International ROA Airspace Integration Issues

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AIAA's 1st Technical Conference and Workshop on
Unmanned Aerospace Vehicles, Systems,
Technologies, and Operations
International ROA Airspace Integration Issues
Geoffrey S. Parker TASC, Chantilly, VA May 20,
2002
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Primary Issues

• See and Avoid
• Navigation Redundancy
• Traffic-alert Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)

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Assumptions

• The capability to operate with manned aircraft
  requires equivalent airspace access
• Having a performance parameter to be robustly
  sufficient for all classes of airspace is
  fundamental to worldwide deployability
• ROAs are aircraft when regulated as aircraft and
  equipped as aircraft, they will warrant the same
  airspace access as aircraft

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The Significance of Aircraft

• The body of regulations for aircraft, here and
  internationally, is established
• Establishing some regulations as not
  applicable, such as oxygen requirements,
  relieves us of having to establish body of
  regulations for a new category

• A separate category (such as that established
  for gliders) would assure ROAs are special
  management aircraft indefinitely
• Military responsiveness dictates that ROAs be
  normalized for civil airspace -- time for
  special coordination for short notice deployments
  does not support military utility

The team of GSTF assets, aligned within an AEF,
will be on call and ready . . . As in any
emerging crisis, the first requirements call for
ISR platforms. General Jumper
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The Aircraft Challenge is CNS/ATM

• Communication, Navigation and Surveillance for
  Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) is driving
  requirements for all aircraft worldwide
• The global aviation support architecture is
  moving toward CNS/ATM to meet user and air
  traffic management demands
• Increased traffic density and commensurate safety
  concerns are driving all airspace users to
  compliance
• As established in the International Civil
  Aviation Organization (ICAO), Standards and
  Recommended Practices (SARPs), flights in Europe,
  for example, (greater than 30 hours per year) are
  expected to comply. Non-compliant aircraft will
  be accepted according to workload and then may
  have to accept altitudes and routes that may
  negate the mission
• The larger European NATO members have stated the
  requirement that their ROAs be fully compliant
  with civil requirements
• Invoking a state aircraft exception does compel
  any nation to accept operations in their
  sovereign airspace. Work arounds, if allowed,
  may be incompatible with mission objectives

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International Airspace Integration
See and Avoid
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See and Avoid
See and Avoid Can Not Be Delegated

• For ROAs, having an on-board capability to detect
  and maneuver is inherent in the see-and-avoid
  requirement
• In civil airspace, FAA controllers have been
  unwilling to add the operators role in air
  traffic separation to their own
• Theres an implied doctrine of shared
  responsibility air ground
• Changing this doctrine would contradict the move
  ATC to ATM where more, not less, responsibility
  is on the operator
• The trend is to move away from
  infrastructure-based systems towards more
  autonomous, vehicle-based system for collision
  avoidance. (Federal Radionavigation Sys Plan)
• In airspace where uncontrolled traffic can be
  expected, the separation burden is wholly on the
  operators to avoid non-cooperative targets

The Trend Toward ATM
See and Avoid
ATM
Responsibility
ARTCC
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See and Avoid FAA Guidance
FAA Order 7610.4

• Under Air Force Flight Standards Agency (AFFSA)
  leadership, the FAA adopted this language that
  has enabled many ROA operations to date
• For example, Global Hawk operations have used
  
• Visual observers
• Patrol/Chase aircraft
• Radar observation (From Air Ground)
• However, the CONOPs for arrival and departure
  employed to date is not sustainable

• Provide an equivalent level of safety,
  comparable to see-and-avoid requirements for
  manned aircraft.
• Alternatives explicitly cited in the directive
  that would suffice
• Radar observation
• Forward or side looking cameras
• Electronic detection systems
• Visual observation
• Monitored by patrol or chase aircraft
• Or a combination thereof

This is FAA guidance for safety not for
integration into the NAS
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An Example of the Application of 7610.4 Approach
into Langley AFB

• Uses Segregation Strategy
• Activate Warning Area, W-386A
• Norfolk TRACON Radar
• Giant Killer Radar Monitoring
• Patrol Aircraft Radar Clearing
• Approach Landing Before Morning Twilight
• FAA COA Required
• AFFSA Waivers Required
• FAA Declined To Provide Primary Radar Service

Global Hawk deployed from Edwards AFB to Langley
AFB in June 2001. The approach into Langley
required several special arrangements.
W-386A
Giant Killer Radar
Patrol Aircraft
Langley AFB
Norfolk TRACON
Commander Naval Air Force, Atlantic Fleet, Fleet
Area Control and Surveillance Facility (FACSFAC)
Virginia Capes
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Due Regard Requirements
DoD Directive 4540.1
Operations not conducted under ICAO are under the
due regard or operational prerogative of
military aircraft. Requires the one or more of
the following conditions

• VMC (implies pilot on board)
• Under radar surveillance and communications
  with a surface facility
• Aircraft equipped with an airborne radar
  sufficient to provide safe separation from air
  traffic

Sea of Japan
North Korea
Article 3 of the Chicago Convention stipulates
there must be due regard for the safety of
navigation of civil aircraft Article 8,
similarly, requires each state . . . to insure
that the flight of such aircraft without a pilot,
in regions open to civil aircraft, shall be so
controlled as to obviate danger to civil
aircraft.
China
South China Sea
Hainan Island
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Due Regard

• An airborne radar can provide
• Sufficient field of view and range for assured
  separation
• Forward situational awareness in lieu of
  controller or GCI information
• Detection that is not dependent of on transponder
  reporting
• Processed targets are compatible with
  narrow-band widths

Sea of Japan
North Korea
China
South China Sea
Hainan Island
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Independent Functional Detection Range (Dynamic
Analysis)
Protection Envelope at FL600
Not to scale
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International Airspace Integration

• Navigation

So, we need to combine our capabilities to
provide a rapid response. That has always been
our forte, to arrive rapidly and to do it in a
global way. To be able to get our ISR assets on
the scene early. It is always the first thing
that the CINCs ask for . . . General Jumper
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Issues
Regulatory

• Air traffic regulators expect aircraft to have
  equipment compatible with the routes flown, e.g.
  a VOR airway requires a VOR
• Navigational equipment (is required) appropriate
  to the ground facilities to be used (FAR Part 91)
• FAA AC 90-96 on BRNAV . . . In the event of
  (an RNAV) system failure, the aircraft (must)
  retain the capability to navigate relative to
  ground-based navigation aids.
• ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)
  With the failure of one item of equipment,
  navigation equipment must be sufficient to
  complete the flight

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Issues
GPS Reliability Vulnerability

• Presidents Commission on Critical Infrastructure
  Protection The most significant vulnerability
  to the transportation infrastructure . . . is the
  association of the modernization of the NAS with
  the plan to adopt the GPS as the sole basis for
  radionavigation in the US by 2010. This creates
  the basis for a single-point failure
• Federal Radionavigation Plan
• The effects of jamming and unintentional
  interference are primarily to increase the
  workload of both the users and the air traffic
  controllers
• Some care will be needed in high-latitude and
  equatorial zone Satnav-based instrument
  approaches at night
• Threats? Increased dependency on GPS for weapon
  targeting and weapon systems motivates
  adversaries to identify and exploit
  vulnerabilities
• EuroControl Navigation Strategy Expects there
  is need for a ground-based back-up system for
  GNSS for the foreseeable future for all phases of
  flight. The requirement for DME is projected
  indefinitely into the future

Ionospheric scintillation can cause
fluctuations in radio wave propagation. This
causes outages on satellite-to-ground or
satellite-to-aircraft transmissions especially in
the equatorial belt. Fleet Satellite
Communications, Air Force Satellite
Communications, and Navstar Global Positioning
Systems are especially vulnerable to this form
of space weather. (Air University Spacecast
2020)
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DOTs GPS Vulnerability Assessment
New! Signed March 2002
Findings
There is growing awareness within the
transportation community of the risks associated
with the GPS system being the only means for
position determination . . .
Like any radionavigation system, GPS is
vulnerable to interference that can be reduced
but not eliminated.
Overarching Issues
There are many augmentation to GPS . . . that
improve the basic accuracy, reliability . . .
even with these augmentations, use of GPS still
can disrupted . . .
As GPS further penetrates into the civil
infrastructure, it becomes a tempting target that
could be exploited by individual, groups, or
countries hostile to the United States.

• Impact to policy in the 2001 Radionavigation
  Plan
• Unaugmented GPS is approved as a primary system
  for use in oceanic and remote airspace.
• GPS is approved as a supplemental system for
  domestic en route and terminal navigation, and
  for nonprecision approach and landing operations.
• The FAAs phase-down plan for ground-based
  Navaids retains at least a minimum operational
  network of ground-based Navaids for the
  foreseeable future.
• Sufficient ground-based Navaids will be
  maintained to provide the FAA and the airspace
  users with a safe recovery and sustained
  operations capability in the event of a
  disruption in Satnav service.

Recommendations
Public policy must ensure, primarily, that
safety is maintained even in the event of loss of
GPS.
Because requiring a GPS backup will involve
considerable government and user expense, it is
recommended that the transportation community
determine the level of risk each critical
application is exposed to, what level of risk
each application can accept, the costs associated
with lowering the risk to this level, and how
such costs are to be funded.
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Precedent Issue

• Precedent
• A manned aircraft, with INS/GPS certified as the
  sole means of navigation, could be able to
  default to contact navigation/map reading dead
  reckoning
• Issue
• Does an ROAs navigational system provide
  sufficient military robustness commensurate with
  the value of the platform, regulatory
  requirements, and its worldwide mission?

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Global Hawk Airspace Integration
Traffic-alert and Collision Avoidance System
(TCAS)
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Requirement

• ICAO SARPs include the TCAS requirement for all
  aircraft exceeding 5700kg by 1 Jan 2005
• ECAC JAA have adopted the ICAO standard
• Two other ICAO regions (AFI Asia/PAC) have
  implemented TCAS requirements
• GATM Capstone Requirements Document (Objective)
• Global Hawk ORD, required now for see-and-avoid
  required in 2005 for international compliance
  (Threshold)

European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC),
Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA)
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Background

• TCAS is a position player for defense in
  depth under routine traffic management. TCAS
  plays in a context that includes
• Airspace structure, standards recommended
  practices
• Operator mission planning
• Training, experience, and familiarity with
  operational patterns of activity
• Shared responsibility between air traffic
  operations authorities and aircrews

Structural arrangements provide the benefits of a
zone defense
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Background

• When flying due regard without EMCON, TCAS
  provides a source of situational awareness for
  cooperative targets
• The ROA becomes the non-cooperative target
• Airspace structure, standards recommended
  practices are still a factor in the expected
  tracks and activity for other targets
• TCAS becomes the substitute for ATC/ATM for
  cooperative traffic

Procedural
TCAS
See and Avoid
With EMCON, TCAS would not play in due regard
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Summary

• Global compliance is an inherent prerequisite for
  Global deployability
• While ROAs qualify for the state aircraft
  exemption, the potential operational limitations
  are not acceptable. (GATM CRD)
• Early incorporation of aircraft requirements will
  ease acceptance of ROAs worldwide
• An unintelligent ROA should not be denied the
  information required for manned aircraft