The TamilSinhala Conflict in Sri Lanka

1
The Tamil-Sinhala Conflict in Sri Lanka

• Part One

2
Table of Contents

• Images of the conflict (slide 3)
• Summary of events since 2002 (slides
• Current state of the problem (slides 4-7)
• Basic data (slides 8-9)
• What the conflict is all about (slides 10-14)
• Chronology of the conflict (slide 15)
• Historical antecedents (slides 16-17)
• Beginning of the conflict (slides 18-20)
• Escalation of the conflict (slide 20-23)
• Ceasefire and its aftermath (slides 24-26)

3
Images of the Conflict

• Price of war for women
• Future without hope
• Fighting for rights or adventure?
• Displacement
• Culture of fear
• Suicide bombers
• Is there any hope?

4
Summary of Events since 2002

• Ceasefire agreement since December 2002
• Reduced tensions
• Ushered a degree of peace and normalcy
• Violations of ceasefire, mostly by the LTTE,
  since the ceasefire
• Tensions have increased since Mahinda Rajapakse
  became the president in November 2005
• Several major provocations by the LTTE
• August 2005 Lakshman Kadiragamar was
  assassinated
• April 2006 a suicide bomber attack the main
  military compound in Colombo. The military
  launched air strikes on Tamil Tiger targets
• May 2006 Tamil Tiger attack a naval convoy near
  Jaffna, a gross violation of the ceasefire
  agreement
• May 2006 the LTTE is declared a terrorist
  organization by the EU
• June 2006 Oviliamadu massacre 'firing practice'
  for child cadres

5
Current State of the Game Different Views

• War in all but name
• Imperium in imperio
• Tales from the front line
• After the bomb fuel of fear and hate
• Axe falls
• Curbing the support of diaspora?
• Sabre rattling
• The spectre of Sinhala nationalist terrorism
• Bin Laden, George Washington and V. Prabhakaran
• Solutions
• Death of a Thousand Cuts
• Devolution of power

6
The Problem

• The LTTE is engaged in an armed conflict with the
  government of Sri Lanka to gain a separate state
  for the Tamils since 1971
• An issue of minority rights involving the
  Sinhalese vs. the Tamils since independence
  (1948)
• Mass violence against the Tamils in areas outside
  the northern and eastern parts of the island
  (1956, 1977 and 1983)
• Ethnic cleansing in the northern and eastern
  parts of the island by the LTTE as a means to
  achieve its goal
• Regular acts of violence committed by the LTTE
• Acts of oppression and intimidation of Tamils in
  the northern and eastern parts of the island
  committed or condoned by the state
• Strong opposition to separatism on the part of
  some extremist groups among the Sinhalese (JVP)
• A marked reluctance to arrive at a compromise
  solution by both parties

7
Mea Culpa

• The present state of the conflict is the
  cumulative outcome of
• Perceived rights and prejudices
• Political greed and irresponsibility
• Desire for greater political power
• Intolerance of any other political view
• Making use of any ideological weapon at hand to
  acquire and strengthen political power
• Action-reaction syndrome
• Effects of globalization
• Diaspora and the conflict
• Funding the LTTE
• Technology comes to the aid
• NGOs and the conflict
• International invention for what purpose?

8
Some Basic Data

• Administrative divisions of Sri Lanka
• Distribution of the Tamil Population in the
  Eastern Province
• Distribution of the Sinhala and Muslim
  populations in the Eastern province
• Country profile in statistics
• Population growth

9
A Profile of Sri Lanka

• Total population 18.9 million (1999)
• Population by ethnicity
• Sinhala 74
• Sri Lankan Tamil 13
• Indian Tamil 5
• Muslim 7
• Other 1
• Population by religion
• Buddhist 69
• Hindu 15
• Islam 8
• Christian 7
• Other 1
• National languages
• Sinhala
• Tamil
• English

10
A Conflict of Cultures?

• Is it a conflict between the Sinhalese and Tamils
  with entrenched cultural identities?
• There are cultural differences
• They are not insurmountable
• There is no open conflict involving people at
  large from both communities
• Both communities lived in peace before and since
  1956
• Periodic mass violence or the conflict in the
  north-eastern provinces have not prevented the
  Tamils and Sinhalese living together

11
Spectre of Sinhala Nationalism?

• Is there a consolidated Sinhala-Buddhist
  opposition to the Tamils?
• The Sinhalese and the Buddhists are not
  monolithic groups
• The Sinhala-Buddhist identity as a political
  weapon is used by some Sinhala politicians and
  their followers
• The Sinhalese (Buddhists and Christians) are
  divided over the issue concerning the Tamils and
  so are the Tamils (Hindus and Christians)

12
Tamils in the North vs. Sinhalese in the South?

• A conflict between Sinhalese in the south vs.
  the Tamils in the north-east?
• The Tamil population is dispersed
• Tamils in Sinhala areas
• 1971 29.2
• 1981 32.8
• 2001 34.0
• Sinhalese in the north-east
• 1971 4.5
• 1981 3.0
• 2001 0.0
• There are no Sinhalese in the extreme north since
  1987
• They have been removed by force by the LTTE
• Tamils outside the north and east have been
  forced to move out temporarily in the aftermath
  of mass violence in 1959, 1977 and 1983
• But the majority of them moved back once order
  was restored

13
Genocide of Tamils?

• The LTTE persistently claims of a genocide of
  Tamils since 1948
• Information has to be carefully scrutinized
• More often than not information is misrepresented
  (example 1 and example 2)
• There have been episodes of killing of Tamils, by
  the security forces, groups of people and, in
  recent years, by paramilitary groups
• But a systematic elimination of Tamils has not
  taken place
• The claims of Tamil genocide looks dubious in
  view of the fact that more than one-third of all
  Tamils and all Indian Tamils live outside the
  north and the east
• There is clear evidence of ethnic cleansing of
  Muslims and Sinhalese in the north and the east
  (sporadically before 1983)

14
Not a Simple Case

• Neither the state of Sri Lanka nor the LTTE can
  claim moral high ground of innocent party
• The conflict involves the state and the LTTE,
  which claims it is the sole representative for
  the Tamils
• The LTTE has acquired the reputation of a
  ruthless political organization to coax the
  Tamils in the north and the east to its agenda
  for a separate state
• The vast majority of people in the country do not
  want two separate states
• The conflict has become complicated because of
  external factors
• Intransigence on the part of both sides makes a
  solution difficult

15
Chronology of the Conflict

• A short chronology of events
• A detailed chronology of events of the conflict

16
The Tamils in Sri Lanka

• Patterns of settlements of population up to the
  12th century
• Tamils lived in Sri Lanka from the early years of
  the Christian era
• Periodic Tamil incursions from South India did
  not last long
• The north-eastern part of Sri Lanka did not
  constitute a Tamil land throughout the history
  of the island
• There was a Tamil kingdom in the north for a
  short period in the 14th century
• The Sinhala rulers confined their rule to the
  area to the south of the northern province after
  1500
• The north-eastern parts were administered by the
  Portuguese and the Dutch (1500-1795) through
  native intermediaries
• The British colonial rule (1795-1948)
  consolidated an ethnic divide in politics and
  economy
• Eurasians and Tamils were the majority of
  educated and state-employed elite well into the
  1940s
• Tamils enjoyed a proportion of education (and
  concomitant power) vis-à-vis the Sinhalese before
  1956

17
Ethnic Composition of Population, 1946-1981
18
Beginning of the Conflict

• The Tamils enjoyed a greater degree of privileges
  than the Sinhalese under the British colonial
  rule (1795-1948)
• Tamil community was uneasy with the provisions
  for minority groups in independent Sri Lanka
  (1948)
• Universal suffrage and electoral system under a
  unitary state
• The Tamil community unsuccessfully tried to
  retain its position to secure its place in the
  country (1948-1956)
• The majority of Sinhalese did not benefit from
  political independence
• Medium of education, administration and
  employment was English

19
The First Wave of Communal Violence

• A major political upheaval in 1956
• The ruling UNP (pro-Western and English educated)
  lost power to the LSFP (pro-socialist) and
  supportive of rights for the Sinhala-speaking
  people
• 1956 Sinhala became the medium of education and
  administration
• 1957 higher education in English, Sinhala and
  Tamil
• Tamil politicians opposed changes
• 1957 Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact
• Sinhalese opposition to the pact and Tamil
  reaction
• 1958 Anti-Tamil riots
• 1959 Bandaranaike was assassinated
• 1959 Switch-over of administration to Sinhala
  only
• Great publicity but little action in most places
• But it was a weapon against the Tamils and
  Eurasians in public service
• Tamil public servants were not sacked, but
  required to learn Sinhala for administrative
  purposes within a reasonable period of time
• Sinhalese re-settlement of the north and
  north-central provinces gathered momentum

20
Development of the Conflict, 1960-1983

• 1960-1970 successive governments failed to
  address the legitimate grievances of Tamils
• 1971 emergence of two new political power groups
• The JVP (Sinhala)
• The LTTE (Tamil)
• 1977 second wave of mass violence after the
  general election (won by UNP)
• 1977-1983 low level conflict in the northern
  part of the island
• LTTE vs. the security forces
• LTTE killing Sinhalese in the north and east
• 1983 third wave of mass violence against the
  Tamils outside the north and east

21
Escalation of the Conflict, 1983-2002

• 1980s both parties were uncompromising
• The LTTE increased its brutal killings of
  civilians
• The government increased its reprisals in the
  north and the east
• 1987-1990 Abortive mediation of India
• 1993-2001 War and diplomacy
• 2002- Peace of a kind
• Oslo conference material
• Ceasefire agreement

22
Ceasefire 2002

• Who agreed with whom?
• The UNP-led government with the LTTE
• Why ceasefire?
• Both parties had been exhausted
• The LTTE needs regrouping its forces
• The security forces were restrained
• The UNP has always been pro-concessions to the
  Tamils
• The UNP is pro-Western and pro-capitalism (with
  unrestrained access to foreign capital)
• A political gain for the UNP vs. SLFP (led by
  Chandrika Kumaratunga)
• International pressure

23
Ceasefire in Action, 2002-2005

• Ceasefire has been useful for both parties
• Peace merchants
• The LTTE has acquired a degree of freedom of
  movement to gather its forces
• The government has also strengthened its military
  forces
• Ceasefire violations by both parties have
  increased
• LTTE eliminating its opponents among the Tamils
  as well as Sinhalese and Muslims in the north and
  east
• Security forces acting in retaliation
• The wild card secret killings by paramilitary
  groups of LTTE dissidents (Col. Karuna)

24
A New Regime in Power

• November 2005 presidential election won by
  Rajapakse (SLFP)
• Rajapakse won largely because of the LTTE made
  sure that the Tamils in the north and east will
  not vote for Wickramasinghe (UNP)
• But why?
• Is the LTTE toying with the idea of military
  action as the final solution?
• Or, does the LTTE think that the UNP is unable to
  deliver a lasting settlement?
• Rajapakse is restrained by coalition with the JVP
• The LTTE is reluctant to sit down for negotiation

25
Status Quo, December 2005 May 2006

• Open hostility of LTTE
• Has become increasingly provocative and large
  scale
• Aimed at provoking the government to retaliate
• Even the slightest retaliation is exploited for
  publicity
• Pressure to negotiate
• The government is under pressure to pursue a
  peaceful path (aid and investment as a weapon of
  persuasion)
• The LTTE is banned as a terrorist organization by
  the EU

26
What Sustains the Conflict?

• The Sinhalese faction
• Political pressure among the Sinhalese to stop
  carving up the island
• Fear of the Sinhalese of being involved in a
  continuous war after separation if it is allowed
• Fear of Sri Lanka coming under Indian hegemony
• The simple desire to have a greater share of
  everything that a majority is entitled
• The Tamil faction
• Reluctance to admit its position as a minority
• An overwhelming desire to acquire a greater share
  of wealth and power than allowed by its numeric
  strength
• Ability to dupe and subjugate the Tamil
  population to support the cause of a nostalgic
  homeland
• International organizations both formal and
  informal supporting the Tamil cause for various
  reasons