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Security, Privacy, and Economic Incentives

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Title: Security, Privacy, and Economic Incentives


1
Security, Privacy, and Economic Incentives
  • Sheng Zhong

2
Personal Background
  • Ph.D., Yale University (2004)
  • 1-Year Postdoc at DIMACS (Discrete
  • Math and Theoretical Computer Science)
  • Joined UB CSE in Fall 05
  • Received NSF research grant (200K) in
  • September 05
  • Doing research on computer security, data
    privacy, and economic incentives

3
Why Security, Privacy Incentives?
  • The need to fight non-cooperative behavior in
    computer systems.
  • To fight really bad guys Security
  • To protect every individual Privacy
  • To promote good behavior among rational people
    Economic Incentives

4
Lines of Research
  • Database Privacy
  • Privacy in Wireless Networks
  • Applied Cryptography
  • Todays Presentation
  • 1. Privacy-Preserving Data Mining
  • 2. Economic Incentives in Mobile Computing (and
    more)

5
1 Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (PPDM)
  • Data Mining Discovering rules/patterns in huge
    amounts of data.
  • Example Finding relationship between illness
    lifestyle from Internet survey.
  • Privacy Concerns Prevent privacy violation in
    data mining.
  • Example Do I have to reveal my medical history
    in the above survey?

6
A Scenario of Data Mining with Privacy Concern
?
Private Information
Personal Data
7
Current Solutions to PPDM
8
Our Work on PPDM
  • All on customer-miner scenario.
  • Faster crypto solution
  • Privacy-preserving data collection ? generic
    crypto solution.
  • Accurate perturbation solution.

9
2 Economic Incentives
  • Consider a protocol (in mobile computing,
    distributed data mining, etc.)
  • Good/honest participants follow it and do nothing
    else
  • Bad/malicious participants deviate from it and do
    arbitrary things
  • But very few people are completely honest or
    malicious most of them are economically
    rational.
  • They do whatever is the best for themselves.

10
Example Incentives in Mobile Computing
  • Ad hoc network multi-hop mobile network without
    pre-existing infrastructure.
  • Nodes depend on other nodes to relay packets but
    other nodes have no incentive to do so.

packet
11
Our Work on Incentive-Compatible Protocol
  • Our Work 1 Simple game theoretic solution to
    packet forwarding game.
  • Our Work 2 General framework for
    routingforwarding.
  • Using game theory cryptography.

12
New Project Incentive-Compatible Protocols
  • Newly funded by NSF Cyber Trust program, Sep
    2005-Aug 2008
  • Studies incentives not only in mobile computing,
    but also in distributed data mining.
  • Also investigates fundamental theory and
    experimental tools of general incentive-compatible
    protocols.
  • Will be a focus of my future research.

13
Summary Selected Publications (1)
  • On Designing Incentive-Compatible Routing and
    Forwarding Protocols in Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks.
    Sheng Zhong, Li Erran Li, Yanbin Grace Liu, and
    Yang Richard Yang. In MOBICOM 2005 (acceptance
    ratio 10.3)
  • Anonymity-Preserving Data Collection. Zhiqiang
    Yang, Sheng Zhong, and Rebecca N. Wright. In KDD
    2005 (full paper, acceptance ratio 12).
  • Privacy-Enhancing k-Anonymization of Customer
    Data. Sheng Zhong, Zhiqiang Yang, and Rebecca N.
    Wright. In PODS 2005 (acceptance ratio 20.4).
  • Verifiable Distributed Oblivious Transfer and
    Mobile Agent Security. Sheng Zhong and Yang
    Richard Yang. To appear in ACM Mobile Networks
    and Applications special issue (acceptance ratio
    19).

14
Selected Publications (2)
  • Privacy-Preserving Classification without Loss of
    Accuracy. Zhiqiang Yang, Sheng Zhong, and Rebecca
    N. Wright. In SDM 2005 (full paper, acceptance
    ratio 18.3).
  • Towards a Theory of Data Entanglement. James
    Aspnes, Joan Feigenbaum, Aleksandr Yampolskiy,
    and Sheng Zhong. In ESORICS 2004 (acceptance
    ratio 17).
  • Sprite A Simple, Cheat-Proof, Credit-Based
    System for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks. Sheng Zhong,
    Jiang Chen, and Yang Richard Yang. In INFOCOM
    2003 (acceptance ratio 20.8).
  • Optimistic Mixing for Exit-Polls. Philippe Golle,
    Sheng Zhong, Dan Boneh, Markus Jakobsson, and Ari
    Juels. In ASIACRYPT 2002 (acceptance ratio
    19.7).

15
End of Talk
  • Thank You!
  • Questions?
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