Democracy is Overrated

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Democracy is Overrated

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Democracy is Overrated X Michael Munger Duke University November 7, 2005 Key Elements of Public Choice Methodological Individualism Aggregation Consequence, not ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Democracy is Overrated


1
Democracy is Overrated
X
  • Michael Munger
  • Duke University
  • November 7, 2005

2
Key Elements of Public Choice
  • Methodological Individualism
  • Aggregation
  • Consequence, not Intention
  • Disagreement
  • Self-interest
  • Institutions and Organizations

3
THE Key Element
  • Difference between Samuelsonian public goods
    problem and the problem of making choices
    collectively
  • Information, tastes, and culture
  • Institutional design
  • Collective choices

4
Collective v. Public
Property of Choice Property of Good Individual Decision I can choose, alone and without interference Collective Decision Choices are made by a group, and are binding on all
Private Decision My choice has no consequence for your welfare Liberty of the individual What socks should I wear? Whom should I marry? Tyranny of the majority Invasion of privacy Theft of property rights
Public Decision My choices affect your welfare Underinvestment, or else theft by the minority Air or water pollution Education Liberty of the group How much to spend on defense? How to take care of the poor?
5
I. Information, Tastes, and Culture
  • The peculiar character of the problem of a
    rational economic order is determined precisely
    by the fact that the knowledge of the
    circumstances of which we must make use never
    exists in concentrated or integrated form but
    solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and
    frequently contradictory knowledge which all the
    separate individuals possess. The economic
    problem of society is thus not merely a problem
    of how to allocate "given" resourcesif "given"
    is taken to mean given to a single mind which
    deliberately solves the problem set by these
    "data." It is rather a problem of how to secure
    the best use of resources known to any of the
    members of society, for ends whose relative
    importance only these individuals know. Or, to
    put it briefly, it is a problem of the
    utilization of knowledge which is not given to
    anyone in its totality. (F.A. Hayek, 1945, AER).

6
The Right Thing
  • There may not be any one right thing to do. It
    depends.
  • It is the nature of collective choices that they
    are unitary One defense budget, one standard
    for pollution, and so on.
  • Asking What Will We Do? begs the question. The
    real question is
  • Why Do You Think There is a We?
  • Buchanan and Tullocks Two Levels Cant let
    the majority decide what the majority gets to
    decide

7
My Plan Your Plan ? Our PlanSocialist
Calculation Debate
  • This is not a dispute about whether planning is
    to be done or not. It is a dispute as to whether
    planning is to be done centrally, by one
    authority for the whole economic system, or is to
    be divided among many individuals. Planning in
    the specific sense in which the term is used in
    contemporary controversy necessarily means
    central planningdirection of the whole economic
    system according to one unified plan.
    Competition, on the other hand, means
    decentralized planning by many separate persons.
    The halfway house between the two, about which
    many people talk but which few like when they see
    it, is the delegation of planning to organized
    industries, or, in other words, monopoly.
    (Hayek, 1945).

8
Coherence and Legitimacy
  • Can a group of people who disagree come to a
    consensus? How would this work? Why would we
    believe that the consensus is any more than an
    imperfect choice?
  • Do the choices of majorities tell us anything
    about the right thing to do in the face of
    disagreement?
  • Is there such a thing as the majority, which we
    just have to discover through voting or some
    political process?
  • I wantyou wantwhat do we want?

9
Institutional Design
  • Institutions are the humanly devised rules of the
    game that shape and direct human interactions.
  • Institutions reduce uncertainty by shrinking the
    choice set of all of the players. If the rules
    are not formalized, the players spend too much
    time arguing over the rules, and less time in
    productive activities. The actual choice of
    institutions, however, is hard, since there are
    countless ways of choosing. What makes some
    institutions better than others?
  • In particular, is democracy a good institution?
    How would we know? What are the alternatives?

10
Step back for a moment.The Fundamental Human
Problem(according to Munger)
  • How can we construct or preserve institutions
    that make individual self-interest not
    inconsistent with the common good?

11
Two Approaches
  • Madisonian
  • Ambition must be made to counteract ambition
  • Rousseauvian
  • Transform the self, solve the problem of amour
    propre. Inscribe the law on the hearts of men.
    Some preferences are better than others.

12
Origins of Markets
  • Differences in endowments
  • Differences in preferences
  • Technical cost conditions (div of labor,
    economies of scale, increased dexterity,
    innovations in tool design)

13
Origins of Government Institutions
  • Disagreement/exchange (BT)
  • Capture gains from trade by reducing transactions
    costs
  • Make public goods possible

14
Origins of Government Institutions
  • What if we all wanted the same thing? Would
    government even be necessary?
  • It would. Because we do all want the same thing
    more.
  • On disagreement, Charles IV
  • My cousin Francis and I are in perfect accordhe
    wants Milan and so do I.

15
Madisonian Institutions
  • MarketsSmiths baker
  • PoliticsFederalist 51
  • Men are not angels
  • Men are not ruled by angels
  • Ambition must be made to counteract ambition

16
Democracy Unbound.Rousseau
  • But it is asked how a man can be both free and
    forced to conform to wills that are not his own.
    How are the opponents at once free and subject to
    laws they have not agreed to?
  • I retort that the question is wrongly put. The
    citizen gives his consent to all the laws,
    including those which are passed in spite of his
    opposition, and even those which punish him when
    he dares to break any of them. (From The Social
    Contract)

17
Democracy Unbound.
  • When in the popular assembly a law is proposed,
    what the people is asked is not exactly whether
    it approves or rejects the proposal, but whether
    it is in conformity with the general will, which
    is their will.
  • When therefore the opinion that is contrary to my
    own prevails, this proves neither more nor less
    than that I was mistaken, and that what I thought
    to be the general will was not so.
  • If my particular opinion had carried the day I
    should have achieved the opposite of what was my
    will and it is in that case that I should not
    have been free.

18
Loyal Opposition?
  • This conception of democracy is logical. The
    actions of government are driven by the people
    the general will is sovereign. Opposition to the
    general will is treason, and must be punished.
    No need for two parties only one general will.
  • All those countries with Peoples Democratic
    Republic of ___ were not perversions of
    democracy, but examplars. That is what pure
    democracy, with no limits on scope, looks like.
    Cannot be otherwise.
  • Democracy, in and of itself, is an attractive
    concept that must constitute a recipe for
    tyranny, unless the scope of collective
    sovereignty is strictly limited.

19
Che Guevaras Man and Socialism in Cuba (1965).
  • Society as a whole must become a huge
    school....We can see the new man who begins to
    emerge in this period of the building of
    socialism. His image is as yet unfinished in
    fact it will never be finished, since the process
    advances parallel the development of new economic
    forms. Discounting those whose lack of education
    makes them tend toward the solitary road, towards
    the satisfaction of their ambitions, there are
    others who, even within this new picture of
    over-all advances, tend to march in isolation
    from the accompanying mass. What is more
    important is that people become more aware every
    day of the need to incorporate themselves into
    society and of their own importance as motors of
    that society

20
Collective ChoicesWhat is truth? said jesting
Pilate, and would not stay for an answer.
  • True Statements?
  • Democracy means rule by the people
  • Democracy is the best form of government
  • The many are wiser than any one person
  • Morality is defined by majorityDemocracy is a
    means of discovering truth

21
A movie Pure Democracy in Action
22
Central Questions
  • Can reasonable people differ? Can a reasonable
    person oppose gay marriage? Can a reasonable
    person be pro-life? Is it possible to support
    the war in Iraq?
  • What is the basis of disagreement
  • Chocolate vs. Vanilla? In politics, values. Are
    they primitives? Deliberation wont help.
  • Different information sets? Evidence about
    causes, different understandings of means-ends
    relations. Deliberation might help.
  • Is there a fact of the matter?

23
Central Questions
  • Is it true that the many are wiser than any one?
    Many people have argued this claim.
  • For it is possible that the many, no one of whom
    taken singly is a sound man, may yet, taken all
    together, be better than the few, not
    individually, but collectively. (Aristotle,
    Politics, Book I, Chapter 11)
  • Some important analytical support, under some
    circumstances. Condorcets Jury Theorem, for
    example.

24
Central Questions
  • The real problems of democratic choice
  • Scope of government/collective power the
    Buchanan problem
  • Information of time and place the Hayek problem
  • Coherence and legitimacy The Condorcet / Arrow
    problem

25
Scope
  • What can government decide? How would we decide
    what government can decide?
  • What do I get to decide, by myself? What things
    does my family get to decide?
  • Suppose a group of people want to decide
    something for me, for my own good? Can they do
    that? How could I stop them?

26
P.J. ORourkeInformation and Scope Problems of MR
  • Now, majority rule is a precious, sacred thing
    worth dying for. Butlike other precious, sacred
    things, such as the home and the familyit's not
    only worth dying for it can make you wish you
    were dead. Imagine if all of life were determined
    by majority rule. Every meal would be a pizza.
    Every pair of pants, even those in a Brooks
    Brothers suit, would be stone-washed denim.
    Celebrity diets and exercise books would be the
    only thing on the shelves at the library.
    Andsince women are a majority of the population,
    we'd all be married to Mel Gibson. (Parliament of
    Whores, 1991, p. 5).

27
James Buchanan Like Hobbes, too much liberty?
  • What should government be allowed to do? What
    is the appropriate sphere of political action?
    How large a share national product should be
    available for political disposition? What sort of
    political decision-structures should be adopted
    at the constitutional stage? Under what
    conditions and to what extent should individuals
    be franchised? (Politics Without Romance.)

28
Coherence and Legitimacy
  • Can a group of people who disagree come to a
    consensus? How would this work? Why would we
    believe that the consensus is any more than an
    imperfect choice?
  • Do the choices of majorities tell us anything
    about the right thing to do?
  • Is there such a thing as the majority, which we
    just have to discover through voting or some
    political process?
  • I wantyou wantwhat do we want?

29
Problem of the U.S. in Iraq
30
Democratic Choices War in Iraq
  • Youve got to help me out hereplay along!
  • Preferences and beliefs, on the little card.
    REALLY! Accept the premise, and act like those
    are your preferences. Three choices
  • No war N
  • Aggressive war W
  • Police/political means P

31
Choices War in Iraq
  • One possibility isolationist variant of Powell
    doctrine
  • N gt W gt P
  • We should not get involved.
  • But, if we do, we should go in with overwhelming
    force.
  • Worst thing is to expose our troops/workers in a
    limited police action, depend on the U.N.

32
Choices War in Iraq
  • Another possibility Rummy World
  • W gt P gt N
  • Iraq/Saddam is an imminent threat, will develop
    WMD.
  • If not war, then must vigorously pursue sanctions
  • Worst thing is to do nothing, relax sanctions and
    let Iraq become nuclear power

33
Choices War in Iraq
  • Final possibility Prudent Dove
  • P gt N gt W
  • Let sanctions and inspections do their work,
    because Iraq is a potential danger to its
    neighbors and the world
  • We have no good claim to just war, so next best
    is to do nothing
  • Worst thing is to use war against a nation that
    has made no overt attack on the U.S.

34
Choices War in Iraq
  • Sowe have disagreement
  • Prudent dove wants to use P, police action
  • Rummy wants war
  • Isolationists would prefer to stay far away from
    foreign entanglements, so do nothing.

35
Choices War in Iraq
  • Lets use democracy, the pure kind where the
    people make the choice directly.
  • First, lets decide whether to use force, or do
    nothing.
  • Vote P vs. W to decide which activity is better,
    and then vote that against N. That way, we are
    comparing the best do something against do
    nothing.

36
Choices War in Iraq
  • Consider what just happened. Simply by changing
    the order in which we consider the alternatives,
    I could generate as the winner any one of the
    three alternatives.
  • Choosing the agenda, then, is tantamount to
    choosing the outcome.
  • Is this just a conjurers trick, or does it tell
    us something about democracy?

37
Choices War in Iraq
  • If there are three (or more) alternatives, and
    there is disagreement, then democracy may be
    radically indeterminate.
  • More simply, there is no correct answer to the
    question, What do the people want?
  • In fact, some majority opposes every alternative.

38
Choices War in Iraq
  • Here is the problem
  • I/P Rummy Prud Dove
  • N W P Best
  • W P N Middle
  • P N W Worst
  • Majority preferences
  • W gt P gt N gt W
  • Endless, infinite cycling over alternatives. Not
    a tie, but a literal perpetual motion machine

39
But this is nonsense meetings end
  • That is what should terrify you meetings end,
    and things get decided. The point is that we are
    rarely presented with three or more alternatives.
    We usually are presented with two. How are
    those two chosen?
  • The Lawson Revolution coalitions form,
    charismatic people take power. Not the will of
    the people, but the force of will of some
    demogogue or tyrant
  • If the rules matter to this extent, that means
    that procedures, not preferences, determine
    outcomes. And elites control procedures.

40
Democracy works fine. So long as everyone agrees
  • But if there is disagreement, and at least three
    alternatives, then a majority opposes every
    available choice. So, democracy fails us when we
    need it most!
  • Since some choice has to be made, we are left
    with an outcome that is either
  • Imposed (tyranny)
  • Arbitrary (random or procedure-driven)
  • In either case, democratic choice is chimerical
  • Dictatorship with the trappings of democracy

41
The worst of all worlds
  • Democracy without constitutional liberalism
  • 1. Rule of law, protections of property and
    liberty
  • 2. Limits on scope of issues within the
    jurisdiction of collective choice
  • Democracy without these is the most terrifying
    kind of tyranny you can imagine. Americans, and
    the West, are confused about good government.
    The key is constitutional liberalism, not
    democracy.

42
Stability is a variable
  • Politics in nations are not always stable
  • Different nations have different institutions
  • Those institutions are more or less effective at
    different times
  • How do U.S. institutions serve to make our
    political system more, or less, stable? How do
    the institutions of other nations solve this
    problem, differently?

43
In our example, Iso-Powell was the culprit
Utility
Prudent Dove
Rummy
Iso-Powell
N
P
W
Intensity of War Effort
44
Cannot Rely on the Conditions of the MVT to Turn
Up by Chance
  • Institutions shape the choices nations make.
    But
  • Preferences arent single-peaked
  • Issues are not always one-dimensional
  • Democratic institutions are likely to fail when
    we need them most

45
Three Histories
  • Plato
  • Shakespeare
  • Plutarch

46
Plato Democracy Means Tyranny
  • Democracy is precisely the constitution out of
    which tyranny comes from extreme liberty, it
    seems, comes a slavery most complete and most
    cruel.When a democratic city gets worthless
    butlers presiding over its wine, and has drunk
    too deep of libertys heady draught, then, I
    think, if the rulers are not very obliging and
    provide plenty of liberty, it calls them
    blackguards and oligarchs and chastises themand
    any who obey the rulers they trample in the dust
    as willing slaves and not worth a jot.
    (Republic, Book VI, 560a-564b)

47
  • Shakespeares Tragedy of Coriolanus Act II, Sc
    3
  • BOTH CITIZENS. The gods give you joy, sir,
    heartily! (Exeunt citizens)
  • CORIOLANUS. Most sweet voices!
  • Better it is to die, better to
    starve,
  • Than crave the hire which first we
    do deserve.
  • Why in this wolvish toge should I
    stand here
  • To beg of Hob and Dick that do
    appear
  • Their needless vouches? Custom
    calls me to't.
  • What custom wills, in all things
    should we do't,
  • The dust on antique time would lie
    unswept,
  • And mountainous error be too highly
    heap'd
  • For truth to o'erpeer. Rather than
    fool it so,
  • Let the high office and the honour
    go
  • To one that would do thus. I am
    half through
  • The one part suffered, the other
    will I do.

48
ARISTIDES FROM PLUTARCHS LIVES
  • Aristides being surprised and asking if
    Aristides had ever done him any injury, "None at
    all," said he, "neither know I the man but I am
    tired of hearing him everywhere called the just."
    Aristides, hearing this, is said to have made no
    reply, but returned the sherd with his own name
    inscribed. At his departure from the city,
    lifting up his hands to heaven, he made a prayer
    (the reverse, it would seem, of that of
    Achilles), that the Athenians might never have
    any occasion which should constrain them to
    remember Aristides.
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