Lesson 16

1
Lesson 16

• Italy Sicily, Salerno, Anzio

2
Agenda

• Strategic Picture
• Sicily
• Branches and Sequels
• http//www.army.mil/cmh-pg/Brochures/72-16/72-16.h
  tm
  
• Salerno
• Invading the mainland
• http//www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/naples/72-17.
  htm
  
• Anzio
• Missed Opportunity
• http//www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/anzio/72-19.h
  tm

3
Italy

• On 10th June 1940, Mussolini declared war on
  Britain and France and four months later invaded
  Greece.
  

4
Allies

• US advocates for a cross channel invasion to
  directly attack Germany
  
• Churchill prefers an indirect
• approach, attacking through
• the soft underbelly of
• Europe

• Describe the American and British strategies in
  terms of annihilation, exhaustion, and
  attrition.
  

5
Casablanca ConferenceJan 1943

• Britain
• the control of the Mediterranean meant control
  of the Western world.
  
• Had imperial fortunes in Egypt, the Middle East,
  and India
  
• Felt it was the Axis vulnerable point

• Americans
• periphery pecking would delay the cross-channel
  invasion that would strike the German jugular

6
Trident Conference May 1943

• Americans accept the strategic goal of
  eliminating Italy from the war but demand that
  the forces involved consist only of those already
  in the Mediterranean
• Americans and British also agree that planning
  begin for a cross channel invasion in May 1943

Doughty, 497
7
Sicily, 1943

• Branches and Sequels

8
Operation Husky

• It is inexcusable that high
• planning on an overall scale is
• not taking definite form.
• Planners should project
• themselves forward and set
• up a grand-scale strategic
• plan for the Allied forces. We
• cant win a war by capturing
• islands.
• General Mark Clark, Fifth Army Cdr

9
Eisenhowers Mission

• to plan such operations in exploitation of HUSKY
  as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from
  the war and to contain the maximum number of
  German forces
• Numerous possible plans beyond Sicily were
  offered and discussed, but all were reserved for
  future determination
  
• Hanson Baldwin

10
Next Step?

• Sicily was a strategic compromise conceived in
  dissension and born of uneasy alliance-- a child
  of conflicting concepts and unclear in purpose.
  
• Hanson Baldwin
• An attempt to decide upon the next objective
  would have revived divergences of view-- but in
  such matters tactful deferment is apt to result
  in strategic unreadiness.
• B. H. Liddell Hart
• With the invasion less than two months away, The
  Americans were still asking, Where do we go
  from here? and the British were still irritated
  by the query.
• Hanson Baldwin

11
The failure to plan ahead

• The decision to land in Sicily was
  unaccompanied by any consideration as to further
  aims.
  
• B. H. Liddell Hart
• Sicily was entered upon as an end unto itself
  not as a springboard for Italy or anywhere
  else.
  
• Samuel Morrison
• There were no decisions reached about how to
  exploit a victory in Sicily It was an egregious
  error to leave the future unresolved. It led to
  misguided planning for and a cloudy conclusion to
  the Sicily operation and to costly mistakes
  beyond Sicily.
• Omar Bradley

12
The Result

• Landing occurred with minimal resistance on 10
  July
  
• Astonishing as it seems in retrospect, there was
  no master plan for the conquest of Sicily.
  Nothing had been worked out beyond the limited
  beachhead objectives.
• Omar Bradley
• On 12 July Axis forces begin withdrawing
• On 23 July Patton captures western tip of Sicily
• Alexander orders him to turn eastward toward
  Messina, key transit point between Sicily and the
  Italian mainland

13
The Result

• 26 July the Italian king puts Mussolini under
  arrest, but...
  
• Its not until 31 July that Roosevelt and
  Churchill agree to a set of short armistice terms
  to present to the Italians
  
• 17 Aug
• American elements reach Messina, but
• German evacuation is over by the time they get
  there

14
Branches and Sequels

• Branches
• Options built into the basic plan
• Sequels
• Subsequent operations based on the possible
  outcomes of the current operation-- victory,
  defeat, or stalemate

How do these relate to your tactical planning?
15
Salerno, 1943

• Invading the Italian Mainland

16
Operation Avalanche

• Operation Husky had exceeded Allied expectations
  and the Italian Army was on the verge of
  disintegrating
  
• Operation Avalanche was designed to seize the
  port of Naples and the airfields of Foggia,
  followed by a drive to Rome

17
Possibilities

• Shift German strength away from the Western
  Front.
  
• Forcing the Italian surrender would cause the
  Axis powers to replace them with German units.
  
• Vital airfields in Italy could be seized to
  further control the Mediterranean.
  
• The push in Italy would create a second front to
  relieve pressure on Stalin in the east.

18
The Plan

• Fifth Army would land at Salerno on 9 Sept
• McCreerys British X Corps in the north
• Dawleys American VI Corps in the south
• Montgomerys Eigth Army would cross the Straits
  of Messina on 3 Sept as a diversionary attack
  
• Germans had expected Allies to choose Salerno as
  main thrust and were not fooled by the diversion

19
The Invasion of Italy
20
Clark, Montgomery, Dawley
21
Kesselring

• Supreme Commander
• "South" or O.B.S.
• (Oberbefehlshaber
• Süd)

22
Operational

• General Clark and both of his corps commanders
  had no amphibious experience prior to Salerno
  
• Both corps commanders decided to skip the
  pre-invasion bombardment in order to obtain
  tactical surprise
  
• After landing, both sides raced to obtain
  numerical superiority over the other

23
Tactical

• Landing Phase
• No surprise
• One Panzer Division had to defend 30-miles of
  beach
  
• Reinforcement race (10-13 September)
• 45th Division (Reserve) thrown in
• 82nd Airborne Division
• 26th Panzer and 29th Panzer Grenadier Divisions
• 15th Panzer Grenadier Division

24
Tactical

• Counterattack (13-16 September)
• Three Panzer and three Panzer Grenadier
  Divisions
  
• Main drive against VI Corps along Sele River
• Push Allies back to D1 positions
• General Kesselring stopped by
• Massive naval gunfire
• Strategic bombers
• Determined Allied ground forces.

25
German defense centered on Monte Cassino astride
the Liri, Sangro, Rapido, and Garigliano Rivers
-- Major position from which to defend Rome
Gustav Line
26
Anzio, 1944

• Missed Opportunity

27
Strategic Situation in late 1943

• Allies searching for a way to alleviate
  stalemate
  
• Campaign had stalled about 80 miles short of Rome
  and was beginning to resemble the trench warfare
  of WWI
  
• A landing at Anzio would bypass German defenses
  around Cassino and put the Allies just 35 miles
  south of Rome

28
(No Transcript)
29
Overall Guidance to Fifth Army

• Carry out an assault landing on the beaches in
  the vicinity of Rome with the object of cutting
  the enemy lines of communication and threatening
  the rear of the German 14 Corps
• Cut the enemys main communications in the Colli
  Laziali (Alban Hills) area southeast of Rome, and
  threaten the rear of the 14 German corps
  
• Advantage must be taken of this to break
  through his main defenses, and to ensure that the
  two forces join hands at the earliest possible
  moment
• Harold Alexander, 15th Army Group commander

30
Planning Considerations

• Despite the relatively few German units
  immediately available to defend at Anzio, Fifth
  Army assumed that VI Corps would meet strong
  initial resistance on the beaches
• Expected the corps to receive heavy
  counterattacks as soon as the Germans became
  aware of the extent and the purpose of the
  operation.

31
Defensive Mindset

• Lesson of having underestimated German strength
  at the time of the Salerno invasion had been too
  well learned.
  
• Fifth Army and VI Corps expected the same pattern
  of opposition to develop at Anzio that had come
  close to defeating the Allies at Salerno.
  
• The emphasis consequently turned toward defense.
  
  
• VI Corps was to maintain a strong reserve.
• Troops were to dig in on initial objectives at
  once to hold the beachhead against armored
  counterattack.
  

32
Contingencies

• Fifth Army expected VI Corps to be ready to do
  one of two things upon landing.
  
• If the enemy reacted in strength, the corps was
  to take the defensive and assemble reserves to
  meet German counterattacks.
  
• If the corps could take the offensive, it was to
  advance "on" the Alban Hills by one of two
  routes directly up the Albano road to cut
  Highway 7 or by way of Cisterna and Velletri to
  cut not only Highway 7 but also Highway 6 near
  Valmontone.
• Whether the VI Corps assumed a defensive or
  offensive attitude after landing would depend on
  how General Lucas saw the situation and on how he
  decided to act.

33
Rome, Alban Hills, Anzio
34
Lucas Pessimism

• Replaced Dawley after Salerno
• Tired from mountain warfare in Italy appeared
  dispirited and discouraged.
  
• In mid-January 1944, eight days before the Anzio
  landing, he turned fifty-four years old.
  
• Wrote in his diary, I am afraid I feel every
  year of it.
  
• I must keep from thinking of the fact, he wrote
  on the following day, that my order will send
  these men into a desperate attack.

35
Lucas Pessimism

• Unless we can get what we want in the way of
  vessels, the operation becomes such a desperate
  undertaking that it should not, in my opinion, be
  attempted. Otherwise, a crack on the chin is
  certain.
• Lucas would do what he was ordered to do, but
  these Battles of the Little Big Horn aren't
  much fun and a failure now would ruin Clark,
  probably kill me, and certainly prolong the war.
  

36
Anzio

• Allies achieved complete surprise by landing on
  22 Jan 1944
  
• Quickly established a beachhead and advanced
  three miles inland by midmorning against light
  resistance
  
• Majority of German forces were south around
  Cassino and could not possibly reinforce Anzio
  until 23 or 24 January

37
Initial Landing
38
Immediate Success

• If Allies pursed their advantage they could seize
  a virtually undefended Rome
  
• Instead Lucas took counsel of his fears and
  waited until 29 January to continue offensive
  operations
  
• By then the opportunity was lost
• Germans reinforcements has arrived in force and
  seized the dominating high ground in the break
  head area
  
• Allied drive stalled and Germans now had the
  initiative

39
Immediate Success
40
Opportunity Lost
41
Missed Opportunity

• On January 22 and even the following day, an
  audacious and enterprising formation of enemy
  troops could have penetrated into the city of
  Rome itself without having overcome any serious
  opposition
• Siegried Westphal, German Chief of Staff
• Lucas orders were to advance on the Alban
  Hills
  
• Did that mean toward or to?
• What was Alexanders intent?

42
Anzio Review

• Describe in terms of
• Command climate
• Commanders intent
• Audacity and tempo (characteristics of the
  offense)
  
• Surprise and offensive (principles of war)

43
Homework

• Read Doughty, p. 517-526