PHL 201 March 18, 2004

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PHL 201March 18, 2004

• Quiz 3 Answers
• Next Quiz Mar. 26 (new format)
• Essay Assignments
• Chapter Four The Self
• Faculty Course Surveys

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Chapter Four The Self

• How do we think about the self?
• Personal Identity
• The Bundle Theory of the Self
• The Self as an Organizing Principle

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How do we think about the self?

• (i) Some things we actually think about
  ourselves
• -We were once smaller than we are now.
• -We will become older than we are now.
• -As we age our bodies change.
• -The organic material that composes our bodies
  changes over time.
• -Our memories will fade or change over time.
• -We could survive losing certain parts of our
  bodies.

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• -The first list is compatible with a
  materialistic view of what we are we are
  material bodies.
• -The second list suggests that we are more than
  just bodies.
• -It suggests we are immaterial souls that are
  contingently fastened to our bodies.
• -we can change shape and form over time,
  and can exist without being connected to our
  bodies

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• -René Descartes (1596-1650) thought he had good
  reason for thinking that his body and his soul
  were distinct kinds of things
• -he also thought he had a clear and distinct
  idea about what his soul/self was
• -David Hume (1711-1776) disagreed
• -when he introspected, all he was aware of were
  particular sensations or thoughts
• -he was never aware of something more
• -his self was elusive to introspection
• -if he possessed a self, he thought it
  would be observable by introspection

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• -Other philosophers, e.g. Descartes and Thomas
  Reid (1710-1796), have thought that the soul must
  be simple, non-composite, and indivisible
• -many have thought that if the soul is simple,
  then it must be immortal (indestructible)
• If something changes or decays, then it must be
  composed of parts.
• The soul is not composed of parts.
• Therefore,
• The soul does not change or decay

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• -If this is a sound argument, then it follows
  that the soul will survive the death of our
  bodies.
• -However, if its sound, it also follows that our
  souls existed before we were born.
• -This does sound odd.
• -Note that this argument does not give us reason
  for thinking that if the soul is composed of
  parts, then it must be mortal.

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Personal Identity

• -We think that we are the same person today that
  we were yesterday (a week ago, a year ago, ten
  years ago)
• -We also think that, if we live long enough,
  there will be someone ten years from now who is
  us i.e. someone who is identical to us
• -But what conditions must obtain for it to be
  true that someone at an earlier time/later time
  is identical to who we are now?

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Some Logical Properties of Identity

• If A, B, and C are names objects, then
• A is identical to A (Everything is identical to
  itself Identity is a reflexive relation.)
• If A is identical to B, then B is identical to A
  (Identity is a symmetrical relation.)
• - If A is identical to B, and B is identical to
  C, then A is identical to C. (Identity is a
  transitive relation.)

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The Ship of Theseus

• An illustration of how difficult it can be to
  think about identity over time (Diachronic
  Identity)
• -Theseus sails away in a new ship called Argos.
• -Over time, Theseus replaces parts of the ship as
  they age, and replaces them with new parts.
• -Twenty years later, every part of Argos has been
  replaced and the ship has been renamed Argos1.
• -Socrates finds all the original pieces in a
  shipyard and assembles them into a ship Argos2

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A Puzzle About Identity

• Consider the three ships Argos, Argos1, and
  Argos2.
• -If Socrates had not reassembled the old parts to
  make Argos2, we would all say that ArgosArgos1.
• -But since he did assemble the parts, it is not
  easy to decide whether Argos1 or Argos2 is
  identical to the original Argos.
• -How would you decide?

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A Puzzle About Identity

• Consider the three ships Argos, Argos1, and
  Argos2.
• -If Socrates had not reassembled the old parts to
  make Argos2, we would all say that ArgosArgos1.
• -But since he did assemble the parts, it is not
  easy to decide whether Argos1 or Argos2 is
  identical to the original Argos.
• -How would you decide?

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Oak Trees and Ships

• John Locke (1632-1704) compared personal identity
  with identity across time in case of other
  organic things e.g. plants or trees
• -to be same plant over time does not require same
  constituent parts
• -what it does require, thought Locke, is same
  organizational/functional structure
• -the same might hold for persons i.e. we are
  same person over time if we preserve the same
  functional/organizational structure

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Souls and Elastic Balls

• -Blackburn argues that immaterial souls would not
  help us understand personal identity across time
• -we are able to count persons (as the same or
  different) without essential reference to
  immaterial souls
• -also, we know nothing about the nature of
  immaterial souls (what are they like?)
• -for all we know, they might be replaced every
  night as we sleep
• -the same does not hold for
  organizational/functional structure

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Personal Identity and Memory

• Locke argued that memory was necessary and
  sufficient for personal identity across time
• -A person, A, is the same as someone, B, at an
  earlier time if and only if A is conscious of Bs
  experiences (that is, if and only if A has
  memories of what B experienced)
• -a consequence of this is we cannot survive
  complete amnesia
• -also, in cases of partial amnesia, we would
  conclude that we are not same person

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Thomas Reids Objection

• Reid argued that Lockes account was
  contradictory
• -Consider three temporal stages of your life, A,
  B, and C.
• -Suppose you won a prize at A, and that you can
  remember this at B.
• -It follows that you are the same person at B
  that you were at A (A B).
• -Suppose that at stage C, you can remember
  getting a job at stage B.
• -It follows that you are the same person at C
  that you were at B (B C).
• -Suppose, finally, that at stage C, you can
  remember nothing about stage A.
• -It would therefore follow that you are not the
  same person at stage C that were at stage A.
• -But identity is a transitive relation (If AB
  and BC, then AC)
• -Therefore, if Lockes account is correct, at
  stage C you are not the same person as at stage
  A, but you also are the same person as at stage
  A.

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Humes Bundle Theory (Again)

• Hume argued that if you dont observe the self in
  experience, then youve no right to say it
  exists.
• -the self, on Humes view, is just an aggregate
  of perceptions (content but no container)
• Problem Can we really make sense of idea of
  unowned perceptions
• -perceptions seem to be features of persons just
  like dents are features of, e.g., cars.
• -there certainly seems to be an I or ego that
  accompanies all perceptions (I am currently
  aware of a pain in my back. How would you say
  this without using egocentric words like I and
  my?)

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The Self as Organizing Principle of Experience

• We might respond to Hume by rejecting the idea
  that self must be something substantial which we
  observe in introspection.
• -Kant (1724-1804) argued that concept of a self
  was a necessary accompaniment of all experiences
• -all experiences require a point of view (an
  implicit reference to who it is thats having the
  experience)
• -see pp.138-139 of Think