Security and Privacy Issues in Epassport

1

• Security and Privacy Issues in E-passport
• Ari Juels, David Molnar, and David Wagner
• Presented by
• Vivian Bates and Pano Elenis

2
Outline

• Key Words
• Introduction
• Radio Frequency identification (RFID)
• Biometrics
• Related Work
• Security and Privacy Threats
• Cryptography in E-passports
• Strengthening Todays E-passport
• Future Issues in E-passport
• Conclusion

3
Key Words

• US-VISIT
  
  
  
• United States Visitor and Immigrant Status
  Indicator Technology program
• ISO
• International Organization for
  Standardization
• ICAO
• International Civil Aviation
  Organization, the issuer of the biometric
  passport standard currently being applied. The
  ISO 7501-12005 is a short form of the ICAO
  standard
• RFID
• Radio Frequency Identification is an
  automatic identification method that rely on
  storing and remotely retrieving data using
  devices called RFID tags or transponders
• RFID (chip)
• Radio Frequency IDentifier (chip) a
  family of small chips that are capable of
  permanently and/or temporarily store information
  and duplex communication with a reader using
  radio waves
• MRTD
• Machine-Readable Travel Documents, an
  abbreviation used by the ICAO, means machine can
  read passports, visas and official travel
  documents
• Faraday Cage
• A capsule of radio wave blocking material
  (example aluminum) used to protect the RFID-chip
  in biometric passports from being read at other
  times than when reading is expected
• Biometric
• The verification of a human identity
  through the measurement of biological or
  behavioral characteristics. A unique, measurable
  characteristic or trait of a human being for
  automatically recognizing or verifying identity

4
Introduction New Generation
of Identity Cards Combination
of RFID and Biometric TechnologyPurpose Reduce
Fraud Identity Check Enhance security

• ICAO guidelines
• RFID chips to store and transmit data in a
  wireless manner
• biometric identity verification (face
  recognition)
• ISO 14443 specifications
• radio frequency of 13.56MHZ
• small passive chip
• no on-board source of power
• power derived indirectly from signal of a reader
• intended read range 10 centimeters

5
US-VISIT US-VISIT is a first step in a
multi-layered approach to enhance border security
mandated adoption by October 2006 of
Biometrically enabled passports by twenty-seven
nations in its Visa-Waiver Program (VMP)

• Foreign visitors traveling to the United States
  must have their two index fingers scanned and a
  digital photograph taken to match and
  authenticate their travel documents at the port
  of entry
• The US-VISIT requirements do not replace visa
  requirements for entering the United States
•   For more information on visas, please visit the
  U.S. Department of State's

6
Passports

• RFID tags are being embedded in passports issued
  by many countries
• First E-passports issued by Malaysia in 1998
• information
• visual data page
• record the travel history (time, date, and place)
  of entries and exits from the country
• 5,000,000 1st generation in circulation, image of
  thumbprint
• 125,000 2nd generation in circulation, extracted
  fingerprint only
• Standards for RFID Passports
• International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
• ICAO Document 9303, Part 1, Volumes 1 and 2 (6th
  edition, 2006)
• ICAO refers to the ISO 14443 RFID chips in
  e-passports as "contactless
  integrated circuits
• ICAO standards provide for e-passports to be
  identifiable by a standard e-passport logo on the
  front cover.

7
Passports

• RFID tags are included in new UK and some new US
  passports beginning in 2006
• The US produced 10 million passports in 2005
• Estimated that 13 million will be produced in
  2006
• The chips will store the same information that is
  printed within the passport
• Include a digital picture of the owner
• The passports will incorporate a thin metal
  lining to make it more difficult for unauthorized
  readers to "skim" information when the passport
  is closed

8
Radio waves have the longest wavelengths in the
electromagnetic spectrum These waves can be
longer than a football field or as short as a
football
http//imagers.gsfc.nasa.gov/ems/radio.html
9
History of RFID

• Radio Frequency Identification automatic
  identification method that rely on storing and
• remotely retrieving data using devices called
  RFID tags or transponders
• 1946 Leon Theremin invented an espionage tool for
  the Soviet government which retransmitted
  incident radio waves with audio information
• 1939 The British IFF transponder invented by the
  British used by the allies in World War II to
  identify airplanes as friend or foe
• 1948 Harry Stockmans paper "Communication by
  Means of Reflected Power" (Proceedings of the
  IRE, pp 11961204, October predicted that
  "...considerable research and development work
  has to be done before the remaining basic
  problems in reflected-power communication are
  solved, and before the field of useful
  applications is explored.
• Mario Cardullo U.S. Patent 3,713,148 in 1973 was
  the first true ancestor of modern RFID (a passive
  radio transponder with memory)
• 1973 The first demonstration of today's reflected
  power passive and active (backscatter) RFID tags
  done at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory

10
General RFID

• Data transmitted by a mobile device called a tag
• Tag read by an RFID reader
• RFID process according to the needs of a
  particular application
• Data transmitted by the tag may provide
• identification
• location information
• product tag specifics
• price
• color
• date of purchase
• Two Types of Tags
• Passive
• Active

11
Passive RFID Tags

• Internal power supply
• Electrical current induced in the antenna by the
  incoming radio frequency signal
• CMOS integrated circuit tag to power up and
  transmit a response
• Most passive tags signal by backscattering the
  carrier signal from the reader
• Response not necessarily just an ID number
• Tag chip can contain non-volatile EEPROM for
  storing data.
• Embedded in a sticker or under the skin

12
Passive RFID Tags

• Smallest devices measured 0.15 mm 0.15 mm
• Thinner than a sheet of paper 7.5 micrometers
• Lowest cost EPC RFID tags (used by Wal-Mart,
  Target, Tesco in UK and Metro AG in Germany) for
  5 cents
• Antenna tag size of a postage stamp to the size
  of a post card
• Passive tags practical read distances ranging
  from about 10 cm (4 in.) to a few meters
• Non-silicon tags made from polymer semiconductors
  are currently being developed by several
  companies globally
• Less expensive than silicon-based tags

13
Active RFID Tags

• Own internal power source which is used to power
  any ICs that generate the outgoing signal
• More reliable than passive tags due to the
  ability for active tags to conduct a "session"
  with a reader
• Onboard power supply transmit at higher power
  levels than passive tags, allowing them to be
  more effective in "RF challenged" environments
• like water (including humans/cattle, which are
  mostly water)
• metal (shipping containers, vehicles)
• longer distances

14
Active RFID Tags

• Ranges hundreds of meters
• Battery life of up to 10 years
• Include sensors such as temperature logging
• concrete maturity monitoring
• monitor the temperature of perishable goods
• humidity, shock/vibration
• light, radiation, temperature and atmospherics
  like ethylene
• Range 300 feet
• Larger memories than passive tags
• Store additional information sent by the
  transceiver
• The United States Department of Defense
• reduce logistics costs
• improve supply chain visibility for more than 15
  years

15
Supply Chain vs. Passport RFID

• Passport RFID
• shorter intended read range
• tamper resistance
• cryptography

• Supply Chain RFID
• simple
• cheap
• no support for cryptography
• single identifier
• (kill command-render
• tag inoperable)
• frequency 915 MHz
• range read 5 meters

16
BiometricsA unique, measurable characteristic
or trait of a human being for automatically
recognizing or verifying identity

• Practical biometrics for e-passport deployment
• Face recognition-automated analog of the ordinary
  human process of recognition
• Fingerprint- determines that two friction ridge
  impressions originated from the same finger or
  palm
• Imaging and automation fingerprint matching
• Fingerprint scanners optical or silicon-sensor
  forms
• Iris- uses pattern recognition techniques based
  on high resolution images of the iris of an
  individual's eye

17
Related Work

• Pattinson
• Points out the need for direct link between
  optically scanned card data and secret keys
  embedded in e-passports
• Outlines the privacy problems with-passports
  readable by anyone
• Jacob
• Discusses issues in e-passport deployment in the
  Netherlands
• Highlights the importance of basic access control
• Investigates the issues surrounding a national
  database of biometrics identifiers
• Smart Card Research Group at IBM Zurich
• Demonstrates a Javacard application running on a
  Philips chip that performs basic access control
  and active access control in under 2 seconds

18
E-Passports Security and Privacy Threats

• Clandestine scanning
• Clandestine tracking
• Skimming and cloning
• Eavesdropping
• Biometric data-leakage
• Cryptographic weaknesses

19
Secrecy and Privacy Threats

• Clandestine scanning
• Problem Baseline ICAO guidelines do not require
  encryption or
• authentication between passports
  and readers
• An unprotected chip is subject to
  short range illegal scanning
• Clandestine tracking
• Problem The standard for e-passport RFID chips
  (ISO 14443) stipulates the emission (without
  authentication)
• of a chip ID on protocol initiation
• A different ID on every passport (even if data
  can not be read) could enable tracking the
  movement of passport holder by unauthorized
  parties
• Skimming and cloning
• Problem Baseline ICAO regulations require
  digital signatures on e- passport data
• 
  
• Digital signatures allow the reader to verify
  that data came from the correct passport
  issuing authority
• No defense against cloning because the digital
  signatures do not bind the data to a particular
  passport or chip

20
Secrecy and Privacy Threats

• Eavesdropping
• Problem Faraday cages do not prevent
  eavesdropping on legitimate passport to reader
  communications
• Function creep e-passports will be used in new
  areas like e-commerce
• feasibility may be feasible at a longer
  distance
• Detection difficulty in passive do not involve
  powered signal emission
• Faraday cages (a metallic material in the cover
  or holder ) prevent penetration of RFID signals
• Biometric data leakage
• Problem Baseline ICAO regulations require
  digitized headshots (Secrecy needed for
  authentication)
• Automation required with e-passports and
  physical environment is not strictly controlled
  
• Cryptographic weakness
• Problem ICAO guidelines include an optional
  mechanism for authenticating and encrypting
  pass-port-to-reader communications
• No mechanism to revoke access once a reader
  knows the k key

21
E-passport Threats

• Data leakage threats skimming-covert reading of
  contents
• Installation of RFID readers in doorways
• Security checkpoint
• airport
• sporting event
• concerts
• Clandestine readers resemble anti-theft gates
• shops
• entrances to buildings
• Identity Theft new identity or fake documents
• photograph, name, birthday, social security card
• Tracking and Hotlisting
• Tracking static identifier track movement of
  RFID device
• Hotlistings target specific individuals
• RFID enabled bomb keyed on collision avoidance
  UID
• Unattended triggering
• Comprehensive targeting

22
Biometric Threats

• Automation
• Human oversight
• Opportunity for spoofing authentication system
• Spillover
• Compromised data one system threaten integrity of
  unrelated ones
• Special properties Passport photos
• Image Quality
• Higher quality than the image an attacker may
  produce
• Forgery
• Spoof face-recognition systems

23
Cryptography in E-passports

• Pano Elenis
• ICAO Specifications

24
The ICAO Specifications

• One mandatory cryptographic feature
• Passive authentication
• Data on e-passport signed by issuing nation
• Permitted algorithms RSA, DSA and ECDSA
• Only demonstrates that data is authentic
• Does not prove that container for data is
  authentic (i.e. the passport)

25
The ICAO Specifications

• Two optional cryptographic features for improved
  security
• Basic Access Control and Secure Messaging
• Ensures that data is only ready by authorized
  RFID readers
• Stores a pair of secret cryptographic keys (KENC,
  KMAC)
• Active Authentication
• Anti-cloning feature
• Relies on public-key cryptography

26
Basic Access Control

• When a reader attempts to scan, a
  challenge-response protocol is engaged
• Proves knowledge of (KENC, KMAC) keys Upon
  successful authentication, a session key is
  derived and the passport releases its data
• KENC and KMAC are derived from optically
  scannable data printed on the passport
• The passport number, the date of birth of the
  bearer, the date of expiration of the passport
  and three check, one for each of the three
  preceding values.

27
Key Establishment Mechanism 6

• Random nonce
• Checks MAC and decrypts
• Keying material
• Concatenation
• Encrypt
• Checksum

• Keying and Nonce
• Concatenation
• Encrypt
• Checksum

28
Encryption and Decryption

• Two key 3DES in CBC mode with
• Zero IV (i.e. 0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00)
  according to ISO 11568-2

29
Retail Message Authentication Code

• Cryptographic checksums are calculated using
  ISO/IEC 9797-1 MAC algorithm 3 with
• Block cipher DES
• Zero IV (8 bytes)
• ISO9797-1 padding method 2.

30
Basic Access Control Shortcomings

• Entropy of key is too small
• ICAO PKI Technical Report warns that entropy key
  is at most 56 bits
• Some of these bits may be guessable in some
  circumstances
• A single fixed key is used for the lifetime of
  the e-passport
• Impossible to revoke a readers access to the
  e-passport once it has been read
• Databases of keys may be inadvertently
  compromised
• Basic Access Control is still better than no
  encryption at all

31
Active Authentication

• Anti-cloning feature
• Does not prevent unauthorized parties from
  reading e-passport contents
• Relies on public-key cryptography
• Proves that e-passport has possession of a
  private key
• The corresponding public key is stored as a part
  of the signed data on the passport

32
Active Authentication Mechanism
ISO/IEC 7816 Internal Authenticate mechanism

• Random nonce
• Verifies signed message with passports public key

• Random nonce
• Concatenation
• Signs X with private key with ISO 9796-2 padding

33
Active Authentication

• Public-key must be tied to specific e-passport
  and biometric data to avoid man-in-the-middle
  attacks
• Every reader capable of Active Authentication and
  is compliant with the ICAO specifications must
  also have hardware capability for Basic Access
  Control
• Deployments that neglect this part will open
  themselves to a risk of cloned e-passports

34
Active Authentication Issues

• The certificate required for verifying Active
  Authentication also contains enough information
  to derive a key for Basic Access Control
• When used with RSA or Rabin-Williams signatures,
  responses can be distinguished
• As a result, tracking and hotlisting attacks are
  possible even if Basic Access Control is in use
• It is recommended that Active Authentication be
  carried out only over a secure session after
  Basic Access Control has been employed and
  session keys derived.

35
Cryptographic measures in planned deployments

• A Federal Register notice dated February 18, 2005
  provides a number of details on U.S. e-passport
  plans
• The Federal notice offers three reasons for the
  decision not to implement Basic Access Control
• The data stored in the chip is identical to the
  data printed in the passport
• Encrypted data would slow entry processing time
• Encryption would impose more difficult technical
  coordination requirements among nations
  implementing the e-passport system
• Faraday cages will enough to prevent
  eavesdropping

36
Flaw in Federal notice reasoning

• Reason 3 is flawed because all the data required
  to derive keys for Basic Access Control on the
  data page, no coordination amongst nations is
  required
• Faraday cages are not sufficient to protected
  against unauthorized eavesdropping
• Lack of Basic Access Control means that any ISO
  14443 compliant reader can easily read data from
  the e-passport
• Original deployment choices of the U.S. puts
  e-passport holder at risk for tracking,
  hotlisting and biometric leakage

37
Planned Deployments

• Malaysian identity cards/passports are not
  compliant as it predates ICAO standards
• Other nations may or may not meet the United
  Stats mandate for deployment in 2005
• Due to complaints from several countries, the
  deadline as been extended from October 2005 to
  October 2006

38
Strengthening Todays E-passports

• Faraday cages
• Simple measure to prevent unauthorized readings
  (skimmings)
• Materials such as aluminum fiber can block RF
  signals
• Does not prevent an eavesdropper from snooping on
  a legitimate reading
• Faraday cages were deprecated in favor of Basic
  Access Control because they do not prevent
  eavesdropping.

39
Strengthening Todays E-passports

• Larger secrets for Basic Access Control
• Long term keys only contain 52 bits of entropy
• Brute-force attack
• The addition of a 128-bit secret, unique to each
  passport, would strengthen the resistance to
  brute-force attacks
• Private collision avoidance
• The collision avoidance protocol in ISO 14443
  uses an UID
• Care must be taken that each UID read is
  different and that UIDs are unlinkable across
  sessions
• A countermeasure would be to pick a new random
  identifier on every tag read

40
Strengthening Todays E-passports

• Beyond optically readable keys
• Current ICAO approach ties neatly together with
  physical presence and the ability to read
  biometric data
• Might not be possible for next-generation ID
  cards
• Important to create a keying mechanism that
  limits a readers power to reuse secret keys and
  a matching authorization infrastructure for
  e-passport readers

41
Future Issues in E-passports

• Visas and writeable e-passports
• Upon the acceptance of e-passports, there will be
  the desire to support visas and other
  endorsements
• Being that multiple RFID chips may interfere with
  each other, the feasibility to include a new RFID
  tag with each visa stamp may not be possible
• Instead, all the data would have to be stored on
  the same chip as the passport data
• Requires the ability to write data after issuance

42
Future Issues in E-passports

• A simple first attempt at visas on e-passports
• An area specified as append-only memory for visas
• Visa would be named by e-passport and signed by
  issuing government
• Could possibly include sanity checks to ensure
  a visa is properly signed and names the correct
  e-passport before committing it to the visa
  memory area

43
Future Issues in E-passports

• Another thing to consider is that some travelers
  do not want border control to know where theyve
  traveled
• For example, most Arab countries will refuse
  entry to holders of passports which bear Israeli
  visas
• The previous example is considered a legitimate
  reason, but someone entering the United States
  from Canada may be harboring terrorists
• It may be hard in the future to determine the
  legitimate reasons from the illegitimate, but
  preventing illegitimate visa removals will become
  a goal of future visa-enabled e-passports

44
Future Issues in E-passports

• Function creep
• Passports might some day come to serve as
  authenticators for consumer payments or mass
  transit passes
• Has the ability to undermine data protection
  features as it will spread bearer data more
  widely among divergent systems
• May lead to consumer convenience (i.e. removal of
  optical scanning and faraday-cage use)
• Unless new privacy features are added, it is
  conceivable that an e-passport can reveal a great
  deal of private information
• For example, an age check at a bar can also leak
  information about their passport number, place of
  birth, and possibly elements of their travel
  history
• Web cookies are an instructive example of
  function creep

45
Conclusion

• The secrecy requirements for biometric data imply
  that unauthorized reading of e-passport data is a
  security risk as well as a privacy risk
• At a minimum, a Faraday Cage and Basic Access
  Control should be used in ICAE deployments to
  prevent unauthorized remote reading of
  e-passports.
• Because the U.S. deployment uses Active
  Authentication, readers are required to include
  the capability to optically scan e-passports.
  This capability is sufficient for Basic Access
  Control and would therefore require no change or
  coordination with other nations to implement it.
• Todays e-passports deployments are just the
  first wave of next-generation identification
  devices

46
Current News

• 27 countries participating in the Visa Waiver
  Program
• Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brunei,
  Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland,
  Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,
  Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
  Portugal, San Marino, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain,
  Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

47
Current News

• According to a statement released by the
  Department of State on August 14, 2006, the
  issuance of e-passports to the public begins
  today
• Production has started at the Colorado Passport
  Agency and will be expanded to other production
  facilities over the next few months
• Consistent with globally interoperable
  specifications adopted by the International Civil
  Aviation Organization (ICAO), this next
  generation of the U.S. passport includes
  biometric technology
• A contactless chip in the rear cover of the
  passport will contain the same data as that found
  on the biographic data page of the passport
  (name, date of birth, gender, place of birth,
  dates of passport issuance and expiration,
  passport number), and will also include a digital
  image of the bearers photograph

48
Current News

• The Department of State has employed a
  multi-layered approach to protect the privacy of
  the information
• Metallic anti-skimming material incorporated into
  the front cover and spine of the e-passport book
  prevents the chip from being skimmed, or read,
  when the book is fully closed
• Basic Access Control (BAC) technology, which
  requires that the data page be read
  electronically to generate a key that unlocks the
  chip, will prevent skimming and eavesdropping
• A randomized unique identification (RUID) feature
  will mitigate the risk that an e-passport holder
  could be tracked. To prevent alteration or
  modification of the data on the chip, and to
  allow authorities to validate and authenticate
  the data, the information on the chip will
  include an electronic signature (PKI)

49
Current News

• The Electronic Passport Logo
• Will be displayed at border inspection lanes and
  transit ports equipped with special data readers

50
Current News

• Hackers Clone E-Passports
• Successfully cloned to a blank RFID tag
• Not possible to change data on the chip without
  being detected
• Due to cryptographic hashes that authenticate
  data

51
Passport Front Cover
52
Inside Cover and First Page
53
Data and Signature Pages
54
Visa Pages
55
Visa Pages
56
Old and New Passport
57
References

• http//travel.state.gov/passport/eppt/eppt_2788.ht
  ml
• http//www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/70433.htm
• http//travel.state.gov/passport/eppt/eppt_2502.ht
  ml
• http//www.infoworld.com/article/05/10/26/HNrfidpa
  ssport_1.html
• http//www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1160497737875
  .shtm
• http//www.icao.int/mrtd/Home/Index.cfm
• http//www.wired.com/news/technology/0,71521-0.htm
  l?twrss.index
• http//http.cs.berkeley.edu/daw/papers/epassports
  -sc05.pdf
• http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RFID
• http//www.aware.com/products/compression/icaopack
  _gg.html