Training for Safety

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Training for Safety Captain Michael Varney Senior
Director Flight Crew Development AIRBUS
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TrainingDoes One Size fit All?
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IATA Training Qualification Initiative (ITQI)

• IATA Board of Governors has asked IATA to conduct
  a review of airline industry training needs for
  licensed personnel (pilots, mechanics /
  engineers) and develop recommendations for
  meeting these needs with no compromise to safety
  and quality
• December 2007

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Flight Operations Deliverables

• Review the applicability of existing regulations
• Develop global standards and best practices for
• MPL implementation
• Instructor qualification
• FSTD
• Approval criteria for training providers
• Pre-selection criteria for pilots
• Type Rating and Recurrent training
• Transition into Competency based training

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Evidence - Based TrainingMeeting the real
challenges
NO TYPE OR IMAGES CAN TOUCH THE SKY

• Why change?
• What do we mean by evidence?
• How do we manage the process?
• The outcome

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Mandatory Items(JAR-FCL)

• Flight Preparation
• Before take-off checklist
• Engine failure between V1 and V2
• Rejected take-off before reaching V1
• Instrument departure and arrival procedures
• Engine-out Precision Approach to minima
• NDB/VOR/LOC approach to MDA
• Go-Around engine-out
• Landing critical engine inoperative

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JAR-FCL Mandatory Items

• Engine
• Pressurisation
• Pitot-static
• Fuel
• Electrical
• Hydrualic
• Flight controls
• Anti ice
• Autopilot/flight director
• Stall warning system
• GPWS
• Radio navigation

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JAR-FCL Mandatory Items

• Fire Drills
• Smoke control removal
• Engine failures
• Fuel dumping
• Windshear
• Pressurisation failure
• Incapacitation
• Other emergency procedures
• ACAS event
• Steep turns
• Stalling

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The Airline BurdenCrowding of training
requirements

• Existing framework
• Mandatory items licensing and operations
• Low Visibility mandatory items
• Special airport operations
• ETOPS
• Very little scope for effective additional
  training within existing cost structure
• Too much focus on abnormal procedures
• Much more needed in approach landing

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The Problem

• Regulatory prescriptions for flight crewmember
  training and checking are based on events, which
  may be highly improbable in aeroplanes designed
  to meet modern standards. Training programmes are
  consequently saturated with items that may not
  necessarily mitigate the real risks, or enhance
  the safety of modern air transport operations.

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Objective

• Develop, evaluate and publish best industry
  practices for training and checking of aeroplane
  (pilot) flight crewmembers in modern air
  transport operations

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Evidence Based TrainingThe working group
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2nd jet generation
Includes western built jets Excludes training,
flight test, war, terrorism
1st generation
All aircraft
2nd generation
4th generation
3rd generation
Years Of Operation
Sources Airclaims, Airbus
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Relative Importance of contributing factors in
fatal accidents(Source Civil Aviation Safety
Data, 1989-2003)
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Analysis of Flight Data
Max vertical acceleration and vertical speed (at
touchdown)
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Max vertical acceleration and vertical speed (at
touchdown)
A340-300 A340-600
A340-600 has higher amount of Hi G landings
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STEADES
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Output
Accidents Incidents Flight Data LOSA
Protocol Gatekeeper Process
General Filtered
General Generation Specific Fleet
Specific Operation Specific
IATA Best Practice Referenced in ICAO Future
PANS-TRG
Sort
New TrainingHypothesis
Process Evidence Based Training
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Knowledge Skills Attitudes
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Training Construction By Flight Phase
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Data can mislead

• Should we train for the statisticallylikely?
• We can anticipate 95 ofevents
• The BIG problem is theother 5

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Black Swans

• Data is reactive
• Accidents are difficult to predict
• Pilot behaviour is difficult to predict

When people and complex systems interact, there
will always be an infinite number of possible
outcomes
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The Unforeseen If we could anticipate all,
failures should be designed out (Sioux City)
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Reactive
Proactive
Unique unforeseeable
What we dont know
Same skills to manage the foreseen and the
unforeseen
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Risk of doing nothing

• Complacency with reliable technology
• Devalued and ineffective training programmes
• Difficult designing training programmes
• No impact on Accident rates

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Benefits

• Evidence based programmes adapted by fleet and
  operation
• Greater focus on normal operations
• Greater emphasis on human performance
• Encourage out of the box thinking with
  developed methodologies to manage risk

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New paradigm for training

• Accept improvements in design reliability
• Evolve training away from inventory based
  approach
• Train the real skills to manage risk

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