NADIA BOYADJIEVA, PH.D. KOSTADIN GROZEV, PH.D. BULGARIA

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NADIA BOYADJIEVA, PH.D.KOSTADIN GROZEV,
PH.D.BULGARIA

• Second International Conference on Intercultural
  Communication and Diplomacy, DIPLOFOUNDATION

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Diplomacy, International Intervention and
Post-War Reconstruction

• Interactions between States, International
  Organizations and Local Authorities in the
  Implementation of the Dayton Accords for Bosnia
  and Herzegovina (1996-2003)

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1. Multi-track Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War
World Order

• Communicating National Interests and Implying
  Humanitarian Considerations

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A. The Notion of Multi-Track Diplomacy

• Multi-track Diplomacy aims to incorporate all
  levels of diplomacy in building a real and
  sustainable peace
  
• Bosnia and Herzegovina an appropriate case-study
• government-negotiated settlements (Dayton)
• unofficial moves by parties to the conflict
• academics/intermediaries aiming conflict
  resolution
  
• efforts by community groups or NGOs furthering
  the peace process and the creation of a durable
  peace.

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Multi-Track Diplomacy Model

• Track I Dayton Accords
• Track II and Track III creating real and
  sustainable peace
  
• Using the tools of Conflict Transformation
  Approach Political Settlement PLUS
  Restructuring of the System that allowed the
  Conflict to Flourish

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Definitions of the Term

• Unofficial, non-structured interaction between
  members of adversarial groups or nations that is
  directed toward conflict resolution by addressing
  psychological factors"
• Joseph Montville, 1990

• Unofficial, informal interaction between members
  of adversary groups or nations that aim to
  develop strategies,influence public
  opinionorganise human and material resources in
  ways that might help resolve their conflict, J.
  Burton

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Diplomacy Track I to V

• Track One Official government-to-government
  diplomatic interaction
  
• Track Two Unofficial, non-governmental,
  analytical, policy-orientated, problem-solving
  efforts by skilled, educated, experienced, and
  informed private citizens interacting with other
  private citizens
• Track Three Businessman-to-businessman, private
  sector, free-enterprise, multinational and
  corporation interactions
  

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Diplomacy Track I to V

• Track Four Citizen-to-citizen exchange programs
  of all kinds, such as scientific, cultural,
  academic, educational, student, film, music, art,
  sports and youth exchanges
• Track Five Media-to-media based efforts designed
  to expose and educate large segments of the
  population in conflict to the philosophy, ideas,
  culture, and needs of the other national,
  society, or ethnic group with whom they are in
  conflict McDonald, 1991

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How to Resolve Ethnic Conflicts

• Two sets of Factors
• Political/ diplomatic topics
• Personal /humanistic concerns
• Neither of them can create peace independently,
  as each is dependent on and supportive of the
  other

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UN Official May 1996

• We have to admit at this point and realize that
  Bosnia will never again be a unified country.
  Bosnia is rapidly turning into a permanently
  divided society in which there is peace between
  people, across guarded borders, with no
  interaction whatsoever

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NATO Officer (early 1996)

• Its going well by definition. That is, weve
  succeeded in separating the three groups in their
  defined areas. Thats the most important thing,
  because if they dont talk to each other, they
  dont argue and insult each other. If they dont
  do that, they dont fight. If they dont fight,
  there wont be any bullets flying. So the peace
  is safe as long as we keep them in their own
  places, apart from one another

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NATO Handbook (2001)

• The Bosnian experience has fundamentally
  transformed modern peacekeeping. It has broken
  down cultural barriers between military and
  civilians. It has fostered new training and
  education programs that bring together all
  parties involved in rebuilding a failed state. It
  has been a model for entirely new peacekeeping
  partnership where it matters on the ground

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B. The Challenges of Intervention in the Former
Yugoslavia Area (up to 1995)

• Ethnic Tensions and Conflicts
• Researgence of Old Historic Rivalries
• Outbreak of Violence
• Coincide with Democratization in Eastern Europe
• Results Bloodshed and Diplomatic Setbacks

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War in Bosnia and Herzegovina Successes and
Failures of International Actors (1992-1995)

• UNITED NATIONS
• NATO
• EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
• OSCE
• MAJOR WORLD POWERS

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NATO IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (1991-1995)

• When the Bosnian war began in 1991, NATO had
  never fired a shot in anger. It had never
  conducted an operation outside its own territory.
  It had never even considered taking on robust
  peacekeeping operations. It had never had
  significant relations with other institutions.
  Indeed, in the minds of many, NATO had less and
  less reason to stay in business at all. Bosnia
  and Herzegovina made it clear why NATO had to
  remain in business.

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THE UNITED STATES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
(1992-1999)

• The Sole Remaining Superpower
• Pro-interventionist Track in order to Safeguard
  World Peace and Regional Stability
  
• Moral Challenges in Bosnia
• Overcoming NATOs Out of Area Syndrom
• Leading Role of European Community in 1991-1993

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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITYS INVOLVEMENT UP TO 1995

• A Very Complex, Multi-layered, Web-like
  Involvement of the International Community
  
• NATOs Engagement - Mainly Supporting One,
  Restricted to Supplying Mainly Military Support
  and Other Related Services
  
• Leading Role - the Peacekeeping Efforts of the UN
  and the OSCE

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TOOLS OF DIPLOMACY

• CONTACT GROUP
• SPECIAL ENVOY
• SPECIAL MIILITARY ADVISOR TO U.S. SECRETARY OF
  STATE
  
• SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY
• TALKS IN DAYTON, OHIO

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NATO v. UN in Bosnia and Herzegovina

• NATO - a Regional Security Organization
• UN Overoptimistic About its Ability to Prevent
  Conflicts and Guarantee Peace and International
  Stability in Co-operation with Regional
  Organizations

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Deepening of International Involvement and the
Accompanying Risks

• Enforcement of the UN Embargo
• Military Flights Ban
• Establishment of the Safe-areas
• Exclusion Zone
• Ultimatums
• Hostages Crises
• Bombing Campaign Late August 1995

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The Road to Dayton, November 1995

• Failure of Crisis Management Ineffectiveness of
  UNPROFOR
  
• Acceptance of the Use of Greater Force on the
  Part of NATO and the U.S.
  
• Operation Deliberate Force
• NATO Controlling Military Aspects
• Holbrooke Used Military Arguments on the
  Diplomatic Table

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Experts Opinion on the End-Results

• By the time the parties to the Bosnian conflict
  signed a peace agreement in Dayton, NATOs
  involvement with the UN had gone from virtually
  non-existent to having been the source of NATOs
  first military action since its creation

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2. Diplomacy, International Involvement and the
Implementation of the General Framework
Agreement for Peace

• Communications and Interactions between the
  Different Actors on the Scene in Bosnia and
  Herzegovina (1996-2003)

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General Framework Agreement for Peace, 14
December 1995, Paris

• Primary Goal Stop the War in the Multiethnic,
  Multiconfessional and Multicultural Society
  
• Establish a Completely New Kind of Statehood
• New Institutions and Tools With Specific Forms,
  Means and Methods of Action

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Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

• One State
• Two Entities
• Three State-Formative Peoples
• Final Goal to Become a Unified Multiethnic and
  Democratic Actor in International Relations

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International Community

• Complex Web of Interlinked Institutions
• Using the Whole Spectrum of Previous Mandates
• Combined with Newly Acquired Functions
• Aiming at Enforcing Order in a Secure Environment
  

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New Federation (Anex II)

• ONE COUNTRY WITH COLLECTIVE EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY
• Bosniak-Croat Federation 51
• Republica Srbska 49

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IMPLEMENTATION FORCE - IFOR

• Under NATO Command with a Grant of Authority from
  the UN (Article VI)
  
• Primary Mission - Monitoring Compliance of the
  Agreement on Military Matters (Disarmament and
  Withdrawal of Forces)
  
• Right to Use Force as Necessary and to Have
  Freedom of Movement

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OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE - OHR

• Coordinate and Facilitate the Civilian Aspects of
  the Agreement
  
• Humanitarian Aid
• Economic Reconstruction
• Protection of Human Rights
• Holding of Free Election

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New Potential for Communication

• Between NATO and non-NATO States in a
  Peace-enforcement Operation
  
• Between Military and Civilian Institutions
• (in an environment that was apt to
  producingoutbreaks of violence at any moment)

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IFOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS 1996 Military Tasks

• Causing/maintaining cessation of hostilities by
• - separating the armed forces of the Bosniac -
  Croat Entity (the Federation) and the Bosnian -
  Serb Entity (the Republika Srpska) mid-January
  1996
• transferring areas between the two Entities by
  mid-March
  
• moving the Parties' forces and heavy weapons into
  approved sites by the end of June

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IFORS OTHER TASKS

• It had the right to help create secure
  conditions for the conduct by others of other
  tasks associated with the peace settlementto
  assist UNHCR and other international
  organizations in their humanitarian missionsto
  observe and prevent interference with the
  movement of civilian populations, refugees, and
  displaced persons, and to respond appropriately
  to deliberate violence to life and person
• Annex 1A, Article VI3 of
  the GFAP

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IFOR INTERACTED IN 1996 WITH

• OHR
• OSCE - in Preparing and Conducting Peacefully the
  September 1996 elections
  
• Conclusions from IFORs Actions in 1996 - both
  Potential for Peace-enforcement and Restrictions,
  due to Certain Flaws in the Mechanism of the
  Early Implementation of the Agreements

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Limitations to Carl Bildt (OHR)

• Bildt was Entrusted with the Overall Civilian
  Implementation but with Few Formal Powers
  
• IFOR had 60 000 troops, the High Representative
  had to Build from Nothing an Organization Capable
  of Running the Institutions of the Civilian
  Implementation.

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STABILIZATION FORCE SFOR, 1997

• IFOR Implement the Peace
• SFOR Stabilize the Peace
• Transition from Peace-keeping to
  Peace-enforcement and Later to Peace-building

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SFOR Mission and Tasks

• Mission - Contribute to the Safe and Secure
  Environment Necessary for the Consolidation of
  the Peace
  
• Tasks - to Deter or Prevent a Resumption of
  Hostilities or New Threats to Peace to Promote a
  Climate in which the Peace Process Could Continue
  to Move Forward and to Provide Selective Support
  to Civilian Organizations within its Capabilities

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Reduction of Size of SFOR Indicative of
Changing Environment

• Initially 32 000 troops twice Smaller than
  IFOR
  
• Open-ended Military Commitment in Bosnia and
  Herzegovina by Talking not of End-date but
  Instead of End-state
  
• SFOR - a Multi-national Peace Operation,
  including Troops from non-NATO Members

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IFOR/SFOR Communicating With Russia

• Major Step in the Evolving NATO-Russia
  Co-operative Relationship
  
• Russian Forces were Deployed within IFOR in
  January 1996 after Special Arrangements between
  NATO and Russia
  
• Later Russian forces became part of SFOR as well
• -

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Uniqueness of IFOR/SFOR Operations

• Deep, Daily Cooperation between Security
  Institutions
  
• Military and Civilian Roles/Responsibilities
  clearly intermingled
  
• The Final Success of the Operations was to Be
  Judged by the State of the Economy, by the
  Stability of the Political System and
  Self-sustainability of the Emerging Civil Society

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INTERACTIONS IN PEACE IMPLEMENTATION AFTER 1995

• Common Goals Achieved Through Joint Work of a
  Variety of Inter-governmental and
  non-governmental bodies.
  
• NATO Provided the Secure Environment
• UN Provided Legitimacy to the Oversight and
  Overall Coordination of the High Representative.
  
  
• OSCE Helped to Train Police Officers and to Run
  Elections
  
• EU Provided Financial and Technical Assistance