Congestion%20Avoidance%20

1
Congestion Avoidance Controlfor OSPF
Networks(draft-ash-manral-ospf-congestion-control
-00.txt)
Anurag Maunder Sanera Systems amaunder_at_sanera.net
Jerry Ash ATT gash_at_att.com
Gagan Choudhury ATT choudhury_at_att.com
Vera Sapozhnikova ATT sapozhnikova_at_att.com
Vishwas Manral NetPlane Systems vishwasm_at_netplane
.com
Mostafa Hashem Sherif ATT mhs_at_att.com
2
Outline (draft-ash-manral-ospf-congestion-control
-00.txt)

• problem
• concerns over scalability of IGP link-state
  protocols (e.g., OSPF)
• much evidence that LS protocols cannot recover
  from large failures widespread loss of topology
  database information
• failure experience
• vendor analysis
• simulation modeling
• propose protocol mechanisms to address problem
• throttle LSA updates/retranmissions
• detect notify congestion state
• neighbor nodes throttle LSA updates/retransmission
  s
• keep adjacencies up
• database backup resynchronization
• proprietary implementations of mechanisms have
  improved scalability/stability
• need standard features for uniform implementation
  interoperability
• issues discussed on list

3
Background Motivation

• Failure experience
• LS routing protocols cannot recover from large
  flooding storms
• triggered by wide range of causes network
  failures, bugs, operational errors, etc.
• flooding storm overwhelms processors, causes
  database asynchrony incorrect shortest path
  calculation, etc.
• ATT has experienced several very large LS
  protocol failures (4/13/1998, 7/2000, 2/20/2001,
  described in I-D)
• vendor analysis of LS protocol recovery from
  total network failure(loss of all database
  information in the specified scenario, 400 nodes,
  etc.)
• recovery time estimates up to 5.5 hours
• expectation is that vendor equipment recovery not
  adequate under large failure scenario
• network-wide event simulation model choudhury
• medium to large flooding storms cause network to
  recover with difficulty and/or not recover at all
• model validated -- results match actual network
  experience

4
Failure ExperienceATT Frame Relay Network,
4/13/98

• cause effect
• administrative error coupled with a software bug
• result was the loss of all topology database
  information
• the link-state protocol then attempted to recover
  the database with the usual Hello topology
  state updates (TSUs)
• huge overload of control messages kept network
  down for very long time
• several problems occurred to prevent the network
  from recovering properly (based on root-cause
  analysis)
• very large number of TSUs being sent to every
  node to process, causing general processor
  overload
• route computation based on incomplete topology
  recovery routes generated based on transient,
  asynchronous topology information then in need
  of frequent re-computation
• inadequate work queue management to allow
  processes to complete before more work is put
  into the process queue
• inability to access node processors with network
  management commands due to lack of necessary
  priority of these messages
• worked with vendor to make protocol fixes to
  address problems
• along the lines suggested in the I-D

5
Proposed Protocol MechanismsThrottle LSA
Updates/Retransmissions

• detect node-congestion by
• length of internal work queues
• high processor occupancy long CPU busy times
• notify congestion state to other nodes
• use TBD packet to convey congestion signal
• when a node detects congestion from a neighbor
• progressively decrease flooding rate, e.g.
• double LSA_RETRANSMIT_INTERVAL for low congestion
  
• quadruple LSA_RETRANSMIT_INTERVAL for high
  congestion
• simulation analysis shows proposed mechanisms
  perform effectively (Choudhury)
• deals better with non-linear failure modes than
  statistical detection/notification methods

6
Issues Discussed on List

• is there a problem (need to prevent catastrophic
  network collapse)
• most seem to agree there is a problem
• several have observed LSA storms their ill
  effects
• storms triggered by hardware failure, software
  bug, faulty operational practice, etc., many
  different events
• sometimes network cannot recover
• unacceptable to operators
• vendors invited to analyze failure scenario given
  in draft
• no response yet
• how to solve problem
• better/smart implementation/coding of protocol
  within current specification
• e.g., never losing an adjacency solves problem
• these are proprietary, single-vendor,
  implementation extensions
• standard protocol extensions
• for uniform implementation
• for multi-vendor interoperability
• already demonstrated with proprietary,
  single-vendor implementations

7
Issues Discussed on List

• what protocol extensions?
• not just signaling congestion message on the
  wire but also response
• need uniform response to congestion signal slow
  down by this much to be effective
• rather than implementation dependent response
• like helper router response to grace LSA from
  congested router in hitless restart
• how evaluate effectiveness of proposals
• expert analysis based on experience
• simulation
• a couple of academic shaky simulation
  comments
• validated simulations used widely
• for network design of routing features, nm
  features, congestion control, etc.
• for many years
• many large-scale network design examples (e.g.,
  Dynamic Routing in Telecommunications Networks,
  McGraw Hill)
• white-box approach
• implement text in the lab
• expert analysis, simulation, white-box all useful

8
Issues Discussed at IETF-55Routing Area Meeting
MPLS WG Meeting

• box builders view
• stop intruding into our box
• design choices should be made by box builders
• nothing wrong with current way of building boxes
• box users view
• still observe major failures
• most agree there is a problem (from list
  discussion)
• box-builder/vendor analysis shows unacceptable
  failure response (in draft)
• box-builders/vendors invited to analyze scenario
  in draft
• box-builders approach doesnt work to prevent
  failures
• boxes need a few, critical, standard protocol
  mechanisms to address problem
• have gotten vendors to make proprietary changes
  to fix problem
• require standard protocol extensions
• for uniform implementation
• for multi-vendor interoperability
• user requirements need to drive solution to
  problem

9
Conclusions

• problem
• concerns over scalability of IGP link-state
  protocols
• evidence that LS routing protocols (e.g., OSPF)
  currently can not recover from large failures
  widespread loss of topology database information
• problem is flooding, data base asynchrony,
  shortest path calculation, etc.
• evidence based on failure experience, vendor
  analysis, simulation modeling
• propose protocol mechanisms to address problem,
  e.g.
• throttle LSA update/retransmissions
• detect notify congestion state
• neighbor nodes throttle LSA updates/retransmission
  s
• simulation analysis shows effectiveness of
  proposed changes (Choudhury)
• propose draft as an OSPF WG document
• refine/evolve proposed protocol extensions

10
Backup Slides
11
Proposed Congestion Control Mechanisms

• throttle LSA updates/retransmissions
• detect notify congestion state
• congested node signals other nodes to limit rate
  of LSA messages sent to it
• neighbor nodes throttle LSA updates/retransmission
  s
• automatically reduce rate under congestion
• keep adjacencies up
• database backup resynchronization
• topology database automatically recovered from
  loss based on local backup mechanisms
• allows a node to recover gracefully from local
  faults on the node
• prioritized processing of Hello LSA Ack
  messages (Choudhury draft)

12
Keep Adjacencies Up

• increase adjacency break interval under
  congestion
• goal is to avoid breaking adjacencies by
  increasing wait interval for non-receipt of Hello
  messages
• if node detects congestion from a neighbor if
  no packet received in NODE_DEAD-INTERVAL
• wait additional time ADJACENCY_BREAK_INTERAL
  before calling adjacency down
• throttle setups of link adjacencies
• define MAX_ADJACENCY_BUILD_COUNT maximum number
  of adjacencies a node can bring up at one time

13
Database Backup Resynchronization

• database backup
• node should provide a local, primary, nonvolatile
  memory backup GR-472-CORE
• node should back up all non-self-originated LSAs,
  routing tables, states of interfaces
• database should be backed up at least every 5
  minutes
• restoration of data should be completed within 5
  minutes of initiation GR-472-CORE
• nodes signal neighbors when safe to perform
  resynchronization procedures
• based on TBD packet format
• under resynchronization, node
• should generate all its own LSAs
• should receive only LSAs that have changed
  between time it failed current time
• should base its routing on current database,
  derived as above

14
Database Backup Resynchronization

• database resynchronization
• propose changes to receiving/transmitting
  database summary LSA request packets
• when in full state
• node sends receives database summary LSA
  request packets as if performing database
  synchronization when peer data structure is in
  Negotiating, Exchanging, loading states
• node informs neighbor when to use resync
  procedures
• node supports resync to neighbor request by
  receiving/transmitting database summary LSA
  request packets

15
Failure Experience

• other failures which have occurred with similar
  consequences
• moderate TSU storm following ATM nodes upgrade,
  7/2000
• network recovered, with difficulty
• large TSU storm in ATM network, 2/20/2001
  pappalardo1, pappalardo2
• manual procedures required to reduce TSU flooding
  stabilize network
• desirable to automate procedures for TSU flooding
  reduction under overload
• worked with vendor to make protocol fixes to
  address problems
• along the lines suggested in the I-D
• other relevant LS-network failures have been
  reported cholewka, jander
• conclusions
• LS vulnerable to loss of database information,
  control overload to re-sync databases, other
  failure/overload scenarios
• networks more vulnerable in absence of adequate
  protection mechanisms
• generic problem of LS protocols
• across a variety of implementations
• across FR, ATM, IP-based technologies

16
Vendor Analysis

• vendors service providers asked to analyze LS
  protocol recovery from total network failure(loss
  of all database information in the specified
  scenario
• network scenario
• 400 node network
• 100 backbone nodes
• 3 edge nodes per backbone node (edge single
  homed)
• backbone nodes connected to max of 10 backbone
  nodes
• max node adjacency is 13
• sparse network
• 101 peer groups
• 1 backbone peer group with 100 backbone nodes
• 100 edge peer groups, each with 3 nodes, all
  homed on the backbone peer group
• 1,000,000 addresses advertised

17
Vendor Analysis

• projected recovery times
• Recovery Time Estimate A 3.5 hours
• Recovery Time Estimate B 5-15 minutes
• Recovery Time Estimate C 5.5 hours
• expectation is that vendor equipment recovery not
  adequate under large failure scenario

18
Analysis Modeling

• various studies published atmf00-0249, maunder,
  choudhury
• choudhury reports network-wide event simulation
  model
• study impact of a TSU storm
• captures
• node congestion
• propagation delay between nodes
• retransmissions if TSU not acknowledged within 5
  seconds
• link declared down if Hello delayed beyond
  node-dead interval (aka inactivity timer in
  PNNI, router-dead interval in OSPF)
• link recovery following database synchronization
• approximates real network behavior processing
  times
• results show
• dispersion -- number of control packets generated
  but not processed in at least one node
• medium to large TSU storms cause network to
  recover with difficulty and/or not recover at all
• results match actual network experience

19
Impact of TSU Storm on Network Stability