Genomics and the Pharmaceutical Industry

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Dual use genomics results from a pilot project
Dual use genomics results from a pilot project
Caitríona McLeish Paul Nightingale (Science
Policy Research Unit - University of Sussex, UK)
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Society on science

• Traditionally scientists provide expertise for
  policy
• This project examines scientists as the objects,
  rather than originators, of policy controls
• Project about societys impact on direction of
  science
• Security policy is not science policy
• Goal of security policy is to defend nation
• Closed worlds
• Dont have deliberation process
• Portrayed as clash of cultures
• Our findings show weak links and confusion over
  language

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Definitions dual use and the dual use dilemma

• Dual use - the tangible and intangible features
  of a technology that enable it to be applied to
  both hostile and peaceful ends
• this includes current and potential applications
• Policies designed to constrain the acquisition of
  biological weapons can also disrupt legitimate
  scientific and technical activity
• potentially very substantial social costs
• Policies designed to encourage the development of
  lawful technologies might also inadvertently
  encourage the proliferation of biological warfare
  technologies

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Policy problem in a nutshell
How do you suppress the malign applications of
a technology without inhibiting its socially
beneficial exploitation?
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The project questions

• How institutions operate under the current regime
  of biosafety and biosecurity regulations
• What sorts of impacts these regulations have had
  on current RD programmes and what perceptions
  and concerns there are about future impacts
• What perception there is of current interaction
  between scientific practitioners and the
  government designers of these regulations and how
  this interaction could be improved

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Who we spoke to

• Needed to create a community
• Created a data set of core people connected to
  listed pathogens.
• Scientists and funders of science, biosafety
  personnel, security officials
• Institution size typically 11-100 active
  researchers
• Required effective communication
• Had to build credibility with users
• Had to build trust

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What we did

• Questionnaire
• Needed to effectively communicate across barriers
• Needed to be policy relevant
• Sections of questionnaire impact on
  administrative costs and benefits, institutional
  costs and benefits and perceptions
• Interviews
• In-depth interviews with key figures
• Follow-up interviews on a sample of questionnaire
  responses and used to probe answers

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Biosecurity procedures in place prior to 2001
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Changes to operational procedures since 2001
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Major complications experienced in the UKsince
the introduction of biosecurity laws
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Who ought to have responsibility for protecting
the life sciences against misuse?
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Which biosecurity policies are worthconsidering?
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Discussion

• Portrayed as clash but its a presentational
  problem
• When appropriate language used found a high
  degree of social responsibility
• When presented as part of solution there is a
  willingness to consider all possible policy
  options.
• Common ground
• Bridging mechanism between security and science
• Created the communication channel weve been
  studying
• Briefed OST, FCO, DTI, Cabinet Office, Police
  Security Services, RS, (international interest)
• Taking this pilot project forward
• UK, Geneva etc

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Questions