Schlieffen Plan

1
Schlieffen Plan
2
The Plans

• French Plan XVII disregards Belgian frontier
  (think Germans wont violate Belgian neutrality)
  
• Schliefen Plan has main effort through Belgium

3
Schlieffen Plan
See similar map on Doughty page 262
4
Problems with the Schlieffen Plan

• Moltke modified Schlieffens original plan
• Weakened the right wing and strengthened the left
  
  
• Moved four and a half corps from the west to the
  east to protect East Prussia
  
• Modified sweep of right wing so that Germans
  would not violate the Netherlands neutrality
  
• Added a counterattack mission to the left wing
• Violated Schlieffens dying words to Keep the
  right wing strong
  

Doughty page 261-262
5
Problems with the Schlieffen Plan

• Became inflexible war by timetable
• Required enormous logistical effort to move men
  and equipment from Aachen to around Paris in a
  little more than five weeks
  
• Commited Germany to a two front war
• Necessitated attacking before Russia or France
  could seize the initiative (even if Germany
  wasnt ready)
  

Doughty page 262-263
6
Hutier Tactics
7
Hutier Tactics

• Credited with rediscovery of mobile warfare
• Sometimes overstated as being the Father of the
  Blitzkreig
  
• Short, violent artillery prep as storm troops
  advance to assault positions
  
• Storm troops infiltrate through main defenses to
  objectives in the rear
  
• Artillery shifts to fix enemy
• Follow on forces reduce bypassed pockets of
  resistance
  

Doughty, p. 350 (Doughty actually credits
Bruchmuller)
8
Hutier Tactics
9
Infiltration
10
Peripheral Operations
11
Widening war

• Ottoman Empire enters war on the side of the
  Central Powers on 31 Oct 1914
  
• Growing discontent, especially with the British,
  about the deadlock on the Western Front
  
• End result is a series of operations on the
  periphery of Europe
  
• Strategy of the Indirect Approach (Hart)
• Strategy of Evasion (Fuller)

Doughty, 298-299
12
Operations

• British defend Egypt against a Turkish invasion
  and fighting gradually moves into Palestine
  
• Allenby and T. E. Lawrence
• Dardanelles Campaign
• Gallipoli
• Tigris River
• Salonika

Doughty, 299
13
Dardanelles and Gallipoli
14
British Strategy

• Take advantage of superior seapower
• German High Seas Fleet contained in the North Sea
  so British had freedom of maneuver
  
• Churchill was the British First Lord of the
  Admiralty
  
• Proposed an assault on the Dardanelles -the
  nearly 50 kilometer-long strait separating the
  Aegean Sea from the Sea of Marmara, which at its
  narrowest point, the Narrows, was less than two
  kilometers wide.
• The object would be to pass a force into the Sea
  of Marmara and threaten Constantinople, the
  capital of the Ottoman Empire.
  

15
Regional Considerations

• With the Turks advancing northwards in the
  Caucasus, Russia appealed for action to relieve
  the pressure.
  
• The need was fleeting-Russian forces soon drove
  the Turks back-but impetus had been given to
  Churchill's concept of an attack on Turkey.
  
• The tempting idea of inducing the Balkan states
  to join the Allies and attack Austria-Hungary
  from the south-east, never more than an illusion,
  was also influential.
• A campaign in the Eastern Mediterranean might,
  moreover, encourage Italy to enter the war on the
  Allied side.
  

16
Economy of Force

• Plan was designed to be limited in nature
• Would be predominantly a naval attack, requiring
  limited ground forces
  
• Older battleships would be used so as not to
  hinder British naval operations in the vital
  North Sea
  
• Despite the strong reservations of the commander
  of the Eastern Mediterranean Squadron
  (Vice-Admiral Sackville Carden), the War Council
  approved the proposal on 15 January 1915.

17
Gallipoli
See similar map Doughty, 300
18
ANZAC Landing on Gallipoli
19
Failure

• Eventually a ground attack force was put
  together
  
• Half hearted effort to build the force resulted
  in too little too late
  
• Five divisions against a roughly comparable
  Turkish force which enjoyed the advantage of
  operating on interior lines and in defensible
  terrain

20
Gallipoli and Principles of War

• Objective
• Deviation from decisive theater
• Economy of force versus mass
• Effort to do Gallipoli on the cheap meant not
  enough resources to accomplish the mission
  
• Maneuver
• Made possible by British sea power

21
Aufstragtaktik
22
The End and the Interwar Years

• Eventually the Allies overwhelmed the Germans
  with men and equipment
  
• Americans and tanks
• Germans begin working on a new doctrine
• Decentralized, mission-type orders
• Speed and exploitation of enemy weakness require
  the use of initiative
  
• Close integration and cooperation between
  branches
  
• Leadership from the front

Doughty, 358, 373
23
Auftragstaktik

• Mission oriented tactics
• Commanders were expected to understand the intent
  of their leaders and to take initiative when
  necessary to accomplish the mission
  
• Germans preparing for a mobile battlefield

Doughty, 374-375
24
Blitzkrieg and Surprise
25
French and German Plans forthe Battle of France
1940
26
The Panzer Corps Outflank the Allied
DefensesBattle of France May 12-13, 1940
27
Surprise

• The armored weight of the German attack on France
  struck westward in the Ardennes region, in the
  weakly held center of the Allied front.
  
• Envelopment
• This was an unanticipated move and it led to a
  serious crisis for the Allied armies.
  

28
Anzio
29
Strategic Situation in late 1943

• Allies searching for a way to alleviate
  stalemate
  
• Campaign had stalled about 80 miles short of Rome
  and was beginning to resemble the trench warfare
  of WWI
  
• A landing at Anzio would bypass German defenses
  around Cassino and put the Allies just 35 miles
  south of Rome

30
(No Transcript)
31
Overall Guidance to Fifth Army

• Carry out an assault landing on the beaches in
  the vicinity of Rome with the object of cutting
  the enemy lines of communication and threatening
  the rear of the German 14 Corps
• Cut the enemys main communications in the Colli
  Laziali (Alban Hills) area southeast of Rome, and
  threaten the rear of the 14 German corps
  
• Advantage must be taken of this to break
  through his main defenses, and to ensure that the
  two forces join hands at the earliest possible
  moment
• Harold Alexander, 15th Army Group commander

32
Planning Considerations

• Despite the relatively few German units
  immediately available to defend at Anzio, Fifth
  Army assumed that VI Corps would meet strong
  initial resistance on the beaches
• Expected the corps to receive heavy
  counterattacks as soon as the Germans became
  aware of the extent and the purpose of the
  operation.

33
Defensive Mindset

• Lesson of having underestimated German strength
  at the time of the Salerno invasion had been too
  well learned.
  
• Fifth Army and VI Corps expected the same pattern
  of opposition to develop at Anzio that had come
  close to defeating the Allies at Salerno.
  
• The emphasis consequently turned toward defense.
  
  
• VI Corps was to maintain a strong reserve.
• Troops were to dig in on initial objectives at
  once to hold the beachhead against armored
  counterattack.
  

34
Contingencies

• Fifth Army expected VI Corps to be ready to do
  one of two things upon landing.
  
• If the enemy reacted in strength, the corps was
  to take the defensive and assemble reserves to
  meet German counterattacks.
  
• If the corps could take the offensive, it was to
  advance "on" the Alban Hills by one of two
  routes directly up the Albano road to cut
  Highway 7 or by way of Cisterna and Velletri to
  cut not only Highway 7 but also Highway 6 near
  Valmontone.
• Whether the VI Corps assumed a defensive or
  offensive attitude after landing would depend on
  how General Lucas saw the situation and on how he
  decided to act.

35
Rome, Alban Hills, Anzio
36
Lucas Pessimism

• Replaced Dawley after Salerno
• Tired from mountain warfare in Italy appeared
  dispirited and discouraged.
  
• In mid-January 1944, eight days before the Anzio
  landing, he turned fifty-four years old.
  
• Wrote in his diary, I am afraid I feel every
  year of it.
  
• I must keep from thinking of the fact, he wrote
  on the following day, that my order will send
  these men into a desperate attack.

37
Lucas Pessimism

• Unless we can get what we want in the way of
  vessels, the operation becomes such a desperate
  undertaking that it should not, in my opinion, be
  attempted. Otherwise, a crack on the chin is
  certain.
• Lucas would do what he was ordered to do, but
  these Battles of the Little Big Horn aren't
  much fun and a failure now would ruin Clark,
  probably kill me, and certainly prolong the war.
  

38
Anzio

• Allies achieved complete surprise by landing on
  22 Jan 1944
  
• Quickly established a beachhead and advanced
  three miles inland by midmorning against light
  resistance
  
• Majority of German forces were south around
  Cassino and could not possibly reinforce Anzio
  until 23 or 24 January

39
Initial Landing
40
Immediate Success

• If Allies pursed their advantage they could seize
  a virtually undefended Rome
  
• Instead Lucas took counsel of his fears and
  waited until 29 January to continue offensive
  operations
  
• By then the opportunity was lost
• Germans reinforcements has arrived in force and
  seized the dominating high ground in the break
  head area
  
• Allied drive stalled and Germans now had the
  initiative

41
Immediate Success
42
Opportunity Lost
43
Missed Opportunity

• On January 22 and even the following day, an
  audacious and enterprising formation of enemy
  troops could have penetrated into the city of
  Rome itself without having overcome any serious
  opposition
• Siegried Westphal, German Chief of Staff
• Lucas orders were to advance on the Alban
  Hills
  
• Did that mean toward or to?
• What was Alexanders intent?

44
Normandy and Aufstragtaktik
45
Offensive

• The Germans launched no tactical
  counteroffensives against the American airborne
  assault.
  
• American paratroopers gathered in ad hoc small
  groups and executed operations in accordance with
  the commanders intent.
  
• SLA Marshall

46
Offensive

• the performance of the Wehrmachts high
  command, middle-ranking soldiers, and junior
  officers was just pathetic. The cause is simply
  put they were afraid to take the initiative.
  They allowed themselves to be paralyzed by stupid
  orders coming from far away that bore no relation
  to the situation on the battlefield. Tank
  commanders who knew where the enemy was and how
  and when he should be attacked sat in their
  headquarters through the day, waiting for the
  high command in Berchtesgaden to tell them what
  to do.
• Stephen Ambrose

47
Normandy and Objective
48
Objective Allies (Tactical)

• Objectives of the airborne forces were to
• secure exits from the beaches to allow the
  amphibious forces to move inland
  
• block German counterattack routes to protect
  amphibious forces

49
Normandy and Surprise
50
Surprise Fictitious Armies

• By spurious radio transmissions, the Allies
  created an entire phantom army, "based" in
  southeast England (opposite Pas-de-Calais) and
  alleged to be commanded by Patton.
• In addition, on the night of the invasion itself,
  airborne radar deception presented to German
  radar stations a "phantom" picture of an invasion
  fleet crossing the Channel narrows, while a radar
  blackout disguised the real transit to Normandy.

51
Inflatable Tank
52
Surprise Ultra

• At the same time, through the top-secret Ultra
  operation, the Allies were able to decode
  encrypted German transmissions, thus providing
  the Overlord forces with a clear picture of where
  the German counterattack forces were deployed.

53
Surprise Targets

• The air campaign was designed not only to disrupt
  German anti-invasion preparations but also to
  serve as a deception operation.
  
• Two-thirds of the bombs were dropped outside the
  invasion area, in an attempt to persuade the
  enemy that the landings would be made northeast
  of the Seine--in particular, the Pas-de-Calais
  area, directly opposite Dover, England--rather
  than in Normandy.

54
506th PIR Drop Dispersal
55
Pacific Theater Twin Drives
56
Twin Drives

• Admiral King favored a drive across the central
  Pacific moving toward Japan over the coral atolls
  scattered across the Pacific
  
• Take advantage of ability to leap across vast
  distances
  
• MacArthur favored an advance across the South
  Pacific via New Guinea and the Philippines
  
• Meet obligations to Filipinos
• Maintain pressure against the retreating
  Japanese
  
• Protect against a renewed threat against Australia

Doughty, p. 554- 555
57
Compromise

• Kings drive would move first against the Gilbert
  Islands and then toward the Philippines
  
• MacArthur would likewise advance toward the
  Philippines
  
• Joint Chiefs gave no clear priority to either
  drive
  
• Mutual supporting or mutually competing?

Doughty, p. 554, 558
58
Twin Drives
See similar map on Doughty, p. 555
59
Operation Cartwheel
60
Operation Cartwheel

• MacArthur requests five additional divisions and
  1,800 aircraft to capture Rabaul
  
• mass

61
Operational Cartwheel

• Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude there are not
  enough resources to capture Rabaul in 1943 so
  they accepted MacArthurs proposal for a
  two-pronged drive to isolate it
• maneuver

62
Operation Cartwheel

• MacArthur would be in overall command
• Halsey would advance up the Solomons as far as
  Bougainville
  
• MacArthur would move along the coast of New
  Guinea before attacking the western end of New
  Britain
  
• unity of command

63
Isolation of Rabaul
See similar map on Doughty, p. 548
64
Operation Cartwheel

• Became the model for Pacific commanders
  throughout the rest of the war
  
• dont move island to island advance by great
  bounds using air superiority
  
• bypass major strongpoints and leave them reduced
  to strategic and tactical impotence
  
• hit Japanese weak spots avoid frontal assaults
  use deception and surprise
  
• seize existing airfields and ports and use these
  newly acquired bases to support the next leap
  forward

65
Atomic Bomb Impact on Post-War
66
Post-war Impact of Atomic Bomb

• Changed the very nature of war
• Presented the possibility of annihilation of
  humankind
  
• US comes to place great strategic reliance on
  atomic bomb
  
• War plans emphasize sudden atomic attack against
  USSR to allow time for conventional mobilization
  
• US holds atomic monopoly until 1949
• Huge US-USSR arms race follows
• Eventually leads to Mutually Assured Destruction
  (1967)
  
• Massive retaliation strategy (1954) meant US was
  prepared to respond to Soviet aggression with a
  massive nuclear strike
  
• Nuclear weapons prove to not be a reasonable
  option in limited wars
  

Doughty, p. 574-596