Anastasia LoukaitouSideris

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Rail Transit Security in an International Context
Security Issues and Impacts Conference UCLA, June
1, 2006

• Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris
• Department of Urban Planning, UCLA
• A Collaborative Research Project
• UCLA Department of Urban Planning
• UC Berkeley Institute of Transportation Studies

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• For those intending to kill in quantity and
• willing to kill indiscriminately,
• public transit offers an ideal target
• While air transport security has been given great
  attention, urban transport systems carry more
  people and depend on open, accessible design to
  function well

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Public Transit Terrorist Incidents

• Over 900 incidents since 1920
• Two-thirds intended to kill people rather than
  just to disrupt service
• More than one-third of attacks actually produced
  fatalities
• Of fatal incidents, three-quarters produced
  multiple deaths, and one quarter produced ten or
  more deaths

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Since 1990 more than 40 of all terrorist attacks
in the entire world have been on transportation
systems
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Stages in Security Planning

• Stage 1 Planning, Design, Building
• Stage 2 Planning for Incident Response
• Stage 3 Immediate Response to Incidents
• Stage 4 Long-Term Recovery and Adoption of
  New Rules Procedures

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Components of the Project

• Review of the literature on transit terrorist
  incidents
• Survey of 113 U.S. transit agencies
• Case studies of U.S. transit systems New York,
  Washington, D.C.
• International case studies London, Madrid,
  Paris, Tokyo

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A Great Deal to Learn From International
Experience

• London after IRA attacks
• Japan after sarin gas attacks
• Paris after GIA bombings
• Madrid after Al-Queda attack

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Scope of Research

• Comparing strategies of transit agencies in U.S.
  and around the world
• Contrasting transit security processes of
  different transit authorities and ministries
• Evaluating transit station design for security
• Assessing lessons learned from actual attacks in
  different contexts for future response
  prevention

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Survey of Domestic Transit Operators

• The survey looked at the perceptions and
  experiences after the 9-11 attacks, in four
  distinct areas of transit security planning
• Policing
• Security hardware and technology
• Public education/user outreach
• Environmental design strategies
• 113 transit agencies responded (44 of agencies
  contacted)
• 108 cities in 40 different states

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Most Recent Incidents Experienced By Systems
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Vulnerability of System Modes to Attack
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Vulnerability of System Components
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Threat and Vulnerability Assessments

• Of 113 agencies, 85 have conducted some level of
  threat and vulnerability assessment of key system
  infrastructure
• Almost half (46) of systems have conducted
  comprehensive security assessments
• Among agencies who have not conducted assessments
  (n11), reasons given for not doing so included
  lack of resources, agency in the process of
  planning assessment, and one respondent claimed
  that his agency was not a high value target

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Frequency of Assessments

• A third of agencies reported doing assessments at
  least once a year
• Other agencies did not have regular policy
  conduct assessments as deemed necessary
• 70 have conducted an assessment in the last 3
  years

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Importance of Strategies in Security Planning
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Perceived Effectiveness of Strategies
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CPTED Strategies and Transit Security

• More than two-thirds (69) of respondents
  familiar with crime prevention through
  environmental design (CPTED)
• 58 of the transit systems employ CPTED
  strategies
• Familiarity and use of CPTED was higher among
  systems with rail

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Components where CPTED Strategies are used
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Components of Rail Systems where CPTED strategies
are used
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General Survey Conclusions

• Significant attacks are so far rare in the US
  although transit agencies have received at times
  credible threats
• Attention to transit security increased
  significantly after 9-11 CPTED and information
  and outreach was given much more attention after
  9-11
• Survey findings reflect fundamental dilemmas of
  transit security planning systems inherently
  open and vulnerable, but security has increased
  dramatically in the past decade

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International Case Studies Research Questions

• How are transportation systems in different
  cities of the world handling transit security?
• What mix of strategies do they use?
• Do they perceive crime prevention through
  environmental design as a valid security
  strategy?
• What lessons can U.S. transit systems learn from
  the international experience?

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International Fieldwork

• Interviews with transit managers, transit
  officials responsible for security, architects,
  and engineers designing the operation of transit
  systems in 4 cities.
• Visits to stations of case study systems and
  their control and command centers
• Visits to model stations with state of the art
  measures of security (Alto del Arenal in Madrid,
  METEORs Gare de Lyon, and St. Lazare on the EOLE
  line in Paris).

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Paris

• Previous attacks more limited in scope.
• Recognition that threat is different today.
• Security has become more of a goal than a
  reality. The primary goal is to create a feeling
  of security rather than reduce the risk to zero,
  which is practically impossible.

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Paris A Hierarchical System of Security- A Web
of Plans

• Government plans for civil security under the
  authority of Prefet Plan Rouge
• In each region, local communities of security
  composed of police, local government officials,
  and transit operators
• After Algerian attacks of 1995, Vigipirate Plan
  for periods of high alert in Paris
• Security Audits and prioritization of security
  needs by French Ministry of Transport
• Security plans for specific types of threats
  (chemical, biological, radioactive
• Security measures by transit operators (SNCF and
  RATP)

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ParisKey Security Emphasis

• Comprehensiveness, coordination, communication,
  adoption of a systemic approach to security,
  integration of different strategies
• Coordination transcends national borders.
  Pan-European cooperation through the
  International Union of Transportation (UITP)

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Line 14 - MeteorIntegration of Security
Strategies

• Security Technology Computerized trains under a
  command center which can communicate with each
  train. Glass doors on platforms, adjustable locks
  on trains, remote control CCTV cameras
• Policing Uniformed and civilian-clothed staff
  and police on platforms and trains.
• Information Campaigns

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Integration of Security Strategies

• Design Wide, straight passageways, corridors,
  and platforms, limited exits, use of natural and
  artificial lighting, shatter proof fiberglass,
  transparent and resistant materials, transparent
  trashcans

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Tokyo

• Sarin attack came as a shock to the safe
  society of Japan it was perceived as an
  isolated incident, an indiscriminate large-scale
  murder not a terrorist incident
• 9-11 attacks forced the Japanese to perceive
  terrorism as a very serious threat to their
  transit systems

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TokyoResponsibility on Transit Operators

• Minimal role of the national government in
  issuing security regulations or implementing
  transit security improvements
• National government issues at times security
  suggestions and guidance memos
• Broad security directives and strategies are
  decided by the Board of Directors of transit
  companies smaller security issues are decided
  upon by the Safety Affairs Division of each
  company

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TokyoTransit Security Strategies

• Policing and patrolling by staff, private
  security guards, municipal police

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TokyoTransit Security Strategies

• User outreach through posters, stickers and
  public announcements

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TokyoTransit Security Strategies

• Security technologies with security cameras and
  CCTV technology. Since sarin attack 2,200
  security cameras have been installed at strategic
  points (platforms, ticket gates, restrooms)
• Alarm and security buttons

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TokyoTransit Security Strategies

• Design strategies only considered after 9-11
• Efforts to minimize dead space
• Make inaccessible certain station areas
• Locate restrooms away from secluded spaces make
  walls out of translucent materials
• Remove trashcans and cigarette receptacles
• New train windows open more easily
• Fireproof train materials

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London

• Very comprehensive system of security directives
  and standards due to the series of terrorist
  attacks by IRA in last 30 years
• The Al-Queda attacks were perceived as a
  different brand of terrorism and have injected a
  new sense of urgency

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LondonA Layered Network of Security

• National Level Two national committees under the
  Department of Transport Rail Safety and
  Standards Board (sets safety standards) and
  TRANSEC (regulates airports, ports, and railway
  stations)
• Regional Level Transport for London (TfL)
  facilitates emergency planning and response of
  transportation agencies in the greater London
  area
• Industry-wide
• British Transport Police (BTP) for all railway
  systems in Great Britain
• Network Rail (nonprofit) owns and controls
  railway infrastructure deals with the security
  of stations and infrastructure
• Transit Operators operate their own Security
  Division, which oversees implementation of
  security standards and suggests enhancements

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LondonKey Security Emphasis

• Interagency coordination Regular meetings of
  representatives from each agency
• Coordination with European agencies to share best
  practices
• Not much collaboration with American transport
  operators

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LondonTransit Security Strategies

• Mix of security technology, customer outreach,
  policing, and design strategies
• I dont think one of these strategies sits on
  its own. Youve got to do each one. And youve
  got to have an element of each one in terms of
  combating terrorism
• London Underground official

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LondonTransit Security Strategies

• Security technology 6,000 CCTV cameras, some
  connected to alarms, and some with recording
  capabilities some skepticism about their
  effectiveness
• Policing and staff vigilance 630 officers in
  London Underground in 2004
• Information and outreach has resulted in
  significant vigilance by the public reports of
  10,000 unattended items every month!

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LondonTransit Security Strategies

• Design strategies emerged in the last decade
• Elimination of concealment spaces (vending
  machines and phone booths with sloping tops)
• Securing in-between spaces (walkways, escalators,
  elevators, storage and power supply rooms)
• Many decentralized control rooms for the system.
• Redesigned trash receptacles (see-through plastic)

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Madrid

• Long experience with terrorism because of ETA
  attacks
• New understanding of terrorism after 3-11-04
  attack as indiscriminate, international,
  unexpected

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MadridTriple Layer of Security National
Municipal Transit Operator

• National Level Ministry of Defense provides
  information about threats Ministry of Interior
  instigates security regulations and standards
  Civil Guard protects Metro Madrid.
• Local Level Municipal police protects Metro
  Madrid Consorcio Regional de Tranportes de
  Madrid (CRTM) coordinates transportation
  agencies.
• Transit Operators Operate security departments,
  contract private security officers
• Association holding bi-monthly meetings of
  representatives of local and regional agencies
  dealing with security.

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MadridTransit Security Strategies

• Security Technology
• Retrofit of Metro Madrid and RENFE stations with
  anti-intrusion and detection systems, and video
  and security cameras.
• Scanning system of passengers of high-speed (AVE)
  trains.
• Command and control center

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MadridTransit Security Strategies

• Public Outreach Only training of employees
  absence of warning posters and advice for the
  public
• Policing Combination of private and municipal
  police forces, and national forces for Metro
  Madrid

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MadridTransit Security Strategies

• Design Strategies Design guidelines for new
  stations
• Limited entrance points
• Clearly visible, open corridors, platforms,
  waiting areas
• Avoidance of underground passages and
  footbridges, and winding corridors

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MadridDesign Strategies (cont)

• Elimination of dark zones
• Panoramic elevators
• No space on top or underneath vending machines
• Transparent materials in station design
• Good lighting

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Ten Lessons Learned

• Public transit systems are inherently vulnerable
  to terrorist attacks they cannot be closed and
  secured like other parts of the transportation
  system.
• The threat of transit terrorism is probably not
  universal most attacks in the western world have
  been on largest systems in the largest cities.
• Transit managers are struggling to balance the
  costs and benefits of increased security against
  the costs and benefits of attracting passengers.
• Close coordination among government, security and
  transit sectors is critical to effective
  planning.

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Ten Lessons Learned

• Despite significant progress in increasing
  coordination, much work remains (particularly in
  the U.S.).
• Standardization of emergency training, security
  audits, and guidelines, and disaster preparedness
  procedures is important.
• Passenger education is a challenge Informed
  passengers can increase safety, fearful
  passengers may stop using transit.

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Ten Lessons Learned

• Anti-terrorism efforts have had as a positive
  side-effect the reduction of person and property
  crime in transit systems.
• The role of crime prevention through
  environmental design is waxing.
• Transit agencies have been more likely to adopt
  comprehensive, multi-pronged approaches to
  security after 9-11.

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You can have the cleanest trains in the world,
you can have the most luminous trains in the
world, and you can have the most comfortable
trains in the world, and you can have the most
punctual trains in the world. But when you go in
a train and do not feel safe you are not going to
use that train. Manuel Rodriguez Simons,
Director of Security and Civil Protection, RENFE,
Madrid
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Questions Comments