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Was It or Not? Why Has the Israeli-Palestinian
Military Security Cooperation Concept Failed? A
Personal Retrospective Outlook on a Hope without
a Prospect May 1994 September 2000 a Case Study
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SOME IMPORTANT MILE STONES
September 13 1993 Washington D.C. DOP May 4
1994 Cairo The Gaza and Jericho First
Agreement May 12 1994 Entrance of the
Palestinian security forces May 17 1994
Establishing the DCOs in the Gaza Strip and
Jericho September 28 1995 - Washington D.C. -
Oslo B Agreement and redeployment in the West
Bank including establishing of the
DCOs November 4 1995 Rabin assassination Janu
ary 20 1996 The elections for the Palestinian
Legislation Council May 1996 Elections in
Israel and a new government
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SOME IMPORTANT MILE STONES

• September 1996 The Western Wall Tunnel
  incidents
• November 1996 Hebron Agreement
• January 1997 Redeployment in Hebron
• May 1998 The first NAKBA DAY
• October 1998 Why Plantation Agreements
• November 1998 The implementation of the first
  phase redeployment in Jenin
• May 1999 Elections in Israel and a new
  government
• July 2000 The Camp-David summit
• September 2000 The Outbreak of El-Aqsa
  uprising

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The Composition of the Security Coordination
Apparatus
JSC
RSC Gaza Strip
RSC West Bank
DCO
DCO
JP
JMU
JP
JMU
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The Definitions of the Joint patrols Roles
The mission The mission of the Joint
patrols is to ensure free, unimpeded and secure
movement along the roads and in the areas
described in Articles IV and V of this Annex.
There is no extension or interpretation regarding
the terms free and unimpeded movement.
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The composition of the crews the Joint
patrols shall each be composed of two 4-wheel
drive vehicles, one Palestinian and one Israeli.
The vehicles shall be marked so as to be easily
distinguishable from all other vehicles in the
area. There will be four persons in each vehicle
an officer, a signal operator, a driver and a
guard.
There are no details concerning the officers
status and the required professional training and
there are no further instructions concerning the
role of the other members of each crew. The term
guard was chosen in order to provide a response
to the asymmetric reality of Palestinian police
vis-à-vis Israeli army. The fuzzy term created a
space of interpretation regarding the question
who can be included in this term?
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The modus operandi The Joint patrols will
patrol 24 hours a day, in vehicles and on foot,
along their routes of activity and on the
adjacent sides of the roads upon which the
security of traffic along these roads is
dependent, or as directed by the DCO. In roads
under Israeli security responsibility, the
Israeli vehicle will be the leading vehicle. In
roads under Palestinian security responsibility,
the Palestinian vehicle will be the leading
vehicle. The Joint patrol will be under the
direction of the relevant DCO. The Joint patrols
shall monitor continuously movement within their
area of operation with a view to preventing
incidents that may threaten or endanger persons
using the roads. They shall report any such
incident or threat thereof to the relevant DCO,
and to the Israeli and Palestinian district
headquarters.
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Where the incident is dealt with by the
authorities functioning in the area, the Joint
patrol shall verify that the appropriate measures
have been taken and report to the relevant DCO
accordingly. Immediately upon becoming aware of
the occurrence of one of the events listed in
subparagraph 2.e above, the Joint patrols shall
report the event to the relevant DCO, as well as
to the respective headquarters of the two
sides. On reaching the scene of an incident, the
Joint patrol will provide as much assistance as
possible.
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The articles do not interpret and clarify how the
patrols by foot will be operated. There is no
clarification regarding the relevant DCOs
directives, does it mean an agreed directive a
common Israeli-Palestinian directive? There are
no explanations or clarifications regarding the
definitions of the adjacent sides of the roads
what are they and how wide is their extent?
Under which conditions the movement security
along the roads will be influenced to the degree
that activity on foot should be taken and what
should be the characteristics of this activity?
There is no definition regarding a threatening
incident or the appropriate measures in order to
deal with the incident, what is facilitation and
when and how should it be given by the Joint
patrols?
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The Operational Principles of the Security
coordination Operating by coordination and
agreement under the frame of the security
annex. Parallel operational frames/structures in
the all levels. Living in a shared military
accommodation regarding the DCO level. The JP as
a common force in order to implement a common
mission and under shared commanding there is no
one commander for one mission. The Israeli crew
deals with the Israeli population while the
Palestinian crew deals with the Palestinian
population.
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In any case of disagreement the parties should
freeze the situation and involve the
supervising level (DCO). In the organizational
hierarchy there is a rational of softening the
conflicts.
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Four Levels of Analysis
The Personal Level
The Organizational Level
The Cultural Level
The Political Level
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The Main Problems and Obstacles Regarding the JP
Activity Different languages, cultures,
behavioral codes and organizational
culture. Hate, hostility, alienation and
negative historical influences because of the
protracted conflict. Absence of professional
training and common training to the common
mission force. Contradictory interests and very
few common interests. Cooperation with the IDF
was perceived by the local population as
collaboration with the adversarys interests.
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• Disagreements in the political level clearly
  project on the field level.
• Avoiding concessions or compromises because of
  fear of perpetuating the current situation in the
  reality of negotiating the forthcoming
  agreements.
• Intensive friction between the populations along
  side intensive friction between the IDF and the
  Palestinian population because of the field
  characteristics and the agreement map
  restrictions.
• Fuzzy formulation of the agreement so there is
  place for more than one interpretation.
• The centrality of the conspiracy approach among
  the Palestinian security leadership regarding the
  Israeli policy and intentions.

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Political indoctrination among the Palestinian
security forces. A military mission which
requires semi-diplomatic skills. Absence of
relevant conceptualizing systems The dynamic
and changing reality which in the security
apparatus operated, obligated a permanent
conceptualization system in order to reframe the
reality. Absence of a method for developing
cooperation The security apparatus operated
without drawing lessons, documentation and
learning in the required and sufficient
professional standards.
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• Weakening of the authority source The
  agreements declare that the supreme authority
  source regarding the general operation of the
  Joint patrols and the security coordination in
  should be the JSC.
• The perpetuation of the asymmetric reality of
  conqueror and conquered - The Joint patrols had
  become an Israeli interest in the eyes of the
  Palestinian population as well as in the eyes of
  the Palestinians security personnel.
• No classification of the DCOs and the Joint
  patrols personnel Most of the personnel were
  infected by prejudices and stereotypes that
  blocked the ability and the possibility to absorb
  new information and prevented the opportunity to
  correct ideas as well as behavior toward the
  other.

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About Coordination and Cooperation and what is
Between
Coordination Activity of two parties or more
based on mutual reporting. There is no need for
common interests or common goals. The activity of
each side does not require the agreement of the
other sides.
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Cooperation Activity of two parties or more
who share some interests and act on the base of
coordination and agreement in order to implement
goals that fulfill interests of all the parties.
The activity can be done together or alone but it
requires and obligates the agreement of the other
sides. Cooperation is the highest level of
operational interaction among parties.
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Cooperation generates processes of changing
attitudes, undermines the fixation of the
object, develops another organizational culture
and it is a correcting experience which enables
shaping an alternative reality.
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About Security Cooperation and Visibility
The military cooperation level
Visibility level
The intelligence cooperation level
Security cooperation level
The intelligence cooperation is an unseen
(covert) activity regarding the population and
under such conditions it seems to be easier
(especially for the Palestinians) to cooperate.
The military activity is an uncovered activity
and perceived by the Palestinian population as
collaboration.
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Issues and questions for further discussion in
the future sessions The case description and its
analysis evoke some significant topics and
questions The apparatus subordination and its
organizational belonging Should it be a
military apparatus? What are the organizational
and the cultural aspects that should be taken in
account? Should the apparatus be limited to
military security coordination only? Will it be
reasonable to design a wider apparatus with more
authorities and resources that will be able to
balance the different aspects regarding any
agreement?
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Classification and training. Who is going to
train the parties and who is going to train the
trainers? What shall be considered common and
supper ordinate goals and how to create such
goals? How to produce and to shape public
support and public legitimacy to security
cooperation? What should be the characteristics
of the Third Party? Should it head the security
apparatus? Who is going to verify the breaches
should it be the Third Party by itself or
cooperating with the parties?
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Some possible recommendations regarding
establishing security coordination apparatus To
consider establishing an independent apparatus
that will be defined and separated from the army
(in the sense that it will not belong to the
army), but its authority will be recognized by
the army. It is essential to ensure that in any
future apparatus that will be established there
will be an headquarters composed of an equal
number of Israelis and Palestinians and the
division of the functions and responsibilities
will enable a balance of powers and influence.
One of the possibilities to reach such a balance
is by using the mechanism of rotation in
functions between Israelis and Palestinians an
Israeli commander and a Palestinian deputy in one
scope and vice versa in another scope and after a
period there will be an exchange of duties.
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There will be a clear definition of the authority
and responsibility scopes of the apparatus. A
special and detailed article in the agreement
will dictate in detail the procedures and the
mechanisms of dispute resolution, monitoring,
verification and compliance, as well as the
standards and criteria for action evaluation.
The authorities of the Third Party must be
defined clearly and in detail. There will be a
classification process based on acceptable and
professional criteria with the help of
professionals from the disciplines of conflict
resolution and social psychology, in order to
select the most suitable personnel from both
sides.
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The classification process will be permanent and
will be continued during the operating period in
order to enable the parties to remove negative,
problematic and unsuitable personnel from the
apparatus. All the training process as well as
the operational process will be documented by the
parties according to agreed criteria and
principles. The permanent documentation will
enable the parties to perform common
investigations and inquiries, action evaluation,
learning and reporting.
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