Paul B. Hartzog

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Paul B. Hartzog

• PaulBHartzog_at_panarchy.com
• http//www.panarchy.com

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Institutions for Collective Action

• Commons
• Dilemmas
• Solutions

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Commons

• Rivalrousness degree to which one persons uses
  diminishes others use (subtractability).
• Excludability the difficulty of excluding
  others from using the resource

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Rivalrousness/Excludability
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Commons

• Common pool resources are rivalrous resources
  managed under a property regime in which a
  legally defined user pool cannot be efficiently
  excluded from the resource domain.

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Excludability

• In most situations, excludability is a human
  artifact rather than an unalterable natural
  condition (Oran Young).
• Non-human user pools (whales, etc.) exist.
  Laws, licenses, etc. do not apply.
• Definition of efficient we could all wear
  gas-masks with air meters i.e. pay2breathe
• Moral boundary Internet technology is a part of
  the global commons (Tokyo Declaration on Global
  Commons).

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Rivalrousness

• The Internet Paper is rival, bits are not,
  unless they are forced to be.

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Technology

• Rival into non-rival spectrum
• Non-rival into rival intellectual property
• Excludable into non-excludable Internet
• Non-excludable into excludable fences, DRM

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First-order Dilemmas

• Tragedy of the Commons
• Logic of Collective Action
• Prisoners Dilemma

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Tragedy of the Commons

• Free-rider problem
• Open-access v. shared resource
• Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons

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Logic of Collective Action

• "Unless the number of individuals in a group is
  quite small, or unless there is coercion or some
  other special device to make individuals act in
  their common interest, rational, self-interested
  individuals will not act to achieve their common
  or group interests" (Mancur Olson).

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Governing the Commons

• Prisoners Dilemma

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Second-order Dilemma

• The perceived cost of solving a collective action
  dilemma can prevent those trapped in it from
  making a move to escape.
• The inability of participants to change the
  structure may or may not be an empirical reality.
• Reclaiming the narrative of the commons (David
  Bollier)

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Institutions for Collective Action

• Institutions are the shared concepts used by
  humans in repetitive situations organized by
  rules, norms, and strategies (Ostrom).

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Approaches

• Res nullius (open)
• Res communes (group)
• Res publica (government)
• Res privatae (private)

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Successful Approaches

• What one can observe in the world, however, is
  that neither the state nor the market is
  uniformly successful in enabling individuals to
  sustain long-term, productive use of natural
  resource systems. Further, communities of
  individuals have relied on institutions
  resembling neither the state nor the market to
  govern some resource systems with reasonable
  degrees of success over long periods of time
  (Ostrom).
• Cooperation is an alternative res communes, not
  res nullius

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Successful Institutions

• "all efforts to organize collective action,
  whether by an external ruler, an entrepreneur, or
  a set of principals who wish to gain collective
  benefits, must address a common set of problems"
  (Ostrom).
• "coping with free-riding, solving commitment
  problems, arranging for the supply of new
  institutions, and monitoring individual
  compliance with sets of rules" (Ostrom).

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Design Principles (Ostrom)

• Group boundaries are clearly defined.
• Rules governing the use of collective goods are
  well matched to local needs and conditions.
• Most individuals affected by these rules can
  participate in modifying the rules.
• The rights of community members to devise their
  own rules is respected by external authorities.
• A system for monitoring member's behavior exists
  the community members themselves undertake this
  monitoring.
• A graduated system of sanctions is used.
• Community members have access to low-cost
  conflict resolution mechanisms.

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Conclusion

• Commons management is possible by cooperation
• Consider If its so easy, i.e. if we know how
  to design effective institutions, then why do we
  see so many failures?