CPHL709: Religion, Science

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CPHL709 Religion, Science Philosophy

• Science and Pseudo-science

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Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations

• Popper on the Demarcation Problem
• Popper was an important 20th century philosopher.
• His main areas of contribution were in the
  philosophy of science and epistemology.
• He was interested in the demarcation problem of
  distinguishing science from non-science or
  pseudo science.

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Popper, Conjectures and Refutations

• According to Popper, science does not proceed, as
  the logical positivists supposed, by verification
  and induction (i.e. by the process of inducing
  theories based on empirical evidence.)
• Rather, it proceeds by falsification what makes
  a theory or doctrine scientific is that it can be
  falsified. There are (in principle) crucial
  experiments or experiences that would falsify
  them.
• In other words, scientific theories must be risky
  they must take the chance of being proven
  false.

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Popper, Conjectures and Refutations

• Heres the falsification principle in a nutshell
• A theory is falsifiable only if we can specify
  conditions under which the theory would be proven
  false. A theory whose conditions of falsehood
  can be specified is called a falsifiable theory.
• Notice that a falsifiable theory isnt
  necessarily false. To say that it is falsifiable
  is simply to say that we can at least imagine
  conditions that would prove it false.

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Popper, Conjectures and Refutations

• Examples of falsifiable theories
• i. Einsteins theory of relativity
  (corroborated by Eddingtons eclipse
  observations)
• ii. Newtons theory of gravity (corroborated
  by observations of planetary orbits).
• iii. The theory that the sun goes around the
  earth (one that has in fact been falsified)

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Popper, Conjectures and Refutations

• A.J. Ayers positivist, verificationist
  criterion of demarcation is too inclusive it
  labels theories as scientific that dont seem to
  have scientific credentials.
• e.g. Marxs theory of history, Freuds theory
  of psycho-analysis, astrology
• These theories are easy to confirm since
  confirming evidence can be found almost anywhere,
  given the appropriate interpretation yet they
  are perhaps impossible to falsify

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Flew et al, Theology and Falsification

• The Meaningfulness of Religious Language
• A radical criticism of religion is that it is
  neither true nor false, but more severely,
  nonsensical.
• Antony Flew argues in favour of this view,
  regarding specifically typical theistic
  utterances.
• He argues that such utterances are not genuine
  beliefs or "assertions" at all, and thus are
  neither true nor false they are altogether
  meaningless.

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Flew, Theology and Falsification

• Flews argument is an application to religion of
  Poppers falsification principle.
• Consider a typical religious claim such as God
  loves us.
• According to Flew, believers are never willing to
  specify conditions under which such a claim would
  be proven false.

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Flew, Theology and Falsification

• Heres a simplified version of Flews argument,
  in standard form.
• A1
• P1. If an utterance U is meaningful, then there
  must be
• imaginable conditions that would count against
  U's
• being true.
• P2. It is not the case that there are imaginable
• conditions that would count against the truth
  of
• typical theistic utterances (such as God
  loves us)
• __________________
• C1.Typical theistic utterances are not meaningful
• assertions.

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Flew, Theology and Falsification

• Objections to Flew's Argument
• O1 A1 It is true that core religious utterances
  (such as the
• belief that God loves us) cannot be falsified
  by any
• specifiable conditions, yet they are still
  meaningful
• they are bliks, foundational interpretive
  structures
• that guide our understanding of the specific
• conditions of the world. Rejects P1. (R.M.
  Hare).
• O2 A1 Core religious utterances are not
  conclusively falsifiable. But
• certain conditions might, more or less, be
  understood to count
• against core religious utterances this shows
  that those
• utterances are not altogether meaningless.
  Rejects P2 (Basil
• Mitchell)
• O3 A1 Certain meaningful assertions are not,
  even in principle,
• falsifiable if false they are, however
  verifiable (in principle) if true. Rejects P1
  (John Hick)