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Health Economics Introduction

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Title: Health Economics Introduction


1
Health Economics - Introduction
  • Understand behavior
  • Providers
  • Insurers
  • Health care professionals
  • Consumers
  • Learn how to apply economic way of thinking to a
    particular industry
  • Learn to think about the implications of
    government regulation of industry

2
Chapter 1 Why Health Economics?
  • Is health care different? Does market failure
    warrant government intervention?
  • Externalities
  • Uncertainty
  • Asymmetric Knowledge
  • Societys responsibility for health care

3
Is health care different? Does market failure
warrant government intervention?
  • Example from state medical licensing
  • Economists have debated licensure of medical
    professionals
  • Monopoly or asymmetric information?

4
Asymmetric Information as the basis for
government regulation of health care provision
  • The doctorhas a considerably, possible
    massively, greater level of knowledgeabout the
    diagnosis and treatment of disease.
  • The doctor might be able to deceive the patient
    and make money doing so. (Phelps, 2003, 5)
  • Phelps, Charles E. Health Economics, 3rd Edition.
    Addison Wesley, Boston, 2003

5
Monopoly as the basis for regulation of
physicians and non-physician clinicians
  • Economists see licensing (by state governments)
    as a source of cartel power among physician
    groups.
  • Kessel (1958 and 1970) pointed out
  • licensing requirements increase returns for
    existing practitioners at consumers expense.
  • Licensure gave the AMA (American Medical
    Association) the power to approve medical
    schools. allowing organized medicine to control
    entry to the very market it served (Kessel 1958,
    283).
  • Kessel, Reuben A. 1958. Price Discrimination in
    Medicine. Journal of Law and Economics 1 20-53
  • Kessel, Reuben A. 1970. The A.M.A. and the Supply
    of Physicians. Law and Contemporary Problems
    35(2) 267-283

6
Economists cite economist Kenneth Arrow
  • The general uncertainty about the prospects of
    medical treatment is socially handled by rigid
    entry requirements.
  • These are designed to reduce the uncertainty in
    the mind of the consumer as to the quality of
    product insofar as this is possible. (Arrow
    1963, 966)
  • Arrow, Kenneth J. 1963. Uncertainty and the
    Welfare Economics of Medical Care, American
    Economic Review 53(5) 941-973.

7
Arrow (Continued)
  • I think this explanation, which is perhaps the
    naïve one, is much more tenable than any idea of
    a monopoly seeking to increase incomes.
  • No doubt restriction on entry is desirable from
    the point of view of the existing physicians, but
    the pubic pressure needed to achieve the
    restriction must come from deeper causes. (Arrow
    1963, 966)

8
Arrow (Continued)
  • How well they achieve this end is another
    matter. R. Kessel points out to me that they
    merely guarantee training, not continued good
    performance as medical technology changes.
    (Arrow 1963, 966)

9
Arrow (Continued)
  • Both the licensing laws and the standards of
    medical-school training have limited the
    possibilities of alternative qualities of medical
    care . . . that might appeal to different
    tastes and incomes. (Arrow 1963, 953).
  • restrictions on entry to the field have
    constituted a direct and unsubtle restriction on
    the supply of medical care. (Arrow 1963, 955)

10
Arrow (Continued)
  • The licensing laws . . . exclude all others from
    engaging in any one of the activities known as
    medical practice. As a result, costly physician
    time may be employed at specific tasks for which
    only a small fraction of their training is
    needed, and which could be performed by others
    less well trained and therefore less expensive.
    (Arrow 1963, 957)

11
Arrow (Continued)
  • the present all-or-nothing approach could be
    criticized as being insufficient with regard to
    complicated specialist treatment, as well as
    excessive with regard to minor medical skills.
    (Arrow 1963, 967)

12
Phelps on Licensure
  • Asymmetric information consumer unable to judge
    quality
  • Difficult to trade in service when it does not
    work (vs. car)
  • Mistakes harder to correct than with goods
  • Most people dont know much about medical care
    (vs. auto repair)
  • Market failure implies role for government

13
Against State Licensure
  • Government does not assure quality
  • Licensure means it is legal for all doctors to
    perform brain surgery
  • State boards rarely discipline physicians (revoke
    or suspend license)
  • Consumers are protected by
  • Private specialty board certification
  • Need for reputation (repeat customers and
    referrals)
  • Hospital and Health Maintenance Organization
    (HMO) oversight (check records of physicians)
  • Malpractice insurance must be purchased

14
Chapter 1 - Health as a Durable Good
  • Health as a durable good
  • Think of yourself as having a stock of health
    that you are trying to keep in good shape (like
    painting a home)
  • The demand for medical services is a derived
    demand.
  • That means people dont want medical services
    (enjoy your last root canal?), but they want
    health.
  • The demand for medical services (healthcare) is
    derived from the underlying demand for health.

15
Utility Function U U(X,H)
  • U Utility (satisfaction from consumption of
    goods and services) in a specific period of time
    for a particular consumer
  • Economics Consumers act so as to maximize their
    utility
  • H health during that period of time (how
    healthy were you?)
  • NOTE this is not the consumption of health care
    goods and services, but the consumption of health
  • X other consumption goods and services
  • So, you consume health and other goods and
    services every day/week/year

16
U U(X,H)
  • Utility is a function of the amount of X you have
    (the amount of goods and services consumed) (each
    line drawn below is for a particular level of H
    H is held constant along each line)

The positive slope illustrates that U increases
as you get more X. The shape of the line
(concave to the horizontal axis) shows that
Utility increases at a decreasing rate as you get
more X (diminishing returns to the consumption
of additional units of X)
U (HH2)
Utility
U (HH1)
Utility increases with more Health H2 gt H1
X
17
U U(X,H)
  • Utility is a function of the amount of H you have
    (the amount of goods and services consumed) (each
    line drawn below is for a particular level of X
    X is held constant along each line)

The positive slope illustrates that U increases
as you get more H. The shape of the line
(concave to the horizontal axis) shows that
Utility increases at a decreasing rate as you get
more H (diminishing returns to the consumption
of additional units of H)
U (XX2)
Utility
U (XX1)
Utility increases with more X X2 gt X1
H
18
  • Consider points A and B Which one has more goods
    and services (X)?
  • Which one has better (more) health (H)?
  • Would you rather be at point A or B?
  • This person would be indifferent to a trade of H2
    H1 for X2 X1

U (XX2)
Utility
A
B
U (XX1)
U1
Utility increases with more X X2 gt X1
H
H1
H2
19
Definition Indifference Curves show a consumers
willingness to trade one good for another.
  • If you are indifferent, that means you dont
    have a preference if you are indifferent
    between two baskets of goods (two combinations of
    goods), it means the Utility associated with the
    two baskets is equal you dont care which one
    you get.

20
Indifference Curves Choosing between health and
all other goods.
  • Would you trade health for other consumption
    goods and services?
  • Marginal vs total distinction (not an all or
    nothing decision)
  • Why dont you get a checkup every 3 months?
  • Why doesnt the city station a paramedic on every
    street corner?
  • Do you engage in behaviors that reduce your
    health? (eat foods high in fat and sugars? Play
    professional football?)

21
Indifference Curves show the consumers
willingness to trade health for other goods
  • How much health would you give up to have more
    of other goods?

A
H (units of health)
This person would trade H2 H1 units Of health
for X2 X1 dollars of other goods and
services Why is U steep north of A?
H2
B
H1
U
X (other goods/services, measured in dollars)
X2
X1
22
Production Function H g(m, D)
  • H is the annual consumption of health
  • m is medical care
  • D is disease

Common Cold
Broken Arm
H
Allergies
m
23
Investment in Health An Intertemporal Decision
Health in Period 2
Fun in Period 1 (unconstrained behavior sun
exposure, smoking, junk food, risky sports)
24
Consumers pick Lifestyle
  • H g(XB, XG, m)
  • XB includes bad goods/services (bad for your
    health)
  • Age-specific death rates are lower in Utah. Is
    that good?

25
In what areas can economists contribute to the
health policy discussion?
  • Licensure and scope-of-practice laws
  • Regulation of pharmaceutical industry profits
  • Price controls (through Medicare/Medicaid)
  • Decisions about investment in hospitals and
    equipment (e.g., certificate of need programs)
  • Insurance market insights (moral hazard, adverse
    selection) (impact of subsidies)
  • Universal coverage (government provision vs.
    procurement)

26
Chapter 1 End-of-Chapter Questions
  • Problem 6
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