5: Philosophy of Mind: The MindBody Problem

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5 Philosophy of Mind The Mind-Body Problem

• Outline
• What is Philosophy of Mind?
• What is the Mind-Body problem?
• Major positions
• Dualism
• Philosophical Behaviourism
• Reductive Materialism
• Functionalism
• Eliminative Materialism
• Theories of the Nature of Mind
• Folk Psychology
• Eliminative Materialism
• The Intentional Stance

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Philosophy of Mind

• Several areas of enquiry, including
• Ontology
• What exists? What is its essential nature?
• Mind-body problem
• Semantics
• Where does meaning come from?
• Epistemology
• What is knowledge and where does it come from?
• The problem of other minds
• Consciousness

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The Mind-Body Problem

• What is the nature of mental states/ processes?
• How are they related to the physical world?
• Does mind/self/consciousness live on after death?
• Can a computer be conscious?
• 2 basic positions
• Dualism
• Materialism

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Dualism

• Mind is nonphysical
• Mind and body are separate and distinct
• Types of dualism
• Cartesian dualism
• Interactive dualism
• Epiphenomenalism
• Arguments for
• Religion
• Introspection
• Irreducibility

• Arguments against
• Parsimony
• Explanatory Power
• Neural Dependence
• Evolution

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Philosophical Behaviourism

• Reaction against Dualism
• Mental states descriptions of patterns of
  behaviour
• A mental state is equivalent to a set of
  potential behaviours
• Susie wants a kitten
• Behaviours
• Talking about kittens
• Looking at kittens in pet shops
• Accepting a kitten, if offered

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Criticisms of Philosophical Behaviourism

• Ignores inner mental life
• e.g. Pain has a qualitative nature
• Problem of describing mental states in terms of
  conditions
• Long (infinite?) list of conditions
• Conditions may not always be appropriate

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Reductive Materialism

• Also Identity Theory
• Mental States are physical brain states
• Arguments in favour
• People are physical objects
• Every other animal is a physical object
• Mental phenomena have neural dependence
• Success of neuroscience

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Criticisms of Reductive Materialism

• Introspection yields thoughts, sensations,
  emotions
• Cannot have identicality of the mental and
  physical
• What is the physical location of the belief that
  x
• Brain states dont have meaning
• What Mary Didnt Know (Jackson, 1986)
• Psychologist/Neuroscientist knows all about
  colour perception, but has never seen colours
• What is it like to have a sensation-of-colour?

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Functionalism

• Mental states have causal relations to
• Environmental effects on body
• Other types of mental states
• Bodily behaviour
• e.g. pain
• Results from trauma
• Causes other mental states
• Distress, annoyance
• Causes bodily behaviour
• Facial expressions, nursing of damaged area
• Any state that has this function is pain

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Criticisms of Functionalism

• Sensory qualia
• Functionalism ignores qualitative nature of
  internal states (e.g. qualitative nature of
  pain)
• Spectrum-inversion argument
• Tomato is seen by 2 observers as green and
  red
• Functionally identical
• sensation of green is identical to sensation
  of red
• Response
• sensation of red may be different for different
  people, but is still caused by red objects
• Chinese Room

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Folk Psychology

• Also Commonsense Psychology
• We discuss mind and behaviour in terms of
• Attitudes
• Beliefs, desires
• Propositions
• it is raining
• Representational Theory of Mind (Fodor, 1987)
• Propositional attitudes are related to internal
  representations
• Mental processes are causal processes involving
  transitions between internal representations

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Criticisms of Folk Psychology

• Q. Do these inner states exist?
• A. No (Churchland 1981)
• FP is quasiscientific
• FP cannot explain
• Sleep
• Memory
• Creativity
• Mental illness
• All other folk theories have been demolished
• Doesnt fit in with our scientific picture of
  ourselves (neuroscience, physics)

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Eliminative Materialism

• FP framework is false radically misleading
• Historical parallels
• Caloric fluid
• Phlogiston
• Crystal spheres
• Witches / Demonic possession
• Replace FP with explanation of behaviour that
  appeals to
• Neuropharmacological states
• Neural activity in specialised anatomical areas

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Criticisms of Eliminative Materialism

• Intuitively implausible
• Introspection reveals existence of pain, beliefs
  etc.
• Answer Not a problem, just a different
  conceptual framework

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Dennetts (1987) Intentional Stance

• Instead of looking at cognitive organisation
  (whether internal representations or
  neuroscientific description), we should look at
  behaviour patterns.
• Talking about beliefs and desires adopting the
  Intentional Stance
• Intentional System
• a system whose behaviour is reliably and
  voluminously predictable via the intentional
  strategy

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Learning Outcomes

• Understand the mind-body problem
• Demonstrate an understanding of the major
  positions on the mind-body issue
• Demonstrate an understanding of the strengths and
  weaknesses of each of these positions
• Understand what is meant by folk psychology
• Show an awareness of the debate regarding the
  truth of folk-psychological explanations of mind

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Reading

• For next week, read
• Nagel, T. (1981). What is it like to be a bat? In
  D. R. Hofstadter D. C. Dennett (Eds.), The
  minds I. London Penguin.
• Further Reading
• See lecture webpage or .pdf handout
• Glossary of useful terms
• See lecture webpage or .pdf handout