1973 arab war

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October War, 1973
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Lecture Contents
Introduction
Stage of political diplomatic efforts
Building the Armed Forces and preparing the
commanders and compatants
Preparation for October war
Operational problems and Solutions
Planning for the war
Strategic deception
Size and positions of the two sides forces
October War, 1973
Combat stages and positions
Noticeable points in leadership and Control.
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INTRODUCTON
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The objective of October War,1973
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War decisions circumstances
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War decisions circumstances
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War decisions circumstances
Lack of confidence between the Egyptian people
and their political command as a result of 67
defeat , a matter that never permits having an
uncalculated adventure .
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War decisions circumstances
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War decisions circumstances
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War decisions circumstances
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War decisions circumstances
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Preparation For October War
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The political Diplomatic Efforts
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The political Diplomatic Efforts
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First initiative on Feb. 4th, 1971
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The second initiative,May 1971
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On the African level
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On the African level
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On the African level
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Henry Kissinger said before October War1973
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Henry Kissinger said before October War1973
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Construction of the Armed Forces , and
Preparation of the Commanders and Combatants
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Construction of the Armed Forces , and
Preparation of the Commanders and Combatants
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Construction of the Armed Forces , and
Preparation of the Commanders and Combatants
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Construction of the Armed Forces , and
Preparation of the Commanders and Combatants
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Construction of the Armed Forces , and
Preparation of the Commanders and Combatants
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Construction of the Armed Forces , and
Preparation of the Commanders and Combatants
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Construction of the Armed Forces , and
Preparation of the Commanders and Combatants
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Construction of the Armed Forces , and
Preparation of the Commanders and Combatants
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Construction of the Armed Forces , and
Preparation of the Commanders and Combatants
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Construction of the Armed Forces , and
Preparation of the Commanders and Combatants
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Construction of the Armed Forces , and
Preparation of the Commanders and Combatants
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Construction of the Armed Forces , and
Preparation of the Commanders and Combatants
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Construction of the Armed Forces , and
Preparation of the Commanders and Combatants
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Construction of the Armed Forces , and
Preparation of the Commanders and Combatants
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Construction of the Armed Forces , and
Preparation of the Commanders and Combatants
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Construction of the Armed Forces , and
Preparation of the Commanders and Combatants
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Construction of the Armed Forces , and
Preparation of the Commanders and Combatants
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Construction of the Armed Forces , and
Preparation of the Commanders and Combatants
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Construction of the Armed Forces , and
Preparation of the Commanders and Combatants
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Construction of the Armed Forces , and
Preparation of the Commanders and Combatants
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
Equipping the first waves with light anti-tank
systems ( Stinger RBG) s
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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The War Operational Problems Solutions
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Planning For October War
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Planning For October War
Israel
Considering the Israeli military way of thinking,
doctrines and behavioral patterns that indicated
the following
Accurate analysis of the Israeli security theory
and determining on points of Israeli weakness and
strength
The Israeli Headquarters suffers excessive
self-Confidence
Considering the possible psychological impacts of
the Israeli Headquarters as well as its potential
reactions.
After 1967 War, Israeli continuously emphasized
its superiority over the Arab Countries and also
accentuated both the cultural and technological
gaps.
Gathering data on Israeli Forces and studying
their defense techniques on the Suez Canal as
well as precisely estimating their actual
capabilities.
The Egyptian political leadership suffered some
weakness with regard to decision making and
efficient management of the struggle under the
prevailing international attitude and regional
circumstances.
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Planning For October War
Studying topographic and aerial circumstances to
select the most appropriate time to manage the
coming battle from the Arab perspective
Denying the Israeli troops the following
Air superiority through establishing a modern and
reliable air defense system as well as taking the
necessary actions to grant the Egyptian Air Force
the opportunity to operate through all over the
battle.
Determining on the best technique to prepare and
organize the Egyptian Armed Forces in a manner
that positively serves the nature of their
missions
Taking the advantage of the initiative
Maintaining the ability to deliver a strong
counter attack by means of tanks during the first
stages of the offense.
Putting great emphasis on all factors that grant
success and most importantly taking Israelies by
surprise .
Making the best use of natural and artificial
barriers
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Planning For October War
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Planning For October War
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Planning For October War
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Strategic Deception
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Strategic Deception
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Size of both Egyptian and Israeli Forces
2 infantry \ armored brigades 1Nahal battalion
1st Echelon
5 infantry divions 2 independent infantry brigades
Some infantry and armored brigades
Some infantry anal armored brigades .
Reserves
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Positions of both Egyptian and Israeli Forces
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18
21
2
16
7
4
6
19
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Combat Stages and Positions
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Salient points In Command Control
Applying the principle of elasticity to achieve
continuous initiative according to the battle
and quick changes in the situation , this could
be done through a combination of centralization
and decentralization in controlling the forces.
Some procedures were taken to guarantee constant
control during the combat stages at the different
levels.
Control groups were formed in hand of the General
Head Quarters to be moved forward to the vital
regions and directions, aiming to study the
situation and make the appropriate decisions.
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Salient points In Command Control
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Salient points In Command Control
The presence of the command posts in the front
more than stated in tactics.
The control of the Air Force commanders over
their units from the air.
The control of the Navy commanders over their
unit from the board their ships.
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outputs of october war
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Outputs of October war, 1973
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Outputs of October war, 1973
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Outputs of October war, 1973
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Outputs of October war, 1973
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Outputs of October war, 1973
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Outputs of October war, 1973
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Outputs of October war, 1973
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Outputs of October war, 1973
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Outputs of October war, 1973
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Outputs of October war, 1973
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Outputs of October war, 1973
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Outputs of October war, 1973
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Outputs of October war, 1973
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Outputs of October war, 1973
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Outputs of October war, 1973
The committee has reached an agreement that chief
of general staff General David EL-Yaazer is
personally responsible for the mistakes of the
situation assessment and mobilization of the
Israeli armed forces . Due to this negligence,
the committee recommended that General EL-Yaazer
to be discharged from his position as chief of
General staff
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Outputs of October war, 1973
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Outputs of October war
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Conclusion
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conclusion
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Quotes by Israeli officials
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Quotes by Israeli officials
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Quotes by Israeli officials
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Quotes by Israeli officials
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Quotes by Israeli officials
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International military experts testimonies
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International military experts testimonies
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International military experts testimonies
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International military experts testimonies
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International military experts testimonies
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International military experts testimonies
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Newspapers Quotations
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Newspapers Quotations
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Newspapers Quotations
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Newspapers Quotations
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October war, 1973 A war for the sake sake of
peace
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October war, 1973 A war for the sake sake of
peace