Assessing Iraqs Stability

1
Assessing Iraqs Stability
UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE . CENTER FOR
NAVAL WARFARE STUDIES . STRATEGIC RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT
686 CUSHING ROAD . NEWPORT . RHODE ISLAND .
02841 . 401-841-7805 . WWW.NWC.NAVY.MIL

• Andrew C. Winner
• Presented at The Johns Hopkins University
• Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International
  Studies
• 23 October 2003

2
Problems of Perspective

• Most major media outlets and commentators have
  tilted on post-war according to their views on
  war initiation
• Parachute journalism provides compelling stories
  but are snapshots
• Casualty count tops most news
• Administration attempting to put best face on
  news criticizing media coverage
• Soldier blogs, emails, and diaries are micro views

3
Baseball and Social Science

• Tendency to generalize wildly from own experience
• Tendency to be overly influenced by most recent
  performance
• Bias toward what people saw with their own eyes,
  or thought they had seen

4
U.S. Government Having Difficulty Measuring
Progress

• Input problems
• Lack of linguists cultural ignorance
• Polling data highly questionable even when
  available
• Security problem keeps CPA, NGOs, troops
  confined, buttoned up
• Assessment Problems
• Tools simplistic matrices of successes/failures
  but no integration
• Definition of success questionable
• Impact of variables uneven and complex

5
Data Sources and Methodology

• U.S./UK government data
• Reports from journalists, military officers,
  other government officials, regional analysts who
  have traveled to or are deployed in Iraq
• Level of operational experience of U.S. military
  officers
• Identify key variables to monitor
• Benchmark historically
• Assess interaction of those variables
• Provide watch list indicators and warning

6
Key Variables

• The violent opposition
• Saddam
• Coalition forces, casualties, and capabilities
• Reconstruction pace and scope (funds and
  projects)
• Iraqi domestic political evolution
• Sectarian violence
• Wildcards

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The Violent Opposition

• Who are they?
• Former regime loyalists (FRLs)
• Non-Iraqi Jihadis
• How many?
• Fedayeen estimates, 2 RG divs
• External best estimates
• Capabilities and evolution
• Improved C2
• Consistent M.O. EID, RPG, mortar, occasional
  car bomb
• Largest problem ability to high-value political
  targets (cooperative Iraqis)
• Strength and Persistence

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Saddam Hussein
9
Coalition Forces -- Casualties
10
Coalition Deaths Geographic Location
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Coalition Capabilities

• Numbers and types of troops an issue
• Numbers for static security duties borders,
  ammunition caches, critical infrastructure
• Capabilities ongoing need for high-skill units
  such as SOF, civil affairs, intelligence
• Casualties (including wounded) plus rotational
  issues will strain U.S. ability to sustain CI
  campaign
• Question on large numbers of foreign troops
• ROK, Turkey political questions, others
  questionable even after passage of UNSCR 1511

12
Reconstruction

• U.S. reconstruction package
• Grant vs. loan
• Speed of payout
• Donors conference Madrid Oct. 23-24
• Speed of payout
• Restrictions on uses issues
• Relationship to local populace support for
  insurgents
• More basic services restored provides breathing
  room for IGC and other Iraqi governing bodies
  once stood up

13
Iraq Political Evolution

• Governing Council, constitution, elections
• Shiite objection to how constitutional convention
  delegates chosen
• Watch December 15 deadline on constitutional
  drafting timetable
• Further steps referendum, elections
• Large city local governance
• Examples of ability to compromise, establishment
  of negotiated settlement precedents politics,
  compromise

14
Sectarian Violence

• The dog that hasnt barked (so far)
• Score-settling has been fairly low-level
• Political violence so far within groups for
  control (Shiite, Sunni, Kurd)
• Changes could occur with move to constitution
  drafting as nation-wide political power
  determined
• Force level question enough if this escalates?

15
Wild Cards

• Single incident attack success with high
  political value (e.g., destroying the IGC, large
  portions of the CPA)
• Inflammatory U.S. incident vs. high-visibility
  Iraqi leader
• Outside military requirements for U.S. North
  Korea, Afghanistan
• U.S. presidential election

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Watch List

• Opposition politically significant attack,
  ability to sustain keep out zones for coalition
  forces
• Coalition forces U.S. economizes on forces
  without substantial international replacements
• Reconstruction pace lags noticeably
• Iraq domestic political construction lags or
  becomes completely ethnically/religiously-based
• A long, hard slog in Iraq? You bet.