Proliferation resistance. Global challenge needs global response.

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Proliferation resistance.Global challenge needs
global response.
NATO Russia Advanced Research Workshop on
Proliferation resistant nuclear technologies
By Vladimir S. Kagramanyan, Obninsk, Russia
Moscow, Russia, March 27-28, 2008
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Introduction

• Increase of interest in many countries to nuclear
  power
• Nuclear power (NP) challenges (infrastructure,
  economic, safety, waste, resource and
  non-proliferation)
• National technological and institutional
  responses
• To what extend they address challenges of global
  character (global warming, non-proliferation and
  resource base)?
• Possibility of optimum global answer to global
  challenges including non-proliferation

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Approach for NP analysis

• National and global dimensions
• Complete and incomplete nuclear energy systems
• Key indicators for each NP issue
• Expert assessment of key indicators at
  qualitative level (high, middle, low)
• Solution to proliferations resistance in
  conjunction with other global issues

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Nuclear Energy Systems (NES)

• Complete NES for use at national and global
  levels
• LWR - O open fuel cycle
• LWR(MOX) semi closed fuel cycle
• LWRFR(BRgt1) closed fuel cycle
• LWRFR(BR1) closed fuel cycle
• LWRFR(BRlt1) closed fuel cycle
• Incomplete NES for use at national level
• LWR B with back end open fuel cycle facilities
• LWR N without fuel cycle facilities

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Illustrative grouping of countries depending on
scale of NP program

• Low level NP less than 5 GWt(e)
• Middle level NP from 5 to 50 GWt(e)
• High level NP more than 50 GWt(e)
• (Today EU (France), USA, Japan.
• Future Russia, China, India, S. Korea?)
• Overall capacity of NP for world sustainable
  development - several thousands of GWt(e)

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NP issues at national and global levels

• SAFETY
• Economics
• High level nuclear waste (HLW)
• Assurance of non-proliferation
• Resource sustainability

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1. Resource sustainability

• Nuclear resource base
• Natural and depleted U (UU-238U-235)
• generated Pu as by-product by LWR
• Natural Th
• Relative energy content of natural U isotopes and
  Pu
• U-238 - 99
• U-235 - 0,7
• Pu - 0,3

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Relative energy content of Russian natural fuel
resources

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Potential of NES to tap different nuclear
resources
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Assessment of NES from resourcesustainability
perspectives
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2. High level nuclear waste HLW

• High level radioactive waste - Spent Nuclear Fuel
  (SNF)
• fission products (FP)
• exposed U
• generated Pu
• generated minor actinides (MANp, Am, Cm)
• Relative mass and toxisity
• FP - 1t/GWt(e)year toxic - hundreds years
• Pu - 0.2t/GWt(e)year toxic - thousands years
• MA -0.03t/GWt(e)year toxic - thousands years

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Potential of NES to minimize toxic elements in
HLW
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Assessment of NES from HLW management perspectives
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3. Economics

• All NES should produce competitive and affordable
  electricity no questions!
• The main economic issue is level of required
  preliminary RDD to develop NES technologies and
  associated infrastructure to the commercial level
• Acceptability of NES for country would depend
  whether anticipated level of preliminary RDD can
  be compensated in future from electricity sales

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Relative level of RDD required for
commercialisation of different parts of NES
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Potential to compensate RDD cost through
electricity sales
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4. Assurance of non-proliferation

• Three possible paths of NES misuse at
  governmental level
• Direct NES misuse. Covert diversion of NES
  materials or covert misuse of NES technologies
• Misuse of knowledge. Misuse of knowledge and/or
  human resources associated with NES in CNWP.
• Break-out scenario. Break-out from NPT and open
  misuse of NES materials and technologies

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Key indicators to characterize NES PR features

• Attractiveness Level of attractiveness of Pu
  or U isotopic vectors used or that can be
  produced within NES for weapon.
• Difficulty Level of efforts needed
  for proliferators to change materials acquired
  within NES into a weapon usable form?
• Cost of assurance Level of efforts (safeguard,
  technical barriers, security) required to assure
  non-misuse of a specific NES in a specific
  country

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Possible option for sub-categorization of civil Pu
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Evaluation of PR indices for NES
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Nationally driven world
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Globally driven world
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Overall findings from NES evaluation

• Only LWRFR BRgt1 system may provide opportunity
  for large scale global development.
• But this system, like any other complete NES,
  would also provide opportunities for its misuse.
• There is no technological fix against possible
  misuse of enrichment or reprocessing facilities
  if a state would have motivation to do it and if
  there is no adequate institutional barriers
• Continuously increasing proliferation risk and
  rising safeguard efforts could be intolerable.

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Global nuclear energy with least proliferation
risk and safeguard efforts

• Sell LWRs combined with assurance of fresh fuel
  supply and take back spent nuclear fuel (SNF).
• LWR SNF might be stored in regional storage
  facilities
• Commercialize fast reactors (FR) of 3d generation
  as soon as possible. When FR are commercialized,
  then regional spent fuel storages could be
  transformed in international fuel cycle centers
  for SNF management.
• Introduce cost efficient technical barriers for
  system based on 3d generation FR
• Reprocess blanket together core fuel
• Separate Pu together with U-238 (gt50)
• Produce MOX at the reprocessing side .
• 5 Clarify system requirements and cooperate
  on 4th generation reactor systems