Title: Transmission Rights for the Texas Nodal Market
1Transmission Rights for the Texas Nodal Market
- Shmuel S. OrenUniversity of California at
Berkeley - Presented at the PUCT Technical Workshop on
Transmission Rights - Austin, Texas, September 5, 2003
2Objectives
- Understanding the role of property rights in
forward energy trading and risk management - Understand the difference between flowgate
congestion revenue rights (FG-CRR) and point to
point congestion revenue rights (PTP-CRR) as
hedging instruments - What type of transmission rights will best serve
the Texas Nodal market
3Tradable Property Rights
- Purpose
- Facilitates efficient use of scarce resources
(Coase) - Mechanism to reward investment
- Enable risk management (hedging, forward markets)
- Aspects of Property rights
- Right to financial gain from asset
- Right to use asset (weak physical)
- Right to exclude others from using the asset
(strong physical)
4Forms of Financial Transmission Rights
- PTP CRR (Obligation)
- Holder is entitled to or obligated to pay nodal
price difference between designated locations per
MW denomination - FG CRR (Option)
- Holder is entitled to shadow price on congested
element in designated direction per MW
denomination - PTP CRR Options
- Holder is entitled to nodal price difference
between designated locations per MW denomination
if value is positive but can walk away if it is
negative - FG CRR Obligation
- A combination of Long FG CRR and Short FG CRR in
the opposite direction. Holder is entitled to
shadow price on congested element per MW
denomination in Long direction and is obligated
to pay shadow price on congested element per MW
denomination if flow is reversed
5Fundamental Relationship Between Nodal Prices and
Flowgate Shadow Prices
- Let
- Ni Energy nodal spot price at bus i
- Fj ATC shadow price at flowgate j (flowgate
spot price)
Only congested flowgate need to be counted
PTDFPower Transfer Distribution FactorSHIFT
FACTOR
6Hedging Forward Transactions with PTP and FG CRRs
- G1 has a bilateral contract with L3 to deliver
150 MW and wants to hedge congestion charges
PTP approach Buy 150MW of FTR 1 3 FG
approach Buy 100MW of FGR 1 3
50MW of FGR 1 2 50MW of FGR 2
3 (FGR portfolio emulates the
distribution of flow according to the PTDFs
published by ERCOT)
G1
1
G3
?300
2/3
Limits shownX1 for all lines
?100
3
?220
1/3
G2
L3
1/3
2
7Real Time Settlements
- Suppose real time dispatch is based on security
constrained OPF and the flow constraint on
link 2 3 with corresponding shadow price F23
(shadow prices on uncongested links are zero) and
nodal prices N1 , N2, N3 - Nodal pricing based congestion charges paid by
the generator for the 150MW transaction from node
1 to 3 are 150(N3- N1) - Settlement for 150MW PTP CRR 1 3 paid to the
generator is 150(N3- N1) - Settlement for 50MW FG CRR 2 3 is 50 F23..
But N3- N11/3 F23 (relation
of nodal and shadow prices) - Both the PTP and FG settlements offset the real
time congestion charges (full hedging)
8So What is the Difference?
- PTP CRRs guarantee a perfect hedge
- Insurance against congestion on flowgates
- Insurance against changes in PTDFs
- Insurance against changes in ATC on flowgate
- Revenue adequacy conditions necessitates limiting
the PTP CRR offering - FG CRRs only provides insurance against
congestion on flowgates - Holder is responsible to maintain proper mix
- PTDF tracking services or insurance against
deviation can be offered as a service by private
commercial entities
9Issuing and Trading PTP CRRs
- PTP CRRs representing financial property rights
to the transmission system must be issued
centrally by the ISO (Speculative PTPs off track
betting can be issued by anyone but have no
physical cover) - To insure that congestion revenues can cover PTP
settlements, PTPs must meet a simultaneous
feasibility condition - The virtual CRR operating point corresponding
to simultaneous bilateral schedules replicating
all outstanding PTP CRRs must meet all security
and flow constraints. - In an PTP CRR auction (PJM) bidders submit bids
for specific PTPs, ISO selects winning bids by
treating CRR bids as proposed schedules using a
security constraint OPF that maximizes CRR
auction revenue
10Issuing and Trading PTP CRRs (contd)
- When the RT operating point differs from the CRR
operating point, congestion charges will exceed
CRR settlements. The difference represents
unhedged congestion. - Reconfiguration of simultaneously feasible PTP
CRRs to track the operating point must be done
centrally (monthly at PJM). - Low liquidity due to large number of CRR types
and coordination requirements makes secondary
trading impractical. - PTP CRRs must be issued as two sided instruments
(that can have negative value) in order to
provide adequate hedging capability. - Issuing PTP CRRs as options while meeting
simultaneous feasibility severely restricts CRR
offering and hedging capability.
11EXAMPLE
(nomogram faces correspond Congested flowgates)
Changing capacity of line 2 to 3
G3
- Two sided PTP CRRs must stay within the outer
nomogram - 2 3 CRR have negative value (must pay) if RT
operating point is at D or B. - One sided PTP CRRs (options) must stay within
inner nomogram
12EXAMPLE (contd)
Â
- Negative valued 2 ? 3 PTP CRRs at D represents a
counterflow obligation (needed to offset
settlement of extra 1 ? 3 PTP CRRs) - If CRR operating point matches RT operating
point then PTP CRR settlements equals congestion
revenues, ISO breaks even and all transactions
can be perfectly hedged. - If Award point is Z and operating point is Y then
there are too many 2 ? 3 CRRs and not enough 1
? 3 CRRs - ISO has excess congestion
- revenue
- Not all transactions can be hedged
- (those that are hedged
- have perfect hedges)
13Congestion and PTP CRRs Settlement
(OPF solution Point D on nomogram)
MCPE40/MWh
- In Real Time
- G2 receives 5/MW/h for counterflow
- G1 is charged 10/MW/h congestion
- And 2 to 3 CRRs must pay 5/MW/h
- And 1 to 3 CRRs receives 10/MW/h
14Revenue Adequacy
CASE 1 Operating Point D is forecasted correctly
and bids for PTP CRRs match settlements.
Simultaneous feasibility auction also clears at
Pt. D, awarding 100 MW 2 to 3 CRRs and 400MW 1 to
3 CRRs at 10/MW/h 1. PTP CRR obligations
Congestion rents400x10-100x53500/h CRR
settlement400x10-100x53500/h ISO breaks
even. 2. PTP CRR options Congestion
rents400x10-100x53500/h CRR
settlement400x104000/h ISO is short CASE 2
CRR auction clears at Point B awarding 320MW 2
to 3 PTP CRRs and 20MW 1 to 3 PTP CRRs (Auction
revenue may be negative). RT dispatch is still
at Point D Congestion rents400x10-100x53500
/h CRR settlement20x10-320x5 - 1400/h ISO
surplus 4900
15Issuing and Trading FG CRRs
- ISO auctions FG CRRs as financial property rights
to the directional flowgates physical capacity - Only flowgates likely to be congested need to be
included in the auction (but RT congestion rent
will be charged on all congested flowgates) - FG CRRs are issued as options since settlement
(based on shadow prices) can only be positive or
zero - CRR capacity on each flowgate is determined
independently of others (no simultaneous
feasibility condition) - ISO publishes current PTDFs informing traders of
changes in FG CRR mix needed to hedge various
point to point transactions - PTP CRRs can be synthesized from FG CRRs. PTP CRR
options can be synthesized by buying only FG CRRs
with positive PTDFs.
16Issuing and Trading FGRs (contd)
- All congestion revenues are paid as settlements
of FG CRRs issued by ERCOT or as real time
negative congestion payments to counterflow
producers - FG CRRs can be traded on secondary markets
- Traders or private commercial entities update
their FG portfolio to maintain point to point
hedges - Producers of counterflow on congestion prone
flowgates can sell private FG CRRs (i.e. take
short positions covered by their expected real
time counterflow revenues from the ISO) on
secondary markets (these will command the same
prices and settlement as ISO-issued FG CRRs but
will be settled privately) - Sellers of counterflow FG CRRs undertake an
obligation. Such obligations are necessary to
enable full hegdging cover for all transactions - ISO- issued FG CRRs for physical capacity
private FG CRRs for counterflow gt All
transactions can be fully hedged for any
operating point (but it is up to the market to
get the FG CRRs into the right hands)
17EXAMPLE
- ISO can sell FG CRRs covered by physical grid
capacity. - 100MW 2?1 FG CRRs, 100MW 1?2 FG CRRs, 300MW 1?3
FG CRRs, 300MW 3?1 FG CRRs, 220MW 2?3 FG CRRs,
220MW 3?2 FG CRRs - FG CRRs covered by wire capacity will only
provide hedges for operating points in light
area. To cover dark area of nomogram
counterflow producers must undertake counterflow
obligations and sell virtual FG CRRs covered by
RT counterflow revenue.
18Congestion and FG CRR Settlement
(OPF solution Point D on nomogram)
MCPE40/MWh
In Real Time FG CRR 1 to 2 receives 20/MW/h FG
CRR 1 to 3 receives 5/MW/h All other FG CRRs
receive 0 G2 receives net congestion rent 20/3
- 5/35/MW/h G1 pays net congestion rent
-20/3 - 5(2/3)-10/MW/h
ISO congestion revenue 400x10-100x53500/h FG
CRR settlement 100x20300x53500/h ISO always
breaks even Regardless of RT operating point
19Pros and Cons of PTP CRRs
- Offers full hedges that account for security
constraint dispatch - If RT operating point differs from CRR operating
point then not all transactions can be hedged - Centrally managed frequent reconfiguration
auctions needed - CRRs must be defined as two sided instruments
(otherwise feasibility condition is too strict) - Not conducive to secondary trading
20Assumptions Underlying Flowgate Approach
- Flowgates can be defined
- Number of commercially significant flowgates is
small and predictable - PTDFs are relatively stable
- Flowgate capacities are stable and known
-
21Pros and Cons of FG CRRs
- Amenable to secondary trading
- No simultaneous feasibility required
- Requires less central coordination
- Small number facilitates liquidity
- FGRs can be issued for long periods
- Effective property rights for investment or
grandfathered rights - All the grid capacity is sold (all congestion
charges are distributed as FG CRR settlements) - FG CRRs are one sided instruments (holder has no
obligation but issuer does) - Reliance on market to assemble hedges for point
to point transactions - Hedges are not perfect unless the cost of PTDF
variation is socialized (can create gaming
incentives) - Underlying assumptions may not be valid
- Traders interested in PTP hedges may have to deal
with too many FG CRRs
22Best of Both Worlds
- Real time congestion settlement based on
locational marginal prices (nodal for resources
and zonal for load) - ISO can offer both PTP and FG CRRs so that
combination of CRRs is within the nomogram but
remaining capacity on flowgates can also be sold - FG CRRs settled based on flowgates shadow prices.
PTP CRRs settled as portfolio of FG CRRs or based
on nodal price differences (who underwrites the
difference?) - PTP CRR options offered and settled only as
portfolios of FG CRRs - Secondary FG CRR markets enable traders to
reconfigure their hedges so as to track changes
in operating point
23Other Issues
- Derating CRRs
- Do we need all PTP CRRs if congestion settlements
are based on resource node to load zone? - Limiting CRR ownership to prevent market power
- Relaxing the simultaneous feasibility criterion
for revenue adequacy
24Derating
165 MW
If PTP CRRs are awarded based on Pt. D. and RT
dispatch is at Pt. H, then congestion revenues
will not cover CRR settlements. OPTIONS 1. Full
payment to CRR based on nodal prices and uplift
of rev. shortfall 2. Prorate settlement to
all PTP CRRs to cover shortfall 3. Prorate
settlement to derated flowgates Options 1 and 2
socialize cost of derated line (1 to load and 2
to CRR holders) Extreme case when derated line is
radial. Option 3 directly assigns shortfall to
the users of derated flowgate.
25What CRRs are Needed?
- Since load imbalances are settled at zonal
prices, congestion charges on bilateral
transaction must be based on difference of load
zonal price minus resource nodal price (to avoid
arbitrage) - Hedging needs can be met with node to zone CRRs,
which can be settled without publishing price for
each load node - In absence of a state estimator nodal prices at
load nodes may be imprecise but zonal load price
tends to average out the statistical error.
26Limiting CRR Ownership
Dear node
Cheap node
- Generator with market power at Dear node and
dominant CRR holding on line from Dear node to
Cheap node benefits twice from high prices at
Dear node through local energy sales and through
CRR settlement (combined holding amplifies
market power). - Excessive CRR holdings increase incentive to
exercise market power. - Shares of CRR holdings on congested interfaces
must be limited (at least for QSEs with market
power in the load pocket). - Hard to impose such limits with PTP CRRs since
many different PTP CRRs can be used to control a
single FG CRR. - Easy to implement limits for FG CRRs.
27Relaxing the Simultaneous Feasibility Criterion
- Simultaneous feasibility insures revenue adequacy
in every operating interval. - Criterion is too stringent, limiting PTP CRR
awards and distorting clearing prices. - Not a problem with FG CRRs since all capacity is
sold. - Possible relaxation of SF condition may impose
revenue adequacy over longer periods or use a
value at risk criterion for ISO revenue shortfall.