Title: Hyperinflation and Stabilization in Bolivia: The crisis of 1985
1Hyperinflation and Stabilization in Bolivia The
crisis of 1985
- Eduardo Yi
- International Macroeconomics
- April 12, 2007
2Bolivia
3Bolivia
4Hyperinflation and Stabilization in Bolivia
- I. Hyperinflation
- II. Hyperinflation in Bolivia
- III. The Stabilization Program
- The New Economic Policy
- Reasons for success
- Costs of stabilization
- IV. Conclusion
5What is Hyperinflation?
- The classic definition of hyperinflation is
price increases above 50 per month (Cagan,
1956)
6Two Schools of Thought on Inflation Monetarism
vs. Structuralism
- Monetarism
- Inflation is bad
- Caused by excess demand due to budget deficits
financed by printing money
- Govt must cut domestic credit creation
- Monetarists work with full employment models
- Monetarists are identified as conservatives
- Structuralism
- Tight monetary policy is bad
- Inflation is caused by structural imbalances and
rigidities
- The costs of cutting inflation are high, govt
must use income policies and price freezes
- Structuralists emphasize unemployment
- Structuralists are identified as progressive
reformers
7Five Factors of Latin American Inflationary
Processes (Cardoso and Helwege, 2002)
- Seignorage
- Balance of payments crisis
- Dollarization
- Capacity constraints
- Indexation
8Seignorage
- The governments ability to buy goods and
services by printing money
- When the government puts money into the economy
without directly taxing production, the value of
cash drops
- Inflation works like a tax on cash holdings
- Opportunity cost of holding currency increases
9Balance of Payments Crises
- A balance of payments crisis linked to a sudden
fall in terms of trade or a halt of capital
inflows generates an immediate jump in the
inflation rate - A shock to terms of trade (severe price drop of
export commodity or rise of major import) creates
shortages of foreign exchange
- Rise in international interest rates and
withdrawal of foreign lending deprive government
of foreign exchange
- Response has been to devalue
10Dollarization
- As value of domestic currency declines, people
tend to substitute it for foreign money
- With high inflation, domestic money loses
function as unit of measure and store of value
- With high inflation, local currency inevitably
devalues
- Costs of dollarization
- Dollars could be better use by external sector to
import actual goods
- If wealth is transferred out of the country,
credit available to local investors declines
11Capacity Constraints and Supply Shocks
- Real wage increases raise demand, and firms often
raise output, but if firms are protected, they
pass on the higher wage bill to consumers
- Populist governments fail to recognize capacity
constraints and over-stimulate the economy
- Bad harvests and earthquakes increase prices too
- If inflation is too much money chasing too few
goods, shocks that increase demand or restrict
supply create inflationary pressure
12Indexation
- Contracts are written to include indexation
- Minimum wage legislation includes indexation to
past inflation
- Indexation makes inflation a self-perpetuating
process
- Current supply shocks are transferred to future
periods
13Bolivian Hyperinflation An Overview
- Worst case of hyperinflation in Latin American
history and seventh worst in world history
- The only case of hyperinflation that did not come
in the aftermath of a war or political
revolution
- During period of hyperinflation prices rose by
20,000
- During the worst surge of hyperinflation, prices
rose by an annualized rate of 60,000
14Bolivian Hyperinflation An Overview
- High inflation in Bolivia lasted from the first
quarter of 1982 to the fourth quarter of 1985
- According to Cagans definition, hyperinflation
in Bolivia lasted from May 1985 to August 1985
- As with other cases of hyperinflation, the end
came abruptly with a stabilization program in
August 1985
15Bolivian Hyperinflation The Backdrop
- Bolivia was, and is, a very poor country
- Small industrial base (only 1.2 of GDP in 1985)
- Relied on two export commodities tin and natural
gas
- High political instability
- Bolivia was not immune to the 1982 Debt Crisis
16Bolivian Hyperinflation The Backdrop
- Morales (1987) argues that Bolivias failure to
tackle large illegal cocaine production hindered
the flow of external resources to support
stabilization
17The Five Factors of Inflation in the Bolivian Case
- Seignorage From 1965 to 1985 money grew by an
average rate of 360.2 and inflation by 528.1.
Phylaktis and Taylor (1993) argue that the
policies of the government were tantamount to
maximizing inflation tax revenue - Balance of Payment Crisis There was a collapse
of the price of tin in world markets, and
multilateral organizations stopped lending to
Bolivia - Dollarization Most prices were set to dollars,
although transactions were usually carried out in
pesos. Workers and firms shifted their efforts
from production to schemes to get dollars
18The Five Factors of Inflation in the Bolivian
Case (continued)
- Capacity Constrains Only 1.2 of GDP accounted
for by industrial sector, and 2.5 of labor force
employed in it. Large portion of GDP dependant on
tin and gas exports - Indexation In October 1982, wages were indexed
to inflation for the first time in Bolivia with a
trigger mechanism of readjustment whenever
inflation reached 40
19Three Fundamental Aspects of Bolivian
Hyperinflation (Sachs,1986)
- Cutoff of international lending and the increase
in international interest rates in early 1980s
- The recourse to seignorage jumped as the net
international resource transfer turned negative
- Increasing inflation caused the tax system to
collapse
20The Stabilization Program The New Economic
Policy
- An orthodox package based on the monetarist view
of inflation
- It was not the first attempt at stabilization,
previous attempts failed after severe public
opposition
- It was the first stabilization attempt, however,
by a newly elected government
- After experiencing hyperinflation, people were
willing to try anything
21The Stabilization Program The New Economic
Policy
- Devaluation and managed floating exchange rate.
- Immediate reduction of fiscal deficit
- Proposed tax overhaul (enacted eight months
later)
- IMF standby agreement and rescheduling of debt
- Adoption of new currency not an important factor
in reducing inflation
22Managed Floating Exchange Rate A de facto
Devaluation
- Private agents buy and sell foreign exchange at
whatever price they want
- Central Bank sells foreign exchange to the public
in a daily open auction
- Central Bank buys foreign exchange at the average
price from last auction
- Central Bank determines
- Base price for bids at each auction
- The amount of foreign exchange offered at each
auction
- 93 de facto devaluation
23Reduction of Fiscal Deficits
- Raised prices of oil products provided by
state-owned oil company YPFB
- Wage freeze for all public sector employees
- Reduction of public sector employment, mostly in
state-owned mining company COMIBOL
24Tax Overhaul
- Harmonization of all import tariffs to 20
- Value Added Tax of 10
- New taxes on wealth
- Incidence of taxes were proportional to income,
except for very low incomes
25The Standby Agreement with the IMF
- With stabilization, the government regained
credibility and access to foreign sources of
finance
- Loans were secured for US 1.2 billion
- Debt with Club of Paris rescheduled
- Agreement with IMF was signed on June 1986
- Subsequently, Bolivia was granted a Compensatory
Finance Loan and a Structural Adjustment Loan
26Monthly Growth Rate of Money Base, March 1984
March 1987
Arrow indicates beginning of stabilization
27Monthly Changes of Average Price Levels, March
1984 March1987
Arrow indicates beginning of stabilization
28Month-to-month Average Changes of Foreign
Exchange Rate in Parallel Market
Arrow indicates beginning of stabilization
29Reasons for Success of NEP
- Sargent (1981) argues that a convincing regime
change is the necessary and sufficient condition
for rapid disinflation
- Morales (1987) posits that stabilization was
effective because of super tight liquidity and
lowered expectations
- Sachs (1986) argues that hyperinflation ended
because the exchange rate was stabilized
30Convincing Regime Change
- In Sargents view, once it is clearly understood
that the government will not rely on the central
bank to print money, inflation recedes and the
exchange rates stabilize
31Super Tight Liquidity
- Strong devaluation and price hikes produced
contraction of real money supply and a liquidity
crunch
- With liquidity shortage, expectations of
inflation or further depreciation on the short
run abated
- Lower (peso) liquidity and lower expectations had
their most immediate impact on the parallel
foreign exchange market
32Exchange Rate Stabilization
- In Sachss view, the end to hyperinflation
preceded credibility of the government and the
NEP
- Because prices in Bolivia were set in dollars, by
stabilizing the exchange rate, domestic inflation
could be made to revert immediately to the U.S.
dollar inflation rate
33Costs of Stabilization
- Estimates of decreased GDP in 1986 range from
2.9 to 3.5
- Investment in 1986 reached lowest level to that
date
- Unemployment increased by 3 to 20,
underemployment increased from 50 to 60
34Costs of Stabilization
- Real wages decreased dramatically right after
stabilization, and remained stagnant after that
- Quality of services provided by public sector
significantly deteriorated
- Many middle level civil servants quit the sector
- 25 of rural teachers abandoned their schools
35Conclusions
- High inflation in Bolivia lasted from Q1 1982 to
Q4 1985
- Hyperinflation lasted from May 1985 to August
1985
- Bolivia suffered a BOP crisis with the 1982 Debt
Crisis and the fall of tin prices in the world
market
- Bolivia experienced a lot of political turmoil
36Conclusions
- An orthodox stabilization package called the New
Economic Policy was introduced and inflation
ended abruptly
- Hyperinflation ended in spite of public not
having regained confidence in government
- According to Sachs, this is because the economy
was dollarized and the exchange rate was
stabilized
- The short run effects of the stabilization
program were recessionary, and where accompanied
by a marked decline in the quality of public
services, including education
37Thank You