Outline:

1
Lecture 10 The Social Brain I Machiavellian
intelligence in primates

• Outline
• Origins in the social problems sex and food
• Machiavellian intelligence
• Tactical deception, intentionality and theory of
  mind

Readings Chaps 4, 12, 13 in Corballis Lea
Emory Clayton, 2009 Ann Rev Psychol
2
www.abdn.ac.uk/pgopenday
3
(1988) 599.8 Byr (1997) 155.7 Byr
4
In reality, some of the most convincing accounts
given of the likely evolutionary origins of
modern human traits-patterns of infanticide and
homicide (Daly Wilson, 1990, 1996), partner
choice and matrimonial systems (Buss, 1989
Wilson Daly, 1992)-are based on design
principles that apply to apes, monkeys and even
nonprimates, not specifically to Pleistocene
hunter/gatherers. Clearly, important human
traits have a much greater antiquity than the
Pleistocene. Byrne, R.W. (2000). Evolution of
primate cognition. Cognitive Science, 24, 543-570.
5
Dunbar, 2003
Figure 1 Mean social group size for individual
primate taxa (principally, one species per genus)
plotted against relative neocortex volume
(indexed as neocortex volume divided by the
volume of the rest of the brain). Simian (solid
symbols) and hominoid (open symbols) taxa are
shown separately. The datapoint for humans is
that obtained by Dunbar (1992a). ..Reproduced
with permission from Barrett et al. (2002). (pg.
165).
6
Early observations.The Chance-Mead-Jolly-Kummer-H
umphrey hypothesis!
Chance Mead (1953) the social circumstances
in which the evolution of primates is just such
to require the development of differentiated
control of autonomic functions in anthropoid
primatesthe female can be receptive throughout
the whole cycle and the male is continually
potent Continuous mating provocationleads to
modification of sexual gestures, competition to
suppress others from mating which leads to a
system of socially specialized forms of overt
behaviour (pg 41-2 in B W 1988) link such
living in a group problems to neocortical
enlargement
7
Early observations.The Chance-Mead-Jolly-Kummer-H
umphrey hypothesis
in many primate societies the social problems
boil down to sex, food and individuals positions
in dominance hierarchies
8
Early observations.The Chance-Mead-Jolly-Kummer-H
umphrey hypothesis
Humphrey (1976) life is easy for primates, whats
a big brain for? In a complex society, such as
those we now exist in higher primates, there are
benefits to be gained for each individual member
both from preserving the overall structure of the
group, and at the same time exploiting and
out-manoeuvring others within it. pg. 19 in B
W 1988.
9
Early observations.The Chance-Mead-Jolly-Kummer-H
umphrey hypothesis
Jolly (1966) lemurs are social but small brained.
Dominance hierarchies yes but little evidence of
male alliances - big brains follow from
selective pressures of social living?The social
uses of intelligence
10
Early observations.The Chance-Mead-Jolly-Kummer-H
umphrey hypothesis
Kummer (1967) Hamadryas baboons use others as
agents the tripartite behaviour in some
instances comes close to exploitation a primate
may learn to use for his own protection, or for
increasing the effect of his aggression, another
one who primarily is not involved in the events.
(pg. 121 in B W, 1988)
i.e. females will threaten other females only
when sitting beside the dominant male baboon
11
Early observations.The Chance-Mead-Jolly-Kummer-H
umphrey hypothesis
Silk (1998) Bonnett macaques utilise third party
relationships
Silk (1998). Male use information about
third-party rank relationships to recruit allies.
Animal Behaviour, 58, 45-51
12
Machiavellian intellligence

• In MI II, Whiten and Byrne (1997) note that they
  didnt even bother defining MI in MI I (1988)
• an umbrella category for theories of evolution
  of intelligence rooted in social manipulation,
  cunning, and cooperation
• concede that intelligence is tricky to define
  social intelligence no less so
• knowing how versus knowing thatlatter style
  is flexible
• i.e. vervet monkeys pay more attention to calls
  made from unusual locations (Cheney Seyfarth,
  1988). Call X normally belongs in area Y.
• by 1980s very few studies of social problem
  solving in NHPs
• led to much work on NHP tactical deception,
  intentionality and latterly, Theory of Mind

13
Tactical deception
An example of concealment from (Byrne 1995)
14
(No Transcript)
15
(No Transcript)
16
Machiavellian intellligence
But how many of these clever anecdotes boil down
to good social memory (which can all be modelled
by classical and operant conditioning) OR
genetically prewired behavioural patterns common
to all members of the species?
e.g. previous mating attempts with non-alpha
males in proximity to (or in sight of?) alpha
lead to aggression. Do animals with good
abilities to perceive and remember social
relationships have the necessary know-how to
benefit from natural coincidences?
e.g. grooming, long term friendships, use of
third party in conflict resolution, inheritance
of status, all quite common and more or less the
same in all members
17
Tactical deception

• Major classes of TD (Whiten and Byrne 1988)
• Concealment. e.g. hiding something from anothers
  view, acting quietly, avoiding looking at a
  desirable object
• Distraction. e.g. distract target by actively
  looking at something else leading a target away
  (so agent can return to thing of interest)
• Creating an image. e.g. presenting oneself as
  non-threatening
• Manipulation of a target using a social tool use
  a third party in some way
• Deflection of target to a fall guy.

18
(No Transcript)
19
Tactical deception
Byrne (2000) acknowledges that in
monkeys/baboons, all instances of TD could be
understood as examples of social learning which
say little about knowledge of mental states in
others differences emerge not in what great
apes do--which is in practice often much the same
as what monkeys dobut in how they do it.
1. TD examples from great apes cant ALL be
plausibly explained away in social learning terms
(hmmmmmwonders DC) 2. Deliberate instructional
teaching has occasionally been seen in chimps 3.
All great ape species have learned at least part
of a gestural or ideographic language 4. Great
apes appear to recognise their own faces in
mirrors 5. Chimps make alarm calls more often
when their conspecific cant see the threatening
vet! 6. Is there evidence that they understand
others mental states?
20
Machiavellian intellligence
an attractive feature of M.I. conspecifics are
the competitors successful genomes ramp up
the social intelligence of the species (as their
social intelligence increases, harder to
win) Remaining key questions (Whiten and Byrne,
1997) 1. Sources of complexity can we compare
social complexity with environmental complexity
directly? 2. Domain specificity are primates
better at social intelligence problems than
comparable problems in non-social domains? Are
other species the opposite? 3. Mechanisms of
social competition are many of them really
Machiavellian (i.e. nasty)? 4. Brain evolution
is greater social intelligence related to changes
in brain size or structure?
21
What were the selection pressures in human
evolution? (Byrne 2000) Physical environment 1.
Tool making? no corr between brain size and
extractive foraging 2. Spatial ability i.e.
foraging range, spatial memory? 3. Arboreal
locomotion? Social environment 1. Machiavellian
intelligence 2. Social solutions to environmental
problems i.e. social learningsome evidence for
program level imitation in NH great apes but
language rules
22
Theory of Mind
Premack Woodruff (1978) do apes think that
other apes are intentional? What do you think
that Gordon Brown believes that we think he knew
about the emails Damian McBride sent about George
Osbourne and David Cameron? I think thats a 5th
order problem (see next slide) I dont believe
Brown, in any case, thats for sure (1st or 2nd
order?). Are deceptions and other
socially-complex behaviours based on knowledge of
what a conspecific will do (behavioural), can see
(perceptual/intentional), or believes
(intentions)?
23
Intentionality (Dennett 1988)
1st order has beliefs and desires, but no
beliefs and desires about beliefs and desires 2nd
order has intentional states like beliefs and
desires about others intentional states I.e.
Luthien thinks Judith will like my thesis 3rd
order intentional states about others
intentional states and beliefs about others
intentional states and beliefs (including your
ownreverse reverse psychology anyone?) I think
that Luthien hopes that Judith will like her
thesis How high can human beings go? In
principle, forever, no doubt, but in fact I
suspect that you wonder whether I realize how
hard it is for you to understand whether I meant
to be saying that you can recognize that I can
believe you to want me to explain that most of us
can keep track of only about five or six orders,
under the best of circumstances (pg. 185-6).
24
Theory of Mind
Primitive characters are usually identified by
comparison with an out-group, some definitely
less closely related species in this example
the clade which includes humans and other great
apes, monkeys form an appropriate out group
(Byrne, 2000, pg. 546).
25
Karl Marbe, distinguished German experimental
cognitive psychologist, studied Basso, a
chimpanzee in the Frankfurt zoo, that solved
arithmetic problems (Marbe 1917). Asked in German
How much is six plus four? Basso selected a
card bearing the number 10 as in Figure 1.
Verifying that Basso was usually correct, Marbe
interviewed the zookeeper and trainer who drilled
Basso on simple problems as one might drill a
small schoolchild, but without believing that
Basso could do arithmetic.
Animal cognition meets evo-devo R. Allen Gardner
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2005) 28, 698-699
26
He believed, instead, that Basso read his mind.
Marbe tested this hypothesis by asking the
trainer to give Basso a series of arithmetic
problems and think wrong answers. The result was
decisive. Basso repeatedly gave the answer that
his trainer was thinking, regardless of the
correct answer in arithmetic. He succeeded at
mind reading where he failed at
arithmetic. Further tests showed that Basso
selected the card that his trainer looked at. The
trainer himself was unaware that he was gazing at
the correct card or giving any visible hints
whatsoever. Earlier, Pfungst (1965) showed that
Hans, a German horse, solved arithmetic problems
and also spelled out German words by following
the gaze of human interlocutors who were also
unaware that they were hinting. Soon,
experimental procedures that control for
inadvertent hints became standard in comparative
psychology (B. Gardner Gardner 1989a Warden
Warner 1928).
27
Three practice questions which I gave them 4.
Tool use was thought to be a uniquely human
adaptation. Discuss. Nonprimate tool use, New
Caledonian crows Tool construction? The chimp
toolkit study Teaching conspecifics how to make
tools? Something on the Oldowan/Acheulian
distinction, technology etc. Are our estimates of
earliest Hominim tool use too conservative? What
about wood tools, hand morphology etc.
28
Three practice questions which I gave them 5.
What was more important for the evolution of
language? Social intelligence or the ability to
manipulate symbols? Machiavellian intelligence,
tactical deception, theory of mind (for and
against arguments) ecological, non-social
constraints on mind development Recursion
arguments of Hauser, Chomsky Fitch? Some Pinker
and anti- Pinker on whether or not language is a
unique, evolved adaptation?
29
Three practice questions which I gave them 6.
Which came first? Language or some more
generalised cognitive ability such as g? Tough
one! Hurlford, Tomasello Pinkers language
instinct stuff Social intelligence stuff (if
strictly interpreted, Byrne implies that social
probs are it, really) Some mirror neuron
stuff? Corballis gestural stuff?
30
Next lecture Lecture 11 The social brain II.
Brain size and social complexity Readings Byrne
Corp (2004) Proc Roy Soc (from DC or RWBs St
Andrews website) Dunbar (2003) Ann Rev Anthropol