Title: Explaining the Growth of China since 1978
1Explaining the Growth of China since 1978
2Growth and Development
- Growth The increase in the total amount of goods
and services available. - Development A gradual but steady and sustained
increase in output per capita.
3The Growth Performance of China
- Table 6.1 ()
- GDP Population GDP per capita
- 52-78 6.0 1.9 4.1
- 78-05 9.6 1.1 8.5
4Comparative Perspective
- Sustained growth of per capita GDP above 6 has
happened in three episodes - Japan (1955-1973) 8 per year
- Korea, Taiwan, Thailand (1982-1996) around 7
per year - China (1978-2005)
5Questions to discuss
- Is the high growth rate of China real?
- Why China has been able to maintain high growth
rate for 20 years since 1978?
6Outline
- Data and measurement problems
- Driving forces of growth
- Investment
- Labor and migration
- Productivity
- Globalization
7GDP Estimation in China
- Before 1993, National Income but not GDP was
estimated in China. After 1993, GDP replaced NI. - National income reflects the activities of
material production but not nonmaterial services
(banking and insurance, education, science and
research, consulting, etc.) industries. - GDP, in contrast, further includes the service
industries.
8Three Stages of GDP Reporting (Xianchun Xu)
- Preliminary estimation
- Figures released in February of the following
year. - Data from specific fields (rapid reports) by NBS
departments - Primary revision
- Figures released in the China Statistical
Yearbook in the second half of the following year - Including more reliable and encompassing data
from NBS, ministries of the State Council, and
administrative records. - Final Revision
- Figures released in the China Statistical
Yearbook in the second year following the
accounting year. - Including all of the statistical, accounting, and
administrative data.
9Two Adjustments
- The first important adjustment to GDP (1978-93)
was completed in 1994-95, shortly after the first
census of tertiary industries in China. - After the second census of tertiary industries,
the NBS revised GDP upward by 16.
10Remaining Problems with Chinas GDP Estimation
- A regular (annual) survey system for nonmaterial
services has not been established since the first
census of tertiary industries. - The value added of many rapidly developing new
services are estimated mainly based on the wages
and taxes. - Non-observed economy (illegal production,
underground production, informal sector) is not
shown fully in GDP estimation. - Problems in GDP estimation at constant prices due
to the lack of price indices. - Interference of local leaders with statistical
data.
11On Data Quality (text)
- China made a transition to a new data-collection
system in 1998, shifting to sample survey
estimates of small-scale industry and services.
12Does NBS Intentionally Falsify Data? (Carsten
Holz, 2003)
- NBS is unlikely to falsify data, and it has been
making sincere efforts to improve data quality
over time. - Industrial energy use, production quantity of
major products, and freight are insufficient
proxies for true output. - Rawskis re-estimation of China GDP using the
income approach may be misleading due to lack of
data. - Internal publication conforms with published data
- World Bank accepts the official estimates.
13Real GDP Growth (Alwyn Young)
- Systematic understatement of inflation accounts
for 2.5 percent (real) growth per year in the
non-agricultural economy 1978-98. - Most countries estimate real GDP by deflating
nominal GDP using independently constructed price
indices. - In China, enterprises are called upon to report
the value of output in current and constant (base
year) prices. - SSB does compile independent price indices, but
it is not used in their GDP estimates.
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16Findings by Alwyn Young
- Official GDP per capita grew 8 percent per year.
- After adopting correct inflation measures, the
real GDP growth rate of China during the reform
period is not much different from other rapidly
growing economies. - Labor and total factor productivity growth in the
non-agricultural economy are 2.6 and 1.4 percent
per year during the reform years (1978-1998).
17Chinas Nominal GDP Estimates A Pessimistic View
(Thomas Rawski)
- Official GDP measures are plausible 1978-97.
- Overestimation Suggested by 1995 industrial
census - Underestimation No detailed study of the service
sector. Overstatement of farm incomes in 1978. - GDP quality dramatically worsen since 1998.
- A great political responsibility to maintain
high growth rate (under the impact of Asian
financial crisis) led to a wind of falsification
and embellishment. - NBS publicly rejected provincial estimates of GDP
growth for 1997/98, and substitute it with a
lower and black-box estimate (7.8 percent for
1997/98). - Rawski believes that real GDP growth is no more
than 12 between 1997 and 2001, in contrast to
the official estimate of about 30.
18Agreeing and Disagreeing Evidence for the
Pessimistic View
- Disagreeing
- Tax revenue increased by 90 percent 1997-2001
(Lardy 2002). The problem is (1) the tax revenue
may be exaggerated, (2) the presence of
non-budgetary (or non-tax) revenues. - Imports rose by 70 percent 1997-2001. The problem
is the existence of smuggling. - Agreeing
- Falling energy consumption. The problem is the
worsening quality of energy statistics. - Civil air traffic increases slowly despite lower
prices - Declining commodity prices, near-zero employment
growth, sluggish consumer demand, slow growth of
private investment, widespread excess supply of
both commodity and production capacity.
19Accuracy and Reliability of Energy Statistics (J.
Sinton, 2001)
- Energy statistics may be relatively good in the
early 1990s, but the quality has declined since
the mid-1990s. - Strong incentive to underreport coal use due to a
widely publicized campaign to close down small
mines. - Changes in definitions and coverage
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21Accuracy of Transport Statistics(Ralph
Huenemann, 2001)
- Published transport statistics underestimate road
traffic in the 1990s, and the problem get worse
over time. - Growth rate of petroleum consumption in
transportation in the 1980s (around 5) is low
compared to the growth of traffic (around 10). - 1995-98, petroleum consumption grew by 14 while
traffic grew by around 4.
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23Accuracy of Unemployment Rate(Giles, Park, and
Zhang, 2005)
- Unemployment rate of urban permanent residents in
China increased from 6 to 11, and that of all
urban residents increased from 4 to 7.
(official unemployment rate increased from 2.9
to 4 during the period) - Internationally comparable definition
- Survey in Fuzhou, Shanghai, Shenyang, Wuhan, and
Xian.
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26The Solow Model Setup
- Transitional growth rates depend on technology
advance rates and capital accumulation rates
(affected by saving and capital depreciation
rates).
Capital Depreciation Rate
Capital Per Worker
Output Per Worker
Technology
(0ltalt1)
Output
Saving Rate
Capital Stock
27The Solow Model Equilibrium
- Long-term growth rates depend on technology
advancing rates only. - Long-term growth levels depend on technology
level, saving rate, population growth rate, and
capital depreciation rate.
28Productivity
- Productivity may have grown rapidly in China and
contributed significantly to its economic growth. - Li, Wei (1997) SOE 1979-1989 data
29Efficiency of State-Owned Enterprises (W. Li 1997)
- Data Survey data on about 800 SOEs
- Findings
- Total real output grew by 6.37 per year 1980-89
- TFP (total factor productivity, or the A) grew
by 4.68 per year 1980-89 - Increases in factor inputs accounted for the
remaining 27 of output growth
30Determinants of Efficiency Improvements (W. Li,
1997)
- More efficient allocation Shifts in resources
from less productive enterprises to more
productive ones accounted for 38 of the TFP
growth. - Goods allocation improved This is possibly a
benefit of the dual-track system, which created
a market for materials on the margin. - Labor allocation improved The improved labor
allocation might be due to larger incentive for
local government to improve economy and to
increased labor mobility. - Capital allocation changed little
- Incentives Growth in bonus per worker and
increases in product market competition accounted
for 49 of TFP growth.
31Explaining the Increase in Chinas Agricultural
1980-84 (Mead, 2000)
- Before 1980, Chinese households tend to allocate
a disproportionate share of non-land inputs to
individual private plots. - As much as 53 percent of increased farm output
1980-84 may be explained by eliminating
inefficient input allocations before 1980.
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33Investment
- Ironically, Chinas investment rate (over GDP)
actually continued to increase after the Big Push
strategy is abandoned - Temporary decreased after 1978
- Temporary decreased following 1989
- Reaching 40 by 2004
- The most immediate explanation for Chinas rapid
growth may be its high investment rates.
34Why Investment Rates have Increased since 1978?
- Reduced wasted investment by government
- Reflected on the continuously reduced inventory
accumulation rates - Increased return to investments that increase
private saving and investment.
35Labor
- Although the size of population grew much slower
than the growth of industrial sector, the
migration of workers from rural to urban provide
sufficient labor input to satisfy the rapidly
increased demand for labor, without increasing
labor cost much. - The large-scale rural-urban migration is possible
only if the agricultural productivity increased
significantly.
36Labor
- Chinas labor force was 740 million by 2000
census. - A very high, and increasing, share of the
population is of working age. - The share of the labor force in agriculture has
declined since 1978, especially in three periods - 1983-87
- 1991-96
- 2003-present
37Globalization
- Chinas high manufacturing share is also closely
related to its emergence as the worlds
factory. - China clearly can continue to expand its
manufacturing sector for a longer period than if
it were not so integrated into world industry.
38The Future
- Chinas rapid growth is expected to continue for
another decade and then begin to moderate as
labor force growth slows and rural-to-urban
shifts wind down.