LATIN AMERICA AND THE WAR ON TERROR

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LATIN AMERICA AND THE WAR ON TERROR

• Democracy and the Rise
• Of the New Left

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READING

• Smith, Talons, chs. 10-11
• Roberto Russell, U.S. Policy toward Latin
  America A View from the South (Course Reader
  9)
  

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WAR ON TERRORTHE RULES OF THE GAME

• Nations can respond however they chooseincluding
  the use of indiscriminate force.
  
• Preventive action is appropriate and acceptable.
• There is no need to adhere to international
  treaties or conventions.
  
• Alliances are formed around one central issuethe
  anti-terror campaign. Democracy and human rights
  are secondary issues.
  
• Spectator nations must tread cautiously.

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GWB AND LATIN AMERICA

• Lack of high-level attention
• Abandonment of negotiations with Mexico for
  immigration reform
  
• Overriding concern with support for
  anti-terrorist campaign (not democracy)
  
• Hubs, spokes, and FTAs
• Politicization of drug war
• Awaiting Fidels demise
• Opposition to Chávez and the Pink Tide

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GWB and Latin America Comparative and Historical
Perspective _________Latin America as P
riority___________ ______ Low _______
_______ High _____ Operational Mode for
U.S. ____ Unilateral Ad hoc Systema
tic imposition intervention
(Bush 2001-04) (Reagan
1981-89) _______ _________________ _
_________________ Intermittent, Co
nsistent, Multilateral low-level
high-level diplomacy engagemen
t (Clinton 1993-2000) (Kennedy 19
61-63) ________________________________________
____________________
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PROBLEM!

• Democracy and U.S.-Latin American relations
• The rise of the pink tide
• Context Bushs Second Inaugural Address

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THE PINK TIDE ORIGINS

• Economiclack of growth (through 2003), poverty
  and inequality, frustration with Washington
  Consensus
  
• Politicalweakness of representative
  institutions, inattention to poor, persistence of
  corruption
  
• Internationalwar in Iraq, opposition to Bush
  policies and growing distaste for American
  society
  

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THE PINK TIDE MEMBERSHIP

• Hugo Chávez, Venezuela (1998, 2004, 2006)
• Lula, Brazil (2002, 2006)
• Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández, Argentina
  (2003, 2007)
  
• Evo Morales, Bolivia (2005)
• Daniel Ortega, Nicaragua (2006)
• Rafael Correa, Ecuador (2006)
• Near-Misses
• Ollanta Humala, Peru (2006)
• Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Mexico (2006)

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CLARIFICATIONS 1

• Differentiation right/center/left
• Contending leaders in/for Latin America
• Vicente Fox (Mexico)
• Lula (Brazil)
• Hugo Chávez (Venezuela)

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CLARIFICATIONS 2

• Disenchanted masses in Latin America ?
• Voters for pink tide candidates ?
• Leftist candidates for office ?
• Leftist winners of presidential elections ?
• Pro-Chávez chief executives ?
• Hugo Chávez
• Notes
• Tidal swell is spontaneous, not organized
• Rivalries and defections

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THE PINK TIDE GOALS

• Domesticwinning power, rearranging electoral
  alignments overturning status quo, possibly
  through institutional reform changing policy
  direction
• Hemisphericgaining support throughout Latin
  America (invoking Bolivarian dream), reducing
  U.S. hegemony
  
• Globalchallenging international order, forging
  alliances with developing world and non-aligned
  nations
  

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CHALLENGING AMERICAN MYTHS

• The Cherished Assumptionfreely elected leaders
  will support U.S. policy
  
• The Western Hemisphere ideathe new world is
  distinct from old, will forge common front in
  international arena
  
• Democracy rationale for regime changefree
  elections as protective shield
  
• The hegemonic presumptionthe United States can
  dictate political life in Latin America
  

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GWB AND THE PINK TIDE

• Strategy of inoculation
• Circumvention through FTAs
• Cultivation (and cooptation?) of Lula
• The presidential tour (March 8-14)
• Carefully selected sitesBrazil, Uruguay,
  Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico
  
• Rhetoric of social concern
• Only deliverable ethanol agreement
• The Chávez counter-tour

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VISIONS FOR LATIN AMERICAGWB AND USA

• Democraticwith tilt to right or center-right
• Prosperouswith commitment to free-market
  policies and ties to United States
  
• Unifiedunder U.S. leadership
• Peacefulin view of unanimity
• Deferentialfollowing U.S. lead in global arena

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REALITY CHECK 1

• Democracy broad ideological spectrum, from
  left to right
  
• Prosperity mixed economies rejection of
  Washington Consensus, FTAs, and FTAA
  
• Ideology diversity rather than unity
• Outlooks anti-U.S. attitudes strong and growing
  among large share of population
  
• Alliances rejection of U.S. leadership and
  rules of the game
  

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REALITY CHECK 2

• Not everyone wants the same thing!

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Rank-Order Preferences for U.S. Policy
___Partners___
__Targets___ U.S. Policy (Me
xico, (Cuba, __Rivals___ ___Bystanders__
__Configuration__ _Bush II__ __Colombia)_
_ __Venezuela)__ __(Brazil?)__
___(Others)____ Low priority 1
4 2 1 4
Unilateral Low priority 2 3
1 2 2
Multilateral High priority
3 1 4 4 3
Unilateral High priority 4
2 3 3 1
Multilateral Note As presented here
, ordinal rankings mean that 1 stands for the
first-place (most preferable) choice,
2 for the second-place choice, 3 for the
third-place choice, and 4 for the fourth-place
(least preferable) choice.
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The End.