SISAF 444 Africa Studies Seminar

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SISAF 444 Africa Studies Seminar
Winter 2007

• Governance
• Democracy
• Civil Society

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Three Development Paradigms

• Statism (a big government)
• State-led development, industrialization,
  import-substitution
• Neo-liberalism (a small government)
• Washington consensus, stabilization,
  liberalization, structural adjustment,
  conditionality
• State-building (the right government)
• Relationships between state, market and
  non-state/non-market institutions (e.g. civil
  society),
• Emphasis on governance, incentives and wider
  economic/political participation

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James Madison on Angels and Men

If men were angels, no government would be
necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither
external nor internal controls on government
would be necessary. In framing a government which
is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this you must first enable
the government to control the governed and in
the next place oblige it to control itself. A
dependence on the people is, no doubt, the
primary control on the government but experience
has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary
precautions Federalist No. 51 (February 1788)
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Bates Prosperity and Violence

• Highly politicized economies
• Widespread corruption
• Large informal sectors
• Lack of impersonal rule, big man
• Governments provide private goods for supporters,
  not public goods for everyone

• Postwar period
• international system shapes the way developing
  countries are ruled
• Foreign sources of finance (aid)
• Countries did not have to develop their domestic
  economies
• Limited bargaining power for citizens
• Bad governments, predatory states
• Patronage and privilege

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Bates Prosperity and Violence

• Patron-client relations
• (neo-patrimonialism)
• Governments create rents
• Individuals and groups seek rents
• Co-opting of civil society
• Gatekeeper state
• Importance of ethnicity

• Postwar period
• international system shapes the way developing
  countries are ruled
• Foreign sources of finance (aid)
• Countries did not have to develop their domestic
  economies
• Limited bargaining power for citizens
• Bad governments, predatory states
• Patronage and privilege

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Corruption and State Failure
www.transparency.org
Corruption Perceptions Index 2005 (Transparency
International)
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Corruption Perceptions Index 2005 (Transparency
International)
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Source Heritage Foundation
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Freedom House rankings

• Political Rights
• 1 closest to ideal
• 2 less free, corruption, discrimination
• 3,4,5 conflict, military involvement, unfair
  elections, one-party dominance
• 6 juntas, dictatorships, religious hierarchies,
  autocrats

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Freedom House rankings

• Civil Liberties
• 1 broad pol./ec. freedoms, rule of law
• 2 some deficiencies
• 3,4,5 censorship, violence/terror, prevention of
  free association
• 6 severely restricted rights, political terror,
  highly restricted business activity
• 7 virtually no freedom, widespread repression

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Freedom House rankings

• Political Rights/Civil Liberties
• 1 closest to ideal
• 2 less free, corruption, discrimination
• 3,4,5 conflict, military involvement, unfair
  elections, one-party dominance
• 6 juntas, dictatorships, religious hierarchies,
  autocrats
• 7 political rights virtually nonexistent, severe
  oppression/civil war, extreme violence, or
  absence of functioning gvt.

1.0-2.5 free 3.0-5.0 partly free 5.5-7.0
not free
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Freedom House rankings
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Freedom House rankings
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Patrimonialism

• A traditional political system in which
  government is personal, and government
  administration is an extension of the ruler. In
  such a system, the individual national leader
  controls the political and economic life of the
  country, and personal relationships with the
  leader play a crucial role in amassing personal
  wealth or in the rise and decline of members of
  the political elite.

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Neo-patrimonialism

• Hybrid regimes with rational-legal façade
  (written laws, modern bureaucratic institutions)
• subverted by a patrimonial logic based on
  charismatic and/or traditional authority
  involving
• dyadic exchange
• private appropriation of public resources
• rent-creation and rent-seeking
• prebendalism

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Neo-patrimonialism
Patrimonialism loyalty to an individual
political leader

• Hybrid regimes with rational-legal façade
  (written laws, modern bureaucratic institutions)
• subverted by a patrimonial logic based on
  charismatic and/or traditional authority
  involving
• dyadic exchange
• private appropriation of public resources
• rent-creation and rent-seeking
• prebendalism

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Neo-patrimonialism

• Hybrid regimes with rational-legal façade
  (written laws, modern bureaucratic institutions)
• subverted by a patrimonial logic based on
  charismatic and/or traditional authority
  involving
• dyadic exchange
• private appropriation of public resources
• rent-creation and rent-seeking
• prebendalism

A relationship between exactly two entities
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Neo-patrimonialism

• Hybrid regimes with rational-legal façade
  (written laws, modern bureaucratic institutions)
• subverted by a patrimonial logic based on
  charismatic and/or traditional authority
  involving
• dyadic exchange
• private appropriation of public resources
• rent-creation and rent-seeking
• prebendalism

Transfer of a public office, with the use of its
revenues as a source of income
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States and societies

• African states
• weak (low capacity, unable to project power
  effectively, achieve stated goals)
• autonomous (relatively able to insulate
  themselves from effects of policies)

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States and societies

• African civil society
• weak (few effective non-state mechanisms for
  collective action, organized interest groups)

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State scope and state strength
Based on Francis Fukuyama, State-Building (2004)

Strength of state institutions
Classical Liberalism
Welfare State
Developmental State
Totalitarianism
Patrimonial State
Failed State?
Scope of state functions
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Governance

• The manner in which something is governed or
  regulated method of management, system of
  regulations.
• The office, function, or power of governing
  authority or permission to govern

Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed.
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Three Development Paradigms

• Statism (a big government)
• State-led development, industrialization,
  import-substitution
• Neo-liberalism (a small government)
• Washington consensus, stabilization,
  liberalization, structural adjustment,
  conditionality
• State-building (the right government)
• Relationships between state, market and
  non-state/non-market institutions (e.g. civil
  society),
• Emphasis on governance, incentives and wider
  economic/political participation

• Many possible definitions and indicators
• Recent project World Bank Institute
• Six governance indicators 1996-2004

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World Bank Governance Indicators
1996-2004 http//www.worldbank.or
g/wbi/governance/govdata/

• Voice and Accountability
• Political Stability and Absence of Violence
• Government Effectiveness
• Regulatory Quality
• Rule of Law
• Control of Corruption
• Composite Indicator (1-6 above)

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World Bank Governance Indicators
1996-2004 http//www.worldbank.or
g/wbi/governance/govdata/

• Voice and Accountability includes in it a number
  of indicators measuring various aspects of the
  political process, civil liberties, political and
  human rights, measuring the extent to which
  citizens of a country are able to participate in
  the selection of governments.
• Political Stability and Absence of Violence
  combines several indicators which measure
  perceptions of the likelihood that the government
  in power will be destabilized or overthrown by
  possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means,
  including domestic violence and terrorism.
• Government Effectiveness combines responses on
  the quality of public service provision, the
  quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of
  civil servants, the independence of the civil
  service from political pressures, and the
  credibility of the government's commitment to
  policies.
• Regulatory Quality instead focuses more on the
  policies themselves, including measures of the
  incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as
  price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as
  well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by
  excessive regulation in areas such as foreign
  trade and business development.
• Rule of Law includes several indicators which
  measure the extent to which agents have
  confidence in and abide by the rules of society.
  These include perceptions of the incidence of
  crime, the effectiveness and predictability of
  the judiciary, and the enforceability of
  contracts.
• Control of Corruption is a measure of the extent
  of corruption, conventionally defined as the
  exercise of public power for private gain. It is
  based on scores of variables from polls of
  experts and surveys.

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Global Overview

• World Bank,
• Governance Matters IV

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Individual Countries

• World Bank,
• Governance Matters IV

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Sweden 1996, 1998, 2004
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USA 1996, 1998, 2004
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Nigeria 1996, 1998, 2004
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Botswana 1996, 1998, 2004
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South Africa 1996, 1998, 2004
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Kenya 1996, 1998, 2004
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Zimbabwe 1996, 1998, 2004
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Somalia 1996, 1998, 2004
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Regional Averages

• World Bank,
• Governance Matters IV

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OECD, average 1996, 1998, 2004
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Caribbean, average 1996, 1998, 2004
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Eastern Europe and Baltics, average 1996,
1998, 2004
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East Asia, average 1996, 1998, 2004
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Latin America, average 1996, 1998, 2004
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South Asia, average 1996, 1998, 2004
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Sub-Saharan Africa, average 1996, 1998, 2004
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Former Soviet Union, average 1996, 1998, 2004
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Polity IV

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A Simple Model of Governance
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A Simple Model of Governance
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State scope and state strength

• Essence of stateness enforcement
• Scope of state activities
• Strength of state power

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State scope and state strength

• The scope of the state
• Minimal functions
• Intermediate functions
• Activist functions

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State scope and state strength

• The scope of the state
• Minimal functions
• Pure public goods
• Defense, LO, PRs, macro stabilization, public
  health
• Improving equity
• Pro-poor

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State scope and state strength

• The scope of the state
• Intermediate functions
• Externalities
• Regulation (antitrust, competition)
• Social insurance

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State scope and state strength

• The scope of the state
• Activist functions
• Industrial policy
• Wealth redistribution

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State scope and state strength

• The strength of the state
• How efficient is the state?
• Can the state achieve its goals?
• Can the state enforce policies?

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State scope and state strength

Strength of state institutions
I.
II.
III.
IV.
Scope of state functions
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State scope and state strength

Strength of state institutions
W. Europe
Japan
U.S.
USSR
I.
II.
Brazil
III.
IV.
Sierra Leone
Scope of state functions
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State scope and state strength

Strength of state institutions
Europe since 1600
I.
II.
III.
IV.
Scope of state functions
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State scope and state strength

Strength of state institutions
U.S. since 1800
I.
II.
III.
IV.
Scope of state functions
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State scope and state strength

Strength of state institutions
I.
II.
Russia since 1990
III.
IV.
Scope of state functions
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State scope and state strength

Strength of state institutions
I.
II.
III.
IV.
Africa since 1980
Scope of state functions
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State scope and state strength

Strength of state institutions
I.
II.
Desirable reform path?
III.
IV.
Scope of state functions
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State scope and state strength

Strength of state institutions
Classical Liberalism
Welfare State
Developmental State
Totalitarianism
Patrimonial State
Failed State?
Scope of state functions
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Natural resources and competition for rents

• Key factors in African conflicts
• Poverty
• Dependence on natural resource exports
• Low or negative economic growth

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Natural resources and competition for rents

• Rents
• profits that are much higher than the minimum
  level needed to keep the activity going
• easy profits
• Often related to scarce resources that are unique
  cannot be replicated (e.g. mineral resources,
  talent)

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Six routes from natural resources rents to
conflict

• Political struggle for control of rents
  (rent-seeking)
• Government less dependent on people (revenue
  imperative)
• Risk of secession in mineral-rich areas
• Rents are source of rebel finance
• Appreciation of real exchange rate (Dutch
  disease)
• Resource prices are often volatile

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Wantchekon and Jensen 2004
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Wantchekon and Jensen 2004

• Countries that are NR-dependent have lower
  democracy scores
• NRs make democratic transition or consolidation
  (political liberalization) more difficult
• NR-rich countries have greater government
  consumption
• NR-rich countries have worse governments (World
  Bank governance measures)

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Natural Resources in Africa Diamonds

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Natural Resources in Africa Oil

National Geographic
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Natural Resources in Africa Coltan

Heinz School/Carnegie Mellon University
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Natural Resources in Africa Coltan

Approximately 60 of known world coltan reserves
Heinz School/Carnegie Mellon University
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Sub-Saharan Africa, regional average
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NR-Rich Countries Nigeria
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NR-Rich Countries Equatorial Guinea
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NR-Rich Countries Chad
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NR-Rich Countries Angola
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NR-Rich Countries Republic of Congo
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NR-Rich Countries Sudan
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Challenges for natural-resource rich states

• Scrutiny
• Collective action problem
• Transparency
• Accountability

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Example Chad-Cameroon pipeline

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Chad-Cameroon pipeline

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Chad-Cameroon pipeline

• Revenues due to Chad are deposited in an escrow
  account in London
• 10 of revenues placed in a Future Generations
  Fund
• Allocation of oil revenues monitored by oversight
  committee (CCRSP) that includes representatives
  from civil society, government, parliament and
  supreme court.

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Chad-Cameroon pipeline
World Bank, Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Website
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Chad-Cameroon pipeline
BBC, 13 April 2006