David Rodin, Terrorism without Intentions

1
David Rodin, Terrorism without Intentions

• David Rodin is Director of Research at the
  Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics at Oxford
  University.

2
Rodins Thesis

• Rodin argues that some harms inflicted
  unintentionally on noncombatantsso called
  collateral damagemay . . . Be properly
  characterized as terrorist (p. 553).

3
Defining Terrorism

• There are at least four different theoretical
  approaches that can be used to define terrorism
• (1) Tactical and operational (weapons used)
• (2) Teleological (ends or goals of the violence)
• (3) Agent-focused (nature of the actor)
• (4) Object-focused (targets of the attacks)
• For Rodin the fourth approach is the most
  important, since it allows for a moral
  understanding of terrorism that fully recognizes
  that terrorism consists in the use of force
  against those who should not have force used
  against them (p. 555).

4
A Moral Definition of Terrorism

• Rodin defines terrorism as the deliberate,
  negligent, or reckless use of force against
  noncombatants, by state or nonstate actors for
  ideological ends and in the absence of
  substantively just legal process (p. 555).
• He then examines the five clauses of this
  definition in detail
• (a) Use of force
• (b) Ideological ends
• (c) Noncombatants
• (d) State or nonstate actor
• (e) Substantively just legal process

5
Collateral Casualties and Double Effect

• According to traditional moral theory . . .
  collateral casualties are considered the
  regrettable but generally permissible side effect
  of legitimate military activity and are strongly
  distinguished from terrorism. In what follows I
  aim to cast doubt on this assessment. Doing so
  will entail examining a feature of moral theory
  which has long been thought to support it the
  doctrine or principle of double effect. A
  standard formulation of the principle of double
  effect is as follows. One may never
  intentionally bring about an evil, either as an
  end in itself, or as a means to some greater
  good. Nonetheless, one may use neutral or good
  means to achieve a good end which one foresees
  will have evil consequences provided that (i) the
  evil consequences are not disproportionate to he
  intended good, (ii) the action is necessary in
  the sense that there is no less costly way of
  achieving the good (p. 560).

6
Double Effect and Terror vs. Tactical Bombing

• The double-effect principle has traditionally
  been taken to ground a moral distinction between
  the deliberate targeting of noncombatants, often
  called terror bombing, and tactical bombing,
  which aims at military targets but may cause
  collateral damage among noncombatants. In terror
  bombing, so the argument goes, the agent intends
  the death of noncombatants as a means to his
  ends. This is always wrong, though the goodness
  and viability of the ends may be very great
  indeed. In tactical bombing, on the other hand,
  the agent intends only to strike at legitimate
  military targets. The death of noncombatants,
  while it is a foreseen consequence of the action,
  is not intended either as a means or as an end. .
  . . Provided the requirements of necessity and
  proportionality are met, therefore, the action,
  together with its foreseen consequences, is not
  impermissible (p. 560).

7
An Objection to the Principle of Double Effect

• Rodin criticizes the principle of double-effect
  by contrasting it with two considerations that
  explain how legal and moral culpability may exist
  in the absence of direct intention these are he
  concepts of recklessness and negligence (p.
  560).
• Recklessness the culpable bringing about of
  unintentional evil consequences (or the risk
  therof) that are in fact unreasonable and
  unjustified in the circumstances (p. 560).
• Negligence the failure to take reasonable
  precautions in the face of a foreseeable risk
  (p. 561).
• Ex The motorist and the medical researcher (p.
  561).

8
Standards of Care in Military Operations

• Rodin argues as follows
• (1) The more dangerous the activity one is
  engaged in, the higher the standard of care
  required.
• (2) Aerial bombardment is a highly dangerous
  activity.
• (3) Therefore, aerial bombardment requires a
  high
• standard of care.
• Objection to (1) in certain circumstances,
  often in emergencies, it is justifiable to
  observe a lower standard of care and to incur a
  higher degree of risk than would otherwise be
  appropriate.
• But, Rodin responds, a crucial part of what
  makes the risk justifiable is that the party
  assuming the risk is also the beneficiary of the
  risk-producing activity (p. 562).

9
Recklessness, Negligence, and Terrorism

• But the question remains should reckless and
  negligent harming of noncombatants through aerial
  bombardment properly be regarded as terrorist?
• Objection leave the definition of terrorism
  alone and strengthen the proportionality
  requirement of just war theory.
• Rodins response
• (a) Proportionality has its most natural
  application in he domestic sphere.
• (b) The proportionality response . . . rests on
  a misunderstanding of the reasons why the
  unintended infliction of harm or risk upon
  noncombatants is morally problematic (p. 564).

10
Two Conclusions for Policy

• We should be extremely cautious about
  extending the rules of jus ad bellum so as to
  include terrorism as a just cause for war (p.
  565).
• In terms of jus in bello, it seems
  intuiitively correct that any engagement that has
  as part of its goal the elimination of terrorist
  threats and which is called a war on terror
  should not, if it is to be legitimate, use
  terrorist tactics itself (p. 566).