The European Parliament III

1
The European Parliament III

• Roles and Responsibilities

2
Budgetary Powers

• Hague Summit EP given restricted power.
• EP and the Council become the ECs joint
  budgetary authority, sharing responsibility for
  EC spending but not for raising revenue
  (Commission).

3
Budgetary Powers

• Compulsory expenditures resulting from the
  treaties of from acts adopted in accordance with
  them
• Agricultural price supports
• Various items connected with agricultural and
  fisheries (development) policy
• Flat-rate refunds to the member states, such as
  cost incurred in collecting their own resources
• Part of development aid (although most EU
  development assistance comes from a separate
  budget financed directly by the member states)

4
Budgetary Powers

• Non-compulsory expenditure all other
  expenditures, (structural funds, to promote
  social and economic cohesion). Has increased from
  about 8 percent of the budget in the 1970s to
  about 55 percent in 2004 (excludes the CAP, which
  accounts for most of the rest).
• The EP may only propose modifications to
  compulsory expenditure but may amend
  noncompulsory expenditure. The Constitutional
  treaty does away with the distinction between
  non-compulsory and compulsory and gives the EP
  the final word on the budget as a whole.

5
Budgetary Powers

• Since the early 1970s EP has used its budgetary
  authority to raise its political profile and
  enhance its institutional standing.
• Constrained by the relatively small size of the
  EU budget.
• Almost all public spending and social transfers
  are controlled by the member states and their
  parliaments.
• EU spends less than 2 of the GDP of the whole EU
  area, in contrast EU member states spend on
  average 55 of their GDP on public spending.

6
Legislative Powers

• Initially its legislative powers were limited to
  the consultation procedure right to submit a
  non-binding opinion before the Council adopted a
  Commission proposal.
• Power of legislative delay confirmed
  (inadvertently) by the ECJ in Isoglucose ruling
  (Council has to wait for EP opinion) in 1979.
  This gave the EP an important "bargaining tool"
  to force concessions from Commission and Council
  but only in urgent matters (limited value).
• This procedure is now mainly used for
  agricultural policy and police and justice
  co-operation.

7
Legislative Powers

• The Assent procedure
• Introduced by the SEA (1986) requires the Council
  to obtain the EP's assent before certain
  important decisions are taken. Parliament may
  accept or reject a proposal but cannot amend it.
  If Parliament does not give its assent, the act
  in question cannot be adopted.
• Applies to accession of new Member States,
  association agreements and other fundamental
  agreements with third countries, and the
  appointment of the President of the Commission.
  TEU extends it to citizenship issues, the
  specific tasks of the European Central Bank
  (ECB), amendments to the Statutes of the European
  System of Central Banks and the ECB, the
  Structural and Cohesion Funds, and the uniform
  procedure for elections to the European
  Parliament.
• Treaty of Amsterdam assent also required for
  sanctions imposed on a Member State for a serious
  and persistent breach of fundamental rights.
• Constitutional treaty assent procedure under the
  heading of "special legislative procedures".
  Assent to be renamed into "approval procedure."

8
Legislative Powers

• The Cooperation procedure
• Introduced by the SEA. Always initiated by a
  proposal from the Commission forwarded to the
  Council and the EP. First reading Parliament
  issues an opinion on the Commission proposal. The
  Council (QMV), draws up a common position, which
  is forwarded to Parliament.
• Parliament examines this common position at
  second reading, and within three months may
  adopt, amend or reject the common position
  (absolute majority of its members). If it rejects
  the proposal, unanimity is required for the
  Council to act on a second reading.

9
Legislative Powers

• The Commission then re-examines, within one
  month, the proposal upon which the Council based
  its common position and forwards its proposal to
  the Council at its discretion it can include or
  exclude the amendments proposed by Parliament.
• Within three months, the Council may adopt the
  re-examined proposal by qualified majority, amend
  it unanimously or adopt the amendments not taken
  into consideration by the Commission, also
  unanimously.
• In the cooperation procedure, the Council may
  still exercise a veto by refusing to express its
  opinion on the amendments proposed by the
  European Parliament or on the amended proposal
  from the Commission, thereby blocking the
  legislative procedure.
• The treaty of Amsterdam practically eliminated
  this procedure (only EMU), and the Constitutional
  Treaty abolished it and replaced it either by an
  ordinary legislative procedure (codecision
  procedure) or by non-legislative acts of the
  Council.

10
Legislative Powers

• The Codecision procedure
• Introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht
  (codecision I). Cives the EP the power to adopt
  instruments jointly with the Council free
  movement of workers, right of establishment,
  services, the internal market, education, health,
  consumer policy, trans-European networks
  (guidelines), environment, culture and research.
• Codecision I was an extension of the cooperation
  procedure. Under this procedure after the second
  round, if the Council is unwilling to accept EP
  amendments, it has to refer the matter to a
  Conciliation Committee (composed of an equal
  number of Council and EP representatives, 15
  each).
• If the Conciliation Committee cannot agree on a
  common solution that was supported by a majority
  of the EP and a qualified majority of the
  Council, a unanimous Council could offer the EP a
  final proposal, which becomes law unless an
  absolute majority of all MEPs vetoed it.

11
Legislative Powers

• Treaty of Amsterdam simplified the codecision
  procedure (Codecision II). If the EP and the
  Council continue to disagree in the Conciliation
  Committee, a unanimous Council can no longer
  offer its position as a take it or leave it
  proposal. Instead new legislation is simply not
  passed (extended to new areas, from 15 to 38,
  such as social exclusion, public health and the
  fight against fraud affecting the European
  Community's financial interests).
• The Treaty of Nice (2001), extended the issue
  areas from 38 to 43. Among others
  discrimination, judicial cooperation in civil
  matters, the statute for European political
  parties and measures relating to visas, asylum
  and immigration. Also it established the
  codecision procedure for any policy area where
  the Council of Ministers adopts proposals by
  qualified majority voting (rather than
  unanimity).
• Under the Constitutional Treaty, procedure will
  be extended so that it becomes the "ordinary
  legislative procedure".

12
Scrutiny and Supervision

• Until Maastricht EP powers over the commission
  were purely negative
• Maastricht Treaty stipulated that the EP must
  approve the president and the Commission as a
  body, before they get appointed by the Council
  with a QMV, and formalized the convening of
  temporary committees of inquiry, at request of
  one quarter of the EPs members.

13
Scrutiny and Supervision

• Other tools
• The right of citizens to petition the EP, on
  matters related to Community law directly
  affecting the citizen.
• The office of the ombudsman, appointed by the EP
  and empowered to receive complaints from any
  citizen concerning instances of maladministration
  in the activities of the Communitys institutions
  or bodies.

14
External Relations

• For actions in the second and third pillars, the
  European Parliament plays a small role. But EU
  budget.
• Also plays a decisive role when it comes to EU
  enlargement and association with third countries
  through the assent procedure.
• If the Constitutional Treaty had been ratified by
  all member states, it would have abolished the
  pillar structure, bringing all EU activity
  under the umbrella of the European Union.

15
Questions

• Does the EU suffer from a Democracy deficit, and
  how would it be resolved by extending the powers
  of the EP, how/ why or why not?
• Is the EP a parliament in the traditional sense,
  if not then what is it?
• In what way does the EP enhance political
  accountability and legitimacy in the EU?