8 Res Cogitans and Dualism

1
8Res Cogitans and Dualism
2
The immateriality of the soul

• Doubt
• I can doubt whether I have a body, but I cannot
  doubt that I am or exist.
• This argument, though, is invalid (see Arnaulds
  objection CSM II 139).
• From the fact that I doubt that something
  possesses a given property it doesnt follow that
  this very thing lacks it.

3

• The method of doubt concerns ones subjective
  perception and this does not prevent physical
  properties to be essential parts of a thing.
• Thus from the fact that I can doubt about me
  having a body and that I cannot doubt that I am
  thinking it does not follow that the soul is
  immaterial.
• From I doubt p I cannot doubt q it doesnt
  follow that q is not p.
• E.g. From I doubt that 224 I cannot doubt
  that 314 it doesnt follow that 22 is not 31.

4

• I said in one place that while the soul is in
  doubt about the existence of all material things,
  it knows itself preacise tantumin the strict
  sense onlyas an immaterial substance I did
  not at all mean an entire exclusion or negation,
  but only an abstraction from material things for
  I said that in spite of this we are not sure that
  there is nothing corporeal in the soul, even
  though we do not recognize anything corporeal in
  it. (Appendix to Fifth Objections and Replies
  CSM II 276)
• Thus, the Cartesian doubt cannot constitute a
  proof of the immateriality of the soul.

5
The argument from clear and distinct perceptions

• The arguments which should prove the
  immateriality of the soul is known as the
  Argument for Clear and Distinct Perceptions.
• I can clearly and distinctly perceive the mind
  apart from body (see fifth meditation).
• Arnauld suggested that this argument is similar
  to the doubt argument (see CSM II 142).

6

• Arnaulds argument
• One can clearly and distinctly perceive that a
  triangle has a right angle and yet not clearly
  and distinctly perceive that it has the
  Pythagorean property. But even God could not
  create a right-angled triangle which lacks it.
• Descartes reply consists in arguing that
  neither the triangle nor its property can be seen
  as a complete thing, while the mind and the body
  must.

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• A complete thing is a substance that can exist on
  its own.
• Since in my thinking I can conceive the
  mind/soul to subsist independently of physical
  properties it is perfectly conceivable that God
  created my thinking substance without creating
  the physical ones.
• Hence the physical attributes do not belong to
  the essence of the soul/mind.
• The concept of mind is complete insofar as one is
  aware of ones thinking. And this is sufficient
  for one to exist with this attribute and this
  alone. Thinking is the only necessary property of
  the mind.

8
The Divisibility Argument

• The mind and body are mutually exclusive. Being
  extended the body can be divided while the mind
  is indivisible.
• There is a great difference between the mind and
  the body inasmuch as the body is by its very
  nature always divisible while the mind is utterly
  indivisible. For when I consider the mind, or
  myself in so far as I am merely a thinking thing,
  I am unable to distinguish any part within
  myself I understand myself to be something quite
  single and complete. Although the whole mind
  seems to be united to the whole body I recognise
  that if a foot or an arm or any other part of the
  body is cut off nothing has thereby been taken
  away from the mind. (Sixth Meditation CMS II 59)

9

• But, what if we take away the brain?
• Descartes circumvents this problem in
  concentrating on pure thought (he recognises that
  some mental activity such as imagination and
  sense-perception depends on the brain), e.g.
  thoughts of abstract objects.
• Even if the body is destroyed, the mind or soul
  would not be harmed it would merely leave the
  body. The soul/mind is immortal.
• This doctrine, though, has already been
  established a priori it does not rest on the
  divisibility argument.

10

• This power of imagination which is in me,
  differing as it does from the power of
  understanding, is not a necessary constituent of
  my own essence, that is, of the essence of my
  mind. For if I lacked it, I should undoubtedly
  remain the same individual as I now am from
  which it seems to follow that it depends on
  something distinct from myself. the difference
  between this mode of thinking and pure
  understanding may simply be this when the mind
  understands, it in some way turns towards itself
  and inspects one of the ideas which are within
  it but when it imagines, it turns toward the
  body and looks at something in the body which
  conforms to an idea understood by the mind or
  perceived by the senses. (Sixth Meditation CSM
  II 51)

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The immortality of the soul

• Main Argument
• Phase one
• Prem. 1 If I can clearly and distinctly
  understand A apart from B and B apart from A,
  then God could have created one without the
  other, and A cannot depend on B for its
  existence, or B on A.
• Prem. 2 I can clearly and distinctly understand
  myself as a thinking thing apart from body, and a
  body as an extended thing apart from thought.
• Preliminary Conclusion God could have created
  my mind in such a way that it does not depend on
  any body.

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• Phase two
• Prem. 3 God could have created my mind in such
  a way that it does not depend on any body.
• Prem. 4 If A could have been created to be
  independent of B, A can exist when B no longer
  exists.
• Prem. 5 When I am dead, my body (as such) will
  no longer exist.
• Conclusion I can exist when my body is dead.
• This does not prove, though, that the Soul
  survives after the death. It merely proves that
  it can survive it.

13

• Critique
• (Cf. Dan Scotus) Some predicates can be
  conceived apart from one another and, yet, they
  cannot exist apart from one another
• E.g. divine justice and divine mercy it is
  impossible for God to be just and not merciful as
  it is impossible for Him to be merciful without
  also being just.
• Reply
• For it to be the case that we can understand two
  things distinctly and separately, they must
  really be entities in their own right.

14

• Imagination
• The ability to employ imagination suggests the
  presence of the body. If there can be thought
  without imagination, as Descartes suggests, there
  can be thought without a body.
• Imagination, like perception, is not essential
  to a subject. Thus, if the souls is immortal it
  does not involve imagination and perception it
  merely requires intellectual understanding.

15
The Mind-Body divide

• Descartes Aim
• To prove that the mind and the body are
• 1. real subjects
• 2. numerically distinct entities
• 3. can exist without the other

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Identity

• Leibnizs Law and the Identity of Indiscernibles
• Leibnizs law
• a b ? (?F) (Fa ? Fb)
• If a and b are identical then each property of a
  must also be a property of b and vice versa.

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• Identity of indiscernibles
• (?F) (Fa ? Fb) ? a b
• This is the converse of Leibnizs law and states
  that if every property of a is also a property of
  b and vice versa (i.e. there is no discernible
  difference between them), then a and b are
  identical.
• If a and b have all properties in common, then a
  and b are identical.

18

• Thus.
• If MIND and BODY have all properties in common,
  then MIND BODY
• If MIND and BODY differ in some property, then
  MIND ? BODY

19
Mind vs. Body an Epistemological Distinction

• The mind (x) and the body (y) are distinct df.
• x and y are distinct insofar as x and/or y can
  be conceived/understood without each other.
• For establishing a real distinction it is
  sufficient that two things can be understood as
  complete and that each one can be understood
  apart from the other. (Reply to Arnauld Fourth
  Set of Replies CSM II 156)

20

• Criterion for Distinctness Clear and Distinct
  Ideas
• Descartes criterion of distinctiveness is
  epistemological.
• Yet, since clear and distinct ideas must reflect
  the true nature of things, distinct ideas reflect
  distinct substances.
• Main question
• How can ideas be distinct and thus represent
  different substances?

21

• Answer
• Descartes draws a comparison between mental
  intuition (perception) and seeing with the eyes
• Indeed there are very many people who in their
  entire lives never perceive anything with
  sufficient accuracy to enable them to make a
  judgement about it with certainty. A perception
  which can serve as the basis for a certain and
  indubitable judgement needs to be not merely
  clear but also distinct. I call a perception
  clear when it is present and accessible to the
  attentive mindjust as we say that we see
  something clearly when it is present to the eyes
  gaze and stimulate it with sufficient degree of
  strength and accessibility. I call a perception
  distinct if, as well as being clear, it is so
  sharply separated from all other perceptions that
  it contains within itself only what is clear.
  (Principles of Philosophy 45 CSM I 207-8)

22

• Direct Mental Apprehension
• Descartes account of knowledge is thus based on
  direct mental apprehension.
• Mental intuition goes proxy for mental
  acquaintance/grasping.
• In discussing the action of the intellect by
  mean of which we are able to arrive to the
  knowledge of things with no fear of mistake
  (Rules for the Direction of the Mind CSM I 14),
  Descartes recognizes two intellectual actions
  intuition and deduction.

23

• Intuition
• By intuition I do not mean the fluctuating
  testimony of the senses or the deceptive
  judgement of the imagination as it botches things
  together, but the conception of a clear and
  attentive mind, which is so easy and distinct
  that there can be no room for doubt about what we
  are understanding. Alternatively, and this comes
  to the same thing, intuition is the indubitable
  conception of a clear and attentive mind which
  proceeds solely from the light of reason. Thus
  everyone can mentally intuit that he exists, that
  he is thinking, that a triangle is bounded by
  just three lines, and a sphere by a single
  surface, and the like. (Rules for the Direction
  of the Mind CSM I 14)

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• Necessary/Eternal Truth Depend on Gods Will
• They have been created by God and God makes us
  to recognize them (following Descartes method of
  doubt). God could have created other necessary
  truths even the more basic laws of logic could
  have been different if God wished so.
• All eternal/necessary truth depend on Gods will.

25

• Since every basis of truth and goodness
  depends on his omnipotence, I would not dare to
  say that God cannot make a mountain without a
  valley, or bring it about that 1 and 2 are not 3.
  I merely say that he has given me such a mind
  that I cannot conceive a mountain without a
  valley, or sum of 1 and 2 which is not 3 such
  things involve a contradiction in my conception.
  (Letter to Arnauld, 29 July 1648 CSMK III
  358-9)

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Arnaulds Challenge

• Arnauld objects that one cannot go from the
  subjective fact to an objective fact.
• That is, one cannot infer from his subjective
  state of certainty or uncertainty concerning a
  given fact, to the objective certainty or
  uncertainty concerning the fact itself.
• Thus once cannot, pace Descartes, infer from the
  fact that one is certain about the distinction
  between ones mind and body, to the fact that the
  mind and the body are in fact/in reality distinct.

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• How does it follow, from the fact that he is
  aware of nothing else belonging to his essence,
  that nothing else does in fact belong to it? I
  must confess that I am somewhat slow, but I have
  been unable to find anywhere in the Second
  Meditation an answer to this question. (Arnauld
  Fourth Set of Objections CSM II 140)
• Arnaulds argument
• It is not possible for (triangle) T to exist
  without P (the square of the hypotenuse is equal
  the square of the two sides)

28

• Even if I deny that the square on the
  hypotenuse is equal to the square on the other
  two sides, I still remain sure that the triangle
  is right-angled, and my mind retains the clear
  and distinct knowledge that one of its angles is
  a right-angle. And given that it is so not even
  God could bring it about that the triangle is not
  right-angled. But how is my perception of the
  nature of my mind any clearer than his perception
  of the nature of the triangle? Although the man
  in the example clearly and distinctly knows that
  the triangle is right angled, he is wrong in
  thinking that the aforesaid relationship between
  the squares on the sides does not belong to the
  nature of the triangle. Similarly, although I
  clearly and distinctly know my nature to be
  something that thinks, may I, too, not perhaps be
  wrong in thinking that nothing else belongs to my
  nature apart from the fact that I am a thinking
  thing? Perhaps the fact that I am an extended
  thing may also belong to my nature. (Arnauld
  Fourth Set of Objections CSM II 142-3)

29

• Arnauld objects to the following
• What we seem to conceive of x, we really
  conceive of x
• Arnauld denies Descartes epistemic transparency.
  
• Arnaulds argument rests on the fact that
  possibility precedes conceivability.
• Thus Arnauld seems to deny this, Cartesian, form
  of argument
• If one can conceive of x that it is F and of y
  that it is not F, then x ? y.

30

• Descartes way out of this problem is to propose
  a reliable, transparent, notion of
  conceivability. His notion of ideas should supply
  what we need
• If one entertains an idea of x being F and an
  idea of y being F-less, then x ? y
• From the distinctness of ideas one can derive the
  distinctness of the entities the ideas are about.
  
• But ideas must be ontologically transparent,
  i.e. there is no gap between the idea and the
  thing it is about (cf. Wittgensteins Tractatus
  picture theory, where we have a one-one
  correspondence between words and objects).

31

• In order to sustain Descartes argument about the
  mind-body distinction, the idea of the mind and
  the idea of the body must be primitive.
• That is, they cannot derivate (by abstraction)
  from other more basic and primitive ideas.

32

• The idea I have of something is not and idea
  made inadequate by an abstraction of my
  intellect. I derive this principle purely from my
  own thought or awareness. I am certain that I can
  have no knowledge of what is outside me except by
  means of the ideas I have within me But I think
  also that whatever is to be found in these ideas
  is necessarily also in the things themselves. So,
  to tell whether my idea has been made incomplete
  or inadequate by an abstraction of the mind, I
  merely look to see whether I have derived it, not
  from something outside myself which is more
  complete, but by an intellectual abstraction from
  some other richer or more complete idea which I
  have in myself The idea which I have of a
  thinking substance is complete in this sense, and
  that I have in my mind no other idea which is
  prior to it and joined to it in such a way that I
  cannot think of the two together while denying
  the one of the other. (Letter to Gibieuf 19 Jan.
  1642 CSMK III 201-2)

33

• We can even grant Arnauld that, of necessity,
  ones mind coexists with ones body, i.e. that
  they are a union inside a human being.
• Yet we can maintain that they are different the
  mind is a thinking thing while the body is an
  extended thing. As such they are different
  substances in which different attributes inhere.
• Thus even if it is not really/actually possible
  for the mind to exist without the body it is
  logically possiblethere is a possible world in
  which the mind exists without the body. While the
  mind is essentially thinking, the body is not.
  They are thus numerically distinct.

34

• If one entertains a primitive idea of the mind
  being essentially thinking and of the body not
  being essentially thinking, then the mind differs
  from the body.
• The idea of the mind reflects that the mind
  really is it is transparent, a de re idea.
  Descartes is assuming that when one
  imagines/thinks about/ ones own mind one has
  direct access to it. In that case, what one is
  imagining/is having an idea of/, is really what
  it is. We cannot divorce, as Arnaulds argument
  seems to suggest, the what it is (the res) from
  its idea. In short, there is no gap between the
  idea of mind and the mind. Primitive ideas are
  directly representative.

35

• There seem to be no difference between the mind
  (as a res) and its phenomenological character.
• The exercise involved in thinking about ones
  own mind is radically different from the exercise
  involved in thinking about an external object.
• Two distinct objects/substances (e.g. XYZ vs.
  H2O) may instantiate the same phenomenological
  properties. This is never the case when thinking
  about the mind.

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The Union Between Mind and Body

• Mind-Body Unison
• I am not merely present in my body as a sailor
  is present in a ship, but that I am very closely
  joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so
  that I and the body form a unit. If this were not
  so, I, who am nothing but a thinking thing, would
  not feel pain when the body was hurt, but would
  perceive the damage purely by the intellect, just
  as a sailor perceives by sight if anything in the
  ship is broken. These sensations of hunger,
  thirst, pain and so on are nothing but confused
  modes of thinking which arise from the union and,
  as it were, intermingling of the mind with the
  body. (Sixth Meditation CSM II 56)

37

• The main question, though, concerns the manner in
  which the mind is related to the body.
• Descartes seems to give contrasting
  (contradictory?) answers.
• On the one side, he said the soul resides in the
  brain (the pineal gland) and on the other side he
  said that it is coextensive with the body.

38

• It must be realised that the human soul, while
  informing the entire body, nevertheless has its
  principal seat in the brain it is here alone
  that the soul not only understand and imagines
  but also has sensory awareness. (Principle of
  Philosophy 4. 189 CSM I 279-80)
• My next observation is that the mind is not
  immediately affected by all parts of the body,
  but only by the brain, or perhaps just by one
  small part of the brain, namely the part which is
  said to contain the common sense. (Sixth
  Meditation CSM II 59)

39

• These statements suggesting that the mind-body
  union is guaranteed by the pineal gland seem to
  contradict the following
• Clothing, regarded in itself, is a substance,
  even though when referred to the man who wears
  it, it is a quality. Or again, the mind, even
  though it is in fact a substance, can nonetheless
  be said to be a quality of the body to which it
  is joined. This is exactly the way in which I
  now understand the mind to be coextensive with
  the bodythe whole mind in the whole body and the
  whole mind in any of its parts. (Sixth Set of
  Replies CSM II 297-9)

40

• How, though, can a non extensive substance (the
  mind) be coextensive with an extensive substance
  (the body)?
• Descartes is aware of this problem.
• Even though the mind is united with the whole
  body, it does not follow that it is extended
  throughout the body, since it is not in its
  nature to be extended, but only to think. (Fifth
  Set of Replies CSM II 266)

41

• 30. The soul is united to all parts of the body
  conjointly
• But in order to understand all these things more
  perfectly, we need to recognize that the soul is
  really joined to the whole body, and that we
  cannot properly say that it exists in any one
  part of the body to the exclusion of the others.
  For the body is a unity which is in a sense
  indivisible because of the arrangement of its
  organs, these things being so related to one
  another that the removal of any one of them
  renders the whole body defective. And the soul is
  of such a nature that it has no relation to
  extension, or to the dimensions or other
  properties of the matter of which the body is
  composed it is related solely to the whole
  assemblage of the body organs. This is obvious
  from our inability to conceive of half or a third
  of a soul, or of the extension which a soul
  occupies. Nor does the soul become any smaller if
  we cut off some parts of the body, but it becomes
  completely separate from the body when we break
  up the assemblage of the bodys organs.

42

• 31. There is a little gland in the brain where
  the soul exercises its functions more
  particularly than in the other parts of the body
• We need to recognize also that although the soul
  is joined to the whole body, nevertheless there
  is a certain part of the body where it exercises
  its functions more particularly than in all the
  others. It is commonly held that this part is the
  brain because the sense organs are related to
  it ... the innermost part of the brain, which is
  a certain very small gland situated in the middle
  of the brains substance and suspended above the
  passage through which the spirits in the brains
  anterior cavities communicate with those in its
  posterior cavities. (The Passion of the Soul CSM
  I 339-40)

43

• Sameness of Body
• Existence thorough time our body keep changing,
  yet it is the same as the one we got in our
  infancy.
• That remains the same, though, are not the
  qualitative properties but its numerical
  identity. The latter is granted by the soul. The
  numerical identity of ones body rests on the
  identity of ones mind.

44

• But when we speak of the body of a man, we do
  not mean the determinate part of matter, or one
  that has a determinate size we mean simply the
  whole of the matter, or one which is united with
  the soul of that man. And so, event through the
  matter change, and its quantity increase or
  decrease, we still believe that it is the same
  body, numerically the same body. So long as it
  remains joined and substantially united with the
  same soul there is no longer in them any part
  of the matter which then belonged to them and
  even though they do not have the same shape any
  longer so that they are only numerically the
  same because they are informed by the same soul
  (Letter to Mesland 9 Feb. 1645 CSMK III 243)

45

• In the same letter Descartes recognises the
  ambiguity in the world body
• I consider what exactly is the body of a man,
  and I find that this word body is very
  ambiguous. When we speak of a body in general, we
  mean a determinate part of matter, a part of the
  quantity of which the universe is composed. In
  this sense, if the smallest amount of that
  quantity were removed, we would judge without
  more ado that the body was smaller and no longer
  complete and if any particle of the matter were
  changed, we would at once think that the body was
  no longer quite the same, no longer numerically
  the same. (Letter to Mesland 9 Feb. 1645 CSMK
  III 242-3)

46

• In the Meditations body is defined generally.
• By a body I understand whatever has a
  determinate shape and a definable location and
  can occupy a space in such a way as to exclude
  any other body it can be perceived by touch,
  sight, hearing, taste or smell, and can move in
  various ways, not by itself but by whatever else
  comes into contact with it. For, according to my
  judgement, the power of self-movement, like the
  power of sensation of thought, was quite foreign
  to the nature of a body. (Second Meditation CSM
  II 17)

47
Descartes Error

• Feelings (cf. Damasio. 1994. Descartes Error)
• It is wrong to consider the working of the brain
  and mind as separate from the working of the
  body.
• The mind is part and parcel of the body.
• E.g. background feelings, i.e. the underlying
  awareness of the state that your body is in.

48

• Background awareness depends on the various
  neuronal and hormonal signals arising from the
  body organs (skin, hearth, ) that are sent to
  and processed by the brain.
• These signals provide a continuous update on the
  changes that our body state undergoes.
• These background feelings provide our sense of
  self.

49

• We process information emanating from our entire
  body.
• Hence, we wouldnt be the same person if our
  brain were transplanted in another person.
• For the body would provide different information.

50

• On top of background feelings we also have
  stronger feelings arising when we experience
  emotions in response to particular events.
• New born babies tend to show only primary
  emotions (e.g. fear) which are innate and
  pre-organized.
• As we grow we develop and make more use of
  secondary emotions which are primary emotions
  tempered by experience.
• Emotions become associated with particular
  experiences. Thus their link with learning.

51

• Peptides
• Are neurotransmitters produced in the brain.
• They are also active in the human immune system
  and endocrine system.
• Hence, they participate in the constant
  relationship between the brain and the body.