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Dynamic Pricing and Yield Management

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Title: Dynamic Pricing and Yield Management


1
Dynamic Pricing and Yield
Management
  • Yossi Sheffi
  • Professor, MIT

MIT Executive Course January 7th, 2003
2
Outline
  • Airline revenue management
  • An analytical model of seat reservation
  • The essence of price discrimination
  • Revenue management in TL trucking

3
Yield/Revenue Management
  • Objective maximize revenue (minimize lost
    revenue / opportunity costs)
  • Science of squeezing every possible dollar from
    customers

4
Revenue Management Example
R25,000
50
500
5
Revenue Management Example
of Seats
Lost Revenue Affordability
100
Lost Revenue M.O.T.T
50
1,000
500
Price
6
Revenue Management Example
of Seats
100
R31,250
50
25
750
1,000
500
Price
7
Revenue Management Example
of Seats
100
R37,500
75
50
25
750
1,000
500
250
Price
8
Revenue Management Example
of Seats
Maximum Revenue (area under the curve) 50,000
100
1,000
Price
Note willingness to pay ? happiness to pay
9
Two Challenges
  • How do we make sure that the people who are
    willing to pay 750 will not buy the 250 ticket?
  • How do we make sure that we have enough seats for
    those willing to pay 750?

10
Two Answers
  • Create artificial hurdles
  • Advance purchase 21 days, 14 days, 7days
  • Use limitations Saturday night stay,
    non-refundable tickets
  • Restrict the number of seats sold at the low
    price
  • This requires a forecast of future booking by
    higher-paying customers and the discipline to
    forgo a bird-in-hand.
  • Note 1 airlines do not change prices
    dynamically they actually change capacity
    (classes) dynamically
  • Note 2 freight can also displace passengers when
    RM is really optimized

11
Why is This Important?
  • American Airlines saved over 1.4B between
    1989-1992
  • I believe that yield management is the single
    most important technical development in
    transportation management . . .
  • Robert Crandall, CEO AMR

12
Setting Multiple Prices Under Uncertainty An
Analytical Framework
13
The Framework
  • Scenario
  • A flight with T seats
  • The airline can sell as many leisure seats as it
    designates at a price of L (/seat)
  • The airline reserves Q seats for business
    passengers.
  • Each business seat can be sold for H (/seat)
  • The demand for business seats is a random
    variable, D
  • Any unsold business seat is lost.
  • Problem
  • How many business seats to reserve for a
    particular flight?

14
Demand Data
Demand data for business seats for the same
flight for the last 52 weeks is the following
  • Total business seat demand 4023 seats
  • Average 77.4 seats
  • Standard Deviation 15.4 seats
  • Lowest 51 seats
  • Highest 113 seats

15
(No Transcript)
16
Bin Accumulation
17
(No Transcript)
18
Optimal Seat Reservation
H 800 L 300 S 100
Reserve 90 but 70 show up 70?800(220-90)?30095,
000
Reserve 90 but 100 show up 90?800(220-90)?30011
1,000
19
Slope (H-L)
Slope (-L)
Note the slopes
20
Optimal of Reserved Seats
  • The optimal order size, Q, will be at a point
    where the expected revenue from an additional
    seat reserved will be approximately zero, --
    turning extra revenue into lost revenue
  • The expected revenue from reserving the (Q1)st
    business seat is H if it is sold and 0 for if it
    is unsold.
  • The probability of selling the (Q1)st business
    seat is the probability that the demand will be
    higher than Q, Pr(X ? Q), and the probability
    of not selling it is Pr(X ? Q).
  • The expected revenue from reserving the (Q1)st
    business seat is H ? Pr(X ? Q) 0
    ? Pr(X ? Q).
  • Optimality conditions
  • Solving for optimality

21
Example
  • H 800
  • L 300
  • Critical ratio (H-L)/H 0.625

Q 80 seats
Business Passengers would be turned away 37.5 of
the time.
22
(No Transcript)
23
Normal Distribution
  • Normal density function
  • Average using original data 77.37
  • Standard Deviation using original data15.38
  • Use NORMDIST(x,?,?,T/F)

24
Sensitivity Analysis
25
Effect of Short Term Sale
H 800 L 300 S 100
Using the Internet or Bucket shops
26
Optimal of Reserved Seats
  • The optimal order size, Q, will be at a point
    where the expected revenue from an additional
    seat reserved will be approximately zero, --
    turning expected positive revenue into lost
    revenue
  • The expected revenue from reserving the (Q1)st
    business seat is H if it is sold and S for if it
    is unsold at full fare but dumped using the
    Internet.
  • The probability of selling the (Q1)st business
    seat is the probability that the demand will be
    higher than Q, Pr(X ? Q), and the probability
    of not selling it is Pr(X ? Q).
  • The expected revenue from reserving the (Q1)st
    business seat is H ? Pr(X ? Q) S
    ? Pr(X ? Q).
  • Optimality conditions
  • Solving for optimality

27
Example
  • H 800
  • L 300
  • S 100
  • Critical ratio (H-L)/H 0.71

Q 84 seats
Business Passengers would be turned away 29 of
the time.
28
Back to General Price Discrimination
29
Price Discrimination
  • First degree willingness to pay (rare)
  • RR in late 1800-s, asking shippers for their
    income statement so they could determine their
    ability to pay
  • College financial aid
  • Taxes
  • Second degree artificial hurdles but open
  • Buying process (coupons, advance purchase)
  • Cost to serve (volume discounts, risk
    adjustments, store P/U, set up costs in travel
    industry)
  • Distribution channels (Internet, outlets, etc.)
  • Markdowns (timing of purchase, product age,
    selection, etc.)
  • Value of product (in many rail movements
    regeltarifklassen)
  • Commodity type (part of tariffs in many rail
    movements)
  • Use limitations (e.g., final sale)
  • Bundling (menu vs. a-la-cart)
  • Time of use (e.g., peak hour, congestion pricing)

30
Price Discrimination
  • First degree willingness to pay (rare)
  • Second degree artificial hurdles but open
  • Third degree based on external factors
  • Geography (neighborhood, state)
  • Gender (womens clothing)
  • Age (senior/student discounts)
  • Profession/affiliation (small/large business
    business educational, medical)

31
3rd Degree Discrimination
32
Specific Example
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33
Specific Example
34
Price Discrimination
  • Most schemes are based on 2nd degree
    discrimination seems more fair
  • Principle of fairness discounts are more
    acceptable than price increases, even if the
    result is the same
  • Principle of fairness profiteering is not
    acceptable

Fed Up With Airlines Business Travelers Start To
Fight Back WSJ 8/28/01
35
Price Discrimination
  • Most schemes are based on 2nd degree
    discrimination seems more fair
  • Principle of fairness discounts are more
    acceptable than price increases, even if the
    result is the same
  • Principle of fairness profiteering is not
    acceptable

36
Price Discrimination
  • Most schemes are based on 2nd degree
    discrimination seems more fair
  • Principle of fairness discounts are more
    acceptable than price increases, even if the
    result is the same
  • Principle of fairness profiteering is not
    acceptable
  • Some forms of 3rd degree discrimination are
    illegal, but many are acceptable
  • student/senior citizen discounts
  • profession/use (Dell)
  • Secretive schemes are not (Amazon)

37
When Does RM Work?
  • Requirements
  • Long term pricing power
  • Monopoly
  • Oligopoly with signaling and/or government
    blessing
  • Airlines, ocean conferences

Best of all, there is no Saturday night stay
required.
Boston Globe 10/16/01
38
When Does RM Work?
  • Requirements
  • Long term pricing power
  • Monopoly
  • Oligopoly with signaling and/or government
    blessing
  • Airlines, ocean conferences
  • Temporary pricing power
  • Limited capacity
  • Demand spike
  • Incentives
  • Perishable product/service
  • High fixed costs and low variable costs
  • Ability to adjust prices easily (consider
    administration, relationships, etc.)

39
Carrier Portfolio of Pricing
Dynamic pricing with spot market shippers
Dynamic pricing with contracted shippers
Long-term fixed-rate contracts
LT fixed rate contracts with capacity commitments
40
Rev. Management in TL Trucking
  • Little opportunity during bid response
  • No monopoly power
  • Exceptions good service history coupled with
    client strategy geared towards service
  • Value-added services
  • Only opportunity in real-time (spot) market
  • There are limited opportunities for
    local/temporary monopolies
  • Responses to shipper dialing for diesels
  • Requests along power lanes

41
Rev. Management in TL Trucking
  • Remember the twin challenges
  • How do we make sure that the people who are
    willing to pay 750 will not buy the 250 ticket?
  • How do we make sure that we have enough seats for
    those willing to pay 750?
  • Comes down to one question Should
    we take this load?
  • Should capacity be committed to a particular
    load/shipper/contract?, or should we wait for a
    better-paying load?
  • Depends on the forecast

42
System Contribution of a Load
  • Regional potential the expected contribution of
    a truck in a region.
  • P(A) - Potential of region A
  • D(A-B) - Direct cost for moving a truck from A to
    B
  • R(A-B) - Revenue for the move from A to B

43
System Contribution of a Load
S(A-B) R(A-B) - D(A-B) P(B) - P(A)
P(B) - the value of one more truck at region
B P(A) - the value of one less truck at region A
Order acceptance - Take a load only if S(A-B)
gt 0 - Take the load with the highest S(A-B)
44
Analysis of Movements
Head haul
S(A-B) R(A-B) - D(A-B) P(B) - P(A)
Back haul
S(A-B) R(A-B) - D(A-B) P(B) - P(A)
45
YM in Manufacturing
  • Reserve capacity to the highest paying customer
  • Tie the pricing to the capacity commitment
  • Use pricing to manage component supply (in BTO)

46
Final Observations
  • RM involves the entire enterprise
  • Customer service
  • Sales
  • Reservations
  • Scheduling
  • RM can be used to increase profits and serve
    customers better
  • Bring in those who otherwise would not use the
    service
  • Provide higher LOS to those who pay a lot by
    given them more frequent service, higher
    probability of service, etc.
  • Increase utilization by smoothing demand patterns
  • The essence of RM is the judicious management of
    capacity and pricing simultaneously
  • The trick reserve capacity to the highest paying
    customers

47
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