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LectureSeminar
Migration, Integration, and Ethnic Conflicts
Hartmut Esser University of Mannheim Fakulty of
Social Sciences Mannheim Centre for European
Social Research April/May 2006
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Program
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1. Migration
2. Integration Basic Concepts and Debates
3. Acculturation The Case of Language
4. Education and Labor Market
5. A General Model of (Intergenerational)
Integration
6. Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts
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Lection 6
Ethnic Conflicts and Ethnic Movements
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Lection 6 Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts
1. Ethnicity and Conflicts
2. The Basic Problem Ethnic Organization
3. Two Mechanisms
4. A General Model of Ethnic Movements
5. An Outlook
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Lection 6 Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts
1. Ethnicity and Conflicts
2. The Basic Problem Ethnic Organization
3. Two Mechanisms
4. A General Model of Ethnic Movements
5. An Outlook
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What Means Ethnicity?
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What Means Ethnicity?
Max Weber subjective belief in common anchestry
Characteristic(s) of Ethnic Groups

• Boundaries
• Communality (Gemeinschaft)

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Boundaries
visibility, markers, symbols
kind of marker is arbitrary skin color,
fashion, hair, life style, habits, culture
ascriptive no easy change high
transaction costs between groups
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Communality (Gemeinschaft)
ingroup-outgroup differentiation social distances
feelings of moral obligations, affection and
solidarity
common language
shared mental models (including narratives and
legitimations)
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Difference to other Collectivities
Aggregates more than a common trait only
(relations intramarriage)
Classes more than interests (feelings
and identity)
Castes castes are special cases of
ethnic groups (religious legitimation
of boundaries)
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How to Explain Ethnicity?
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Three Approaches

• primordial
• reactive
• constructivistic

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primordial
ethnic groups have a natural basis
common gene-pool and binary instinct
(Sociobiology) inherited cultural traditions
(History and Sociology)
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reactive
ethnic groups are arational reaction to a
common fate
kinds of common interests
rights and recognition regional
disparities sub-nationalism centre-periphery labo
r market differentiations
but especially defense of specific (human)
capital (language, cultural skills,
institutions)
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constructivistic
ethnicity is nothing but a construction, mainly
of interested elites (eg in connection with
nation building)
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A plausible integrative view on the whole we
are nepotists and when we are not, it is for some
good reason. One cannot create an instant
ethny by creating a myth. The myth has to be
rooted in historical reality to be accepted.
Ethnicity can be manipulated but not
manifactured. Unless ethnicity is rooted in
generations of shared experience, it cannot be
created ex nihilo. (Pierre van den Berghe)
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The problem
Modelling the interaction of structural and
cultural elements in orientations and actions
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Debates
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Clash of Cultures (or what else)?
Ethnicity and modern society?
How to deal with theoretically? (the old debate
on ethnographic descriptions and/or analytical
explanations)
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Conflicts
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In general
Ethnic inequality and ethnic differentiations can
be/are the core of (ethnic) conflicts and
movements
Main driving force
Control/loss/transferability/de- and
re-evaluation of ethnic capital, which has its
value under specific institutional and cultural
conditions only
language, education, habits, life style,
networks, institutions, traditions, convictions,
emotions, values
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A simple sketch of the problem
depends on the constitition of a society
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Constellation 1 no difference by ethnicity
gain
ethnic capital
loss
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constellation 1 no difference in the value of
(ethnic) capital
constitution
A B
4, 4
A
coordination only
constitution
4, 4
B
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Constellation 2 partial loss
gain
ethnic capital
loss
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constellation 2 partial loss and moderate
conflict
constitution
A B
A
partial conflict
constitution
B
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Constellation 3 complete loss and stigmatization
gain
ethnic capital
racism
loss
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Constellation 3 complete loss and fundamental
conflict
constitution
A B
A
fundametal conflict
constitution
B
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the three situations of possible losses
gain
ethnic capital
loss
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Variants of Ethnic Conflicts
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Three variants
Social distances stereotypes, boundaries,
dsicrimination
Ethnic violence youth gangs, spontaeous riots,
Ethnic movements separatism, civic war,
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First hypothesis
losses in specific capital constitute the main
incentive to participate, especially to organize
an (ethnic) conflict movement
problem mobilization as collective good-dilemma
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Lection 6 Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts
1. Ethnicity and Conflicts
2. The Basic Problem Ethnic Organization
3. Two Mechanisms
4. A General Model of Ethnic Movements
5. An Outlook
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First hypothesis (again)
losses in specific capital constitute the main
incentive to participate, especially to organize
an (ethnic) conflict movement
problem ethnic organization and mobilization as
social dilemma and collective good-problem
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collective movement as social dilemma (1)
no mobilization
mobilization
3, .
mobilization
no mobilization
4, .
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collective movement as social dilemma (1)
no mobilization
mobilization
3, .
mobilization
1, .
no mobilization
2, .
4, .
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collective movement as social dilemma (1)
no mobilization
mobilization
3, .
mobilization
1, .
no mobilization
2, .
4, .
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collective movement as social dilemma (1)
no mobilization
mobilization
3, .
mobilization
1, .
no mobilization
2, .
4, .
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collective movement as social dilemma (1)
no mobilization
mobilization
3, 3
mobilization
1, 4
despite of common intererest nobody participates
no mobilization
2, 2
4, 1
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Ethnic movement as a social dilemma (2)
N-Person-Game
expected gain
the gap remains always
collective good gain
0
100 Participants
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Solution(s)
Selective incentives individual rewards
Reference group rewards social recognition
Triggering of programs and emotions Collective
Identity
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Ethnic movement as a social dilemma (2)
expected gain
the gap remains always
collective good gain
0
100 Participants
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Ethnic movement as a social dilemma (2)
expected gain
the gap remains always
collective good gain
0
100 Participants
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Second Hypothesis
it is the specific combination of interests,
opportunities and identity in ethnic groups,
which helps to overcome this problem
because
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Three peculiarities of ethnic groups
interests losses of specific capital are very
strong motivators for the individuals already
opportunities ethnic organizations, communities
and networks serve as (relatively) cheap
instruments for ressource mobilization
additionally selective incentives and
reference group rewards by ethnic networks and
culture
identities mental models of a boundary
function as frames for defining the situation
as collective conflict and for the activation
of emotions
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Three specific questions
What drives all these selections?
How interact interests, opportunities and
identities?
Are there typical processes and collective
outcomes?
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Lection 6 Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts
1. Ethnicity and Conflicts
2. The Basic Problem Ethnic Organization
3. Two Mechanisms
4. A General Model of Ethnic Movements
5. An Outlook
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Two basic mechanisms
Investment rational action to overcome
the problem of capital loss
Framing activation of mental models of
orientation, emotions and
action programs
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Investment
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Investment
Main goals
Economic success/Social recognition
positions, income, influence
Precondition(s)
Qualifications/Human capital
Problem(s)

• Control/Loss/Transferabality of
• relevant human capital

• (Ethnic) Stigmatization and
• Discrimination

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Options
Status quo Investment in improvement
three Variants of Investment
Investments in RC capital assimilation
Investments with EG capital ethnic
entrepreneurship/transnational relations
Investments in re-evaluation of EG
capital ethnic organization/ethnic movement
ethnic conflict!
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Components
Gain status quo U(sq)
Gain investment U(in)
Probability of success p
Costs C
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Gain status quo gains from the
alternatives to conflict (assimilation,
living in the colony, ethnic
enterprise)
Gain investment success of ethnic
movement
Probability of success ethnic
institutions/networks/solidarity
Costs mobilization costs, losses in
case of failure
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EU-weights of the alternatives
EU(sq) U(sq)
no investment
EU(in) pU(in) (1-p)U(sq) - C
investment
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Investment if
EU(in) gt EU(sq)
pU(in) (1-p)U(sq) C gt U(sq)

U(in) U(sq) gt C/p
Motivation gt
Costs/Opportunities
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A graphical illustration
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U(in) U(sq) gains
Motivation
Costs
C
Opportunities
p
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U(in) U(sq) gains
C/p
Motivation
Costs low
C
Opportunities high
p
p
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U(in) U(sq) gains
C/p
Motivation
Costs high
C
Opportunities high
p
p
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U(in) U(sq) gains
C/p
Motivation
Costs high
C
Opportunities high
p
p
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U(in) U(sq) gains
Motivation low
Costs
C
Opportunities
p
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U(in) U(sq) gains
Motivation increases
Costs
C
Opportunities
p
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Elites Political Entrepreneurs
U(in) U(sq) gains
C/p
Motivation high
Costs
C
Opportunities
p
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U(in) U(sq) gains
C/p
Motivation very high
Costs
C
Opportunities
p
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U(in) U(sq) gains
C/p
Motivation very high
Costs decrease
C
Opportunities
p
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U(in) U(sq) gains
Motivation very high
Costs decrease
C
Opportunities
p
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U(in) U(sq) gains
Motivation very high
Costs decrease
C
Opportunities
p
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the main problem because ethnic movements are
special cases of collective good
problems, (RC-)investment-theory is not
enough
remember !
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Ethnic movement as a social dilemma (2)
expected gain
the gap remains always
collective good gain
0
100
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What would help?
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Ethnic movement as a social dilemma (2)
expected gain
collective good gain
0
100
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Ethnic movement as a social dilemma (2)
expected gain
collective good gain
0
100
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Ethnic movement as a social dilemma (2)
expected gain
ethnic framing
collective good gain
0
100
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Ethnic framing
automatic activation of a program, including
cognitions, emotions and behavior
main consequence rational fears and risks
become irrelevant
main mechanism match of significant objects
(symbols) with accessible mental
models
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Framing
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An empirical example
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Intentions, grades and educational aspirations
(OLS)
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intention Abitur!
2
0
-2
-4
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conditions for switch
categorisation
matchaccessibility
motivation costs of a wrong
decision
opportunities time pressure (eg)
effort reflection
costs
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situational object
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and the theoretical analysis of
conflict-investments
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high costs/ low opportunites
U(in) U(sq) gains
C/p
no participation
Motivation
Costs
C
Opportunities
p
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Framing effect 1 Ignorance of costs
U(in) U(sq) gains
C/p
Motivation
Costs
C
Opportunities
p
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Framing effect 1 Ignorance of costs
U(in) U(sq) gains
C/p
Motivation
Costs
C
Opportunities
p
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Framing effect 2 Ignorance of
opportunities
U(in) U(sq) gains
C/p
Motivation
Costs
C
Opportunities
p
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Framing effect 2 Ignorance of
opportunities
U(in) U(sq) gains
C/p
Motivation
Costs
C
Opportunities
p
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Some Details to Model of Frame-Selection (MFS)
interests, opportunities and costs play a central
role, but symbols, culture and emotions, too
rational reasons become important, if there are
mis-matches of ethnic framing and motivations
and opportunities to think of consequences
mis-matches weak accessibility, individual
variations, inconsistent reactions (for
instance)
formal version of dual-process-theory (Fiske,
Fazio et.al.)
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Lection 6 Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts
1. Ethnicity and Conflicts
2. The Basic Problem Ethnic Organization
3. Two Mechanisms
4. A General Model of Ethnic Movements
5. An Outlook
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The Problem
Ethnic conflicts are collective actions and
processes, which sometimes evolve against all
interests
Therefore now a short sketch of some typical
stages in the evolvement of ethnic conflicts
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Four stages (and one intermediate condition)1.
Structural Conflict 2. Mobilization 3.
DiffusionEscalation 4. Decline
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Structural Conflict
structural conflict feared/perceived losses in
specific capital
objective structural background ethnic
stratification
and a certain frustration by relative
deprivation
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Structural Conflict
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Mobilization
Problem mobilization
Structural conflicts produce latent cleavages,
but not necessarily a movement
ethnic organizations and ethnicity as (otherwise
emerged) byproducts of ethnic differentiations
serve to overcome the collective-good-problem
Consequence mobilization not impossible/probable,
especially for (frustrated) elites
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Structural Conflict
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Structural Conflict
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Structural Conflict
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Diffusion Escalation
Problem Involvement of other groups and
non-elites
one mechanism diffusion by infection by
others participation (threshold-models)
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100 proportion of participants
individual thresholds
100
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100 proportion of participants
individual thresholds
100
100
100 proportion of participants
individual thresholds
100
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100 proportion of participants
individual thresholds
100
102
100 proportion of participants
individual thresholds
100
103
100 proportion of participants
no mobilization at all
individual thresholds
100
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Changes
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increase of incentives
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Framing
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Framing
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Structural Conflict
Mobilization
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De-Escalation
What stops the vicious circle?
Problem De-escalation as (new)
collective-good-problem
stop the conflict vs continue

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Remember Prisoners Dilemma
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Two answers
1. Endogenous
2. Exogeneous
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1. Endogenous fear for joint destruction
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Prisoners Dilemma (again)
stop
continue
3, 3
stop
1, 4
2, 2
continue
4, 1
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Prisoners Dilemma (again)
Chicken game
stop
continue
3, 3
stop
1, 4
2, 2
continue
4, 1
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Prisoners Dilemma (again)
Chicken game
stop
continue
3, 3
stop
1, 4
2, 2
continue
4, 1
One-sided retention possible
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Prisoners Dilemma (again)
Chicken game
stop
continue
3, 3
stop
1, 4
2, 2
continue
4, 1
... because both try to avoid the worst case
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2. Exogeneous common interests (eg a common
enemy)
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Again Prisoners Dilemma
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Change
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Situation 1 trust
3, .
121
Situation 1 trust
Cooperation pays
4, .
3, .
122
Situation 2 mistrust
., 3
. , 2
123
Assurance Game
stop
continue
4, 4
1, 3
2, 2
3, 1
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Two other exits
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Case 1 convergence of interests
Combination of Chicken and Assurance Game
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Case 2 Cooperative Framing
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Case 2 Cooperative Framing
other alternatives are ignored
128
Structural Conflict
Mobilization
DiffusionEscalation
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A (last) methodological note
That is not a necessary sequence, but a
structural model of some typical problems and
idealized sequences
There can never be a general theory of ethnic
conflicts, which contains all possibilities in
one model
But we have a tool-kit of different theoretical
instruments, which can be used (in flexible, but
well founded) combinations to analyze the
empirical processes
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Lection 6 Migration and Integration 5 Ethnic
Conflicts
1. Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts
2. The Basic Problem Ethnic Organization
3. Two Mechanisms
4. The Dynamics of Ethnic Movements
5. An Outlook
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Will ethnic stratifications, ethnic
fragmentations, ethnic Neo-Feudalism and ethnic
conflicts prevail in the course of globalization?
Or will they disappear as a consequence of the
increasing functional differentiation and
integration of the world society, and all ethnic
differences change to cultural diversity as
special kind of individual life styles in a
modernized world society?
One early answer
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Constant revolutionizing of production,
uninterrupted disturbance of all social
conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation
distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier
ones. All fixed, fast frozen relations, with
their train of ancient and venerable prejudices
and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones
become antiquated before they can ossify. All
that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is
profaned, and man is at last compelled to face
with sober senses his real condition of life and
his relations with his kind. In place of the
old local and national seclusion and
self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every
direction, universal inter-dependence of nations.
. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness
become more and more impossible .
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist
Manifesto, 1848