Military History

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Military History Chapter 21b Vietnam War
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Vietnam War (part II- 1965-1975) Escalation
Stalemate (1965-68)

• By65 SVN Gov appeared on verge of collapse
• NVN shifts to large scale military attacks
• Operational strategy destroy SVN main forces
• Shift to stage 3 was strategically premature
  why?
• US response (1965 gt68) major force
  ?_______________
• Fortunately for NVN, US force escalation was
  gradual
• LBJ incrementally increased pressure (Ltd War
  Theory)
• But NVN able to absorb pain rebuild/re-supply
• Made minor tactical adjustments continued war

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Rolling Thunders Impact

• Rolling Thunders limited impact
• Gradually increased IAW Limited War Theory
• Result
• Failed to meet operational objectives
• NVN continued to infiltrate re-supply/reinforce
  VC insurgents in the south
• All along well established Ho Chi Minh Trail
• General Westmorelands Operational Strategy on
  the ground
• Halt enemys momentum gt
• Provide security to cities
• Then major search destroy operations
• Aim
• Punish main force units break NLF rural lead
• Subsequent to above stabilize pacify South
• Compel enemy to negotiate terms with US

4
Battle of Ia Drang (Nov65)

• Central Highlands
• 1st major direct clash between US
  NVA
• NVA corps executes series
  of ops in Pleiku area
• Aim knock out blow to SVN
• Plan conduct diversion on SF camp near Plei Me
• Then ambush the relief column
• Classic lure ambush tactic

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Execution

• 1st stage NVA diversion is successful
• NVA springs ambush on ARVN relief column
• Then US SVN units launch sharp counterattack
• Gain fire superiority with infantry,
  Arty, CAS air strikes
• NVA plan defeated gt conduct
  tactical withdrawal
• Interim Result
• NVA 850 KIA 1700 WIA
• Westy sent 1st Air Cavalry to search destroy of
  enemy
• Series of violent clashes ensue
• 14 Nov largest encounter at LZ X-ray (Map)
• Fierce heroic fighting ensued at individual
  platoon level

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Medal of Honor
Citation For conspicuous gallantry and
intrepidity at the risk of life above and beyond
the call of duty. As a platoon leader in the 1st
Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 1st Lt. Marm
demonstrated indomitable courage during a combat
operation. His company was moving through the
valley to relieve a friendly unit surrounded by
an enemy force of estimated regimental size. 1st
Lt. Marm led his platoon through withering fire
until they were finally forced to take cover.
Realizing that his platoon could not hold very
long, and seeing four enemy soldiers moving into
his position, he moved quickly under heavy fire
and annihilated all 4. Then, seeing that his
platoon was receiving intense fire from a
concealed machinegun, he deliberately exposed
himself to draw its fire. Thus locating its
position, he attempted to destroy it with an
antitank weapon. Although he inflicted
casualties, the weapon did not silence the enemy
fire. Quickly, disregarding the intense fire
directed on him and his platoon, he charged 30
meters across open ground, and hurled grenades
into the enemy position, killing some of the 8
insurgents manning it. Although severely wounded,
when his grenades were expended, armed with only
a rifle, he continued the momentum of his assault
on the position and killed the remainder of the
enemy. 1st Lt. Marm's selfless actions reduced
the fire on his platoon, broke the enemy assault,
and rallied his unit to continue toward the
accomplishment of this mission. 1st Lt. Marm's
gallantry on the battlefield and his
extraordinary intrepidity at the risk of his life
are in the highest traditions of the U.S. Army
and reflect great credit upon himself and the
Armed Forces of his country.
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US Counterattack

• As NVA attack US counterattack with superior
  fire power
• Arty bombardment from other LZs (8K
  rounds expended)
• F-105 B-52 CAS
  (friendly fire cas result)
• Bitter danger close fighting last 2 days
• (LTC Moore declared Broken Arrow)
• Then NVA withdraw set ambush
• Next day 2nd Battalion of 7th Calvary ambushed
  suffer heavy casualties at LZ Albany
• Casualties NVA 3K KIA US 300
• Impact on Giap Westys conclusion about their
  Strategy?

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Strategy of Attrition Flaws?

• Westy concluded his strategy of attrition would
  work
• Assumption US can inflict unbearable losses on
  NVA
• while keeping US casualties within acceptable
  limits
• Historic experience all ran counter to previous
  events
• WWII recent experience in Asia
• Recall US campaigns in Japan (Oki Iwo) Korea
• Recent French experience in Vietnam at Dien Bien
  Phu
• Enemy sacrifice Giap will sacrifice as many as
  it takes
• Willing to sacrifice any amount of casualties
  necessary to win
• NVNs Protracted War strategy based on
  sacrifice
• To what extent was US willing to go same
  distance?
• NVA control of losses can chose when where to
  strike
• Retained strategic tactical initiative
• Await US to depart op area gt then reoccupy
• Result No lasting operational solutiongt fluid
  dynamic sitcom

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Political Dimension

• Political aspect gained importance over time
• While military situation bogged down
• Saigon government in state of flux
• Coup recently ousted (assassinated) Diem
• Power struggle among SVN generals sucked all
  oxygen out
• Series of coups counter-coups follows
• War refugees crowd city
• Corruption/black market/vice escalate
• American society became divided over war with
  time
• Anti-war protests escalate
• Both Hawks vs. Doves want out
• Go all the way militarily vs. give peace a
  chance

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Tet68 Battle for Hue

• Battle Prep
• Spring/summer67 NVA prepare for major offensive
• Operational Aim
• Break deadlock of current operational situation
• Operational Strategy (NVA) concept of
  operations
• Diversion lure US to remote areas away from
  cities
• Launch coordinated NVA/NLF strike on major cities
  
• Strategic Objectives ultimate strategic aim
• Weaken SVN government spark general uprising
• Concurrently pursue negotiations w/US -objective?
• Get US to halt ?_______ ?____________
  allies/weaken SVN
• Shape favorable coalition government US
  departure

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Execution Phase I

• NVA attack Con Thien, Loc
  Ninh, Song Be, Dak To
• NVA lay siege on Khe Sanh
  (USMC/SF) outpost
• Westy reacts as NVA expected him to
• (Eager to confront NVA in major battle)
• Immediately dispatches re-enforcements
  disperses forces to sound of guns
• (Major intelligence failure gt managed perception
  by NVA)
• Result major cities left vulnerable gt
• US combat troops deployed out of urban areas to
  field

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Execution- Phase II

• NVA/NLF launch coordinated strikes on cities
• All timed but poorly coordinated
• Attack 36 capitols, including assaults on
• AMEMB, Tan Son Shut, Hue
• Following initial shockgt US/ARVN counterattack
• Inflict heavy casualties recover all cities
  except?

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Battle for Hue (31 Jan-2 Mar68)

• Background cultural religious capital of
  Vietnam
• Hue became major battle w/fierce conventional
  combat
• Order of Battle
• NVA 2 infantry regiments 2 NLF (VC) Battalions
• US 8 USMC Battalions ARVN 13 Battalions
• Battle Preparation (NVA)
• Extensive pre-battle preparations
• NVA pre-stage ammo/supply
• Elite advance units (sappers) clandestinely
  inserted prior to Tet attack

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Execution

• NVA Advance units seize hold key tactical
  objectives
• Await reinforcements who arrive as planned
• Soon NVA/NLF control most of Hue its Citadel
• Threaten US Military Command HQ
• Total tactical surprise achieved
• Initial US/ARVN counterattacks fail
• Brutal deadly fighting close quarter battles
  ensue

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Assaults Counterattacks

• NVA conduct pre-set ambushes inflict heavy
  casualties
• 1 Feb resist USMC major assault
• NVA well entrenched
• Conduct effective counterattacks
• Firm decision to take Hue back results in
  destruction
• 7th Fleet A/C Arty bombard NVA positions in Hue
• Hues ancient historical treasures heavily
  damaged
• Finally Hue Citadel retaken after bitter
  fighting high causalities

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Military Political Impact of Tet Hue

• NVA NLF militarily defeated
• Forced to withdraw from initials gains
• No uprising of populace against SVN government
• No other planned objectives achieved
• NLF units (VC) devastated
• Would not recover for long time
• Tactical victory for US ARVN forces- but at
  high costs
• Heavy casualties suffered by US in retaking Hue
• US 1100 KIA ARVN 2300
• But brutality of the war would be bought home to
  America on TV

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Strategic Political Impact of Tet Hue

• Major US domestic political impact
• Tet was major surprise to all Americans
• Westmoreland LBJ viewed by Americans as not
  credible
• Weeks prior launched PAO effort in US
• Aim convince all we had turned the corner
• Administration assessments overoptimistic
• Political disaster for LBJ
• Public support for war plummets
• LBJ approval rating drops to 26!
• Drops out of 1968 presidential election
• LBJ halts bombing ends gradual escalation
  policy
• Indicates desire to negotiate with NVA
• Only Tactical movegt strategic objective remained
  which was?

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Stalemate Negotiating Fighting (1968-1975)

• Nixon takes over Whitehouse in Jan 1969
• Claimed to have secret plan to end war he
  didnt
• Following failure of Kissinger's initial secret
  diplomacy, to include
• Military threats (ignored) covert activities
• US resorts to Vietnamization strategy
• Meanwhilegt NVN conduct strategy of fighting
  while negotiating (like in Korea)
• Closely coordinates military political actions
• Intensify maximum pressure to affect US home
  front
• Aim Divide worsen US-SVN differences

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Nixons Secret StrategyThe Carrot Stick

• Nixon sends Kissinger to begin talks with NVN
  representative
• Conveys strong desire for peaceful settlement
• Proposed mutual withdrawal restoration of DMZ
• Followed by secret bombing of NVA sanctuaries
• In Cambodia along Ho Chi Minh trail
• To Public
• Nixon announced Peace Plan to withdraw 25K troops
• Through Soviet French contactsgt
• Threatens dire consequences if NVN rejects
  proposal
• How did NVN respond to Nixons
  carrot stick proposal

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NVA Response

• NVN rejected Nixons carrot stick proposal
• Called Nixons bluff
• Concluded Nixons offer is really nothing new gt
• Virtually the same as LBJs previous one
• But NVN also hurting badly from battle damage
  from Tet68 repulse
• Must return to guerilla warfare strategic
  defense (stage 1)
• NVN Strategy consolidate rebuild political
  structure
• Drag out negotiations with US ignore Nixons
  threat
• Wear Nixon down (like LBJ)
• Try to persuade Nixon to halt bombing

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Vietnamization or Exit Strategy

• Strategy to implement
• US Advisors step up preparation of SVN
  counterparts
• Aim get ARVN ready to take-over combat ops
• Build-up SVN military strength equipments
• Vast re-supply effort initiated
• New/modern weapons equipment provided to SVN
• SVN also substantially increased its own forces
• Nixon mobilized public support for Vietnamization
• Gives speeches makes direct appeal to Americans
• Also attempted to persuade NVN to talk with US
  now
• (Rather than later with SVN)

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Cambodian Incursion (April 1970) Political
Fall Out

• US SVN conducted series of raids on Cambodian
  sanctuaries (done with acceptable execution)
• Required US CAS advisors support
• When leakedgt Nixon attempted to explain on TV
• Backfired into major protests
• Kent State became a symbol of student distrust
  frustration

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1972 Easter Offensive

• NVN prepared for final military offensive to
  topple SVN
• Meanwhilegt Nixon Kissinger pursued Triangular
  Diplomacy (?)
• Purpose strategic objective of Triangular
  Diplomacy ?
• Detach NVN from its Soviet PRC supporters
• Force NVN to negotiate seriously with US

USSR
PRC
NVN
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Execution

• Mar72 NVA launch conventional offensive into
  SVN
• Infiltrate along Ho Chi Minh
  trail route into south
• Strike, Kontum, Saigon, Quang Tri
• NVA attack ARVN main force units
• Force ARVN to abandon
  Quang Tri Kontum
• ARVN still able to hold An Loc
• Take advantage of US
  combat troop withdrawals
• US unable to provide combat ground support
• SOF advisors only US combat ground troops
  available
• US still provides extensive combat air support
  (CAS)

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Nixons Response Linebacker I

• Nixon initially taken by surprise by aggressive
  offense
• Orders B-52 strikes across DMZ ASAP
• Linebacker I begins
• Also orders mining of Haiphong harbors
• NVN shot down many US Air Craft exhaust
  their supply of SAMs
• US scrambled to rescue downed pilots
  but how with what?
• Only US combat ground troops available in
  Quang Tri are a few SOF advisors (Vietnamization)
• So they will have to do (later)
• But NVA LOCs stretched to limit
• Re-supply too hard (bombing toll)
• ARVN acquit themselves well
• Heavy casualties for both sides
• Big Picture type events often turn on
  individual actions

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Rescue of Two Downed Pilots
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1973 Paris Peace Agreement

• Following failed Easter Offensive
• Stalemate continues
• US Domestic politics
• Nixon faced re-election in Nov72
• Sought to fulfill campaign promise of 68
  campaign
• End war with honor
• Air War became more of a political problem why?
• More sorties more shoot downs more
  ?_______________
• Still NVN becoming more more isolated from
  sponsors
• Triangular Diplomacy on NVN having desired
  effect
• NVN concludes Nixon likely to win 1972
  re-election
• Better to deal with him before than after election

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Breakthrough?

• Both sides moved slowly toward compromise
• Major US Concession NVA allowed to remain in
  place
• Following Cease Fire (in place)
• In returngt NVN dropped insistence on Thieus
  ouster
• SVN resisted terms obstructs settlement why?
• What do they expect will happen without the US
  presence direct support in SVN?
• Kissinger more interested in concluding any
  settlement
• Downplayed Thieus objectionsgt wants US to sign
  anyway
• Nixon sympathized with Thieus concerns
  rejected Kissingers proposal gt wants additional
  modifications to agreement
• Nixon ordered Kissinger to get NVN to accept
  amendments
• K then attempted to modify conditions already
  accepted by NVN
• NVN soundly reject attempt to modify agreed to
  version

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Peace is at hand (?)

• Progress on the settlement then stalled a week
  before US Presidential Elections
• NVN retreated to their prior hard-line position
• Released news of previously agreed upon deal to
  Press
• Kissinger was forced to clarify NVNs statement
  to press
• Results in his now
  famous quote of 31
  Oct 1972
• Peace is at hand
• But events on the
  ground that very same
  day were anything but
  peaceful

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Linebacker II the Christmas Bombing (Dec 1972)

• NVN became recalcitrant restated their previous
  positions
• Nixon Kissinger become frustrated with
  continued NVN stalling
• Nixon then ordered renewed more aggressive
  bombings
• Nixon to CJCS
• nows your chance to win militarily
• Linebacker II (The Christmas Bombing) began
• SOF advisor-teams resume clandestine combat
  operations against NVA VC

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Agreement Reached

• NVN exhaust remaining SAMs with little chance of
  re-supply from Soviets or PRC
• Agree to resume serious talks w/US
• Nixon promised Thieu US will stand firm for SVN
• Made secret commitment to protect SVN if Truce is
  violated
• Convinced Thieu to agree to settlement terms
• He has little choice
• US NVN come to terms sign essentially the
  same earlier agreed upon settlement in Jan73
• US troops return along with most of US POWs
• But 2500 MIA remained unaccounted for

32
Final Offensive

• Following US withdrawal gt tensions mount
• Both SVN NVN jockey for advantage position
• NVN bide their time await opportunity to strike
• Meanwhile US continues support to SVN
• Civilian (CIA contract) advisors replaced
  military
• Early 1975 NVA launch final offensive to South
• ARVN resistgt withdraw gt retreat gt panic gt
  finally become routed
• Thieu ordered re-establishment of
  defense line to South
• But ARVN Troops see hand writing on the wall
• Nobody wants to be last soldier to die in failed
  war
• Army soon collapsed
• Thieu then resigned departed Vietnam for good

33
Fall of Saigon (30 April 1975)

• President Ford Kissinger desperately try to
  gain Congress support for SVN
• Congress refuses to allow Air (ground is
  nonstarter) support
• Not about to fulfill secret Nixon promise they
  were unaware of
• America had had it in Vietnam
• Americans begin evacuation of US citizens
  select SVN
• Emergency evacuation operation to USN ships takes
  many but not most of SVN refugees trying to flee
• NVA tanks then enter Saigon
• City falls 30 April 1975

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The Vietnam Wars Legacy

• Ambiguous unclear
• Open to many interpretations
• US Tactics validated
• Helicopter its role in future operations
• Smart bombs for precision guided strikes
• New era of air warfare rises (B-52 CAS)
• NVN strategy vs. US industrial power debated
• Agricultural society defeats major industrial
  power?
• Questionable NVN claim of victory model for
  future
• Contrasting strategies evaluated
• Peoples protracted war strategy (Giap willing to
  go to limit)
• US strategy of attrition (Search destroy
  tactics not effective)
• Military versus political objectives (Political
  Will is essential)

35
Back-up Slides
36
Conflicting post-War Analysis

• Several hard lessons were learned as a result of
  Vietnam
• For somegt we simply backed the wrong horse
• US Military power support never be enough
  regardlessgt
• Military pwr couldnt prop up RVNs corrupt
  failed regime
• Local revolutionary war fought for nationalistic
  political aims
• Therefore US caught in middle of bitter civil war
• For others war too hard to win under political
  constraints
• War considered integral part of global Cold War
  threat
• Key political concern for LBJ administration
  avoid escalation
• Both in intensity of fighting geographic region
• Result US attempted to fight limited
  conventional war
• Without a coherent realistic operational
  strategy
• While applying separate poorly chosen tactics to
  support it

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Serious Strategic Disconnect

• US approach to war appeared to have serious
  disconnects
• Political Aims were unrealistic given the
  military constraints set
• Operational Strategy poorly matched to those
  strategic aims
• Tactics employed served a failing strategy
• Result Tactical success served a poor
  operational strategy
• Which in turn attempted to achieve Unrealistic
  strategic aims gt
• Which ultimately resulted in political failure at
  the end of the day
• Political decisions makers failed to realize
  until too late
• That superior American military power cant make
  up for what?
• American peoples lack of political will to
  continue war indefinitely!
• These failures would affect many in different
  ways
• Including foreign policy decisions taken
  following the Cold War

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Review of Vietnams Lessons

• Long term status of Communism vs. capitalism
• Capitalism is alive and well (even in China
  Vietnam)
• Review of Vietnams Lessons Learned
• CI vs. Conventional warfare
• Role of battle environment? (which favors which?)
• Plans deserts vs. jungles mountains ( now
  cities)
• Political constraints on US military power
• (was military victory precluded by the
  politicians?)
• Assessment of Limited War Doctrine
• Incremental graduated response failed big time

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Modern Hi-tech Military Advances

• Flexible Response strategy required expansion
  modernization of US conventional forces
• SECDEF McNamara played a major role in
  modernizing US forces
• Established Brush War capability (like for
  Vietnam)
• USAF USN build-up
• WWII BBs refitted updated (USS New Jersey)
• CV/CVN on Yankee Station in Tokin Gulf launch F-4
  A-4 strikes
• B-52 (Guam) F105/F-4 (Thailand) Rolling Thunder

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Weapons Technology Advances

• High Tech Equipment development included
• Radar units small portable developed
• Sniffers detect infiltrators odors
• Sensors passive transmitters alert SF teams
• IBM 1430s computers predict enemy movements
• Puff (AC-47 gunships) AFSOC AC-130 Specter
  Gunships provide devastating fire support

41
Troops, Weapons, Equipment

• Troops best ever trained equipped to date
• 1 Million men combat ready divisions expand11
  to 16
• Airlift equipment stockpiles expanded
• Army reorganization
• Task oriented for specific jobs
• Direct ground support weapons equipment
• Armor Personnel Carriers
• Weapon advances (M-60, M-16, Stoner LMG, M-79)
• Helo its role UH-1, Cobra, CH-47, 1st Air
  Cavalry

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Strategy of Attrition Search Destroy

• Operational strategies often involve individual
  actions and consequences for those who must
  implement them

• For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the
  risk of his life above and beyond the call of
  duty. Seeing indications of the enemy's presence
  in the area, S/Sgt. Morris deployed his squad and
  continued forward alone to make a reconnaissance.
  He unknowingly crawled within 20 meters of an
  enemy machinegun, whereupon the gunner fired,
  wounding him in the chest. S/Sgt. Morris
  instantly returned the fire and killed the
  gunner. Continuing to crawl within a few feet of
  the gun, he hurled a grenade and killed the
  remainder of the enemy crew. Although in pain and
  bleeding profusely, S/Sgt. Morris continued his
  reconnaissance. Returning to the platoon area, he
  reported the results of his reconnaissance to the
  platoon leader. As he spoke, the platoon came
  under heavy fire. Refusing medical attention for
  himself, he deployed his men in better firing
  positions confronting the entrenched enemy to his
  front. Then for 8 hours the platoon engaged the
  numerically superior enemy force. Withdrawal was
  impossible without abandoning many wounded and
  dead. Finding the platoon medic dead, S/Sgt.
  Morris administered first aid to himself and was
  returning to treat the wounded members of his
  squad with the medic's first aid kit when he was
  again wounded. Knocked down and stunned, he
  regained consciousness and continued to treat the
  wounded, reposition his men, and inspire and
  encourage their efforts. Wounded again when an
  enemy grenade shattered his left hand,
  nonetheless he personally took up the fight and
  armed and threw several grenades which killed a
  number of enemy soldiers. Seeing that an enemy
  machinegun had maneuvered behind his platoon and
  was delivering the fire upon his men, S/Sgt.
  Morris and another man crawled toward the gun to
  knock it out. His comrade was killed and S/Sgt.
  Morris sustained another wound, but, firing his
  rifle with one hand, he silenced the enemy
  machinegun. Returning to the platoon, he
  courageously exposed himself to the devastating
  enemy fire to drag the wounded to a protected
  area, and with utter disregard for his personal
  safety and the pain he suffered, he continued to
  lead and direct the efforts of his men until
  relief arrived. Upon termination of the battle,
  important documents were found among the enemy
  dead revealing a planned ambush of a Republic of
  Vietnam battalion. Use of this information
  prevented the ambush and saved many lives. S/Sgt.
  Morris' gallantry was instrumental in the
  successful defeat of the enemy, saved many lives,
  and was in the highest traditions of the U.S.
  Army.