Title: What is Cognitive Science?
1What is Cognitive Science?
Zenon Pylyshyn, Rutgers Center for Cognitive
Science
- Whats in the mind that we may know it?
http//ruccs.rutgers.edu/faculty/pylyshyn.html
2Cognitive science is a delicate mixture of the
obvious and the incredible
- Granny was almost right
- Behavior really is governed by what we know and
what we want (together with the mechanisms for
representing and for drawing inferences from
these)
3Its emic, not etic properties that
matterKenneth Pike
- What determines our behavior is not how the world
is, but how we represent it - As Chomsky pointed out in his review of Skinner,
if we describe behavior in relation to the
objective properties of the world, we would have
to conclude that behavior is essentially
stimulus-independent - Every behavioral regularity (other than physical
ones like falling) is cognitively penetrable
4Its emic states that matter!
5The central role of representation presents some
serious problems for a natural science
- What representations are about is what matters
- But how can the fact that a belief is about some
particular thing have an observable consequence? - e.g. How can the presence of holy grail in a
belief determine behavior when the holy grail
does not exist? - In a natural science if X causes Y then X must
exist and be causally connected to Y! - Its even worse than that even when X exists, it
is not Xs physical properties that are relevant!
- e.g., the North Star navigation
6This dilemma is sometimes referred to as
Brentanos problem or the problem of
intentionality
- What determines what we do is what our mental
states are about, but aboutness is not a category
of natural science. - That is why Brentano concluded that psychology
was beyond the grasp of natural science.
7There are other properties that are special to
cognitively determined behavior
- The Semantic determinants of most cognitive
behavior. To capture regularities in
cognitively-caused behavior we must use semantic
terms terms referring to what things mean.
Same-meaning stimuli are equivalent for many
generalizations of cognitive science. - The Cognitive Penetrability of most cognitive
processes. Almost any regularity can be
systematically altered in a quasi-rational way by
imparting new information.
8Properties that are special about cognition
- The productivity and systematicity of systems of
mental representation. Systems of mental
representation are structured so that if they are
capable of representing certain situations then
they are also capable of representing an
unbounded number of other related situations.
This leads to the requirements that
representations be compositional, and that they
have constituent structure. - The critical role of "Cognitive Capacity".
Because of an organism's ecological or social
niche, only a small fraction of its behavioral
repertoire is ever actually observed. Nonetheless
an adequate cognitive theory must account for the
behavioral repertoire that is compatible with the
organism's structure, which we call its cognitive
capacity.
9Is it hopeless to think we can have a natural
science of cognition?
- Along comes The computational theory of mind
- the only straw afloat
10The major historical milestones
- Brentanos recognition of the problem of
intentionality - The formalist movement in the foundations of
mathematics Hilbert, Goedel, Russell
Whitehead, Turing, Church, - Representational/Computational theory of mind
Newell Simon, Chomsky, Fodor
11How to make a purely mechanical system reason
about things it does not understand or know
about? The discovery of symbolic logic.
(1) Married(John, Mary) or Married(John, Susan)
and the equation or statement, (2)
notMarried(John, Susan). from these two
statements you can conclude, (3) Married(John,
Mary) But notice that (3) follows from (1) and
(2) regardless of what is in the parts of the
equation not occupied by the terms or or not so
that you could write down the equations without
mentioning marriage or John or Mary or, for that
matter, anything having to do with the world.
Try replacing these expressions with the
meaningless letters P and Q. The inference still
holds (1') P or Q (2') not Q
therefore, (3') P
12Intelligent systems behave the way they do
because of what the represent
- But in order to function under physical
principles, the representations must be encoded
in physical properties - How to encode knowledge in physical properties is
by first encoding it in symbolic form (Proof
Theory tells us how) and then instantiating those
symbolic codes physically (computer science tells
us how)
13Cognitive Science and the Tri-Level Hypothesis
- Intelligent systems are organized at three (or
more) distinct levels - The physical or biological level
- The symbolic or syntactic level
- The knowledge or semantic level
- This means that different regularities may
require appeal to different levels
14Calculator example
- Why is the calculators printing faint and
irregular? Why are parts of numbers missing in
the LED display? - Why does it take longer to multiply large numbers
than small ones, whereas it takes the same length
of time to add large numbers as small numbers? - Why does it take longer to calculate
trigonometrical functions than sums? - Why is it especially fast at calculating the
logarithm of 1? - Why is it that when one of the keys (labeled ?)
is pressed after a number is entered, the
calculator prints what appears to be the square
root of that number? Will it always do so? - When the answer to an arithmetic problem is too
long to fit in the display window, why are some
of the digits left off?
15Does intentionality (and the trilevel hypothesis)
only apply to high-level processes such as
reasoning?
16Does intentionality (and the trilevel hypothesis)
only apply to high-level processes such as
reasoning?
- Examples from color vision.
Red light and yellow light mix to produce orange
light This remains true for any way of getting
red light and yellow light e.g. yellow may be
light of 580 nanometer wavelength, or it may be a
mixture of light of 530 nm and 650 nm
wavelengths. So long as one light looks yellow
and the other looks red the law will hold.
17Does intentionality (and the trilevel hypothesis)
only apply to high-level processes such as
reasoning?
John gave the book to Fred because he finished
it John gave the book to Fred because he wanted it
- The city council refused to give the workers a
permit for a demonstration because they feared
violence - The city council refused to give the workers a
permit for a demonstration because they were
communists
18Methodological asideOn the difference between
explanations that appeal to mental architecture
and those that appeal to tacit knowledge
- Suppose we observe some robust behavioral
regularity. What does it tell us about the
nature of the mind or about its intrinsic
properties?
19An illustrative example Mystery Code Box
What does this behavior pattern tell us about the
nature of the box?
20The Moral Regularities in behavior may be due
to either
- The inherent nature of the system (to its
structure), or - The nature of what the system represents (what it
knows).
21Where it matters
- Application of the architecture vs knowledge
distinction to understanding what goes on when we
reason using mental images
22Examples of behavior regularities attributable to
tacit knowledge
- Colour mixing, conservation of volume
- The effect of image size ?
- Scanning mental images ?
23Color mixing example
24Conservation of volume example
25Our studies of mental scanning
(Pylyshyn Bannon. See Pylyshyn, 1981)
There is even reason to doubt that one can
imagine scanning continuously (Pylyshyn Cohen,
1998)
26If cognition is at a different level of
organization than the physical level, how can we
ever tell what it is?
- We are limited only by the imagination of the
experimenter, e.g., - Relative complexity evidence (RT, error rates)
- Intermediate state evidence
- Eye tracking
- Stage analysis (additive factors method)
- Event Related Potentials (EEG)
- fMRI
- clinical observations of brain damage
- Psychophysical methods (SDT)
- Etc
27Example of one methodology Sternberg memory
search paradigm
28Of course we cant always be sure we have the
right method or instrument
29If all else fails there is always parsimony and
generality(they worked well in physics and
linguistics!)