Title: No name
1 2Regional Options for Peace in Northern Uganda
The Case of the Lords Resistance Army
Angelo Izama Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow Nat
ional Endowment for Democracy February 11, 2008
The views expressed in this presentation represe
nt the analysis and opinions of the speaker and
do not necessarily reflect those of the National
Endowment for Democracy or its staff.
3The Great Lakes Region
4A woman stands amid the ruins at Barlonyo after
an LRA attack. 300 Northern Ugandans died from a
ttacks in 2004.
5A man rests his feet in an IDP camp.
6Ethnic Breakdown Baganda 16.9 Banyakole 9.5
Basoga 8.4 Bakiga 6.9 Iteso 6.4 Lang
i 6.1 Acholi 4.7 Bagisu 4.6 Lugbara
4.2 Bunyoro 2.7 Other 29.6 ____________
______ 2002 Census
7The North-South Divide
British Policy sows the seeds of the
North-South divide. Ethnic-based competition
for the Ugandan state. Ethnic violence killi
ngs in Amin era, Luwero Mukura massacres.
1986 Southerners take power. North under sieg
e ever since. Brutal military response by sou
therner Yoweri Musevenis National Resista
nce Army (NRA) serves as forerunner of the
atrocities committed by northerners Lords
Resistance Army (LRA). Conflict remains frame
d along ethnic lines North vs. South.
8The North-South Power Struggle 19661987
1966 Prime Minister Milton Obotea
northernerorders General Idi Amin Dadas
military to overthrow Sir Edward Mutesa, the
King of Buganda. 1971 Idi Amin overthrows Mi
lton Obote. 1979 Ugandan rebel groups overth
row Idi Amin. Obote regains power.
1986 Southerner Yoweri Museveni assumes power
. 1987 Northern groupsincluding the Lords
Resistance Army (LRA)begin an insurrection
against the Museveni regime.
9Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni, head of state
since 1986. Museveni has overseen the longest
presidency in Ugandan history.
10Regional Instability 1990present
The domestic conflict between the Government of
Uganda (GoU) and the LRA coincided with a spike
in violence in the Great Lakes Region.
11Rwanda
1990-1994 Ugandan officers of Rwandan descent
defect and invade Rwanda. 1994 Invasion lea
ds to genocide. 1 million die.
1994-present After genocide ends, Paul Kagame
assumes power and establishes the current
Rwandan government.
12Rwandas President Paul Kagame
Kagame was a Ugandan soldier during the 1980s an
d former head of military intelligence in Kampala.
13Democratic Republic of Congo
1996 Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi begin several
wars that lead to the 1997 overthrow of Mobutu
Sese Seko in Zaire by Laurent Kabila.
1998 Beginning of DRC war, in which Rwanda, U
ganda, Zimbabwe, Burundi, Namibia and Angola ei
ther sponsor proxies or send national troops.
2001 Laurent Kabila assassinated. His son, Jo
seph, assumes power. 2002 End of formal con
flict in DRC. Over 4 million people estimated to
have died.
14President Joseph Kabila of DRC
He was trained in the Rwandan army and spent yea
rs in Uganda as Musevenis guest.
15South Sudan
1983 Beginning of second Sudanese Civil War.
1988 Uganda begins sponsoring the Sudan People
s Liberation Movement/Army. 2005 Comprehensi
ve Peace Agreement signed. End of formal
hostilities between North and South Sudan in
which over 2 million die. 2005 Government of
South Sudan (GoSS) established.
16The late John Garang, founder and former leader
of the
Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement.
17Rebel Groups Currently Operating
along the Uganda-DRC Border
Ugandan Groups Lords Resistance Army (LRA) Al
lied Democratic Forces (ADF) Peoples Redemption
Army (PRA) National Army for the Liberation of Ug
anda (NALU) Congolese Groups Forces Armees d
u Peuple Congolais (FAPC) Mouvement Revolutionair
e Congolais (MRC) National Council for the Defens
e of the People (CNDP) Rwandan Groups Forces
Democratiques de la Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR)
Burundian Groups Front National de Liberation
(FNL)
18Gen. Laurent Nkunda (who could easily be mistaken
for a young Paul Kagame) leads the CNDP in East
DRC.
19Juba Peace Talks 2006present
Juba, Sudan, July, 2006 Govt. of Southern
Sudan (GoSS) mediates peace talks
b/w Ugandan govt. LRA, with aim of ending
the conflict in Northern Uganda.
Chief Mediator GoSS vice-president Dr. Riek M
achar. UN, EU, and U.S. major international p
layers. Peace talks have resulted in a tenuou
s ceasefire in northern Uganda.
Current challenges include disbanding military
wing of LRA and addressing ICC indictments ag
ainst top LRA leaders.
Joseph Kony (left) shaking the hand of Dr. Riek
Machar, former head of the South Sudan Defense
Forces. Looking on is recently murdered deputy
LRA boss, Vincent Otti.
20Opinion Polls Evidence of Todays North-South
Divide
What would you like to see happen to Kony and
his fighters? (Steadman Poll, 2006)
(includes political South)
21Who is likely to break a peace agreement agreed
upon by Government of Uganda and the LRA?
(Steadman Poll, 2006)
22The International Communitys Misguided Approach
U.S. and Western interests have been guided by
bilateralism and the search for a single re
gional hegemon. The U.S. has encouraged a
military solution and has played hardball wit
h the LRA. International attention hinges sole
ly on humanitarian issues. Little has been
said about ethnic and economic
underpinnings of the conflict.
23Recommendations
General Recommendations Urgently expand the
Tripartite-Plus Security System to include South
Sudan. Create a region-wide Disarmament, Demobi
lization , and Reconstruction (DDR) program and a
Veterans Assistance Program. Initiate a dialog
ue through the Tripartite and/or similar networks
to decrease security-related competition and
increase economic cooperation.
Establish formal contacts between the East Afric
an Community and the Government of South Sudan.
24Recommendations
When Negotiating with the Lords Resistance
Army Enlist the Khartoum Government to deliver
a credible proposal to Joseph Kony for
third-country exile. Additionally, ask Khartoum
to consider in-country exile in Northern Sudan.
Encourage Joseph Kony to negotiate directly and
increase contact between him and key players in
the peace talks. Continue the isolation of the
LRA as a military group and continue encouraging
domestic reconciliation in Uganda.
Encourage the return of the Acholi diaspora, fac
tions of which still support the rebellion.
25Recommendations
For the Government of Uganda Increase calls fo
r accountability on all sides, including the
Ugandan Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF).
Fast-track the implementation of the Peace Recon
struction and Development Program (PRDP).
Remove mistrusted wartime government officials (
like UPDF Col. Charles Otema Awany).
Appoint credible, impartial civilian administrat
ors with no connectionpersonal or politicalto
the factions in the conflict. Begin a robust pr
ogram of Veterans Assistance alongside the
demobilization of former combatants.
Renew pressure on Government of Southern Sudan t
o fast- track its own security sector refor
m and DDR programs.
26Security Competition and Fossil Fuels
Oil blocks and Concessions in the Albertine Graben
27The Labor Force of Violence Recommendations
Some thinking must be dedicated to cross-border
rebel movements, or what is in fact a Labor
Force of Violence in the region. In the last
decade, rebel movements have increasingly
cooperated with one another. There is clearly a
need to create region-wide disincentives for
recruitment into rebel movements. By diminishing
the recruitment pool for these movements, the
region can begin to move away from security
competition and move toward economic cooperation.
28How Can We Absorb the Labor Force of Violence in
the Great Lakes Region?
Regional peace and security agreements need to
address veterans, especially in volatile
border districts. Five-to-ten year reintegrati
on and livelihood support programs should be c
onsolidated throughout the region. Create
veterans financial institutions that are
dedicated to providing long-term micro-credit
support to projects run by ex-combatants.
29Recommendations for Uganda
Create a public-private Veterans Bank with the
following goals Lend to and receive deposits
from Ugandan veterans, with the aim of incr
easing their income experience
managing ventures and businesses.
Finance the rehabilitation of veterans and tra
nsform them into a productive force in the ec
onomy. Target areas that have been hit the ha
rdest by war.
30Conclusion
Conflicts in the Great Lakes Region continue to
deplete resources that could otherwise be
directed toward democratic consolidation.
Protracted conflict weakens the state, deepens
ethnic divisions, and stunts the growth of
economies that would otherwise invest in
pluralistic institutions. Only by transitioning
to peace will the Great Lakes Region be able to
achieve its full democratic potential.