Monitoring of Radiologically Contaminated Scrap Metal Czech experience

1
Monitoring of Radiologically Contaminated Scrap
Metal Czech experience

• Milan Hort
• State Office for Nuclear Safety Czech republic

UNECE Group of Experts on Monitoring of
Radiologically Contaminated Scrap Metal Geneva,
5-7 April 2004
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Regulatory infrastructure

• State Office for Nuclear Safety (SÚJB)
• The authority and responsibilities of the SÚJB
  include state supervision of
• nuclear safety
• nuclear items, physical protection of nuclear
  facilities
• radiation protection and emergency preparedness
  of nuclear facilities and workplaces handling
  ionizing radiation sources

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Regulatory infrastructure (2)

• Act No.18/1997 (Atomic Act), revised by Act No.
  13/2002
• and implementing decrees
• No. 307/2002 on radiation protection
• No. 146/1997 on special professional competency
• No. 317/2002 on type approval and transport
• No. 319/2002 on radiation monitoring network
• www.sujb.cz

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Regulatory infrastructure (3)

• Czech legislation
• based on ICRP, IAEA recommendations
• fully harmonized with relevant EU legislation
  and IAEA standards (TS -R-1, ...)
• implements all relevant international agreements
• Czech Republic participates in IAEA Illicit
  Trafficking Database Programme
• SÚJB represents the governmental Point of
  Contact

5
Regulatory infrastructure (4)

• Legal system of authorization, notification,
  registration, licensing of practices and sources
• Legal system of supervision, inspections,
  enforcement
• National system of accounting for nuclear
  materials, national register of radiation sources
• National register of licensees and registrants

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Monitoring (1)

• Customs
• on border crossingportal monitors, hand held
  instruments, rad. pagers, electronic personal
  dosimeters
• in territory mobile groups in each of local
  directorates (8) hand held instruments,
  spectrometers

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Monitoring (2)

• Metal processing facilities portal monitors,
  hand held instruments,final product measurement
  - spectrometers
• Communal waste processors portal monitors (2
  incinerators, 1 waste dump)

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Monitoring (3)

• Role of SÚJB
• Methodological support
• Support in training of Customs staff
• Supervision in detection and following processes,
  especially in more complicated cases
• Unusual events database
• Decision process

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Response

• Procedure for radioactive material seizure -
  Recommendation issued by SÚJB
• Co-operation with the Czech Police, Fire
  Brigades, Customs Service
• Licensed organizations participate on the
  detection and analyses of captured materials
• Seized material disposed or safely stored
• Disposal via licensed organizations on state
  repositories

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Response scheme (1)
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Response scheme (2)
y
n
Significant maximum?
Non-metal NORM, small bg increase?
Legal RM transport complies the rules?
n
n
Intern the vehicle
y
Set protecting zone
y
Record the event
Release the vehicle
Release the vehicle
Notify immediately SÚJB, Police
Record the event
Record the event
Inform SÚJB in monthly report
Inform SÚJB in monthly report
Follow the SÚJB instructions
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Reporting (1)

• 2003 86 seizures 3 border
  crossing 37 steelworks 46
  incinerators and waste dumps
• Border crossing with portal monitor60 - 280
  events monthlyonly 3 seizures 1 metal part
  contaminated with Co-60
  2 NORM
• 1 missing source reported (Cs-137)

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Reporting (2) - steelworks / waste processors

• 1 / 1 radionuclide sources (Cs-137)
• 7 / 0 metal parts contaminated with Co-60
• 18 / 1 metal parts (tubes with NORM)
• 3 / 18 small metal parts with natural
  radionuclides (watch, compass, ...)
• 0 / 9 NORM, chemical agents (Ra-226), raw
  materials
• 0 / 14 hygienic material from medical treatment
• 8 / - returned without investigation
• 0 / 3 false alarms, driver after medical
  treatment

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Experience

• Threat of financial loses push steelworks to
  monitor scrap metal and their production.
• Secondary, it causes pressure to scrap metal
  collectors to monitor scrap metal.
• Not enough licensed person for performing the
  radioactive material (source) localisation,
  unloading, separation from the load,
  identification and analysis
• Problem of radioactive source from military and
  defence programs