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Tragedy of the Commons; Environment; Safety

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... of the Commons; Environment; ... be its own 'mini-lecture' Today: Three mini-lectures ... Total benefit of the grassy field is zero without property rights ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Tragedy of the Commons; Environment; Safety


1
Tragedy of the Commons Environment Safety
  • Today Three applications of market failure
    without government intervention

2
For the rest of the quarter
  • We will cover various topics
  • Each topic will be its own mini-lecture
  • Today Three mini-lectures
  • Tragedy of the Commons/Property rights
  • Environmental regulation
  • Safety regulation

3
Tragedy of the Commons/ Property rights
  • Property rights are important in order for a
    person or firm to efficiently use its resources
  • Classic example
  • Lack of property rights in a grassy field
  • Total benefit of the grassy field is zero without
    property rights

4
Our example today
  • Two investment options
  • A safe stock that always sells for 20 in
    equilibrium
  • Pays 1 per year every year forever
  • Buy a 1-year-old calf today for 100
  • Able to sell at two years old
  • The more calves on the grassy field, the less
    each will be worth at two years old

5
What is the return on the safe stock?
  • Recall from earlier in the quarter
  • The present value of a permanent annual payment
  • PV M / r
  • PV 20
  • M 1
  • This implies that r 0.05, or 5

6
Income from calves
of calves on the commons Price per 2-year-old cow sold () Income per cow ( per year)
1 130 30
2 120 20
3 114 14
4 111 11
5 108 8
6 105 5
7 102 2
7
What will happen w/o property rights?
  • People will buy calves as long as the return on
    the commons is at least 5
  • 5 return for the 100 investment

8
Income from calves w/o property rights Rate of
return of 5
of calves on the commons Price per 2-year-old cow sold () Income per cow ( per year)
1 130 30
2 120 20
3 114 14
4 111 11
5 108 8
6 105 5
7 102 2
Equilibrium w/o property rights
9
What will happen w/o property rights?
  • People will buy calves as long as the return on
    the commons is at least 5
  • 5 return for the 100 investment
  • This is not efficient, however
  • No gain versus the safe stock investment
  • Similar to the no-toll situation on congestible
    routes

10
What is efficient?
  • We need marginal analysis
  • Find marginal income of each calf
  • If marginal income is at least 5 ? invest in
    another calf
  • If marginal income is less than 5 ? stop
    investing

11
Income from calves with property rights
of calves on the commons Price per 2-year-old cow sold () Income per cow ( per year) Total calf income ( per year) Marginal income ( per year)
30
1 130 30 30  
        10
2 120 20 40  
        2
3 114 14 42
        2
4 111 11 44  
Invest as long as marginal income is at least 5
12
Income from calves with property rights
of calves on the commons Price per 2-year-old cow sold () Income per cow ( per year) Total calf income ( per year) Marginal income ( per year)
30
1 130 30 30  
        10
2 120 20 40  
        2
3 114 14 42
        2
4 111 11 44  
gt5 ? INVEST
gt5 ? INVEST
lt5 ? STOP!
Invest as long as marginal income is at least 5
13
What is the commons worth as a private good?
  • An optimal investor (with property rights) will
    invest to maximize the value of commons
  • Suppose that someone has 1000 to invest
  • What is each persons willingness to pay for the
    commons?
  • How much will be invested in
  • Stocks?
  • Calves?

14
Investment analysis
  • A person that owns the commons will buy 2 calves
  • 200 invested
  • 40 return
  • Could get 10 return on the safe stock instead
  • 30 extra in return
  • Willing to pay 600 to purchase the commons
  • Note that the commons can be used every year

15
Investment decision for the commons owner
  • Investment decision of the person buying the
    commons
  • 600 to buy commons
  • 200 to buy two calves
  • 200 in safe stocks
  • Total returns 50
  • Commons
  • 40 for two calves
  • Stock returns
  • 10 in payments
  • This is equilibrium, since any person will be
    indifferent between investing in the commons and
    in stocks

16
Summary Tragedy of the Commons
  • Without private ownership, use of commons leads
    to no gain to society, relative to safe
    investments
  • With private ownership, the land has a positive
    value

17
Environmental regulation
  • Environmental quality is a good that people want
  • Problems with providing environmental quality
  • Goods without markets (air quality, global
    temperature, rivers)
  • Goods that governments own (parks)

18
Environmental regulation and externalities
  • Recall externalities chapter
  • With negative externalities, too much of some
    goods are produced, relative to efficient
    outcomes possible
  • Three ways of reducing pollution
  • Taxes
  • Pollution permits
  • Arbitrary controls (also known as command and
    control methods)

19
Environmental regulation and efficiency
  • Assume we are trying to find efficiency in an
    air-polluted city
  • To reach the efficient level of pollution, we
    need to find firms with the lowest cost to abate
    pollution

20
Environmental regulation and efficiency
  • Example with 3 firms
  • Efficient level of pollution, as determined by
    the government 5 tons of smoke per day
  • One of the two approaches (taxes or permits) is
    needed to solve for the optimal distribution of
    pollution
  • We do not spend much time on command and
    control methods since it is often sub-optimal

21
Example
  • Three firms produce light bulbs
  • With no abatement technology, each firm produces
    4 tons of smoke per day
  • 12 tons of smoke with no regulation
  • To reach efficient level of 5 tons, 7 tons need
    to be abated
  • Some firms can more easily abate pollution than
    others
  • If firms with low abatement costs abate the most,
    we can get an efficient result

22
Example
Tons of smoke emitted per day 4 3 2 1 0
Total abatement cost, firm A 0 14 30 50 75
Total abatement cost, firm B 0 20 45 80 120
Total abatement cost, firm C 0 25 60 100 150
  • Notice that marginal abatement costs increase as
    more is abated
  • Firm A 14 MC to abate 1st unit 16 for the
    2nd unit 20 for the 3rd unit 25 for the 4th
    unit

23
Example
Tons of smoke emitted per day 4 3 2 1 0
Total abatement cost, firm A 0 14 30 50 75
Total abatement cost, firm B 0 20 45 80 120
Total abatement cost, firm C 0 25 60 100 150
  • We need to find the 7 tons with the lowest
    abatement MC
  • Lets start by adding arrows to abatement MC of
    20 per ton or less
  • Not enough Only 4 tons abated

24
Example
Tons of smoke emitted per day 4 3 2 1 0
Total abatement cost, firm A 0 14 30 50 75
Total abatement cost, firm B 0 20 45 80 120
Total abatement cost, firm C 0 25 60 100 150
  • Lets try 30 abatement MC or less
  • 7 green arrows
  • We now have reached the efficient level of 5 tons
    of emissions

25
Our two methods to reach an efficient result
  • Pollution tax
  • Find a tax such that exactly 7 tons of pollution
    will be abated
  • Sell pollution permits
  • Find a price such that exactly 5 tons of
    pollution permits are demanded

26
Pollution tax
Tons of smoke emitted per day 4 3 2 1 0
Total abatement cost, firm A 0 14 30 50 75
Total abatement cost, firm B 0 20 45 80 120
Total abatement cost, firm C 0 25 60 100 150
  • Lets try a 30 tax
  • Firm A will abate all 4 tons of smoke, since
    abatement cost is lower for each ton of smoke
    removed
  • Firm B will abate 2 tons and pollute 2 tons
  • Firm C will abate 1 ton and pollute 3 tons

27
Pollution tax
Tons of smoke emitted per day 4 3 2 1 0
Total abatement cost, firm A 0 14 30 50 75
Total abatement cost, firm B 0 20 45 80 120
Total abatement cost, firm C 0 25 60 100 150
  • 7 tons abated
  • 5 tons polluted
  • We have found a tax that leads to the efficient
    pollution level

28
Pollution permits
Tons of smoke emitted per day 4 3 2 1 0
Total abatement cost, firm A 0 14 30 50 75
Total abatement cost, firm B 0 20 45 80 120
Total abatement cost, firm C 0 25 60 100 150
  • What if you need a permit to pollute?
  • What if we sell permits for 30 each?
  • Firm A will demand no permits (and abate 4 tons)
  • Firm B will demand 2 permits (and abate 2 tons)
  • Firm C will demand 3 permits (and abate 1 ton)

29
Pollution permits
Tons of smoke emitted per day 4 3 2 1 0
Total abatement cost, firm A 0 14 30 50 75
Total abatement cost, firm B 0 20 45 80 120
Total abatement cost, firm C 0 25 60 100 150
  • 7 tons abated
  • 5 tons polluted
  • We have found a price for permits that leads to
    the efficient pollution level

30
Alternative to taxes and permits
Command-and-control methods
  • An alternate method to control pollution is for
    the government to dictate that each firm reduce
    its pollution by a given percentage
  • Example Each firm must reduce emissions by 25
  • Problem Usually not efficient

31
Alternative to taxes and permits
Command-and-control methods
Tons of smoke emitted per day 4 3 2 1 0
Total abatement cost, firm A 0 14 30 50 75
Total abatement cost, firm B 0 20 45 80 120
Total abatement cost, firm C 0 25 60 100 150
  • Example Each firm must abate 1 ton
  • Total cost 59 (see red arrows)
  • Total cost if firm A abates 2 tons and firm B
    abates 1 ton 50 (see green ovals)

32
Summary Environmental regulation
  • Markets with externalities usually require
    government intervention to have optimal outcomes
    to occur
  • Taxes Efficient (with the right tax)
  • Permits Efficient (if permit price leads to an
    efficient amount of pollution)
  • Command and control methods Almost never
    efficient

33
Workplace safety
  • In a perfectly competitive labor market
  • Firms will provide the optimal amount of safety
  • Workers will be hired by a firm
  • Threat to leave firm will prevent the firm from
    lowering safety standards

34
The real world
  • Many countries have laws dictating a minimum
    level of safety to workers
  • Why?
  • Although most labor markets are competitive in
    the long run, there are frictions in the short
    run that prevent immediate job movement

35
What else is going on?
  • Todays work affects the company today, but the
    worker for a lifetime ? Workers value safety
  • Example Lose an arm ? Firm lays you off lower
    worker productivity for a lifetime
  • Firm does not care about future earnings of the
    worker
  • In many countries Government support needed if
    the worker is unable to find a job

36
Unions and workplace safety
  • Note that unions not only fight for high wages,
    but also working conditions
  • Unions can be beneficial in determining the
    optimal amount of worker safety

37
Other methods to increase safety
  • Offer financial incentives
  • Higher safety ? Bonuses (money, gift
    certificates, tickets for prize giveaways)
  • Increased training
  • Shorter work days
  • Tired people are more likely to be clumsy and
    inattentive
  • Workers compensation
  • Insurance system for those injured while working

38
Safety outside of the workplace
  • Many safety laws exist that are not related to
    workplaces
  • These laws often affect children, who are unable
    to fend for themselves
  • Child seats in cars
  • Crib safety
  • Reduced speeds near schools
  • Some speed limits near schools are now 15 miles
    per hour

39
Summary Workplace safety
  • Workplace safety laws try to establish an
    efficient amount of worker safety
  • Other attempts to increase workplace safety
    Unions, financial incentives, increased training,
    shorter work days, and workers compensation
    programs

40
Monday
  • Health care
  • Information topics
  • Reading
  • Pages 295-305

41
Enjoy life,take a deep breath
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