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Regulating negative environmental externalities of agriculture

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Title: Regulating negative environmental externalities of agriculture


1
Regulating negative environmental externalities
of agriculture
  • Lecture 20
  • Economics of Food Markets
  • Alan Matthews

2
Key issues
  • treatment of adverse environmental impacts as
    negative externalities
  • ambiguity of the 'polluter pays' principle
  • relative advantages and disadvantages of
    alternative policies to address negative
    externalities
  • case studies of the EU Nitrates Directive and
    greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture

3
Reading
  • Surveys (Scott, Ribaudo et al)
  • Policy material on implementing the Nitrates
    Directive

4
Environmental damage as an externality
5
Polluter pays principle
  • In the case of negative environmental impacts,
    there is now general endorsement of the Polluter
    Pays Principle (PPP) which has been adopted by
    all OECD countries.
  • However, the question of what is 'pollution'
    whose avoidance costs should be borne by
    producers and how to define 'environnmental
    benefits' for which producers should be
    compensated is a social construct which depends
    entirely on the distribution of property rights
    in the environment in any society.

6
Who should have the property right?
  • the preservation of the tropical rain forests as
    a CO2 sink - should Brazil be required to protect
    its forests, or should the West be required to
    compensate Brazil for doing so?
  • public access to farmland for recreational
    purposes - should farmers be compensated for
    giving rights of way on their land, or is this a
    public entitlement?
  • wetland preservation - should farmers be
    prevented from draining important wetlands on
    their property, or should they be compensated for
    foregoing their right to improve their land in
    this way?
  • traditional farm buildings - should farmers be
    required to preserve farm buildings of heritage
    interest, or should the public compensate farmers
    for so doing?
  • Farmers are asked to improve the housing of their
    animals by giving them more space in response to
    public concerns about animal welfare - should
    they be compensated by the public or not?

7
Regulating environmental bads by assigning
property rights
  • Implications of zero liability and full liability
    rules
  • - either lead to socially optimal output level,
    but distribution of income very different

The Coase Theorem
8
Difficulties in implementing the Coase solution
  • transactions costs involved in negotiating
    solutions would be high where more than two
    parties were involved, and in practice it may be
    difficult to identify who all the affected
    parties are
  • the optimal solution assumes that there is full
    information about the environmental implications
    of different activities which is unlikely
  • often property rights are not divisible (e.g.
    landscape amenity values) implying that
    individual market transactions do not work and
    the free rider problem makes collective action to
    pay compensation difficult.

9
Fiscal instruments
10
Drawbacks of fiscal instruments to tackle
nonpoint agricultural pollution
  • Agricultural pollution is not of the 'point' or
    'end-of-pipe' variety which allows emissions to
    be precisely measured. This makes the use of an
    emissions-based tax infeasible.
  • Taxing an input rather than pollution itself can
    lower the costs of tax collection, monitoring and
    enforcement although it is not necessarily fair.
  • The effectiveness of taxation in controlling
    pollution can be limited because of low price
    elasticies of input demand.
  • Scott (1997) argues that, even before considering
    taxation, the removal of fiscal privileges to
    polluting inputs should be undertaken.
  • Alternatively, subsidies may be paid to farmers
    to encourage them to avoid pollution

11
Emissions trading schemes
12
Regulatory approaches
  • Non-market based approaches are of two types
  • performance standards. These are regulations
    based on measuring the observable outcome of the
    polluter's behaviour, such as limits on the
    chemical residues in water effluent from a
    factory or power station. Such emission-based
    standards are used for point sources of pollution
    but are rarely practical in agricultural
    situations because the pollution contributions of
    individual farms are virtually unobservable.
  • design standards. These are regulations which
    govern the way farmers produce food and manage
    their land. For example, to reduce nutrient
    runoff, regulations could be imposed on waste
    management practices and on the level, timing and
    form of nutrient applications to cropland.
  • May lead to higher total costs of pollution
    abatement

13
Case studies
  • Nitrates Directive 1991 to control water
    pollution from agricultural sources
  • Tackling greenhouse gas emissions from livestock
    production
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