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Fisheries Subsidies What is it all about The good reason and the real reason

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Fisheries is by far the largest agricultural commodity in the global trading system ... Kiribati and Tuvalu LDCs in the Pacific-42% of GDP comes from access fees ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Fisheries Subsidies What is it all about The good reason and the real reason


1
Fisheries Subsidies What is it all about?The
good reason and the real reason
  • Commonwealth Secretariat

2
Fisheries Statistics
  • Total world trade in fish and fish products 58.2
    billion in 2002
  • Share in world imports EU (36 percent) Japan
    (22 percent) US (16 percent)
  • Share in world exports EU (34 percent) Japan (1
    percent) US (6 percent)
  • Fisheries is by far the largest agricultural
    commodity in the global trading system

3
Arguments underlying the demandeurs proposals
  • Fisheries subsidies cause overcapacity and
    overfishing resulting in depletion of fish
    stocks
  • Fisheries subsidies have trade -distorting
    effects through production/export market
    distortions.
  • Harmful Subsidies for prohibition
  • Subsidy measures for capacity enhancement that
    lead to overcapacity and overfishing
  • Subsidy measures relating to illegal, unreported
    and unregulated fishing can be particularly
    destructive
  • Counterfactual- would stock depletion occur
    without subsidies? Answer- definitely but slower.
    So what is the real reason for these
    negotiations- market share the price of fish

4
Whats the commercial reason behind the need for
Regulation of Trade in Fish and Fish Products?
  • Friends of the Fish Group - Countries with
    aggressive market interests
  • Developed Countries Australia, Iceland, New
    Zealand and United States
  • Developing Countries Chile, Ecuador, Peru,
    Philippines.and Brazil?
  • Until the EU made up its mind on CFP in 2004, it
    was silent- now supportive of FF group
  • Japan, Korea and Taiwan ( Bottom-up group) joined
    in when the outcome became clear ie when EU
    joined the fray

5
EUs Commercial Fisheries Policies
  • The EU Fisheries Policy results in the EU
    exporting 34 per cent of total fish exports-
    about 20 bn
  • Is the EU really such an efficient processor of
    fisheries products? Not really this mimics
    agriculture
  • WHY IS THIS HAPPENING ?
  • Three pillars of EU fisheries Policy
  • Subsidies to its own fleets and shore based
    activities
  • High Tariffs for processed fish ( eg 24 for
    canned tuna)
  • Rules of Origin as opaque instruments of subsidy
    to the EU fleets
  • Undermine these 3 pillars and you can capture
    20 b in fish exports

6
Traffic Light Approach to Fisheries Subsidies
Architecture
  • Green-Box Non - actionable subsidies
  • Red-Box Prohibited Subsidies
  • Amber-Box Subsidies subject to disciplines if
    specific adverse affects are demonstrated
  • Two alternative approaches
  • Top-Down Approach General Prohibition with
    specific exemptions. Proponents Friends of Fish
    Group
  • Bottom-Up Approach Identification of prohibited
    subsidies on a case-by case basis. Proponents
    Japan, Korea and Taiwan

7
Arguments behind the Position of Small Vulnerable
Coastal Economies
  • Some SVE have no resource base and are completely
    dependent upon fisheries. Kiribati and Tuvalu
    LDCs in the Pacific-42 of GDP comes from access
    fees- most comes from state subvention.
  • Fish stock depletion is largely a result of bad
    fisheries management- would occur in any case in
    open access fisheries
  • The direction of causal link between fisheries
    subsidies and overcapacity and overfishing and
    subsequently fish stock depletion is difficult to
    ascertain
  • SVE have demanded
  • Access fees and development assistance carved
    out
  • Artisanal fisheries carved out
  • De minimis threshold
  • Will block creation of disciplines that bring
    environment per se under WTO

8
Brazils proposal (TN/RL/GEN/79/Rev.1).
  • Green Box FS which dont have
    trade-distorting or production-distorting effects
    through enhancing capacity and over-fishing
  • Red Box Art.3 ASCM those falling outside
    green box. Exceptions SDT
  • Amber Box SDT only for Dvping countries. List
    subject to Actionable Subsidies Provision of ASCM
    i.e reactivation of Article 6.1 including 5 de
    minimis criteria
  • Notification All fishery subsidies notified
    failing which Red Box presumed.

9
NZs Proposal(TN/RL/GEN/100)
  • Red Box ASCM Art.3 subsidies which confer
    benefit directly or indirectly on any natural or
    legal person engaged in harvesting, processing,
    transport, marketing or sale of fish and fish
    products in Annex IX
  • Non-Prohibited non-exhaustive list
  • SDT FS provided by developing country not
    exceeding de minimis level for that member.
  • FS existing prior to new framework notified. 3
    years after new framework, notified FS brought
    into conformity.

10
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration on Fisheries
Subsidies
  • Para 9 of Annex D on Rules notes
  • note that there is broad agreement that the Group
    should strengthen disciplines on subsidies in the
    fisheries sector, including through the
    prohibition of certain forms of fisheries
    subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and
    over-fishing
  • This language is the greatest risk to the WTO
    from Hong Kong. If fisheries subsidies are
    prohibited then sanctions may be imposed on
    countries using them, not for their trade effect
    but for the environmental effect, per se. If this
    language appears in the chapeau to the new
    chapter then we face the transformation of the
    WTO into an environmental court.
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