Untying the Knot

1
Untying the Knot

• Richard C. Bush
• Brookings Institution
• Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies

2
The Taiwan Strait Paradox

• Shared Economic Interests
• Extensive Private Interchange
• Common Ethnic and Cultural HeritageBUT
• Political Hostility
• Military Build-up

3
The PRC Hypothesis

• Its Lee and Chen, stupid!BUT
• In office, Lee and Chen have been careful not to
  rule out unification totally.
• They certainly opposed one country, two systems
  (1C2S).
• They insisted that the ROC or Taiwan was an
  independent sovereign state.

4
The PRC Hypothesis

• Both have insisted Beijing should acknowledge
  that Taipei is essentially equivalent, that
  Taiwan have an international role, and that the
  PRC renounce the use of force.
• In addition, both have been frustrated that
  Beijing has rejected Taipeis views outright and
  ignored its moderation.

5
The PRC Hypothesis

• To be sure, Lee and Chen did act provocatively at
  times.
• They also took initiatives that were motivated by
  domestic politics.
• Yet Beijing incorrectly read their opposition to
  1C2S as a rejection of unification. For Lee and
  Chen, however, how Taiwan might be a part of
  China has governed whether it should be a part of
  China.

6
The Taiwan Strait Knot (TSK)

• The TSK is a knot formed by two twisted strands
  of rope. Each strand represents a core
  substantive issue
• The first issue is sovereignty
• The second is security
• The strands are twisted because they are
  interrelated.

7
TSK Sovereignty

• Stephen Krasner tells us that sovereignty can
  take four forms
• Domestic sovereignty
• Westphalian sovereignty
• International legal sovereignty and
• Interdependence sovereignty.
• The first three, particularly Westphalian
  sovereignty, are analytically important.

8
TSK Sovereignty

• Many observers focus only on international
  sovereignty, on whether the ROC is a full member
  of the international community.
• But when it comes to sovereignty, for
  cross-Strait relations, its Westphalian
  sovereignty that matters more.

9
TSK Sovereignty

• Westphalian Sovereignty
• A governments absolute right to rule within the
  territory under its jurisdiction unless it
  chooses to vest a higher authority with its
  powers.
• The key is non-subordination.
• This is the concept that underlies the stance
  that the ROC is an independent, sovereign state.

10
TSK Sovereignty

• This claim is fundamentally antithetical to the
  1C2S approach.
• Under 1C2S
• Central government is the exclusive sovereign
• The Special Administrative Region (SAR) is
  subordinate to central government and acts
  internationally only at its discretion and
• The SAR has autonomy and nothing more.
• In practice, Beijings system for Hong Kong
  limits political outcomes to what it can tolerate.

11
TSK Security

• Taiwan and the PRC are locked in a security
  dilemma.
• Each fears the intentions of the other.
• Each builds up its capabilities to hedge against
  pre-emption.
• Each reads the others hedging as hostile.
• Mistrusting the other and fearing exploitation,
  each is afraid to make a concession.

12
TSK Security

• Yet the cross-Strait security dilemma is special.
• What China fears is not military action by Taiwan
  but a political initiative that will irreversibly
  change the status quo and close the door on
  unification.
• In addition, Taiwan must live with the fear of
  abandonment by its de facto ally, the United
  States.

13
TSK Security

• The essence of the security dilemma is that each
  side understands the value of peace but mistrusts
  the other too much to pay the price to gain it.
• Each worries that if it makes a concession, the
  other side will exploit its good will.
• Beijings demand that Chen Shui-bian accept the
  1-China principle is an example.

14
Tightening the Knot

• Several factors in the dispute
• Domestic politics
• In Taiwan
• Identity and the fear of outsiders
• The DPPs history as opposition party
• Taiwans unconsolidated democracy
• In China
• Leadership politics
• Nationalism

15
Tightening the Knot

• Decision-making systems
• Misperception
• Miscalculation
• The Leverage Game
• The International System
• The United Front
• The U.S. Factor
• Dual Influence and Dual Deterrence

16
Untying the Knot

• If the knot is to by untied, three things are
  required
• Ways to reconcile substantive differences over
  sovereignty and security, which are linked.
• Ways to mute the effect of the aggravating
  factors.
• A skillful integration of substance and process.

17
Untying the Knot Substance

• Concerning the sovereignty issue, is there a way
  for Beijing to get what it wants (unification)
  and for Taipei to get what it wants to preserve
  (sovereignty)?
• There are models of political union that are
  composed of sovereign entities confederation,
  federation, etc.

18
Untying the Knot Substance

• Such unions are difficult to construct and hard
  to preserve, but sharing sovereignty is possible.
• Both the KMT and President Chen have expressed a
  positive attitude towards such unions.
• It is the PRC that is opposed, for some important
  reasons.

19
Untying the Knot Substance

• There have been some ideas on the security side
• Agreement to end the state of hostilities
• Allowing Taiwan to keep its armed forces
• Jiang Zemins missile-withdrawal idea
• The interim-agreement proposal
• CBMs
• Yet all of these founder because of mutual
  mistrust.

20
Untying the Knot Process

• Even if theoretically there is common ground,
  mistrust makes it difficult for the two sides to
  move there.
• Perhaps it is necessary to use process to drive
  substance, instead of using substantive
  concessions to begin process.

21
Untying the Knot Process

• Setting preconditions for dialogue, while
  understandable, only compounds mistrust
• One China Principle
• 1992 consensus
• Recall that Beijing set a precondition after Lee
  Teng-huis U.S. trip but then ignored it for Koo
  Chen-fus 1998 visit.

22
Untying the Knot Process

• Instead, the two sides should establish a
  private, authoritative channel to
• Reduce mistrust
• Build mutual understanding and assurance and
• Explore methods of starting public dialogue.
• This sort of channel existed before.

23
Untying the Knot Process

• As trust is built and as dialogue resumes, a
  mutually agreed set of principles could create a
  framework for discussions. This would
• Set limits
• Define areas of fundamental consensus and
• Establish an agenda for future action.
• In process terms, this approach is different than
  an interim agreement.

24
Untying the Knot Process

• How to deal with the aggravating factors?
• For the leverage game diplomatic truce and an
  end to PRC intervention in Taiwan politics.
• To manage the Taiwan politics of cross-Strait
  relations, there needs to be a mechanism of
  transparency and consensus building.

25
Untying the Knot Process

• What role for the United States?
• Different forms of intermediation
• Messenger
• Intellectual facilitator
• Process facilitation
• Mediation
• Serving as a guarantor

26
Untying the Knot Process

• I believe that the lower end of this scale is
  more appropriate. On mediation,
• Do both sides trust Washington?
• Would both sides trust the U.S. throughout?
• Would the Congress support the Executive Branch?
• How to deal with the fact that the United States
  is a party to the dispute?

27
The Near Term

• If solving the dispute is not possible,
  stabilization is the next best thing.
• A window of opportunity has opened.
• Beijing need not fear constitutional change in
  Taiwan.
• Communication and trust-building is as important
  for stabilization as it is for solution.

28
The Near Term

• Preconditions are an obstacle to communication
  and trust-building.
• The U.S. approach of dual deterrence also
  contributes to stabilization.

29
A Final Word

• The group that has the most to lose from
  mismanagement of the Taiwan issue is the people
  of the island.
• They have finally gained the power to make
  choices about their future.
• The U.S. will play a role, but it is the people
  of Taiwan who will have to choose.
• To make good choices, Taiwan must strengthen
  itself.