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Title: Investment in Business Cycle Models


1
Investment in Business Cycle Models
  • Miles Kimball

2
The Power of Investment in Business Cycle Models
  • The technology-induced fluctuations in standard
    Real Business Cycle models are fundamentally
    investment booms.
  • Kimball and Ramnath With Realistic Parameters
    the Basic Real Business Cycle model Acts Like the
    Solow Growth Model
  • Basu, Fernald, Fisher and Kimball
    Sector-Specific Technology Shocks
  • Including investment dramatically changes the
    behavior of sticky-price models.
  • Barsky, House, and Kimball Durable Goods and
    Sticky-Price Models
  • III. The Neomonetarist Synthesis (Kimball)
  • IV. A catastrophic collapse of investment was a
    key propagation mechanism for the Great
    Depression. (Barsky and Kimball)

3
With Realistic Parameters the Basic Real
Business Cycle Model Acts Like the Solow Growth
Model
  • To match the lack of strong long-run trend in
    labor hours, Real Business Cycle models need
    King-Plosser-Rebelo preferences, engineered to
    get WCv(N), or equivalently, Nv-1(W/C).
  • Technology shocks are permanent.
  • --A priori argument Useful knowledge not soon
    forgotten
  • --Direct evidence from Are Technology
    Improvements Contractionary? by Basu, Fernald
    and Kimball
  • The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is
    low.
  • --Consumption Euler equation evidence (Hall)
  • --Hypothetical choice evidence (Kimball, Sahm and
    Shapiro)

4
With Realistic Parameters the Basic Real
Business Cycle Model Acts Like the Solow Growth
Model
  • Given King-Plosser-Rebelo preferences with an
    elasticity of intertemporal substitution of about
    0.3, permanent technology shocks have essentially
    no effect on I/Y or N.
  • These two results are linked. Multiply Cv(N)W
    by N/C
  • Nv(N) WN/C (WN/Y) / (C/Y)
    (1-a) / (C/Y).
  • 1-a is labors share. Given Cobb-Douglas, N
    depends only on C/Y (negatively). Note that C/Y
    1-(I/Y)-(G/Y).
  • Thus, N will increase only if I/Y or G/Y
    increases if a tech shock does not induce an
    investment boom, it does not raise labor hours.
  • Instead, output and investment go up by the same
    percentage due to the direct effect of the
    technology shock, and capital accumulates. (Same
    as the response of Solow Growth Model to a perm.
    tech shock)

5
Sector-Specific Technical Change
  • Susanto Basu
  • Boston College and NBER
  • Jonas Fisher
  • Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

John Fernald Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco Miles Kimball University of Michigan
and NBER
Very preliminary
6
Where does growth originate?
  • Technical change differs across industries
  • Recent work has highlighted that the final-use
    sector in which technical change occurs matters
  • Greenwood, Hercowitz, Krusell
  • Use relative price data
  • We reconsider the evidence
  • Extending GHK to situations where relative
    pricesmight not measure technology correctly
  • Top down versus bottom up

7
Outline
  • Motivation Consumption-technology neutrality
  • How to think about terms of trade?
  • Disaggregating Manipulating the input-output
    matrix
  • Comparing bottom-up versus top-down estimates

8
Consumption Technology Neutrality
  • Suppose utility is logarithmic
  • Suppose there is some multiplicative technology A
    for producing non-durable consumption goods
  • The stochastic process for consumption-technology
    A affects only the production of nondurable
    consumption goods
  • It does not affect affect labor hours N,
    investment I, or an index of the resources
    devoted to producing consumption goods X.

9
Consider social-planners problem for two-sector
growth model, with CRS, identical production
technologies
10
This is Special Case of Following, Simple Social
Planners Problem
Equivalent problem
11
Comments
  • Because ln(A) is an additively-separable term,
    any stochastic process for A has no effect on the
    optimal decision rules for N, X and I.
  • There is a weaker, but still important result for
    the more general King-Plosser-Rebelo case
  • anticipated movements in A act like changes in
    the utility discount rate
  • unanticipated movements in A have no effect on
    the optimal decision rules for N, X and I.

12
King-Plosser-Rebelo Utility with EIS lt 1 (?gt1)
Equivalent problem
13
An Example Mean-Reverting Consumption
Technology
  • If A follows an AR(1) process, then At /A0 lt 1
    after an increase in A above the steady-state
    level at time zero.
  • This makes (At /A0)1-? gt 1, which has the same
    effect as if the discount factor ß were larger.
  • Higher ß (greater patience) would lead to an
    increase in investment I, an increase in labor
    hours N, and a reduction in the resources devoted
    to consumption X.
  • Thus, At /A0 lt 1 leads to an increase in
    investment I, an increase in labor hours N, and a
    reduction in the resources devoted to consumption
    X.
  • However, CAX may increase even though X
    decreases.

14
Empirical Implications Standard RBC Parameters
  • With the standard parametrizations of the utility
    function consumption technology shocks will have
    very different effects from investment technology
    shocks.
  • consumption technology shocks have no effect on
    labor hours or investment.
  • investment technology shocks have the same effect
    on labor hours and investment as pervasive
    technology shocks.
  • therefore, like pervasive technology shocks in
    standard RBC models, investment technology shocks
    should have a large effect on labor hours and
    investment.

15
Empirical Implications Low EIS and Permanent
Tech Shocks
  • With permanent technology shocks and
    King-Plosser-Rebelo utility and relatively low
    elasticity of intertemporal substitution ( 0.3),
    investment technology shocks also have very
    little immediate effects on labor hours, though
    they do raise investment in a way that
    consumption technology shocks do not.

16
A More General Question
  • Example of consumption technology neutrality
    raises possibility that shocks to different final
    sectors have different effects on aggregate labor
    hours and investment.
  • Therefore, we would like to construct technology
    shocks for goods of different levels of
    durability to see empirically if these have
    different effects.

17
Motivation A novel test of price stickiness
  • In the log case, a change in consumption
    technology should have no effect on investment
    and hours
  • For plausible deviations from log utility of
    consumption and permanent technology shocks
    (EISlt1and AR(1) technology as analyzed above),
    improvements in consumption technology should
    raise investment
  • But with sticky prices, Basu-Kimball (2001) show
    that improved consumption technology should lower
    investment and hours in the short run
  • Reason is that with price stickiness, relative
    price of consumption cannot jump down on impact
  • However, consumption technology should have
    RBC-style effect once effective price stickiness
    ends

18
Terms of Trade as Technology
  • In a closed economy, relative prices are always
    driven by domestic factors, including domestic
    technology
  • But this is not true with an open economythe
    relative price faced by a small open economy can
    change due to changes in foreign technology or
    demand
  • We classify such price changes as technology
    shocks because they enable home consumers to
    have more consumption with unchanged labor input
  • View trade as a special (linear) technology, with
    terms of trade changes as technology shocks
  • However, this type of technology is specialfor
    one thing, it has very different trend growth

19
Terms of Trade as Technology, contd
  • Thus, need to allow ToT to follow a different
    stochastic process than more conventional
    technical change
  • Ultimately a definitional questionShould
    technology represent a change in the
    possibility frontier for consumption and leisure,
    or be restricted to a change in the production
    functions for domestic C and I?
  • We use the first, broader, definition. Labeling
    does not matter, so long as one takes into
    account both ToT changes and domestic PF shifts

20
Issues in using industry/commodity data to
measure sectoral technical change
  • Final use is by commodity, productivity data are
    by industry
  • I-O make table maps commodity production to
    industries
  • Can translate industry technology into final-use
    technology, using
  • dzCommodity M-1dzIndustry,
  • where dzIndustry is vector of industry
    technologies
  • Industry/commodity TFP is in terms of domestic
    production, whereas final-use reflects total
    commodity supply
  • Domestic commodity production plus commodity
    imports
  • I-O use table tells us both production and
    imports
  • Requires rescaling domestic-commodity technology

21
Rearranging the standard input-output table
22
Defining final-use technology
23
Notes
  • Trade technology is the terms of trade
  • Suppose there are no intermediate-inputs and one
    of each final-use commodity (e.g., a single
    consumption good)
  • Final-use technology is technology in that
    commodity
  • Otherwise, takes account of intermediate-input
    flows

24
The Power of Investment in Business Cycle Models
  • The technology-induced fluctuations in standard
    Real Business Cycle models are fundamentally
    investment booms.
  • Kimball and Ramnath With Realistic Parameters
    the Basic Real Business Cycle model Acts Like the
    Solow Growth Model
  • Basu, Fernald, Fisher and Kimball
    Sector-Specific Technology Shocks
  • Including investment dramatically changes the
    behavior of sticky-price models.
  • Barsky, House, and Kimball Durable Goods and
    Sticky-Price Models
  • III. The Neomonetarist Synthesis (Kimball)
  • IV. A catastrophic collapse of investment was a
    key propagation mechanism for the Great
    Depression. (Barsky and Kimball)

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There Must Be Sticky Prices for Durables to Get
This Kind of Behavior
  • We show that if a durable goods have flexible
    prices, a monetary contraction will raise the
    output of that durable.
  • Durability, not final use is the key feature for
    this point, business investment, housing
    investment and other long-lived durable purchases
    are similar.

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The Marginal Value of a Durable is Largely
Invariant to Shocks with Temporary Real Effects
1. Stocks of durables will change slowly because
of a high stock/flow ratio 1/d. 2. Only the
first few terms in this series will be affected.

37
The Neutrality Problem
Nd Wt/PjtMRPNf(Nt)/µj
Consider a durable good with flexible prices
Ns
Labor Market Equilibrium v(Nt) (?jt/µj)f(Nt)
(?j/µj)f(Nt)
38
The Comovement Problem
v(Nt) (?j/µj)fj(Njt)
39
The Quantity of Nondurables Is Slaved to the
Relative Price
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The Power of Durables
42
The Power of Investment in Business Cycle Models
  • The technology-induced fluctuations in standard
    Real Business Cycle models are fundamentally
    investment booms.
  • Kimball and Ramnath With Realistic Parameters
    the Basic Real Business Cycle model Acts Like the
    Solow Growth Model
  • Basu, Fernald, Fisher and Kimball
    Sector-Specific Technology Shocks
  • Including investment dramatically changes the
    behavior of sticky-price models.
  • Barsky, House, and Kimball Durable Goods and
    Sticky-Price Models
  • III. The Neomonetarist Synthesis Adding a
    Non-Zero Interest Elasticity of Money Demand to
    the Basic Neomonetarist Model (Kimball)
  • IV. A catastrophic collapse of investment was a
    key propagation mechanism for the Great
    Depression. (Barsky and Kimball)

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LM Curve Case
Note--Opposite Slope for a Wicksellian Rule
rby y bp p bx(x-p), where x is
the price target.
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Real Rigidity and the Dynamics of Inflation
47
The Dynamics of Inflation (?Calvo Parameter)
dp/dt - ?2 ß(y-yf)
Compare to pt pet1 ?(?r)ß(y-yf)
48
dp/dt - ?2 ß(y-yf)
(?Calvo Parameter)
49
Investment is the Key to the Determination of y
50
Cost Minimization?RK/WNa/(1-a) Thus R-d
a/(1-a) (WN/K) d Neoclassical labor
supply? WN/K Ws(N(Y,K,Z),?) N(Y,K,Z)/K where ?
is the marginal value of wealth
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dp/dt - ?2 ß(y-yf)
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LM Curve Case
Notedp/dt has opposite slope for Wicksellian
rule rby y bp p bx(x-p). Saddle path has
same slope.
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A Positive Labor Supply Shock
59
R-d a/(1-a) (Ws(N)N/K) d
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LM shifts back, then gradually out, going beyond
its initial position. If dp/dt slopes the other
way because of a Wicksellian rule instead of an
LM curve, the monetary policy rule will jump out,
then gradually shift out further.
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A Technology Shock
64
Catastrophic Collapse of Investment and the Great
Depression
  • Robert Barsky
  • Miles Kimball
  • University of Michigan and NBER

Very preliminary discussion prepared for seminar
at Michigan, April 11, 2007. Please do not
circulate.
65
Executive Summary Model
  • Study Great Depression in standard New Keynesian
    sticky price model with capital
  • Provides interesting synthesis of
  • Consensus monetary view of Depression emanating
    from Friedman and Schwartz
  • with
  • Earlier arch-Keynesian real theories based on
    collapse of investment, building cycles, floors
    and ceilings, self-fulfilling prophecies, etc.
  • Has elements of the nonlinear, catastrophe-theoret
    ic development of the latter by Hicks, Kaldor,
    Goodwin, Kalecki, Varian, etc. but
  • Money remains the driving variable
  • Model is modern, recognizable, and totally
    standard

66
Executive Summary, cont. Empirical Facts
  • Gross Investment really did collapse essentially
    to zero
  • Sharp drop in wage bill
  • Indicates sharp decline in rental rates on
    capital
  • Strongly deflationary environment with very high
    real interest rates until 1933
  • Then sharp turn towards inflation, low real rates
  • Rental rates and investment didnt show strong
    recovery until at least 1935

67
Bottom Line Explanation of Depression and
Recovery
  • Very high real rates confronted low rental rates
    on capital
  • Former due to tight money and deflation
  • Latter due both to low output and possibly high
    inherited capital stock
  • This lead to complete investment collapse,
    apparently hitting between 1931 and 1932
  • Turn toward inflation in 1933 plus depreciation
    of capital eventually reignites investment, but
    wasnt enough to do it quickly

68
Elements
  • NRR curve net rental rate on capital
  • MP curve real interest rate as function of
    output
  • Easiest case LM curve from constant elasticity
    money demand function
  • Phase diagram to endogenize inflation

69
When and Why Did Investment Leave Great
Depression Models?
  • Friedman and Schwartz
  • Persuasive
  • Highly aggregative no discussion of components
    of GNP
  • Emphasis on why money stock collapsed, not how it
    caused fall in output
  • Temin
  • Pointed out drop of gross investment to near-zero
    in 1932 but
  • Found autonomous fall in consumption, not
    investment (dont confuse impulse with
    propagation!)
  • Bernanke a partial exception
  • But emphasis is on financing, not implications of
    investment per se

70
The Net Rental Rate
  • Rental Market for Capital (no adjustment costs,
    investment smoothing)
  • Rental rate R marginal cost product of
    capital (sticky prices, demand-constrained
  • rR-d
  • NY1/?(1-a)K-a/(1-a)Z-1 (IRTS Cobb Douglas
    production function)
  • RK/WNa/(1-a) (constant cost shares )
  • WUN/UC W(N(Y,K,Z),?) (labor supply)

71
r
The Net Rental Rate Curve
  • Recall that both N and W are increasing in Y
  • Low Y ? low of Investment

NRR
Note Curve would be steeper if elasticity of
substitution between K and L were less than unity
r0
Y
Here gross investment is zero (or at some fixed
minimum)
Ymin (IImin)
72
Wage Bill
  • Capital essentially fixed over short period
  • Indicator of Net Rental Rate

73
Gross Investment Collapse
Gross Investment Collapse
74
Gross Investment Collapse Building Index and
Building Permits
75
r
Multiple Short Run Equilibria
MP
Selection Criterion Stay put unless the
equilibrium you are at disappears
NRR
r0
pe
Y
Ynatural
Ymin (IImin)
76
Depression Predisposing Factors From 1920s
  • Low inflation or deflation (Makes MP curve high)
  • Technology revolution
  • Overbuilding? (Makes NRR curve low)
    -liquidationist" viewpoint
  • Long expansionary period
  • Easy money?
  • Over-optimism about growth rates?

77
r
Unexpected Monetary Contraction
MP
NRR
r0
p
Y
Ymin (IImin)
78
r
Expected Deflation
MP
NRR
p
r0
Y
Ynatural
Ymin (IImin)
79
Hysteresis A Monetary Restoration May Not
Restore the Original Equilibrium
r
MP
NRR
r0
p
Y
Ymin (IImin)
Ynatural
80
Further, Modest Monetary or Fiscal Expansions
Provide No Escape
r
MP
Monetary Expansion Shifts MP Right or Down
Fiscal Expansion Shifts Ymin Right
NRR
r0
p
Y
Ymin (IImin)
81
An Escape by Monetary Policy Alone Can
Cause a Jump Above the Natural Level of Output
r
MP
NRR
r0
p
Y
Ynatural
Ymin (IImin)
82
The Skillful Way Out Involves a Monetary
Restoration Plus a Fiscal Expansion
r
MP
NRR
r0
p
Y
Ynatural
YminCIminG
83
Endogenizing Inflation The Phase Diagram in
the Neighborhood of the Steady State in the
Absence of an Investment Collapse
p
steady- state inflation
dx/dt 0
p0 (different positions possible)
dp/dt 0
x (real money balances)
84
The Phase Diagram with Coexisting Blue (Normal)
and Red (Depression) Dynamics Shown
p
steady- state inflation
dx/dt 0
Reignition Boundary
p0 (different positions possible)
dp/dt 0
Collapse Boundary
x (real money balances)
85
The Phase Diagram with Only the Blue (Normal)
and Red (Depression) Saddle Paths Shown
p
Assume log money follows random walk with
constant drift
steady- state inflation
dx/dt 0
Reignition Boundary
p0 (different positions possible)
dp/dt 0
Collapse Boundary
x (real money balances)
collapse values of x
86
Lessons From Phase Diagram
  • Nonlinearity
  • Need sufficiently large monetary expansion to get
    to the reignition boundary
  • Nothing happens to investment and output until
    then
  • Hysteresis
  • Dynamics depend on where you start from
  • Probably need inflationary boom to reach
    reignition region
  • Mundell and Keynes effects
  • Keynes effect will restore full-employment in
    long run
  • Low but rising inflation means Mundell will
    eventually switch from harmful to helpful

87
Using a Fiscal Expansion to Shift the Reignition
Boundary
p
  • Moves boundary to left of of p-dot0 locus
  • Avoids need for inflationary boom

steady- state inflation
dx/dt 0
p0 (different positions possible)
dp/dt 0
x (real money balances)
collapse values of x
Reignition Boundary
Collapse Boundary
88
The Power of Investment in Business Cycle Models
  • The technology-induced fluctuations in standard
    Real Business Cycle models are fundamentally
    investment booms.
  • Kimball and Ramnath With Realistic Parameters
    the Basic Real Business Cycle model Acts Like the
    Solow Growth Model
  • Basu, Fernald, Fisher and Kimball
    Sector-Specific Technology Shocks
  • Including investment dramatically changes the
    behavior of sticky-price models.
  • Barsky, House, and Kimball Durable Goods and
    Sticky-Price Models
  • III. The Neomonetarist Synthesis (Kimball)
  • IV. A catastrophic collapse of investment was a
    key propagation mechanism for the Great
    Depression. (Barsky and Kimball)
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