IPCRI

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IPCRI Antalya WorkshopMarch 6-9, 2003 A Mil
estone Towards Stability International
intervention in the Israeli Palestinian
Conflict
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International intervention in the Israeli
-Palestinian conflict
Israels overall leading national interests
The existence of Israel as the national homeland
of the Jewish people with a Jewish majority among
its citizens. The existence of Israel as a democr
atic state. Defining permanent, secure and intern
ationally recognized borders for the state of
Israel. Constructing joint understandings for soc
ial, cultural religious and political engagements
among all its citizens. Sustainable economic and
social development for all its citizens.
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International intervention in the Israeli
-Palestinian conflict
Current impediments to Israels national
interests Non-democratic rule over a vast popula
tion undermines democratic and Jewish norms and
values. Without defined borders, demographic tren
ds will lead to an Arab majority within the state
of Israel. No secure and recognized borders. T
he continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict threatens to permanently impair the
delicate relations between the Jewish majority
and Arab minority within Israel.
Low intensity warfare severely damaged Israels
economy.
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International intervention in the Israeli
-Palestinian conflict
The psychological -political environment
A perception within Israeli society of an
existential threat to the state of Israel.
Total break of trust between Israelis and
Palestinians, both at the grassroots and at the
leadership levels. Signed documents are no longer
deemed a satisfactory guarantee for policy
implementations. Real doubt as to the possibili
ty of reconciliation, even in the long run.
An overall feeling of urgency for reaching some
sort of new political agreement / arrangement.
Critical uncertainty - Iraq
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International intervention in the Israeli
-Palestinian conflict
Israels current options
Full Reoccupation
More of the same
Disengagement
PSA
With whom?
Palestinian state end of claims / conflict
IDF security responsibility informal
international civil responsibility
International Protectorate
Unilateral withdrawal
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International intervention in the Israeli
-Palestinian conflict
Disengagement
More of the same
Unilateral withdrawal
International protectorate
Unilateral withdrawal
Full reoccupation
Nescient Palestinian state
Extremist / Terrorist Palestinian entity
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International intervention in the Israeli
-Palestinian conflict
The security obstacle Security under the Oslo acc
ords 100 security Israel efforts Palestinia
n efforts

No longer capable or willing
No longer trusts Palestinian counterparts
Can an international force provide an
alternative? Could it rebuild Palestinian capacit
ies, incentives and reputation?
Israel had to take on full responsibility
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International protectorates - recent examples
Recent International operations - key motivations
Humanitarian Norms Realpolitik
Bosnia 200,000 dead 50 displaced Kosovo
8,000 dead 50 displaced East Timor 10,000 de
ad 66 displaced Afghanistan Extreme human righ
ts violations
Balkans (Europe) Threat of further spillovers
Credibility of foreign policy Within Europe
East Timor (Australia) Proximity to Australia,
threat of refugees
Afghanistan (US) 9/11, war on terrorism
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International protectorates - recent examples
East Timor 1999 - 2002
The main components Security presence - INTERFET
initially 11,400 troops deployed to stop the
violence by Indonesian militias.
Civil presence - UNTAET interim administration
holding full governing authorities and providing
all essential public functions and services.
After independence - UNMISET established to aid
the East Timor government for an initial period
of 12 months Defined Exit strategy An indepen
dent East Timor as a defined end state. INTERFET
mission ended with the establishment of UNTAET.
Initially defined end date for UNTAET - 31.1.01,
extended to 20.5.2002. UNMISET currently set to
end in may 2003.
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International protectorates - recent examples
East Timor 1999 - 2002
The main achievements Security operation of INTE
RFET succeeded in ending the violence
The consecutive international missions succeeded
in maintaining a clear timeline for East Timors
independence Created functioning government stru
ctures and security forces, handed over to freely
elected leadership Main shortcomings High pe
rcentage of its budget went into salaries as
oppose to infrastructure development.
Over centralization - lack of presence below the
district line, not enough local participation in
the governing and the state-building process.
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International protectorates - recent examples
Kosovo 1999 -
The main components Security presence - KFOR
40,000 troops Civil presence - UNMIK holding ful
l governing authorities Defined Exit stra
tegy No end state, no end date formally declared
Standards before Status
Democratization Institution building
Economic development
Police and Justice
Civil Administration
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International protectorates - recent examples
Kosovo 1999 -
The main achievements Demilitarization of the KLA
Institutions for self-governance Compelled a le
arning process of European standards of
governance. Main shortcomings Lack of capacit
y in dealing with the organized crime networks
Setting unrealistic benchmarks ?
The context of success Local motivations Ente
ring the EU - the big carrot European motivations
long lasting commitment
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Leaping out of the Existing Game - Stage I
US-lead force with full security responsibility
The cost to Israel Possible constraints on IDF m
ovements and operations Political concessions - s
ettlements relocation, without direct Palestinian
counter measures Restricted policy options in cas
e of a perceived failure as long as the
international presence stay in the territory

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Leaping out of the Existing Game - Stage I
US-lead force with full security responsibility
Overall mission - Breaking the loop of violence


Halt terrorist activity within and across the
border
Coordinate Army redeployment
Coordinate settlements relocation
Has never been tried by an international force
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Internationally lead stabilization Goals and
tasks
Breaking the loop of violence
Main security objectives Necessary capacities
Possible constraints on implementation
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Internationally lead stabilization Goals and
tasks
Breaking the loop of violence Main security obj
ectives Preventing terrorist infiltration into
Israeli controlled area Dismounting terrorist in
frastructure Restraining public incitement
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Internationally lead stabilization Goals and
tasks
Breaking the loop of violence - objectives
Main security tasks Preventing terrorist infiltr
ation to Israeli controlled areas
Controlling border areas on the Palestinian side
Check points Verifying passing permits Preventin
g the smuggling of arms and explosives
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Internationally lead stabilization Goals and
tasks
Breaking the loop of violence - objectives
Main security tasks Dismounting terrorist infras
tructure Uprooting recruiting networks Preventin
g money transferring Preventing arms manufacturin
g Cutting off / preventing links with outside te
rrorist networks
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Internationally lead stabilization Goals and
tasks
Breaking the loop of violence - objectives
Main security tasks Restraining public incitemen
t Public media Education system Fundamentalist
welfare activities Religious activities
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Internationally lead stabilization Goals and
tasks
Breaking the loop of violence The necessary secur
ity capacities US-lead Professional combat troop
s (50,000 ) Training programs on the local envir
onment (political, cultural, religious,
geographical) Intelligence gathering capacities
Incitement monitoring capacities
Agreed structures and participants
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Internationally lead stabilization Goals and
tasks
Breaking the loop of violence Possible constraint
s on implementation Lack of knowledge (understan
ding of the environment, intelligence and combat
skills) Risk aversion (fear of body bags norma
tive and political constraints by the sending
states) Natural identification with the weak Spo
ilers (Palestinian radicals and settlers)
Exit strategy (the time factor, achievable
benchmarks, and costs)
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Leaping out of the Existing Game - Stage II
The creation of a stable environment for peace
negotiations Developing local security capac
ities Developing Good Governance (state-buildin
g) Sustainable economic development Both pub
lics legitimacy and support
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Stage III
The next phase - Neutralizing the conflict
Guaranteeing a peace agreement
Facilitating in peace negotiations
Ensuring its implementation
The international presence does not end, but its
mandate changes
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The protectorate toolbox - Expectations and
limitations
Law and order - Yes, Security Buffer - ?
Fight Incitement - Yes, Reconciliation - No
Capacity-building - Yes, Western standards - No
Post-Arafat leadership - Yes, Democratization -
No
A protectorates contribution will not be in
solving the conflict but in redesigning the
playing field for a bilateral solution
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The International Protectorates Toolbox
Stabilization operations
Setting benchmarks for statehood
Law enforcement
International protectorate
Democratizationinstitution building and elections
Civil services (health, education, welfare)
Fiscal management
Monitoring incitement
Managing economic reconstruction efforts
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International intervention in the Israeli
-Palestinian conflict
The end.