soviet Nuclear Paranoia?

• Soviet leaders privately feared nuclear war.
  Post-Cold War evidence of nuclear fear by
  Brezhnev

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From 1995 study (declassified in 2009)

• During a 1972 command post exercise, leaders of
  the Kremlin listened to a briefing on the results
  of a hypothetical war with the United States. A
  U.S. attack would kill 80 million Soviet citizens
  and destroy 85 percent of the country's
  industrial capacity. According to the
  recollections of a Soviet general who was
  present, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev
  trembled when he was asked to push a button,
  asking Soviet defense minister Grechko this is
  definitely an exercise?
• Virtually all interview subjects stressed that
  they perceived the U.S. to be preparing for a
  first strike.

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Same study

• 1968 and 1981 Soviet studies USSR could not win
  nuclear war even with a first strike
• In a European war, if NATO forces were about to
  overrun Soviet nuclear weapons sites, the Soviets
  would destroy them with special devices and
  mines rather than use them.
• Soviets studied nuclear winter (without using
  the phrase) before US scientists
• Early 1980s Castro suggested the possibility of
  nuclear strikes against the US. The pressure
  stopped after Soviet officials gave Castro a
  briefing on the ecological impact on Cuba of
  nuclear strikes on the United States

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5. Soviet Nuclear Paranoia

• Soviet leaders privately feared nuclear war.
  Post-Cold War evidence of nuclear fear by
  Brezhnev
• and Andropov. (Able Archer crisis of 1983
  did US rhetoric nearly cause a Soviet strike?)
• Dominant belief was that US would strike first,
  despite preparations for pre-emption.

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6. The last years of the Cold War

• Soviet leaders come to believe (and proclaim to
  subordinates) that nuclear war is unwinnable
• Gorbachev seeks disarmament surprisingly little
  opposition (consensus in favor of some type of
  arms control among leadership)
• Key decision abandon pursuit of parity with US
  (arms race)

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d. Irony Warfighting plans persisted
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The Dead Hand System

• Underground command post
• If communications fail AND nuclear explosions
  detected by sensors
• Rocket is launched with internal radio
• Radio broadcasts launch orders / codes to Soviet
  ICBMs
• Thus, even if all Soviet leaders killed and
  communications disrupted, Soviet missiles will
  annihilate the USA
• Problem They didnt TELL us about it!

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7. Russian nuclear doctrine

• Conventional force reduction ? renunciation of
  NFU policy
• New emphasis on Russia as regional hegemon
  (security umbrella for CIS)
• Putins shift Nuclear weapons not restricted to
  defense of Russian independence ? now to be used
  if crisis threatens military security or
  international stability and peace (not
  renounced by figurehead Medvedev)
• De-Escalation Use a few nuclear weapons in
  limited conventional wars to raise costs of war
  for opponent, inducing peace (remember our game?
  C)

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C. The United Kingdom

• Initial impetus
• US terminates nuclear cooperation in 1946 and
  withdraws troops from Europe. British fear of
  USSR ? decision to proliferate in 1947.
• Goal influence US policy by becoming capable of
  joint operations to defend Europe -- or
  independent escalation of conventional European
  war to nuclear war
• 1949 USSR proliferation shocks UK, prompts
  crash program to proliferate

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2. British force as complement to US power

• Britain designs V-bomber force around
  assumption of US fighter support
• Britain adopts counterforce targeting when US
  focuses on countervalue (fears USSR could still
  attack Europe even after loss of cities) WW II
  example of USAAF refusal to attack V-weapon sites

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3. Modernization and deterrence

• US-UK Defense Agreement of 1958 US supplies
  H-Bomb designs, Tritium, U-235, Nevada Test Site
  to UK in exchange for Plutonium.
• UK diversifies arsenal because bombers are
  vulnerable ? shifts to SLBMs
• UK now owns Trident SLBMs in common pool with US

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D. France

• The Fourth Republic (1945-1958)
• Initial scientific phase ends with purge of
  Communists from nuclear program in 1952
• Decision to build weapons contingency program
  begun after Dien Bien Phu, accelerated after
  Nautilus affair, commitment made after Suez
  Crisis
• Decision to test based on declining influence
  in NATO (goal increase influence)

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US Opposes French Nuclear Ambitions

• Harold Stassen (special Assistant on
  Disarmament) If France makes this decision, the
  Federal Republic will decide to do so..., then
  many additional states will make the same
  decision and the Soviet Union will consider
  itself forced to provide such weapons also to
  other Communist states...

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2. De Gaulle and the Force de Frappe

• Gaullist Foreign policy
• Superpower balance is inherently unstable,
  requiring strong Europe as Third Force
• France is a Great Power with a global role and a
  leadership role in Europe

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b. Gaullist nuclear doctrine

• Proportional deterrence France need not
  destroy an attacker, only punish it
• Multilateral deterrence third force needed to
  inject uncertainty into superpower calculations,
  to prevent conventional war in Europe
• Triggering Unstated belief that France could
  force US defense of Europe by threatening USSR
  cities if USSR invaded West Europe

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c. Gaullism and Flexible Response

• France rejected idea of firebreak between war
  types in Europe BUT
• France DID reserve nuclear weapons for after the
  battle for West Germany was decided, but before
  war entered French soil
• French force structure was offensive credible
  first-strike force

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3. The Giscard Shift in the 1970s

• Revised foreign policy European, Atlantic,
  non-nuclear security
• Adoption of flexible response
• Tactical nuclear weapons (1972)
• Conventional force build-up and modernization
• Secret co-operation with US on MIRV and tactical
  weapons (1974) Giscard claims to have reached
  the same conclusions as General de Gaulle in
  public

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4. The Elections of 1981

• Both left (Socialists) and right (Gaullists)
  attack Giscard for abandoning the force de
  frappe
• Socialist victory nuclear build-up (new
  delivery systems, no disarmament while
  superpowers have more than France)
• Tactical weapons ? prestrategic weapons (shift
  away from flexible response)

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c. Reactions to US Foreign Policy

• French fear of US SDI program (which might leave
  US free to fight tactical nuclear war in Europe)
  ? cooperation with NATO on nuclear matters
• US-USSR proposals to eliminate nuclear weapons
  (esp. INF in 1987) ? French build-up in NATO
  (seeks alternatives to reliance on US)

99
5. After the Cold War

• Program reoriented to non-specific deterrence
  (dissuasion) -- Russia not presumed as enemy,
  nuclear response to chemical attack ruled out,
  force reduction to minimal survivable deterrent
• Adherence to test ban before low-yield weapon
  development completed in 1995 (rejection of
  warfighting doctrines)

100
E. China

• Before the bomb (1949-1963)
• Korean War US threatens use of nuclear weapons
  China makes concessions
• China emphasizes nuclear disarmament, seeks
  no-first-use pledge from US
• Sino-Soviet Cooperation China seeks aid from
  USSR for nuclear weapons.
• The Sino-Soviet Split USSR rejects Chinese
  attempt to lead world revolution, sides with ally
  India in border dispute, refuses to give China
  nuclear weapons

101
2. The early program

• Initial goal minimum deterrence and
  international prestige. Mao six bombs will do
• China decides against opposing proliferation by
  rival India (hopes for divisions in Indian
  politics, diversion of resources from other
  military projects)

102
c. Policy focus avoiding pre-emption

• Develops civil relocation for most of South China
• Some evidence suggests early strategy was to
  dismantle own nuclear facilities to avoid
  pre-emptive strike if one appears imminent!
• China continues to call for total nuclear
  disarmament and NWFZs (favors large conventional
  forces like Chinas PLA)

103
Current NWFZs
104
c. Policy focus avoiding pre-emption

• Develops civil relocation for most of South China
• Some evidence suggests early strategy was to
  dismantle own nuclear facilities to avoid
  pre-emptive strike if one appears imminent!
• China continues to call for total nuclear
  disarmament and NWFZs (favors large conventional
  forces like Chinas PLA)
• China delays ICBM research, focuses on IRBMs for
  use against USSR if it invades
• China adopts NFU pledge

105
3. Chinese Pragmatism

• China-US rapprochement and end of Maos reign ?
  debate
• Shanghai group Isolationists (need to focus on
  domestic development)
• Moderates Focus on foreign affairs, aligning
  with US against USSR
• Moderates prevail
• China deploys CSS-3 ICBM. Can reach Alaska and
  nearly all of USSR

106
Current Chinese Forces
107
ii. China focuses on survivability

• China disperses weapons, even though it lacks
  advanced command and control capability
• Some weapons deployed in caves (no hardened silos
  available)
• Bombers sent to different airfields at random
• China mass produces nuclear weapons, becoming
  third-largest nuclear power

108
iii. China rejects warfighting

• No tactical nukes until at least 1978
• No short-range nuclear-capable missiles! China
  must target cities or nothing.
• Deterring conventional attack unnecessary China
  believes it can repel invaders

109
4. China diversifies from the 1980s

• China develops diverse weapon systems CSS-4 ICBM
  (token numbers), SLBMs, even ADMs for tactical
  use
• Doctrine of countervalue retaliation is retained
• China seeks global NFU agreement and
  establishment of NWFZs

110
V. Conclusions What determines doctrines?
Applying Sagans theories to the evidence
111
A. Evidence supporting realism

• Every country changed doctrines in response to
  threats
• Smaller countries adopted proportional deterrence
  or allied with larger power
• US, China, USSR all adopted some version of
  flexible response as they reached MAD
• Conventionally-superior forces (USSR and China)
  adopt NFU while others (US, UK, France) preserve
  right to strike first

112
B. Evidence for Strategic Culture

• Chinese focus on peoples war delays tactical
  nuclear development
• French nuclear program partly motivated by
  prestige concerns, critical to politicians across
  spectrum
• USSR internal war plans assume capitalists
  attack first triggering disproportionate
  response
• USSR dead hand system assumes evil capitalists
  who will strike without warning

113
C. Evidence for Organizational Politics

• French coup attempt triggers premature nuclear
  test by civilians
• US labs find new nuclear threats after Cold War
  (see RNEP)
• Russia adopts more offensive doctrine as military
  / security apparatus gains control (Putin)
• US retains Triad after Cold War (follow-on
  imperative)