Issues in Philosophy

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Issues in Philosophy

• Guy Longworth
• g.longworth_at_mac.com

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On the Standard of Taste

• Humes essay is superficially straightforward,
  but raises questions of interpretation
• What problem is Hume engaging with?
• What exactly is Humes view?
• How does Hume argue for his view?

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On the Standard of Taste

• Three guides to interpretation
• What the author says here.
• What the author says elsewhere.
• The principle of charity (the Plato no dummy
  principle).

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On the Standard of Taste

• Humes aims
• To argue that our aesthetic responses are not
  immediate responses to objective value.
• To specify the nature of our aesthetic responses.
• To explain how the account in (II) can be
  consistent with the degree of objectivity that we
  take aesthetic value to possess.

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On the Standard of Taste

• The basic puzzle
• We can only give an account of the ordinary
  phenomenology of aesthetic response if we accept
  that aesthetic response is a matter of sentiment
  (feeling), so subjective.
• (B) Aesthetic response can track aesthetic value
  well or badly (some works are better than others
  and the responses of some critics are better than
  the responses of others), so objective.

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On the Standard of Taste

• (A) and (B) seem to be in tension if the
  aesthetic value of a work is a matter solely of
  how it makes you feel (your sentimental
  response), how can there be an objective ranking
  of works, a ranking that your responses might
  fail to track?

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On the Standard of Taste

• Two immediate questions
• Q1. Why does Hume think that aesthetic response
  is a matter of sentiment, rather than immediate
  response to objective aesthetic value?
• Q2. Why does Hume think that aesthetic value is
  an objective feature (or anyway more objective
  than individual sentimental response)?

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On the Standard of Taste

• In effect, Hume deploys an argument from
  queerness
• (QU1) It is an obvious fact of life that peoples
  aesthetic responses vary (hence the saying its
  a matter of taste).
• (QU2) Aesthetic response is intrinsically
  motivating (e.g. one wants to look more carefully
  at what one finds beautiful).

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On the Standard of Taste

• Weve already considered how such arguments might
  be developed and also how an objectivist about
  value might respond.
• Humes response to the arguments is to take the
  view that aesthetic response is a matter of works
  of art causing a sentimental response, a feeling,
  in particular a specific sort of pleasure.

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On the Standard of Taste

• On this view, whether something is aesthetically
  valuable is in the first instance a matter of
  whether it causes in us a specific form of
  pleasure.
• Hence, aesthetic value is determined by
  subjective features of appreciators, their
  sentimental responses to artworks.

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On the Standard of Taste

• This addresses both elements of Humes argument
  from queerness
• (QU1) It is an obvious fact of life that peoples
  aesthetic responses vary (hence the saying its
  a matter of taste).
• Since aesthetic responses are sentimental
  responses, rather than judgmental responses to
  objective features of artworks, and since
  sentimental responses can vary, (QU1) is a
  natural upshot of the account.

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On the Standard of Taste

• This addresses both elements of Humes argument
  from queerness
• (QU2) Aesthetic response is intrinsically
  motivating (e.g. one wants to look more carefully
  at what one finds beautiful).
• According to Hume, the feeling of pleasure is
  intrinsically motivating (as the feeling of pain
  is intrinsically de-motivating). Hence, the
  account in terms of sentiments has a ready
  explanation of aesthetic motivation.

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On the Standard of Taste

• According to Hume, then, we have some reasons for
  indentifying aesthetic value with either the
  power or disposition to elicit a specific type of
  feeling of pleasure or with the ground of that
  power.
• The most straightforward version of this view
  would be one according to which
• X is aesthetically valuable iff X is such as to
  elicit a specific type of feeling of pleasure in
  appreciators.

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On the Standard of Taste

• X is aesthetically valuable iff X is such as to
  elicit a specific type of feeling of pleasure in
  appreciators.
• An upshot of the most straightforward view would
  be that anything that is apt to induce that type
  of pleasure in anyone will thereby count as
  aesthetically valuable.
• An alternative would be
• X is aesthetically valuable for Y iff X is such
  as to elicit a specific type of feeling of
  pleasure in Y.

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On the Standard of Taste

• X is aesthetically valuable for Y iff Y is such
  as to elicit a specific type of feeling of
  pleasure in Y.
• A Humean reason for endorsing the second form of
  account would be that it fits better with the
  instrinsic motivating force of appreciation of
  aesthetic value.
• For instance, I might recognise that X elicits
  aesthetic pleasure in you without that making me
  want to look but if I recognise that X elicits
  pleasure in me, that will be motivating for me.

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On the Standard of Taste

• An immediate question at this point is the
  following. The biconditional equivalences weve
  arrived at to this point simply indicate that
  aesthetic value and sentiment run in step. Which
  end, if any, of the biconditional has priority in
  explaining their running in step?

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On the Standard of Taste

• The question is a version of Eurythphros
  question (in Plato) about the Gods and ethical
  value
• Do the Gods value X because X is good, or is X
  good because the Gods value it?
• Our question
• Do we value X aesthetically because X has
  aesthetic value, or is X aesthetically valuable
  because we value it?

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On the Standard of Taste

• We can distinguish three sorts of answer to this
  type of question
• Detective (or evidential) Sentiment detects
  aesthetic value, so that aesthetic value is taken
  to explain sentimental response.
• Constitutive Sentiment constitutes aesthetic
  value, so that sentimental response explains
  aesthetic value.
• No priority Sentiment and aesthetic value
  constitute each other at the same time (or are
  jointly determined by something else.)

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On the Standard of Taste

• One question, then, is whether Hume takes
  sentimental response to detect or to constitute
  aesthetic value.
• Its not straightforward to answer this question.
  Some of what Hume says fits a detective model and
  some of what he says fits a constitutive model.

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On the Standard of Taste

• To this point we have seen elements of Humes
  view according to which our aesthetic responses
  are not immediate responses to objective
  aesthetic value. Rather, something objective
  causes a sentimental response in use.g. a
  specific type of feeling of pleasureand we are
  motivated by our feeling.

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On the Standard of Taste

• The straightforward view we have derived to this
  point is one according to which there is no right
  or wrong for aesthetic responses. They are
  subjective episodes that simply happen to us, and
  are not to be assessed on the basis of anything
  external.

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On the Standard of Taste

• That gives us one side of the puzzle
• (A) We can only give an account of the ordinary
  phenomenology of aesthetic response if we accept
  that aesthetic response is a matter of sentiment
  (feeling), so subjective.

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On the Standard of Taste

• But Hume thinks that we also ordinarily treat
  aesthetic responses as better or worse or
  rather, that we ordinarily rank the things to
  which we respondartworksas better or worse,
  despite the fact that they induce the same
  feelings of pleasure in at least some
  appreciators.

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On the Standard of Taste

• E.g., we might view Bachs Goldberg Variations as
  of greater aesthetic value than Girls Alouds
  The Promise.
• And that is so even though
• Both might give some people pleasure.
• Some people might get pleasure from Girls Aloud
  and find Bach to be just noise.
• Some people might get more pleasure from Girls
  Aloud than from Bach.

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On the Standard of Taste

• Despite the fact that there is wide variance in
  tasteso in sentimental response to artworkswe
  view aesthetic responses as better or worse
  depending upon how well they track the rankings
  we (or critics) accord artworks.
• This suggests that we view our individual
  aesthetic responses detectively, as tracking or
  aiming to track an independently constituted
  aesthetic reality.

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On the Standard of Taste

• That gives us the second part of the puzzle
• (B) Aesthetic response can track aesthetic value
  well or badly (some works are better than others
  and the responses of some critics are better than
  the responses of others), so objective.

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On the Standard of Taste

• Hume writes
• It is natural for us to seek a Standard of
  Taste a rule, by which the various sentiments of
  men may be reconciled at least, a decision
  afforded, confirming one sentiment and condemning
  another.

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On the Standard of Taste

• The idea of reconciling sentiments is the idea
  of finding a way in which our differences can be
  ironed out, at least for certain purposes of
  aesthetic assessment.
• The idea is that, as well as our individual
  sentimental responses to artworks, there is a
  standard against which those sentimental
  responses can be measured.

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On the Standard of Taste

• Another reading of Hume here has him seeking to
  reconcile, not merely our first order sentimental
  responses, but also our second order views about
  those responses, as in the two parts of the
  puzzle
• We have reason to believe that aesthetic
  response is not simply a matter of taking in the
  layout of objective aesthetic reality. Otherwise,
  we cant explain variation or intrinsic
  motivation.
• We have reason to believe that aesthetic
  response can be better or worse, and can sustain
  a ranking of artworks.

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On the Standard of Taste

• Three options at this point
• (O1) Deny the first part of the puzzle actually,
  aesthetic judgments are immediate responses to
  objective aesthetic reality (and deal with Humes
  arguments to the contrary).
• (O2) Deny the second part of the puzzle
  actually, our view that aesthetic responses can
  be better or worse, and that artworks can be
  ranked, is mistaken.
• (O3) Compatibilism Deny that the two parts of
  the puzzle are really in tension and explain away
  the appearance that they are.

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On the Standard of Taste

• Its plausible that Hume seeks to take the
  compatibilist option.
• Hume wants to explain how his form of
  subjectivism can be consistent with the degree of
  objectivism sustained by our ordinary view of
  aesthetic appreciation and its objects.

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On the Standard of Taste

• Humes account can be approached in two steps
• Rules of composition general rules governing
  what has been universally found to please in all
  countries and in all ages.
• True critics individuals whose aesthetic
  responses most closely track the grounds of
  optimal aesthetic response and so provide the
  best observational input to the rules of
  composition.

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On the Standard of Taste

• Rules of composition general rules governing
  what has been universally found to please in all
  countries and in all ages.
• There are rules of optimal composition according
  to which artworks may be ranked.
• These rules are supposed to be general, so that
  they apply to all artworks, though may be very
  specific so that two otherwise similar artworks
  might be subject to slightly different fully
  specified rules.

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On the Standard of Taste

• We dont have immediate access to these rules.
  Rather, like (other?) laws of nature, they must
  be discovered on the basis of observation and
  generalisation over the data provided by
  observation.

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On the Standard of Taste

• Crudely, one begins with a set of observations
  about what has induced the specific type of
  feeling of pleasure (perhaps with respect to some
  population or under some specified conditions)
  and on that basis put forward general principles
  that would deliver that pattern of verdicts.
• We can then test the general principles against
  further sentimental responses and refine the
  principles on the basis of such testing.

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On the Standard of Taste

• To this point, then, determining the standard of
  taste is modeled closely on what we might think
  goes on in the natural sciences.
• The central difference is that in the aesthetic
  case, elicitation of sentiment replaces
  observation (or elicitation of perceptual
  experience).

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On the Standard of Taste

• For at least two reasons, restrictions must be
  placed upon the input to this approach to
  determining rules of composition.

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On the Standard of Taste

• (R1) If no restrictions are imposed on which
  sentimental responses matter, then the wide
  variation in such responses may well be a barrier
  to the delineation of general principles.
• (R2) The point of seeking the general principles
  was to sustain the ordinary ranking of aesthetic
  responses and (so?) artworks. Principles aiming
  to generalise over all responses are unlikely to
  achieve this.

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On the Standard of Taste

• What appears to be required at this point is some
  restriction on which sentimental responses are to
  count.
• Either, we need to impose conditions on which of
  any individuals responses are to count, or on
  which individuals responses are to count, or
  both.

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On the Standard of Taste

• But now, if the rules of composition are just
  generalisations over this constrained set of
  sentimental responses, they dont appear to add
  anything. Their work might be done simply by
  appeal to the constrained set of responses (as
  long as the required constraints dont mention
  the general rules).
• Moreover, it is plausible that the constraints on
  the set will mark for us a standard of taste
  sentimental responses meeting the constraints
  will be superior to those not meeting the
  constraints.

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On the Standard of Taste

• Returning to our first attempt at connecting
  sentimental response and aesthetic value, we
  might then consider the following adjustment. We
  might replace (I) with (II)
• (I) X is aesthetically valuable iff X is such as
  to elicit a specific type of feeling of pleasure
  in appreciators.
• (II) X is aesthetically valuable iff X is such as
  to elicit a specific type of feeling of pleasure
  in appreciators of type F in conditions C.

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On the Standard of Taste

• If we specify the F conditions on appreciators,
  and the C conditions on sentimental responses by
  those appreciators, in the right way, we will
  then be able to view sentimental responses
  meeting the conditions as supplying a standard of
  taste.
• Responses in the right conditions will be
  sufficiently uniform that they can count as
  yielding optimal aesthetic judgments.
• Responses outside those conditions will not
  yield such judgments and will be counted
  inferior.

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On the Standard of Taste

• This sort of approach seems to provide for
  compatibility between subjectivity and
  objectivity as follows.
• Subjectivity is taken care of because the
  fundamental bases of aesthetic judgments are
  subjective responses, albeit responses subject to
  objective conditions.
• Objectivity is taken care of because subjective
  responses are counted as better or worse
  depending upon the extent to which they meet
  objective conditions.

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On the Standard of Taste

• Notice that its important to this sort of
  approach that the conditions on optimal responses
  are specified without appeal to whether they
  correctly reflect an independently constituted
  (or anyway independently accessible) aesthetic
  reality.
• Otherwise, the conditions wouldnt sustain the
  subjectivist side of Humes view, and so deal
  with that part of his puzzle.

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On the Standard of Taste

• Humes account of the true critic
• True critics are those who have overcome five
  obstacles to optimal appreciation of works
• Insufficient fineness of discrimination.
• Insufficient practice with works of a given sort.
• Insufficient comparative appreciation of works.
• Insufficient application of means-end reasoning.
• Prejudice.

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On the Standard of Taste

• Insufficient fineness of discrimination.
• Proper appreciation of some works requires that
  one is able to distinguish amongst the parts of
  the work, and note fine details of the work.

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On the Standard of Taste

• (2) Insufficient practice with works of a given
  sort.
• If the only works one has come across are
  paintings, one wont be in an optimal position to
  appreciate musical works.
• If the only paintings one has come across are by
  Monet, one wont be in an optimal position to
  appreciate works by Vermeer.

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On the Standard of Taste

• (3) Insufficient comparative appreciation of
  works.
• If one hasnt spent time comparing the strengths
  and weaknesses (or anyway features) of various
  works, one will not be in an optimal position to
  appreciate newly presented works.
• Crucial here is the role of masterworks or
  masterpieces comparison with these enables the
  critic to fine tune their aesthetic responses.

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On the Standard of Taste

• (4) Insufficient application of means-end
  reasoning.
• Some works are produced with particular aims in
  mind, for instance to provoke certain emotional
  responses or to reveal or emphasize certain
  features of a subject matter.
• Critics who havent carefully assessed a work in
  line with its capacity to meet the ends of its
  production are not in the best position to
  appreciate such works.

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On the Standard of Taste

• (5) Prejudice.
• Some responses to works are driven in part by
  prejudice, perhaps trivial (disliking the colour
  purple) or more substantive (homophobia).
• Critics subject to prejudice of this sort and who
  allow the prejudice to affect their response to a
  work are not best placed to appreciate that work.

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On the Standard of Taste

• Question 1 Would someone be required to overcome
  all of those obstacles in order to become a true
  critic?
• Question 2 Are there other obstacles that would
  need to be overcome in order to become a true
  critic?

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On the Standard of Taste

• Humes account
• Hume holds that true critics supply the standard
  of taste, through their properly honed
  sentimental responses to works, perhaps
  influenced by hypotheses about the rules of
  composition that govern or elicit those responses.

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On the Standard of Taste

• Humes account
• This is supposed to solve the puzzle in the
  following way
• The ultimate aim of aesthetic appreciation is
  having valuable sentimental responsesexperiencing
  particular forms of pleasure.
• We can rank works by appeal to their funding such
  responses amongst the true criticsresponses that
  are not an upshot of subjection to the five
  obstacles.

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On the Standard of Taste

• Some concerns
• 1. Isnt Humes account circular? True critics
  will be identified in part by their engagement
  with, and proper responses to, masterworks. But
  only a true critic is in a position to identify
  the masterworks. So only a true critic is in a
  position to identify a true critic.

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On the Standard of Taste

• Some concerns
• 2. Isnt Humes account too mechanistic to
  underwrite the normative aspects of aesthetic
  appreciation (i) the fact that we think some
  works are better or worse and some responses are
  more or less appropriate? (ii) the fact that
  aesthetic responses are improvable and not simple
  changeable? Isnt the account modeled too closely
  on the sense of taste to capture these aspects of
  aesthetic value?

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On the Standard of Taste

• Some concerns
• 3. Isnt Hume too optimistic about the
  convergence of opinion of true critics? Wont
  there be just as much divergence here as amongst
  ordinary folk?

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On the Standard of Taste

• Some concerns
• 4. Isnt Humes account incompatible with the way
  we are ordinarily motivated by others (critics)
  appreciation of aesthetic value? In particular,
  if all that critics reveal is a set of
  sentimental responses that we would have if we
  were true critics, why should we want those
  responses rather than the responses that we
  already have? Why should we go through the effort
  of attempting to approximate true-critic status,
  rather than sticking with our own sentimental
  responses?